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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the distinctive characteristics of emerging 
forms of business enterprise under market socialism and identify how rapid 
environmental and institutional changes in economic reforms are impacting upon 
them; particularly in shaping their management models. Some general patterns in the 
development of business ventures are identified to outline the dynamics of 
organizational change and management under market socialism in China. 
In chapter one, we review trends and characteristics in the development of 
market socialism in China and examine the general environment within which 
organizations operate: the economic and political systems. A summary account for the 
formation of market socialism is presented in this chapter. The impact of these for 
changing management processes is discussed in chapter two. The focus of this chapter 
is upon management practices under the two periods of `state' and `market' socialism. 
The evolution of enterprise management in China is examined in this historical 
context because this legacy has shaped many of the present features of management in 
present-day China. These first two chapters provide the background for our empirical 
research into four different types of enterprise management as these are emerging in 
China. These are (1) changing forms of state ownership; (2) collective-owned 
enterprises; (3) privately-owned business ventures; and (4) foreign joint-ventures. The 
methodology used for the empirical research is outlined in chapter three. Chapters 
four, five, six and seven present empirical data collected in the four case study 
organizations. These are analyzed by reference to the McKinsey 7-S framework. In 
chapter four, the case study of a state-owned enterprise - `Liaoning Times Group' is 
illustrated and analyzed; a collectively-owned enterprise - `Shenyang Liming Anna 
Clothing' is discussed in chapter five; `Dalian Dali Cashmere Product Company' -a 
privately-owned enterprise is investigated in chapter six; and `Dalian Sunfed Fashion 
Clothing' -a foreign joint-venture in chapter seven. In chapter eight, we compare the 
differences and similarities between the four cases studies and identify emerging 
trends in management practices as they are evolving under the continuing 
development of market socialism in China. 
X 
CHAPTER ONE: 
Chinese Market Socialism: A Summary Account 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the main features of market socialism and 
the general environment within which organizations operate: the economic and 
political systems. The focus is on economic reforms which allow for different forms 
of business organization to emerge. These changes under the emerging market 
socialist economy are the background to forms of enterprise management and 
emerging forms of business venture. The relation between these environmental forces 
and organizational change can be illustrated in Figure 1.1 
Figure I. 1 Environmental Forces Impacting Organizations 
The General Environment - Market Socialism 
Economic Reforms 
Politics I Demographics I Technology I Competitors I Economy I Culture 





Enterprises Joint Ventures 
2 
The business environment, sometimes called the macro-environment, includes 
the external factors that usually affect all or most organizations. ' As depicted in 
Figure 1.1, the business environment in China includes the economic system of 
market socialism; the socialist political system; demographics (age, gender, race, ethic 
origin and education level of the population); cultural background (values, beliefs, 
language, behavior, and religious influences), and technology (innovation and change). 
All of these aspects of the general environment have consequences for managing 
organizations. China's economic reforms over two decades have generated a rapidly 
changing environment which has encouraged the emergence of new forms of business 
venture. 
Likewise, under these economic reforms, the drivers of organizational evolution 
can be examined by reference to - foreign direct investment inflow (FDI); World 
Trade Organization (WTO) accession; market deregulation; privatization; 
globalization; and state-owned enterprise (SOE) restructuring. (Figure 1.1) The 
absorption of FDI is one of the key strategies of economic reform since 1992, so as to 
generate economic growth and renewal. Followed by these "open policies", industrial 
sectors traditionally dominated by state-owned industries, have been to give 
precedence to private investment and foreign joint venture ownership. The growth of 
the private sector has generated new forms of management, most prominently 
featured as entrepreneurship. The accession to the WTO has accelerated privatization, 
market liberation and globalization. SOE restructuring is pushing radical changes in 
most sectors of the economy. In a like manner, the implementation of financial 
reforms - the banking sector, particularly induced by WTO accession - gives the 
Chinese government serious challenges. As it is known, the banking sector plays a 
key role in business monetary transactions and capital market exchange. The 
outcomes of banking reforms will have an important impact on organizations' 
operations. 
This chapter focuses on four aspects of market socialism that are the key drivers 
of organizational change and management practices: (1) economic reforms, 
(2) FDI injection, (3) WTO impact and (4) globalization. Conclusions are then drawn 
on the implications of these changes on the economic environment for enterprise 
practices and management. 
' Alder, P. S. and Kwon, S. (2002), `Social capital: prospects for a new concept', Academy of 
Management Review, 27 (1), January 2002, pp. 17-40. 
3 
1.1 The Concept of Market socialism 
Originally "Market Socialism" was an attempt by a Soviet-style economy to 
introduce market elements into its socialist economic system in order to address the 
inefficiencies of its economy. "It was 
. 
first attempted during the 1920 's in the Soviet 
Union as the New Economic Policy, but abandoned. Later it was attempted in 
Hungary (where it was nicknamed "goulash socialism'), Czechoslovakia and 
Yugoslavia in the 1970's and 1980's. Modern Vietnam and Laos can also he 
described as market socialist systems. The Soviet Union attempted to introduce 
market socialist systems with its perestroika reforms under Michael Gorbachev prior 
to the collapse of the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in 1991 It is also 
the system introduced in the People's Republic of China by Deng Xiaoping in the late 
1970's and has evolved into what some economists, outside of China, would argue is 
modern Chinese capitalism. 
Socialism and capitalism, as two social regimes under different political and 
economic systems, coexist and challenge each other. The core differences between the 
two social systems as far as the relations of production are concerned, is in the nature 
of ownership and control. Like the capitalist society, socialism is also a complex 
industrial system systematically geared to the accumulation of wealth. Under 
capitalism, the means of production and economic surplus are privately owned, while 
in the socialist societies, the ownership and economic surplus are legally transferred 
to government; namely to the people of the whole country that own them. The 
distribution of this `publicly-owned' surplus is subject to claims by all sectors of 
socialist society and is a deliberate political process, "the transition of politically 
defined objectives", although they are expressed in economic terms. (Davis and Scase, 
1985)` As Marx and Engels (1969) originally defined it, under capitalism, producers 
create the economic surplus which becomes the personal wealth and property of non- 
producers, that means the capitalists exploit the proletarian. Whereas socialism is 
characterized by public ownership of the means of production, workers are masters or 
owners of the enterprises, so there is no exploitation. The distribution and deployment 
of social resources and economic surplus are conducted and determined by a 
2 htt:, ' enc clopedia. thefreedictionar om/Socialism%20with%20Chinesc%20characteristics 
(accessed 5'h May 2004) 
' Davis, H. and Scase, R. (1985), Western capitalism and state socialism: an introduction, Basil 
Blackwell, London. 
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centralized planning system of government rather than the market. Pierson (1995)4 
has stated the core principles of market socialism; 
"At its simplest, market socialism describes an economic and political system 
which combines the principles of social ownership of the economy with the continuing 
allocation of commodities (including labor) through the mechanism of markets. For 
market socialists, it is not markets but capitalist markets, that is, markets which 
inscribe the social and economic power of private capital, that are objectionable. 
They offer an alternative model in which markets are combined with varying forms of 
the social ownership of capital. Amongst its supporters, the market is recommended 
not only as a way of attaining greater economic efficiency under socialism, but also 
as a way of securing greater individual liberty or a more equal value of liberty, of 
increasing democracy and of enhancing social justice. " 
Socialism in China initially adopted the Marxist theory and the Soviet model 
when it was established in 1949. Through its own practices over decades, the 
Communist Party of China (CPC) has gradually developed its own socialist model 
and radically redefined many of the terms and concepts of Marxist theory from the 
Chinese point of view, to justify its economic policies. The Communist Party of 
China has proceeded from China's realities and integrated the fundamental tenets of 
Marxism with these concrete realities, developing new ways of building socialism in 
China. It has argued that socialism is not incompatible with economic policies such as 
markets, free trade, or anything else that appears to work. In current Chinese 
Communist thinking, China is in the primary stage of socialism, and this redefinition 
allows the People's Republic of China (PRC) to justify the existence of an economic 
market. China's transition from planning towards a market system has many 
surprising features. The communist regime remains intact. Reforms have meant a 
gradual erosion of state economic control rather than a quick retreat from planning. 
Reforms began with no clear objectives other than a determination to improve 
performance. Even, Deng Xiaoping's dictum - `seek truth from facts and just do 
whatever seems to work' (a guiding principle for reforms), presents a false image and 
a great deal of uncertainty. The goal of creating a "socialist market economy with 
Chinese characteristics" is itself an outcome of the reform process that has emerged 
well into the second decade of transition. 
° Pierson, C. (1995), Socialism after communism: the new market socialism, The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, University Park Pennsylvania, USA, pp84-85. 
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China's hybrid economic system is a mixture of political economy with both 
socialist and capitalist characteristics. 5 It is not simply a socialist economy like the old 
Soviet model or Stalin economy, nor does it imitate western capitalism; it has 
hybridized both features. To understand this, it is necessary to grasp some knowledge 
of how the administration is structured and how power and control are wielded by the 
Communist Party. 
1.2 The Evolution of Economic Reforms in China 
The essential content of China's reforms is the transformation from a planned 
economy to a market-oriented economy under the regime of socialism. Initially the 
intention of economic reform at the early phase only focused on adjustments of 
economic policies to improving China's economic performance. Until the middle 
1980s, the objective of market-orientation appeared to be clarified, but how to achieve 
it remained equivocal and controversial. Many policies were implemented as 
experiments, and often resulted in political conflicts. In accordance with the notion of 
Wu Jinglian (a famous Chinese economist and a leading participant in CPC's 
economic reforms' planning and policies since 1995), the evolution of economic 
reforms in China can be systematically clarified in three phases over the past half 
century. These can be described as follows: 
First Phase: Administrative Decentralization 1958 -1978 
Since New China was established in 1949, after 3 years of economic recovery 
from the distortion of civil wars, the Communist Party of China proposed the general 
route of socialist construction and reformation for the transition to socialism. This 
general route requested: (Mao, 1953)6 
`Firstly, during a quite long period, it was to gradually realize the national 
socialist industrialization, constantly expand socialist economic forces, in order to 
construct the lagging agriculture country to be an advanced industrial country. 
Secondly, it was to gradually realize the State' socialist reconstruction in agriculture, 
handicraft and industry. ' 
Lichtenstein, P. M. (1992), `The political economy of left and right during China's decade of reform', International Journal of Social Economics, 19(10), December 1992,1992, pp. 164-180. 6 Mao, Ze-dong (1953), The anthology of Mao Zedong: the general route of Communist Party in the 
transition of socialism, Vol. 5, The People Press, Beijing, p89. 
6 
The essence of this general route was to reconstruct the institutions from 
privatized production resources to a socialist-owned regime, in the aim of rapid 
increasing productivity. In line with this general route, the State implemented the first 
Five Year Plan (1953-1957). The principle task was to rapidly industrialize through 
the construction of 694 major industrial enterprises 7. This built the initial solid 
foundation for socialist industrial construction. The annual average industrial and 
agricultural GDP growth in these five years (1953-1957) was 10.9% (Ren & Ren, 
1993)8. In this period, the centralization of administration appeared to be an effective 
means of allocating and distributing resources to where it was most needed for the 
country's reconstruction. 
At the end of 1957, Mao Zedong launched the `Great Leap Forward' in order to 
push the speed of industrialization. The reforms in 1958 were supposed to 
decentralize administration and give autonomy to enterprises and employees, as well 
as to local governments. Liu Shaoqi and Shun Zhifang were the main representatives 
for this proposition. However, Mao always advocated the `spiritual incentive' and 
opposed the `material incentive' for people, as he regarded this as the distinctive 
difference between capitalism and socialism. Therefore, giving autonomy to 
enterprises and employees was a contradiction to Mao's main ideology, as the 
empowerment would inevitably involve material incentive for enterprise management. 
It was criticized as `Yugoslavian Revisionism' and `Capitalist Individualism' that 
should be abandoned. Decentralization focused only on local government, which was 
all about the distribution of authority from the central administration. This 
decentralization of authority was basically in terms of seven aspects: `planning', 
`enterprise jurisdiction', `resources allocation', `administration of approval', 
`investment and loans on construction projects', `finance and taxation', and `labour 
management'. (Wu, 2003)9 With the prerequisite of a planned economy regime 
remaining unchanged, the decentralization of authority in layers of hierarchy to local 
governments formed the institutional infrastructure for the `Great Leap Forward'. 
Li, Fu-chun, (2004), `The report of the first five year plan about developing national economy', cited 
from Peng et al (2004), Studies on theory and practice of economic development in China, China 
People University Press, Beijing, pp6. 
8 Ren, Da-fang and Ren, An-tai (1993), Century ups and downs - the evolutionary path of modern China national commerce and industry, China Broadcast and Television Publication Co., Beijing, 
pp335-336. 
Wu, Jing-lian (2003), Contemporary China's Economic Reforms, Shanghai Yuandong Press., 
Shanghai. 
7 
Under this institutional support, different levels of local governments fully utilized the 
authority of deploying resources to launch basic construction projects, to employ 
labour and to freely use peasants' material assets, in order to complete Mao's 
unrealized and impossible missions, such as `Double steel production in one year' 
`Exceed Britain in three years and overtop America in ten years' etc. (Bo, 1993)10 
The inevitable consequence was failure. The negative effects appeared in many 
aspects of the economy, such as a reduction in production, large losses in industrial 
and commercial enterprises, serious scarcities in the supply of subsistence consumer 
products, and a slump of the whole economy. Over 15-30 million people died from 
starvation and famine between 1959-1961 (Ashton et al, 1984). 1 
In 1962, the Communist Party remedied the chaos caused by decentralization, 
and returned authority back to the centralized government administration. This 
allocated and deployed resources by executive commands from the Central 
Committee of the Party. However, decentralization allowed for the growth of local 
market relations. For instance, the creation of township-village enterprises (TVEs) 
was the outcome of this period of decentralization. The local governors utilized the 
power they were granted from administrative decentralization to support funding for 
their own regional enterprises' development, in order to pursue local benefits and 
achieve target performance. (Qian, 2003) 12 TVEs were cooperative agreements 
between local governments and enterprises, which represented mutual benefits for 
both. It was argued by Boisot and Child (1996) 13 that at this time, it was more a 
network than a market economy in so far as it was built on a tight web of 
interpersonal obligations based on trust rather than on atomized competitive relations. 
It later proved that the emergence of TVEs became a major contributor to rapid 
growth in GDP in China for the later development of a market-oriented economy. By 
10 Bo, Yi-bo (1993), The retrospect of several important decisions and events, CPC Central Party 
School Publisher, Beijing, pp679-702. 
'' Ashton, B., Hill, K., Piazza, A. and Zeitz, R. (1984) `Famine in China, 1958 - 1961', Population and Development Review, 10 (4), June 1984, pp 122-178. 12 Qian, Ying-yi (2003), Contemporary economics and China economic reforms, China People University Press, Beijing. 
" Boisot, M. and Child, J. (1996), `From fiefs to clans: explaining China's emerging economic order', Administrative Science Quarterly, 41 (4), Dec1996, pp600-628. 
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1991 these enterprises were producing almost 60% of the total output in the 
countryside, as measured in market terms. (Gabriel, 1998)14 
Second Phase: Incremental Reforms 1979 - 1993 
After the Communist Party had failed in reforming the State-owned economic 
sector and faced a standstill in the growth of the state economy, the main force of 
reform began to focus on the non-state economic sectors to provide opportunities for 
growth. It was called the `Incremental Reforms Strategy' (Wu. 2003). 
The creation of this incremental reforms strategy was initiated in 1976 after the 
collapse of the "Gang of Four". When political power returned to the right-wing of 
the Communist Party, the concept of state-owned enterprises' reform was advocated 
by Shun Zhifang in 1957 and became promoted by the Party at this stage. In 1979, 
Xue Muqiao published his works - "A study of the problems in China's socialist 
economy ". This had a big impact on ideas of reform at this time. He argued "the 
economic reform needed to solve two problems - one was reform of administrative 
institutions in the state-owned enterprises (including collective enterprises), the other 
was reforms of the state administration in order to make it adequate for large social 
production. " (Xue, 1979)j5 
With the influence of these ideas, experiments on expending autonomy to state- 
owned enterprises were implemented in Si Chuang province. In 1978 to 1979, there 
were over 100 state-owned enterprises being adopted as the `experimental units' in 
this province, which achieved significant improvement in performance as a result. 
Then these experiments were expanded nationwide. By the end of 1979,4200 state- 
owned enterprises were being reformed. By 1980, this had increased to 6600 units and 
their productivity accounted for 60% of total budgeted national industrial productivity, 
and 70% of total national industrial and commercial profitability (Wu, 2003). 16 
However, this positive effect didn't last for long; the limitation of these reforms 
appeared. The operation of these enterprises with their new autonomy did not trade 
according to the rules of market competition, nor were they led by the market pricing 
14 Gabriel. S. J. (1998), `Technological determinism & socialism with Chinese characteristics: pulling 
the cart without watching the road? ', Sarya Gabriel's Online Papers: C'hina's Essav Series 
httn:, /www. satya"us (accessed 12`h January 2004), October, 1998. 
15 Xue, Mu-qiao (1979), The study on the problems in China's socialist economy, The People Press, 
Beijing, p185. 
16 ̀CPC Congress Bulletin of the Eleven Central Committee the Third Plenary' (22nd December 1978), 
The People Press, Beijing, (1982), cited from Wu, Jing-Lian. (2003), p57. 
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system that reflected the scarcity of commercial commodities. Therefore, such 
exertion of power and autonomy by these enterprises would not be propitious to the 
effective deployment of economic resources. 
An important turning point in economic reform took place in September 1980. 
Headed by Deng Xiao Ping, the Communist Party introduced policies that allowed 
peasants to contract land for farming on the basis of individual/family responsibility. 
This replaced the model of the `peoples communes'. 17 The TVEs, on the basis of 
collective ownership, began to prosper after this change. Since then, China has 
launched a series of reform strategies and policies that distinguished it from Soviet 
Russia and Eastern Europe with their focus on state-owned economic sectors. China 
abandoned attempts to reform the state-economy and transferred its focus to non-state 
sectors, where the market-oriented enterprises were embedded. Since then, their 
growth has driven the development of the whole economy. 
Generally speaking, the success of reforms in the rural non-state economic 
sectors encouraged the Communist Party take further steps in other sectors to promote 
the growth of the non-rural, non-state economy. An increasing number of "mixed- 
ownership" enterprises emerged along the coastal areas, including foreign joint 
ventures, and these became the main force for China's economic growth. The 
performance of this incremental strategy can be illustrated in three aspects: 
(1) Promoting Measures For The Growth of The Non-State Economy 
Whether the existence and further development of the non-state economy should 
be permitted has been a politically sensitive issue in China. The doctrines of socialism 
in Mao's stage, such as `more communes and larger the better'; `the task of 
communists is to vanish capitalism. ' (Mao, 1953)18, still shapes people's thinking. 
This changed with the legitimation of land being contracted to individuals and 
families. Also the growth of TVEs opened up the possibilities of a new form of 
socialism. Because the non-state-owned enterprises were market-oriented, not planned, 
their emergence and prosperity gradually formed regional markets in which market 
" The Communist Party of China (CPC), ̀ Anthology of important literatures since the third plenary 
congress' (1982) The People Press, Beijing, p507. The people commune is the regime of communal 
society, which all the people work in the unit of communal village and equally share the gain and food. 
All the property, particularly the land and productive tools belong to the commune. The peasant do not 
own any piece of land. The new paradigm - contracted responsibility breaks this situation, and allows 
the peasant to contract the piece of land based on the unit of family or individual and responsible for 
the loss and gain with the commitment of fixed submission of annual gain. 18 Mao, Ze-dong (1953), The anthology of Mao Zedong: two talks about the agriculture communal 
corporation, Vol. 6, The People Press, Beijing, p298. 
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forces started playing an increasingly important role in deploying economic resources. 
By the middle of the 1980s, production in the non-state sectors accounted for one- 
third of total national production. In retail industry, its growth was even faster. (See 
Table 1.2 & 1.3) 
Table 1.2 The Percentage of Economic Components in 
Total Industrial Production of China (%) 
YEAR 1978 1980 1985 1990 
State-owned 77.6 76.0 64.9 54.6 
Collective-owned 22.4 23.5 32.1 35.6 
Others* 0.0 0.5 3.0 9.8 
*Notes: Others included private-owned and foreign-invested joint ventures. 
Sources: `China Statistics Year Book' (Selected from varying years) 
Table 1.3 The Percentage of Economic Components in 
Retail Commercial Sales of China (%) 
YEAR 1978 1980 1985 1990 
State-owned 54.6 51.4 40.4 39.6 
Collective-owned 43.3 44.6 37.2 31.7 
Others* 2.1 4.0 22.4 28.7 
'Notes: Others included private-owned and foreign-invested joint ventures. 
Sources: ̀China Statistics Year Book' (Selected from varying years) 
(2) Developing Liberal Economic Policies to Establish Trading Links Between 
Regions and the International Market. 
The market infrastructure was weak due to over 30 years of planned 
economy and the extent to which market forces had been almost extinguished. 
However, the reform leaders of the Party adopted an "Open" strategy using the 
world market and foreign direct investment (FDI) to rapidly reform the domestic 
market in some regions. These selected regions (particularly along costal areas 
with geographical advantage) were connected to international markets through 
tailored regulatory environments. Competitive forces were then injected to 
11 
facilitate the future development of domestic markets. This forced enterprises to 
participate in market forces of competition and enterprise managers had to gain 
market economy skills. Market mechanisms reinforced the imperativeness to 
improve quality and cost of products in order to gain competitive advantages for 
survival. Within this atmosphere of relatively free markets, achieving greater 
enterprise autonomy and improving the quality of management became essential 
issues. Participating in import and export trading also impacted upon domestic 
pricing systems. 
(3) Establishing Experimental Areas for Regional Development. 
The methodology of regional development was adopted as an effective way 
to create small `regions" of free market economy along the costal areas. 19 This 
was to test the new reform policies and to examine the outcomes, and see how 
effective the new system of market economy could operate. These regions were 
mapped out as ̀ economic development zones' (EDZs). How these experimental 
economic zones operated are elaborated in section 5 of this chapter. Their 
existence has shaped the characteristics of Chinese market socialism. 
The Dual-Track System' 
The `dual-track approach' was created to allow the two paradigms - planned 
economy and market-oriented economy to coexist. It created a "track" of the 
market economy to allow for the purchase of raw materials and sales of products 
for non-state enterprises, outside the unified state planning system. Such a 
dualistic system was particularly embodied in the pricing system and in 
ownership institutions. (Opper, 2001) 20 This is a distinctive feature of the 
Chinese socialist market system. Until the middle of 80s, the non-state economy 
accounted for 30% of total industrial outputs (table 1.2). They could not survive if 
there was no free market exchange. In January 1985, the State Price Bureau and 
Material Assets Bureau officially issued "the legal notice for permission on 
opening industrial production materials and self-sell products" (Wu, 2003)21. 
19 The costal areas have their natural geographical advantages with the great convenience in 
transportation, communication and market infrastructures. In history, these geographical advantages 
always lead the advance development compared to the interior lands. 20 Opper, S. (2001), ̀ Dual-track ownership reforms: lessons from structural change in China, 1978- 
1997', Post-communist Economies, 13 (2), Jun2001, pp. 205-227. 21 Wu, Jing-lian (2003), Contemporary China's Economic Reforms, Shanghai Yuandong Press., 
Shanghai, p65. 
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Since then the `dual-track economic system' has been formally in operation. This 
approach has fostered the basic market environment for the non-state economy's 
growth and prosperity. It has matched the general strategy as the institution to 
promote the formation of a dominant market-oriented economy. Gradually prices 
in the domestic market matched prices in international markets as the share of the 
non-state economy increasingly grew. At the beginning of 1990s, planned 
commodity prices no longer dominated the domestic commodity circle. A 
countervailing tendency has also existed where trade and investment barriers 
between provinces grew, inhibiting inter-provincial competition. This potential 
balkanization could be observed at times during the late 1980s and early 1990s as 
the dual-track pricing system gradually phased out price controls (Young, 2000; 
Xu and Voon, 2003)22 (See Table 1.4). Most economists (Qian, Roland and Xu, 
2006; Morphy, Shelfer and Vishny, 2000)23 agree this dualistic approach has had 
more advantages for the transition of China's economy. The problems and 
challenges for the State-enterprises operating under this `dual-track economy' are 
elaborated in section 6 of this chapter and in chapter 2. 
Table 1.4 Percentage of Transactions at Market Prices (By Transaction Volume) 
Retail commodities 
Market State State 
Agricultural commodities Producer goods 
Market State State Market State state 
Year guided fixed Guided Fixed guided Fixed 
1978 0% 3% 97% 6% 2% 93% 0% 0% 100% 
1985 34% 19% 47% 40% 23% 37% 13% 23% 64% 
1991 69% 10% 21% 58% 20% 22% 46% 18% 36% 
1995 89% 2% 9% 79% 4% 17% 78% 6% 16% 
1999 95% 1% 4% 83% 7% 9% 86% 4% 10% 
2001 96% 1% 3% 94% 3% 3% 88% 3% 10% 
2003 96.1% 1.3% 2.6% 96.5% 1.6% 1.9% 87.3% 2.7% 10.0% 
Source: National Reform and Development Commission and Price Yearbooks 
Third Stage: The Growth of Reforms Since 1994 
The Theory of Integral Reforms 
22 Young, A. (2000), 'The razor's edge: distortions and incremental reform in the People's Republic of China', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(4), Nov2000, pp 1091-1135. Xu, Xin-peng and Voon, J. P. (2003), ̀ Regional integration in China', Economics Letters, 79 (1), Apr2003, 
pp35-42. 
Qian, Ying-yi, Roland, G. and Xu, Cheng-gang (2006), 'Coordination and experimentation in M-form and U- form organisations', Journal of Political Economy, 114 (2), Ap2006, pp366-402. Morphy, K. and Shelter, A. and Vishny, R. (1992), 'The transition to a market economy: pitfalls of partial reform', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107 (3), pp. 889-906. 
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Starting in the middle of the 1980s, the reforms in an all-round-way were pushed 
forward by Deng Xiao Ping. The theory of `reforms in an all-round-way' was 
generated amid the process of designing reform plans for systems of price, taxation 
and finance. The designers realized that reforms were needed in all aspects of the 
economic system. The market economy should be a "totality" requiring every aspect 
of the economy in harmony. The only paradigm that could replace the command 
economy was the market-oriented economy as it was the only mechanism available 
for effective resources deployment and distribution. A market economy is an organic 
system that is comprised of three main systems: (1) those independent enterprises 
with self-operating and self-responsibility for loss and profit; (2) a competitive market 
system; and (3) a macro-control system through spontaneous market adjustments. 
These three systems are integrated and so reforms should be exerted in these three 
aspects synchronously as a whole. (Wu, 1985)24 
The Measures and Executory Schemes for `Reforms in All-Round-Way' 
In November 1993, the 14`h Plenary Session of the Communist Party Central 
Committee decided how to build a socialist commodity market system'. This 
consisted of the following elements25: 
(1) Reform of Finance and Taxation 
The old revenue-sharing system was replaced by the implementation of a 
unified `Tax-sharing system' and `VAT' for central and local governments 
based on their administrative authority. A system of taxation was established to 
meet the needs of the market economy, in order to facilitate fair market 
competition, particularly national taxation laws. 
(2) Reforms of Finance and Banking 
A unified, open, fairly competitive and strictly managed financial system was 
established. The national banks remained as the mainstay, while other types of 
financial agencies were allowed to coexist. Concrete reforms were as follows: 
a) The establishment of a `Central Banking System', to execute currency 
policy under the administration of the central government. 
b) National banks were to be set up to operate as professional commercial 
banks and provide various business and financial services. 
24 Wu, Jing-lian (1985), Economic mechanisms and coordinated reforms, antholoKy of Wu Jinglran, 
Shanxi People Press, Tai Yuan. 
25 These are summarized and referenced from the literatures achieves on the official websites 
www. chinatoday. com & www. china. or"cn and www. china-un. orc (accessed 26`h September 2004) 
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c) The setting up of specialist merchant banks for imports and exports, 
agriculture, etc. These were made responsible for providing low-interests loans 
for government-assigned projects. 
(3) The Setting-up of A System of Foreign Exchange Administration 
The government determined two steps for the reform of the foreign exchange 
system. The first step was to eliminate the double standards of foreign 
exchange rate between domestic enterprises and foreign enterprises; to realize 
the merger of dual-tracks of exchange rate, so that the currency of Renminbi 
(RMB) could be partially convertible. The second step depending on the actual 
situation at the time, was to abolish control over capital flows and to realize 
RMB currency as fully convertible currency. 
(4) The Reform of State-own Enterprises 
This proposed the "further conversion of mechanisms of operation in State- 
owned enterprises, establishing them as suitable modem co-operations with 
manifest efficiencies to meet the increasing demands of the market economy. " 
(5) Establishing a New System of Social Security 
This created an institutional system that comprised social insurance, welfare, 
medical insurance, retirement system, etc. 
Since 1994, state-owned and controlled enterprises are no longer the 
determining force of the economy, and the rapid growth and emergence of private 
enterprises has taken precedence in the evolution of market socialism. Table 1.5-A, 
demonstrates the rapid growth of the private-owned sectors of which GDP share has 
increased from 33.8% in 1990 to 47% in 2001; accounting for almost half of total 
GDP. Such mixed ownership and control under state planning is one of the distinctive 
characteristics of Chinese state socialism. 
Table 1.5-B, illustrates the main indicators of four types of enterprise as emergent 
economic components in China in 2004. Privately-owned enterprises make up 57.70% 
of the total number of enterprises and 31.63% of gross industrial output by 
comparison to 12.88% and 32.66% for state-owned enterprises. Privately-owned and 
foreign-invested enterprises comprising the private economy create the majority 
profits and sales revenue, which together account for 66.25% of total sales revenue 
and 54.94% of total profits. These figures demonstrate that the private economy has 
become the mainstream in Chinese market socialism and the state sector has lost its 
dominate role. 
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Table 1.5-A The Percentage of Economic Components in China's GDP Share (%) 
YEAR STATE-OWNED COLLECTIVE-OWNED PRIVATE-OWNED* 
1990 47.7 18.5 33.8 
1995 42.1 20.2 37.7 
1996 40.4 21.3 38.3 
1997 38.4 22.1 39.5 
1998 38.9 19.3 41.9 
1999 37.4 18.4 44.2 
2000 37.3 16.5 46.2 
2001 37.9 14.6 47.5 
-rrivate-owned in this table means the all the privately-owned enterprises. In other words, all 
non-state and non-collective-owned. But it excludes foreign-owned enterprises. 
Source: China Statistic Yearbook (selected from various years). 
Table 1.5-B The Percentage of Different Economic Components in China for 2004 
(Unit: RMB Hundred Million Yuan and Percentage) 
Main Indicators Number of Gross Industrial Total Total Sales Total 
Enterprises Output Value Assets Revenue Profits 
Four Types 
of Enterprises 
State-Owned and State- 35597 70228.99 109708.25 56234.54 5453.10 
Holding (12.88%) (32.66%) (46.72%) (28.43%) (41.36%) 
Collective-Owned 24189 10763.76 7473.12 10532.40 489.04 
(8.75%) (5.01%) (3.18%) (5.32%) (3.71%) 
Privately-Owned 119357 68013.45 62042.37 66301.87 3557.24 
(57.70%) (31.63%) (26.42%) (33.52%) (26.98%) 
Foreign-Invested 57165 65995.21 55601.79 64736.34 3686.64 
(20.68%) (30.70%) (23.68%) (32.73%) (27.96%) 
National Total 276,474 215,001 234,826 197,805 13,186 
(% Total) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) 
aource: c -n: na cconomy ana [ raae Yearbook 2005, pp566-572. 
1.3 Government Institutions in the Transformation to Market Socialism 
3.1 Administrative Structure of Communist Party of China (CPC) 
The Communist Party of China (CPC) is the only political party in the country. 
The CPC has both central and local organizations. At the top is the Central 
Committee. When it is not in session, the Political Bureau and its Standing 
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Committees exercise the power of the Central Committee. Both the Political Bureau 
and its Standing Committees are elected by the plenary session of the Central 
Committee. (Chart 1.6) 
Chart 1.6 Chart of the Central Organisations of the Communist Party of China26 
National Party Congress 
Central Military Cmsn 
Central Committee 






Central Crnsn for Discipline Inspections I Secretariat of the Central Crrde 
General Organization Dept Publicity Dept. Int'I Uaison Dept. Affairs Office 
United Front Foreign Affairs Central Party Party History 
Work Dept. Office School Research Cntr. 
Policy Research Party Literature Int'l Taiwan Affairs 
Office Research Cntr. Cormmnication Office Office 
Security Bureau Guards Bureau Archives Bureau People's Daily 
Z6 Source: Adapted from httP: //www. china. org. cn/enplisli/featLires/state structure/64735. htm 
(accessed 20th April 2003) 
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Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of 
The CPC Central Committee as in 200727 
ta 
H[li 





Hjj, in(a iii Wii G. ý: i) i' Li Changchun 
Other Members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee 
Wang Lequan Wan Zhaoguo Hui Liangyu (Hui) 
Liu Q! Liu Yunshan Wu Yi (f. ) 
Zhang Lichang Zhang Dejiang Chen Liangyu 
Zhou Yongkang Yu Zhengsheng He Guogiang 
Guo Boxiong Cao Ganqchuan Zeng. Pjan 
Alternate Member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee 
Wang Gang 
Members of the Secretariat of the Central Committee: 
Zeng O nghong Liu Yunshan Zhou Yongkang He Guogiang 
Wang Gang Xu Caihou He Yong 
Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee: 
27 it : /a l. chinadaily. corn en'highlights/partyI Ystructu_re2. html (accessed 20 January 2007) 
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Chairman: Jiang Zemin 
Vice-Chairmen: Hu Jintao, Guo Boxiong, Cao Gangchuan 
Members: 
Xu Caihou Liang Guanglie Liao Xilong Li Jinai 
CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection: 
Secretary: Wu Guanzheng 
Deputy Secretaries: 
He Yong Xia Zanzhong Li Zhilun Zhang Shutian 
Liu Xirong Zhang Huixin Liu Fengyan 
The Communist Party is a unified entity organized according to its program, 
constitution and principles of democratic socialism. Its Constitution stipulates that any 
Chinese worker, farmer, member of the armed forces, intellectual and any advanced 
element of other social strata who has reached the age of 18 and who accepts the 
program and constitution of the Party and is willing to join and work in one of the 
Party organizations, and carry out the Party's decisions and pay membership dues 
regularly, may apply for membership. 
The National Party Congress 
The Party's organ of supreme power, the National Party Congress, is held once 
every five years, and is convened by the Central Committee. Its functions and powers 
are to hear and examine the report of the Central Committee; to hear and examine the 
report of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection; to discuss and decide on 
major issues of the Party; to revise the Party constitution and to elect the Central 
Committee and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. 
The Central Committee 
This is elected by the National Party Congress. When the National Party 
Congress is not in session, the Central Committee leads all the work of the Party and 
represents the CPC outside the Party. It is elected for a term of five years. 
The Political Bureau, Its Standing Committee and the General Secretary 
They are all elected by the plenary session of the Central Committee. When the 
plenum of the Central Committee is not in session, the Political Bureau and its 
Standing Committee exercise the functions and powers of the Central Committee. The 
Secretariat of the Central Committee is the administrative body of the Political Bureau 
and its Standing Committee. The general secretary of the Central Committee is 
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responsible for calling sessions of both the Political Bureau and its Standing 
Committee, and is in charge of the work of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. 
Members of the Central Military Commission of the CPC are determined by the 
Central Committee. 
Under the Central Committee of the CPC are such offices and departments as the 
General Affairs Office, the Organization Department, the Publicity Department, the 
International Liaison Department, the United Front Work Department and the Policy 
Research Office. 
Local organisations of the CPC include congresses of various provinces, 
autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the Central Government, cities 
with districts, autonomous prefectures, counties and cities without districts as well as 
districts of cities. The committees elected by the congresses listed above serve a term 
of five years. Grassroots organizations of the Party, where there are more than three 
full members of the Party, are set up in enterprises, rural villages, organizations, 
schools, research institutes, neighbourhoods, the People's Liberation Army, 
companies and other basic units. 
Discipline inspection commissions are also set up at various levels of the CPC. 
Their major tasks are to maintain CPC's constitution and other inner Party rules and 
regulations, assist Party committees to strengthen the Party style, examine the 
implementation of the lines, policies, principles and decisions of the Party. The 
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection works under the Party Central 
Committee. The local discipline inspection commissions work under the dual 
leadership of the Party committees at the same level and the discipline inspection 
commissions at the next higher level. The term of office of discipline inspection 
commissions is the same as that of the Party committees. The People's Daily is the 
paper of the CPC Central Committee while Seeking Truth is the Party's magazine. 
The Central Military Commission of the People's Republic of China (CMC) is 
the highest state military organ with the responsibility of commanding the entire 
armed forces in the country. Led by a chairman and consisting of vice chairmen and 
members, the Commission is elected for a term of five years and can stand for 
reelection. 
The presidency of the People's Republic of China, as the head of the state, is an 
independent organ of the state which, as an office of state power itself does not decide 
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on state affairs, but exercises its power according to decisions of the National People's 
Congress and its Standing Committee. 
The current president is Hu Jin Tao, who was newly elected in 2003. Jiang Ze 
Ming was the previous president and now is the chairman of Military Committee. The 
Premier is Wen Jia Bao, who replaced the previous Zhu Rongjin. The President 
exercises the power of the head of the state, according to decisions of the National 
People's Congress and its Standing Committee. In foreign affairs, the President 
represents the People's Republic of China and enjoys the highest right of 
representation of the state. In terms of procedural, ceremonial and symbolic 
significance, the presidency is the highest position of the state. In essence, however, 
the presidency does not decide any state affairs but acts according to decisions of the 
NPC and its Standing Committee. According to the Constitution, the President of the 
People's Republic of China exercises both domestic functions and powers and those 
in foreign affairs. 
Mass organizations are an important component of the political institutions of 
China. Despite the fact that they are non-governmental organizations, the All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions, the Communist Youth League of China and the All- 
China Women's Federation exercise, to a fairly large extent, some of the functions of 
the government. As a result, the tasks, the organizational setup and posts of leaders of 
some mass organizations are decided by organs of the central authorities. For the 
same reason, these organizations receive appropriations from the state treasury for 
funding. 
There are two major ideologies that compete with each other within the 
Communist Party. One is the "state economy" approach, which emphasizes the need 
to maintain state control over economic activity. (Aoki and Jin 1997)28 The other is 
the "market economy" approach which argues the state should develop the economy 
through encouraging market forces. (Wolf, 1988)29 This is by the state supporting 
enterprises associations, financial agencies, agriculture unions and other activities to 
encourage marketing functions in the economy. The present Chinese government 
favors this latter approach. 
28 Aoki, M. and Jin, Y. (1997), The functions of government in Asian Crisis, China Economics Press, 
Beijing. 
29 Wolf, C. (1988), Market and Government - trade-of two imperfect options, China Development Press, Beijing, pp55-57. 
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In the 1980s, state-sponsored reforms were only intended to make the existing 
central planning system more flexible and efficient by decentralizing the 
administrative system and by making state-own enterprises more efficient. It meant 
the prohibition and restriction of private economy and free market, but promoting the 
mainstream of public ownership. The all-round shift toward market economic reforms 
took place in 1992, after Deng Xiao Ping clarified the concept of the market economy 
to be the cardinal plank of government policy and to replace the state-planned, 
socialist economy. Deng Xiaoping (1992)30 said: 
"From the very outset there are different opinions concerning the establishment 
of special economic zones, fearing whether this meant practicing capitalism. 
Shenzhen's construction achievements have answered those having worries of one 
kind or another, the special zone is "socialist", not "capitalist" in nature. Judged from 
the situation in Shenzhen, public ownership is the mainstay, foreign investment 
accounts for only one-fourth. Take that part of foreign capital for example, we can 
benefit from taxation and labor service! Don't be afraid of the establishment of more 
Sino foreign cooperative enterprises, Sino-foreign joint ventures and solely foreign- 
owned businesses. We need not be afraid so long as we are clear-headed. We have 
advantages, large and medium-sized State-owned enterprises and township 
enterprises, more importantly; we have the political power in our own hands. " 
Xiaoping also said also about the Shenzhen economic zone; 
The "four small dragons" (Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea) in 
Asia have developed very rapidly, so has your development. Guangdong should strive 
to catch up with the "four small dragons" in Asia. In a 20-years' time... ... not only 
should we develop the economy, we should also create a good social order and a 
good social mood We should surpass them in material development and cultural and 
ethical progress. This and this alone can he regarded as socialism with Chinese 
characteristics. Singaporean social order is good, because the country is under strict 
control; we should learn from its experiences and should exercise better management 
of society. " 
Deng's 1992 speech confirmed the political direction of economic reforms, the 
relevant supporting policies and the removal of several state constraints in the 
economic sphere. FDI and private enterprises began to grow rapidly, and a market 
30 http: //app I . chinadaily. com. cn/high I ights/party I6/leaders/dengtour htm (accessed 8th October 2004) 
22 
system based on hybrid forms of ownership emerged with the government's approval. 
At the same time, the government retained ownership over its four heavy and vital 
industries; the State security industry; natural resources monopoly; public service and 
communal products sector; and high-technology. 31 As the progress of market reforms 
would not take place by itself, it has been sponsored by the government. The 
accession to membership of the World Trade Organization has further urged and 
spurred the progress of both economic and political reforms in China. However, 
political reform is a major challenge for the Chinese government, as there are 
inherited traditions from China's command political economy as well as from 
historical feudalism, which still influences the ways of people's thinking. 
1.4 Some Characteristics of the Chinese Economy 
China has been the largest laboratory for extraordinary economic revolution for 
over two decades. The ultimate goal of reform is to improve the efficiency of the 
utilization of resources to generate economic growth and increase the wealth of the 
nation. A complete centralized planning socialist economy32 in the past displayed 
serious inefficiencies in utilizing and distributing resources, which resulted in low 
productivity. The reforms launched in the early 70s for step-by-step economic 
improvement were initiated in the agriculture sector. In terms of outcome, the past 25 
years of reform has witnessed sustained, rapid economic growth, with the average 
annual growth rate of GDP in the 1979-2005 period reaching 10.2 percent in 2005 and 
the total GDP volume exceeding 18 trillion RMB. (Table 1.7) 33 Along with rapid 
economic development, China's impoverished population (population with daily 
living cost less than one US dollar) has decreased by 147 million, accounting for 84.5 
percent of the total volume of reduction in the poverty-stricken population of the East 
Asian region. China's impoverished population has also decreased to around 30 
million (Dong et al, 2003 ). 34 Poverty has always been a difficult problem plaguing 
various countries around the world; it has seriously affected the stability and 
31 The determinations on key issues of the State-own enterprise reform and development' (1999) CPC 
15`/' National Congress giCentral Committee. www. chinadaily. com. cn (accessed 30`h September 2004) 32 Originally it was imitated from Marx theory and Soviet Model in 1949. 33 China Statistics Yearbook 2006, compiled by National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistics 
Press, Beijing, p27. 
34 Dong, P. et al (2003), China economic analysis and prospect in 2003, Economy and Sciences 
Publications, Beijing, p12. 
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sustainable development of the world economy. 3 As a developing socialist country 
with a large population and territory, China has enjoyed sustained, rapid economic 
development, providing constantly improving living standards for its people, thus 
making important contributions to the sustainable development and prosperity of 
humankind. These achievements may be the envy of those countries implementing a 
`Big Bang' strategy as in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Table 1.7 Statistics of GDP of China from 1990 to 2005 
Year Annual GDP (unit: RMB hundred million) GDP Growth rate (%) 
1990 18667.8 3.8 
1991 21781.5 9.2 
1992 26923.5 14.2 
1993 35333.9 13.4 
1994 48197.9 13.1 
1995 60793.7 10.9 
1996 71176.6 10.0 
1997 78973.0 9.3 
1998 84402.3 7.8 
1999 89677.1 7.6 
2000 99214.6 8.4 
2001 109655.2 8.3 
2002 120332.7 9.1 
2003 135822.8 10.0 
2004 159878.3 10.1 
2005 183084.8 10.2 
Source: China Statistics Yearbook 2006, p57. 
1.4.1 China's Economic Development Model 
The vigorous, sustained and rapid growth of' China's economy has become a 
flash point in world economic development and has received close attention from the 
international community. The UN "World Economic Situation and Prospects for 
2003" stated that China has become the "locomotive" for Asian economic growth 
(Joshua, 2004). 36 This may not be very precise but it nevertheless indicates that China 
is making ever-greater contributions to the world economy. These stunning 
achievements in economic development are appealing to other countries that now 
recognize China's economic development model. The Foreign Policy Centre of UK 
3s http: //www. unciiina. orýgaboutchina'htmUpoverty shtml (accessed 3rd October, 2004) 
.1 Joshua, R. (2004), Report of The Beijing Consensus, The Foreign Policy Centre, UK. 
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(2004)37 states; 
"China has begun to remake the whole landscape of international development, 
economics, society, and by extension, politics. The Beijing Consensus replaces the 
widely discredited Washington consensus, and shows how countries develop their way 
of lire and political choices. " 
In contrast with Russia and other ex-socialist countries which experienced 
collapses in economic reforms, China is a distinctive model of success. Christopher 
Marsh, director of Asian studies at Baylor University, has observed; 
"The Chinese are actively studying 'what went wrong' in Russia and other 
countries in Eastern Europe, hoping to devise policies that can continue to promote 
economic growth and a gradual deepening of pluralism, without resulting in a violent 
or sudden collapse of the current system. Ideas such as contrasting a `controlled' as 
opposed to an `uncontrolled 'transition permeate the scholarly research in China on 
post-Soviet Russian politics. " 
Yet the Chinese model of controlled reforms may prove to he more beneficial. 
over the long run, for creating states and societies that are both more open and stable 
than the "creative destruction" that marked Boris Yeltsin's Russia. 38 
1.4.2 Debates of the `China Model' 
The Chinese development model, known as 'Chinese Market Socialism', is still 
reviewed as controversial. There are still many challenges ahead. Some western 
economists (Dorn, 2001; Dorn, 2004; Nove, 1989; Stiglitz 1998) 
39 argue against 
market socialism, arguing that markets must be based on voluntary exchange. 
According to them, socialism destroys the spontaneous nature of markets and 
substitutes government control for individual responsibility. Market socialism, even 
with `Chinese characteristics', is an unnatural and artificial system which, like the 
Yugoslav experiment with workers' management, is destined to fail. 
37 http: //www. un. org/esa/research. htm (accessed 5th October 2004) 
38 http: //www. inthenationalinterest. com/Articles/Vol31ssue6RealistPFV. html (accessed 7th October 
2004) 
19 Dorn, J. A. (2001), 'Creating Real Capital Markets in China', CATO Journal, 21 (1), 
Spring/Summer2001, pp65-75. 
Dorn, J. A. (2004), `Creating a constitutional order of freedom in emerging market economies', 
Economic Affairs, 24 (3), Sep2004, pp58-63. 
Nove, A. (1989), The limits of full economic accountability', Problems of Economics, 32 (3), 
Jul1989, p25-35. 
Stiglitz, J. E. (1998), Whilher Socialism? The MIT Press, London. 
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But the reality is quiet the reverse. China's model seems to be prosperous instead 
of falling into failure or chaos. The consequence of reform experiments over two 
decades has strongly rebutted such claims. However, the Communist Party of China 
faces new challenges. For example, the needs to diversify the ownership of state- 
owned enterprises, and to consummate laws in many fields of business activity are not 
easy tasks to complete due to the weak infrastructure of the market. There is also the 
demand for the banking sector to act as an open capital market in order to embrace the 
forces of globalization. The control from government and demands of the free market 
economy are in friction. How to balance these conflicts is a challenge to the Chinese 
government. Incomplete legal systems are obstacles to bold movements of reforms. 
No experience of such reforms in other countries can be learned for reference, as 
China is developing and creating an explicitly new model by itself. Since the adoption 
of globalization in late 1996, the Party has recognized that economic globalization is a 
double-edged sword for China. The Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998 revealed the 
effect of this double-edged sword of globalization; that is, the challenges it presents as 
well as the opportunities. For example, the international market gives Chinese firms 
more business opportunities to enlarge their sales and expand their market, but it also 
means greater competition and a more complex environment to handle. It is just like a 
double-edged sword, it can beat your enemy while it might also hurt yourself if you 
don't use it properly. 
1.4.3 Summary of Characteristics of Chinese Market Socialism 
In line with the advocacy of the Communist Party40, the Chinese characteristics 
of market socialism can be summarized as follows: 
(I) The essence of socialism is to liberate and develop productive forces, 
eliminate exploitation and polarization, and finally achieve common prosperity. To 
reach this goal, it is committed to adhere to socialist principles, which retains a 
dominant position for public ownership and system of distribution. However, it also 
incorporates the need for markets and private ownership. This redefinition permits 
features of capitalism to co-exist within a regime of state socialist control. 
(2) China is at the primary stage of socialism and will remain so for a long period 
of time, because of the nature of Chinese society and its present stage of development. 
40 http: //www. politicalaffairs. net/article/view/36/I/I/ (accessed 8 ̀h October, 2004) 
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China has a large population and disparities in the level of development in different 
regions. The productive forces are also far from developed. 
(3) China's economic system combines the basic socialist system and market- 
oriented economy. In the process of exploring socialism, the full development of a 
commodity market economy is a phase that cannot be surpassed during socialist 
economic development. This is a breakthrough from traditional thinking that a 
planned economy equals socialism and market economy equals capitalism. Besides, it 
is believed there is no fundamental contradiction between socialism and a market 
economy. A market economy is indispensable to the allocation of resources in 
socialized production. Combining socialism with the market economy is an 
innovation of Marxist theory in socialist economy. This significant innovation is a 
distinctive feature of the `China Model', which generates a hybrid market structure 
encompassing both public and private ownership. 
(4) China is still in the process of building `rules of the game' for a market- 
oriented economy. It means the market legal framework is incomplete. The 
coexistence of the planned economy and the market economy means the government 
stills greatly interferes in market exchanges and transactions and political factors 
influence the direction of economy. Though economic reforms have allowed 
enterprises to independently operate in the market place, production materials, land, 
investment, funds and loans are still controlled by either central or local governments 
and are allocated by the way of government administration. 
(5) Regional imbalances in economic developments have been generated from 
the implementation of government policies. Coastal economic clusters have not been 
caused by the spontaneous tendency of business, clustering, but artificially engendered 
by government policies for `economic zones for foreign investment'. Foreign 
investments are forced to operate in these tailored zones as part of experiments in the 
market-economy. As the market economy matures, these zones will disappear. 
However, they are still operated at the current stage of market socialism and represent 
a distinctive characteristic. 
(6) The Communist Party of China emphasizes the need to build a socialist 
spiritual civilization (socialist cultural and ideological progress). Socialist spiritual 
civilization is a significant feature of socialist society. It is seen as an important goal 
and guarantee of modernization in China. The Party believes that socialism with 
Chinese characteristics can only be built on both material and cultural and ideological 
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grounds. Economic development offers the material basis for spiritual development 
while in return, cultural and ideological progress provides the ideological motive 
force and intellectual support. Since Mao's time, the construction of spiritual 
motivation other than material stimulation has been stressed as the main task of 
civilization. This tradition has never changed under the market economy and although 
the material incentive has been proposed, spiritual civilization is still the prior 
emphasis in Chinese society. It can be regarded as a cultural characteristic of Chinese 
market socialism. 
So far a socialist market economy in the primary stage has been established. The 
public sector of the economy, as a dominant economic component, has contracted and 
the reform of state-owned enterprises steadily advanced. Non-public sectors of the 
economy such as the self-employed and private-owned economy including foreign- 
owned economy have rapidly developed. Market systems are being built and the state 
continues to improve its macro-control mechanism. The reform of finance, banking 
sectors, housing and governmental structures is proceeding. 
1.5 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Economic Development 
China's open door policy towards foreign direct investment was initiated as part 
of the overall reform and open door policy launched by Deng Xiaoping in 1978. " 
From a general overview of China's market conditions for the past ten years (1992 - 
2002), it was elaborated as a basic and featured development of the Chinese economy. 
The present methods of driving China economic growth are to attract FDI and issue 
national bonds (for government spending), as well as to encouraging export growth. 
What does the Chinese government do to attract FDI? What kind of foreign policy 
does the Chinese government implement to promote FDI, while seeking to protect its 
national industry from the severe impact of FDI inflows? How does this Open policy 
fit into a socialist market economy? Basically, foreign policies are exerted under the 
principle of gradualism and only have been implemented in tailored Special 
Economic Zones which are sometimes also called Economic Development Zones 
(EDZs). These are experimental areas for foreign investment. These offer preferential 
tax and administrative treatment to foreign firms locating there. Also, for the first time 
41 The turning point was the 11 s' general assembly of the central committee of the Chinese communist 
party in which the legacy of Cultural Revolution was officially repudiated and a resolution was adapted to the effect that emphasis would be placed on the modernization of socialism in the policies to start in 1979. 
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in modem Chinese history, wholly-owned foreign enterprises are permitted in EDZs. 
The regulations and constraints over FDI disclose the role of the regulatory 
environment over foreign investment, which is an important feature of the governance 
of market socialism. 
1.5.1 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in China 
FDI has been a major and fast-growing contributor to mainland economy in 
recent years. 42 Foreign trade and FDI not only attract capital and managerial skills, 
but also provide jobs, diversifies the economy and facilitates technology transfer. 
They also provide access to global market information, global production and global 
distribution networks that link the mainland more closely with the external economies 
that China needs to penetrate. WTO membership also makes China more attractive to 
foreign investors because they compete on equal terms with Chinese firms. 
As shown in Table 1.8, FDI into China gradually increased in volume from 1979 
to 1991. However, in this period, foreign enterprises in Economic Development Zones 
had tight restrictions. They were permitted to operate only within the geographical 
area designated as Economic Development Zones. Naturally their businesses were 
confined to `passing trades', in which they bring in intermediate inputs from overseas, 
process them and export the final products to other countries. Although they were 
given preferential treatment for imports and exports, foreign enterprises were not 
allowed to transfer the foreign exchanges they earned to the source country directly 
unless this was approved by the National Tax Bureau (NTB) and Foreign Currency 
Administration Bureau (FCAB). We may call this the first phase in China's open door 
policy towards FDI (Branstetter and Feenstra, 2002). 43 
42 This point has been stated in the chapter 2,2.1.1 FDI in China. 43 Branstetter, L. G. and Feenstra, R. C. (2002) `lade and Foreign Direct Investment in China: a political 
economy approach', Journal of International Economics, 58 (2), pp335-358. 
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Table 1.8 FDI Stock from 1979 - 1991 
Unit: US$100 Million 
Year No. Of Projects Contractual Value44 Realized Value45 
1979-1982 920 49.58 17.69 
1983 638 19.17 9.16 
1984 2,166 28.75 14.19 
1985 3,073 63.33 19.56 
1986 1,498 33.30 22.44 
1987 2,233 37.09 23.14 
1988 5,945 52.97 31.94 
1989 5,779 56.00 33.93 
1990 7,273 65.96 34.87 
1991 12,978 119.77 43.66 
Total 42,503 525.92 250.58 
Source: China Statistics Yearbook 2000 
The second phase corresponds to the period between 1992 and 2005, when the 
decision to join WTO was made by the government. A series of deregulations on FDI 
were introduced in this period. There was a surge in FDI as can be seen in Table 1.9, 
the trend of FDI inflows has overtly grown year by year from 2002 to 2005. 
1.5.2 What Do FDI Statistics Tell Us? 
Since the latter half of 1999, most economies in Asia that were hit hard by the 
financial crisis have recovered. As a result, they are now more able to invest in China, 
and Asia is China's number one source of Foreign Direct Investment. 46 (Table 1.10) 
Japan, Korea, and Singapore, accounted 25.26% of total FDI inflow in China. In 
addition there is a regional FDI inflow of 37.61% from Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Macao of China. 
44 Contractual value means the value of contracts between foreign invested companies and Chinese 
companies/governments signed for investment intention. 
45 Realized value means the value of foreign investments has been actually implemented and arrived 
according to the contracts. 
46 Statistics of FDI are sourced from MFTEC (http: //www tdctrade com/econforum/boc/boc03O101. htm 
accessed 12th October, 2004) 
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Table 1.9 FDI Stock from 1992 - 2005 
Unit: US$100 million 
Year No. of Projects Contractual Value Realized value 
1992 48,764 581.24 110.08 
1993 83,437 1114.36 275.15 
1994 47,549 826.80 337.67 
1995 37,011 912.82 375.21 
1996 24,556 732.76 417.26 
1997 21,001 510.03 452.57 
1998 19,799 521.02 454.63 
1999 16,918 412.23 403.19 
2000 22,347 711.30 593.56 
2001 26,140 719.76 496.72 
2002 34,171 847.51 550.11 
2003 41,081 1,169.01 561.40 
2004 43,664 1,565.88 640.72 
2005 44,001 1,925.93 638.05 
Total 510,439 12,415.49 6,306.32 
Source: China Statistics Yearbook 1998,2003,20064' 
47 China Statistics Yearbook 1998,2003 and 2006, National Bureau of Statistics of China, China 
Statistics Press, Beijing. 
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Table 1.10 China's Top-15 FDI Sources by Countries or Regions in 2005 
Unit: USD$ million 
Countries/Regions Foreign Direct Investment Share% 
1. Hong Kong, China 17948.79 32.61 
. Virgin Islands 9021.67 16.39 
Japan 6529.77 11.86 
. Republic of Korea 5168.34 9.40 
United States 3061.23 5.56 
. Singapore 2204.32 4.00 
Taiwan, China 2151.71 3.90 
. Cayman Islands 1947.54 3.54 
Germany 1530.04 2.78 
10. Samoan 1351.87 2.46 
11. Netherlands 1043.58 1.90 
12. United Kingdom 964.75 1.75 
13. Mauritius 907.77 1.65 
14. France 615.06 1.11 
15. Macao, China 600.46 1.09 
Total 55046.90 100 
Source: China Statistics Yearbook 2006, p753-755. 
As the table 1.11 below shows, developing countries have recorded a fluctuating 
increase of FDI by contrast to a gradual decline in developed countries. China's FDI 
has reached USD53.51bn in 2003; up 14.14% and overtaking the USA as the largest 
recipient of FDI. China, after joining the WTO in 2000, has accelerated its open door 
policy. During its first year as a member, China's investment environment has proved 
to be more attractive in a volatile global environment. All these factors have helped to 
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push FDI inflows to reach USD53.51bn in 2003, or more than 9% of the global 
48 total. 
Table 1.11 FDI Inflows and Global Share 
Unit: USD$ billion and percentage 
1990 1995 1999 2000 2001 2003 
China 3.49 37.52 40.32 40.71 46.88 53.51 
(1.67%) (11.33%) (3.75%) (2.93%) (6.38%) (9.56%) 
USA 48.42 58.77 294.98 314.01 124.43 29.77 
(23.21%) (17.75%) (27.44%) (28.34%) (16.93%) (5.32%) 
Developed 171.11 203.46 829.82 1107.99 503.14 366.57 
countries (82.01%) 61.46% 77.19% 79.83% (68.44%) (65.51%) 
Developing 36.90 113.34 222.01 237.89 204.80 172.03 
Countries 17.69% (34.23%) (20.65%) (17.14%) (27.86%) (30.74%) 
World 208.65 331.07 1075.05 1387.95 735.15 559.58 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, ̀ World Statistical Data 2001,2002,2004' 
Table 1.12 reveals that foreign investment has gone into the manufacturing 
sector with approximately 70.95% of the total share; real estate accounts for 9.81 %. 
What is the favorable mode of market entry for foreign firms? Table 1.13 
illustrates the largest amount of FDI value (429.61 million US$) is in the form of 
wholly-owned foreign enterprises which account for 67% of total FDI. The second 
largest (146.14 million US$) is in the form of joint-venture enterprises with 23% of 
total FDI. 
48 In late October 2003, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) released its annual forecast, providing an overview of global FDI flows. This point is one of their findings. 
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Table 1.12 Foreign Direct Investment by Sector in China in 2004 







Value 49 Share% 
Realized 
Value5° Share% 
griculture. Forestry, Animal 
Husbandry and Fishing 11.3 2.59% 3270.9 2.13% 1114.34 1.84°/ 
Mining 2.7 0.64°/ 1155.81 0.75°/ 538 0.89°/ 
Manufacturing 303.8 69.60°/ 109735.7 71.500/ 43017.2 70.95% 
Production and Distribution of 
Electricity, Gas and Water 4.55 1.04% 3960.4 2.58°/ 1136.24 1.87°/ 
onstruction 4.11 0.94°/ 1768.8 1.150/ 771.58 1.27% 
Transport, Storage and Post 6.38 1.46°/ 2372. 1.55°/ 1272.85 2.10°/ 
Information Transmission, 
omputer Services and Software 16.22 3.71% 2021.3 1.32°/ 916.0 1.51 °/ 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 17.0 3.89°/ 2500.53 1.63°/ 739.5 1.22°/ 
Hotel and Restaurants 11.74 2.69°/ 2168.87 1.41% 840.94 1.39% 
Financial In"titu1iuns 0.43 0.10" 575., 11 0.38 4 2~2.48 0.42° 
Real Estate 17.6 4.05°/ 13488.02 8.79°/ 5950.15 9.81% 
Leasing and Business Services 26.61 6.09°/ 6742.48 4.39% 2824.23 4.66% 
Scientific Research, Technical 
Service and Geologic Prospecting 6.2 1.44°/ 1006.41 0.661 293.84 0.49% 
Management of Water 
onservancy, Environment and 
Public Facilities 1.64 0.38°/ 822.0 0.54°/ 229.11 0.38% 
Services to Households and Other 
Services 2.51 0.58°/ 542.51 0.35% 157.95 0.26°/ 
Education 0.5 0.14°/ 172.74 0.11% 38.41 0.06% 
Total 436.6 100% 153478.9_ 100% 60629.9 100% 
Source: China External Economic Statistical Yearbook, compiled by Department of Trade and External 
Economic Relations Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics, People's Republic of China, China 
Statistics Press, Beijing, p124. 
49 Contractual value means the value of contracts between foreign invested companies and Chinese 
companies/governments signed for investment intention. 
so Realized value means the value of foreign investments has been actually implemented and arrived 
according to the contracts. 
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Table 1.13 Amount of Foreign Investment by Type in 2005 
Unit: USD$I00 
Million 
TYPE Number of Projects Contracted Value51 Realized Value 52 
Foreign Direct Investments 
(Sub-total) 
44001 1890.65 603.25 
Joint Venture Enterprises 10408 324.42 146.1 
Wholly-Owned Foreign Enterprises 32308 1459.0 429.61 
Total 44001 1925.93 638.05 
Source: China Statistics Yearbook 2006, p752. 
1.5.3 Foreign Investment Laws 
There are three basic laws, which have an impact on foreign forms investing in 
China; the Chinese-foreign joint ventures Law; the Chinese-foreign co-operative 
enterprise Law; and the Foreign-funded enterprise law. Foreign investment limited 
liability companies. have to act according The Company Law, which is specially 
tailored for them. The fundamental legislation covering foreign investment in China is 
the "Law on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures" (promulgated in 1979, amended 
1990). It was followed by the "Law on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures" 
(1988). The "Law on Foreign Capital Enterprises" (1986) deals with enterprises 
5; established in China by foreign investors, exclusively with their own capital. The 
laws are usually quite general and leave a lot of freedom for interpretation. There are 
also about 150 detailed regulations and provisions applying to foreign investment. 
The legal framework for FDI is in a process of change. As the market economy is still 
in the process of becoming mature, the constraints and limitations placed on FIN will 
be gradually removed in accordance with this situation changing. 
In terms of industrial policy, the law maintains the guidelines for foreign 
investors. 54 in which industries are classified into three groups: foreign capital 
51 Contractual value means the value of contracts between foreign invested companies and Chinese 
companies/governments signed for investment intention. 
52 Realized value means the value of foreign investments has been actually implemented and arrived 
according to the contracts. 
5' The Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) Website, the section of 
Foreign Laws and Regulations (http: //wwwl . moftec ! ov cn/moftec en/law en 
indes html, accessed 
on 14`h October 2004). 
s4 This guideline was effectuated on April 1", 2002. 
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encouraged industries, foreign capital restricted industries, and foreign capital 
prohibited industries. The first type of industries enjoy additional incentives beyond 
those that already are accorded to foreign investors, which include conservation of 
material and energy, technology-intensive investments such as agricultural and 
environmental technology; projects that improve product quality and raw-material 
efficiency; development of energy, communications, and essential raw materials; 
products in short supply and urgent need domestically; export-oriented industries; 
substitutes for imports (which save hard currency); and projects in Central and 
Western regions in the inland. A revised version of the catalogue (1997)55 specifies 18 
industries as "restricted foreign investment industries", which means that the Chinese 
partners usually have to be the holding parties or play "leading roles" in any joint 
venture. Wholly-owned foreign enterprises often are not allowed in these industries. 
Restricted projects include industries that already are fairly well established in China; 
sectors that are open on an experimental basis; exploration of rare and valuable 
mineral resources; as well as industries subject to overall State planning, such as 
grains, pharmaceutical, wholesale and retail, financial services and broadcasting. 
Furthermore, for political, economic, or national-security reasons, foreign capital is 
not permitted into traditional indigenous industries, such as electricity and gas, and 
education and broadcasting, and those that are dangerous to state security, 
environmentally damaging, or involve products made with national-proprietary 
technology (Schlevogt, 2000b). 56 
There are two modes of entry for foreign affiliated enterprises in China: wholly- 
owned subsidiary and joint venture. The joint venture (JV) mode can be broken into 
several sub-modes based on the percentage ownership of the equity: foreign majority- 
owned joint venture, equally-owned joint venture and foreign minority-owned joint 
venture. These two entry modes can be realized by Multi-National Corporations 
(MNCs) through acquisition of an existing enterprise or setting up a new enterprise in 
the Economic Development Zones of China (Sun, 1999). 57 However, foreign 
enterprises are not confined to Economic Development Zones and their dividends are 
made completely transferable. But the earnings need to be defined as net income after 
53 Such catalogue can be obtained from the local governments of Economic Development Zones. 56 Schlevogt, K. A. (2000b), ̀ Doing business in China, part II: investing and managing in China - how to dance with the dragon', Thunderbird International Business Review, 42 (2), March/April 2000, 
pp201-226. 
Sun, Hai-shun (1999), `Entry modes of multinational corporations into China's market: a 
socioeconomic analysis', International Journal of Social Economics, 26 (5), 1999, pp642-659. 
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all the tax clearances by the National Tax Bureau and Foreign Currency 
Administration Council before it is allowed to be transferred to the foreign exchanges 
to the home country. 
The imperfect laws applying to FDI development in China is a result of its recent 
economic development. China, as a socialist market country, has no available model 
of how to develop a successful socialist market economy. Deng Xiaoping has 
described the situation of China's open door policy, like "For the reform of Chinese 
economy, we have to grope the stones by our hands in this river in order to cross it. " 
"Whatever black or white cat, the one who is able to catch the rat is the best cat. " 
These words simply describe the direction of China's Open Door Policy. Although it 
has no available model to adopt, the trial of creating this new model and gathering 
experience through a gradual "opening-up" of the market is the method of the Chinese 
government. It is the reason for setting up the Economic Development Zones in China, 
which are then used as experimental areas for new policies and developing models. 
1.5.4 Functions of EDZs in China 
China's Economy and Technology Development Zones (ETDZs) have played an 
essential role in FDI development. "These years, 58 developed countries have started to 
move their knowledge-intensive manufacturing with high technique content to 
developing countries. Economic development zones have become the hottest spots for 
the individual transfer, both within China and the world at large. " said Zhang 
Yansheng, a famous economist in China. 59 In accordance with the data of 2002 from 
The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT), a total of 43 
Economic Development Zones has reported faster growth in foreign investment and 
foreign trade than the national average. The ETDZs are the home to 736 foreign 
funded enterprises whose contractual foreign investment totaled 6.18 billion U. S. 
dollars during the first half of 2002, an increase of 34 percent compared with the same 
period in the previous year, and accounting for about 18 percent of the country's total. 
60 Realized foreign investment in the ETDZs reached 2.86 billion U. S. dollars in 2002. 
58 These years mean the time range from 1992 to 2002, when is the period for the fastest development 
in growth of FDI and China's economy since the implementation of reform. 59 Cited from www. peopledaily. com (accessed 15th June, 2004) 60 Statistics source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (littp: //www. stats. pov. cn/tisi/ndsi / accessed 
2 °d November 2004) 
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In the classification of Economic Development Zones' functions, these can be 
specified as five types; `Free Trade Zone' (FTZ), `Bonded Zone' (BZ), `Export 
Processing Zone' (EPZ), `Economic and Technologic Development Zone' (ETDZ) 
and `High Technology Zone' (HTZ). Preferential treatment in these various zones 
includes significant reductions in national and local taxes. The preferential profit tax 
rates in ETDZs (15%) and in coastal open cities (25%) compare favorably with the 
national rate of 33%. 61 There also are exemptions on import and export duties, land 
fees, and priority treatment in the provision of basic infrastructure services and 
supplies. A refund of up to 40% of the income tax paid on the foreigner's share of 
profits is available, if it is reinvested directly for at least five years. 62 Under the 
guiding policy of encouraging exports, a refund of VAT (17%) on domestic 
purchased materials is given back to the Foreign-Invested Enterprises when the final 
products are exported. 
1.5.5 Restrictions Over FDI 
Reform policies have significantly improved the business environment during 
the past decade. Many entry barriers for FDI have been removed. For instance, 
regulations and policies that limited foreign firms to joint ventures (JV), were 
abolished in 2005. Policy changes covering price discrimination, foreign trade, 
exchange rates, entry barriers, internal markets and financial systems, have allowed 
for an increased role for substantial foreign investment. But still some constraints and 
limitations remain in the regulatory business environment. To a certain extent, for 
example, the state-controlled banking sector still limits the free movement of capital. 
Companies must adjust to difficulties in coping with the changing regulatory 
environment. This is particularly apt for small firms. Take, for example, the change of 
regulations in the taxation system in foreign investment zones. Foreign companies 
who enjoyed the benefits of tax refund did not pay deposits to local national tax 
departments for years, but such benefits changed in 1999. All foreign companies had 
to place advance deposits before export taxes could be refunded. Small firms 
immediately suffered from this change as they didn't have the sufficient funds to tie 
up in deposits for three month. In 2000, this three month period for refunds was 
61 EIU. (1999), Countryfact sheet China, 5th May, London, Economist Intelligence Unit. 
62 Cheng, F. (1998), Tax incentives for foreign investment, Speech presented by Deputy Director 
General, State Administration of Taxation of China. 
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extended to six months. But the application process was often delayed for more than 
six months due to unpredictable bureaucratic administrative systems. Even now, many 
foreign firms still encounter difficulties in dealing with governmental bureaucracy and 
business relationships. (Keillor et al, 2001; Schlevogt, 2000a) 63 How to handle 
regulatory constraints is a major concern for foreign firms in shaping their strategies 
for developing the Chinese market. 
1.6 China's WTO Accession 
China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) is an important stage 
for market liberation and deregulation. It can be seen as a strong impulse to the 
progress of the market-oriented system. In addition, it has allowed China to step into 
another major phase of globalization. 
1.6.1 Nature of WTO 
The role of WTO is to enforce trade agreements. The predecessor of WTO was 
an association called General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was 
formed in 1947 by 23 countries to negotiate reductions in trade restrictions and work 
toward common procedures for handling imports and exports. By 1995,117 countries 
were participating. GATT's most important activity was sponsoring rounds, named 
for the place in which each began, such as the Tokyo Round and Uruguay Round. 
These negotiating rounds led to a number of multilateral reductions in tariffs and non- 
tariff barriers for its members. The reductions of tariffs are not the same percentage 
for all the member countries. The amount of reduction depended on countries' 
different tariff levels before negotiations and their bargaining strengths. The GATT 
had inherent weaknesses, such as a cumbersome closure, `most-favored-nation' as 
well as no-assuring compliance with agreements. Therefore, the WTO was formally 
established in 1995 to replace GATT and deal with its shortcomings. (Daniels and 
Radebaugh, 2001)M 
63 Keillor, B., Davila, V. and Hult, G. T. (2001), ̀ Marketing entry strategies and influencing factors', 
Marketing Management Journal, 11 (2), Fall 2001, pp I -11. 
Schlevogt, K. A. (2000a), ̀ Doing business in China, part 1: the business environment in China - getting 
to know the next century's superpower', Thunderbird International Business Review, 42(1), 
Jan/Feb2000, pp85-111. 
64 Daniels, J. D. & Radebaugh, L. H. (2001), International Business: Environments and Operations, 9d' 
ed. Prentice Hall. New Jersey. 
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The WTO now has more than 130 members, who subscribe as a free trade 
system contained in two sets of trade agreements. The first set of trade agreements are 
called multilateral agreements, that include among other things, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, (GATT 1994), the Agreement on Trade- 
Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS), the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS), Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes (DSU) and many other agreements. A member must accept all of these 
agreements as a complete whole. The second set of trade agreements is called plural- 
lateral agreements, to which members may adhere on a voluntary basis. These 
agreements include, for example, the Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP) 
and Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft (TCA). China has conducted negotiations 
on these two simultaneous fronts and engaged in regular talks with WTO members on 
a bilateral basis. It was during such bilateral negotiations that China and the U. S. 
agreed to trade concessions and accession conditions in November 1999. China 
concluded a similar agreement with the EU in May, 2000 (Hung, 2001 ). 65 China 
officially became a member of World Trade Organization (WTO) at the end of 2001. 
By 2005, over fifty developed and developing countries have recognized the status of 
the market economy of China. China has become the third largest trading country in 
the world that increasingly exerts influence in the world economy. 66 Between 2006 to 
2010, China will be committed to the total openness of WTO membership, after the 
transition period (2001-2005). It will be a huge challenge for the competitiveness of 
Chinese enterprises. 
1.6.2 Reasons For China Joining WTO 
Demand of Reform Policy 
The demand for economic growth and improvement had become a major force in 
China after the death of Mao. The people's living standards needed to be improved 
and the political status of the country in the world stage needed to be upgraded and 
strengthened. These goals of a country's development have to be closely linked to its 
65 Hung, T. W. (2001), ̀ The impact of WTO treaties on investment in China', Harvard Asia Quarterly, 
California, 25 (2), Jun2001, pp27-50. 
66 China Statistics Year Book for foreign economic trading and corporation (2005) compiled by the 
Committee of China International Trading Promotion and Propaganda, China Business Press, Beijing. 
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economic development. As Deng Xiaoping stated in the early of 1990s67, "Economic 
growth and development is the only strong and true theoretical guide for China. " "To 
seek for a sustainable economic development under a stable environment is the 
essential prerequisite for reform. " Deng's concept has become the principle of China's 
economic policies. Since China first began to open up to the outside world in] 979, it 
has become increasingly dependant on world trade. Total trade in 1979 was worth just 
over US$ 29 billion. By 2000, this had risen to US$ 474 billion - an increase of 16 
times in just 20 years. 68 The position of WTO membership was compatible with China 
self-selected policy of rapid economic reform, which is why there was an opportunity 
for WTO agreement in 1999. 
Security of World Trading Partners 
China therefore needs certainty in trade and investment, it cannot aflbrd to see its 
export figures and investments fluctuate in reflection of whims of other countries' 
relationships with it. WTO membership gives China recourse to WTO sanctions 
against countries that do this. With the trading treaties with other countries, China 
also enjoys the equal opportunities of investment and trade in its partners' countries, 
which efficiently and internationally promote China participation in the world market. 
1.6.3 The Impact of WTO 
Many economists have acknowledged that the influence of the WTO entry on 
changing the Chinese market has been positive because of the ways globalization and 
liberalization have contributed to China's economic transition. It is transforming the 
market conditions significantly, of which the following are the more important aspects. 
Liberation and Deregulation of Market Place 
(1) Import and Export trading 
Thanks to China' accession of WTO in 1999, tariffs and non-tariffs barriers are 
being phased out gradually within 5- 10 years (2005 - 2010). The Chinese 
government has lowered tariffs throughout the entire period of open policy. After 
WTO, China is committed to lower tariffs to meet the accession's conditions. In 
accordance with the announcement from the Chinese Foreign Ministry in 2005, China 
has lowered its average tariffs to 10.1 percent from 14 percent in 2001, and abolished 
6' Deng, Xiaping (1993), The Anthology of Deng Xiaping: the talk in the national congress of China 
Communist Party (23" September, 1985), Vol. 3, p143, The People Press, Beijing. 
68 ̀Xinhua FM spokesman: China seriously fulfills WTO commitments', Xinhua Newspaper, 18`h 
September 2002. htta: //www. stats. -; ov. cnenglish/ (accessed 8"' November, 2004) 
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424 non-tariff measures and granted tariff rate quotas. For example, the tariff rates on 
automobile have been reduced from over 100% in 1998 to 25% in 2005; for air- 
conditioners, from 40% in 1998 to 20% in 2005; for motorcycles from 60% in 1998 to 
40% in 2005 and for computers from 25% in 1998 to 0% by 2005.69 
In addition to trade liberation concerns, deregulation of the legal environment 
has taken place. The constraints and limitations on the business environment is being 
reduced, which is part of the commitment from the Chinese government for being a 
member of WTO. Particularly in the banking sector, the difficulty of handling foreign 
currency has become a manifest obstacle for both foreign and domestic firms. 
The obvious improvement from the first stage of China's preparation to WTO 
accession was the system of customs. A significant reform of structural change for the 
customs system was started in 1999, in order to improve the efficiency of working 
procedures of export and import by combining three originally independent and 
individually administrative departments. Thus, the Commodity Inspection, Hygiene 
Inspection, and Animal and Plant Inspection were cooperated into a single bureau. 
This reform was successfully accomplished by 2002 and speeded up international 
trade flows, simplified by the documentations of trade transparency. IT control 
systems have been put in place to replace traditional paper documentation of trading 
processes. 
As The Economic Survey of China has pointed out (OECD, 2005) 70: "The sole- 
ownership socialist economy had been successfully transformed to a freer socialist 
market with diversified forms of ownership. The momentum towards a more open 
business environment has continued this decade with membership of the World Trade 
Organisation resulting in the standardisation of a large number of its laws and 
regulations and the prospect of further tariff reductions. Further changes have been 
made to the constitution in 2004, stressing the role of the non-state sector in 
supporting economic activity in the county and protecting private property from 
arbitrary seizure. In 2005, regulations that prevented privately-owned companies 
entering a number of sectors of the economy, such as infrastructure, public utilities 
and financial services are abolished. " 
(2) Domestic Market 
69 China Statistics Year Book for Foreign Economic Trading and Co-operation (2005), compiled by the 
Committee of China International Trading Promotion and Propaganda, China Business Press, Beijing, 
p453-454. 
° OECD, Economic Survey of China in 2005, chapter 2,16th September 2005. 
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For the last two decades, China has had important policies to attract FDI, such as 
beneficial tax policies, economic zones' policies, export promotion policies for 
foreign invested enterprises, etc. These policies have given foreign-invested joint 
ventures special treatment in areas such as profit taxes policy and intermediate-inputs 
import tariff remission. At the same time, important incentives for foreign-invested 
joint ventures to export their production have been also developed. However, China 
has imposed legal and de-facto restrictions to limit foreign access to domestic markets. 
Indeed, many of the benefits just mentioned are conditional on export performance. 
Free Trade Zones (FTZs) are mainly located in Economic Development Zones (EDZs) 
where they have easy access to foreign markets. Meanwhile, domestic firms like state- 
owned enterprises (SOEs) and collective-owned enterprises (COEs) enjoy several 
protectionist measures but do not share many of the benefits directed at foreign firms. 
Native firms sell mainly in protected local markets and face some increasing 
competition from state-owned enterprises and collective-owned enterprises has taken 
place. To sustain its commitment to full employment and high production the 
government has directed increasing amounts of credit to state-owned enterprises. A 
smooth opening of domestic markets has been taking place, but the biggest step has 
yet to be implemented: the removal of special protective policies for domestic firms in 
general and state-owned firms in particular. However, all the removal of non-tariffs 
barriers is not an easy task to be completed due to China's dual-tracks economic 
structure. The integration process of China into WTO has advanced in many aspects 
but several additional elements are required before it can be considered to be a full 
member of WTO, such as banking and the capital market while the media industry is 
still restricted and tightly controlled for foreign companies. 
"China's leaders have repeatedly reaffirmed that the long-range objectives of 
trade reform are a more open trade regime and membership in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). A prerequisite of the latter is "national treatment" for Foreign- 
invested Enterprises (FIES); that is, they are not subject to legal requirements that do 
not also apply to domestic firms. To this end, the Chinese have begun to take a 
number of steps to reduce, and ultimately eliminate the differences between the 
present export and domestic trade regimes. Some of these changes have been 
mentioned above: tax breaks on investment goods for FIEs are being phased out, and 
other aspects of tax treatment are becoming more unified. There are also plans to 
reduce the scope of tax exemptions for all entities, foreign and domestic. If 
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implemented, these reforms will tend to unify the trade regimes, and the resulting 
system will be more open than the present dual regime. "(Naughton, 1996) 71 
It is often reported that tariff liberation is accompanied by the liberation of FDI. 
The opening of access of domestic markets to foreign production introduces 
competition in markets. This affects significantly the competitive position of native 
firms if foreign firms have more advanced technologies. (Claro, 2002)72 A larger 
competitive market will emerge domestically. More competitors will come into the 
Chinese market and more domestic and joint venture companies will expand their 
markets to overseas. For the latter trend, domestic firms have to face the serious test 
of whether they are competent to compete in the international market. More private- 
owned enterprises will emerge in the marketplace. WTO obligations make it easier for 
entrepreneurs to develop and grow in accordance with less constraints and 
requirements. 
(3) Improvements in the Enforcement of the Legal System 
While the service and commodity markets are opening in a careful and planned 
way, China has clarified and revised relevant laws and regulations, which are now 
basically in accordance with WTO rules and China's WTO commitments. A reporting 
and consulting system has been set up to make its work more transparent. However, it 
still remains a raising challenge for the present legal system. Albeit China had been 
preparing for the WTO for some time, and now the membership has become a reality, 
reshaping its legal environment in order to satisfy the requirements of the WTO 
involves big modifications. To date, China has repealed legislation regarding price 
controls on over 128 categories of goods. The State Council has examined all the 
administrative regulations passed prior to 2005, and has abolished 221 regulations. 
China has modified or is modifying laws, regulations, and rules governing areas such 
as foreign investment, customs, intellectual-property protection, foreign trade, foreign 
exchange, and insurance. 73 Great progress has been achieved, especially in the areas 
of foreign investment and intellectual-property protection. The Equity Joint Ventures 
Law, the Cooperative Joint Ventures Law, and the Wholly Foreign-Owned 
Enterprises Law as well as the rules for their implementation have been amended. 
71 Naughton, B. (1996), ̀ China's Emergence and Prospects as a Trading Nation', Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, 14 (2), pp. 273-337. 
72 Claro, S. (2002), ̀ What to expect from China's entry into WTO', Journal article of Tariff and FDI Liberation, 27 (1), Jan2002, pp35-60. 
" China Statistics Year Book for foreign economic trading and corporation (2005), compiled by the 
Committee of China International Trading Promotion and Propaganda, China Business Press, Beijing, 
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Provisions on giving priority to purchasing in China, on foreign exchange balances, 
and on required ratios of exports to domestic sales have been removed. These changes 
and improvements in the legal environment, combined with access to China's 
domestic market make China attractive to FDI. (Zweig and Chen, 2007)74 
Pressure on Reforming the Rural Infrastructure of the Agricultural Sector 
About 65% of China's population lives in the countryside. In 2000, there were 
499 million people working in the rural economy with about 355 million working in 
agriculture itself. And yet China's agricultural sector only generates 16% of the 
country's GDP - in sharp contrast to the 50% it generated 50 years ago. (Crook, 
2002)75 Nevertheless, China's WTO entry has helped in part to resolve issues related 
to protecting this sector. China's rural economic system has been guided by its 
mandatory grain-purchase system, with the production and cropping patterns 
determined and planned by the central government. Such system has been changed 
gradually to a market-driven mechanism since the open-policy exerted. After WTO 
entry, China has gradually engaged in free international trade of agricultural products, 
which means its agriculture is subject to global changes in prices, market accessibility, 
trade structure and trade rules concerning agricultural products. 
The impact on the agricultural sector is the benefits from preferential treatment 
in free trade, especially in tariff reduction, enjoyed by all signatory countries to 
GATT. China can unconditionally obtain the most-favored-nation status with all 
WTO members. These give China a better opportunity to tap international agricultural 
resources and markets. It also accelerates its agriculture reforms and establish an 
agriculture macro-control system compatible with the market economy, thus 
enhancing the production of agricultural products and sharpening the competitive 
edge of China's farm products in the international market. (Zhu, 2006)76 
The negative impact on the agricultural sector is the competition arising in the 
domestic market by the entry of foreign firms. As China has to open its domestic 
market and revoke all non-tariff restrictions on imported farm products, the 
government's protective policies on domestic farm products are being gradually 
74 Zweig, D. and Chen, Zhi-min (2007), China's reforms and international political economy, 
Routledge, London. 
's Crook, F. W. (2002), ̀ The WTO's impact on China's agricultural Sector', Journal of China Business 
Review, 29 (2), Mar/Apr. 2002, p12. 
76 Zhu, Zhongli (2006), The security of Chinese industries after WTO accession, Shanghai Finance and 
Economy Press, Shanghai. 
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phased out. Foreign agricultural products at lower prices are set to pose great 
challenges to their Chinese counterparts. The flood of foreign farm products into 
China puts heavy pressure on the country's foreign exchange reserve, the financial 
source of imports. " 
China's WTO tariff commitments varied according to product and were phased 
in by 2004. The average tariff rate on agricultural products fell to 15.8% percent in 
January 1 S`, 2002, according to the Tax Committee of the State Council. China has 
used tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) to protect domestic production of some agricultural 
commodities, including wheat, corn, rice, soybean oil, cotton, and sugar. According to 
the agreements with WTO, China must restrict domestic support to its farmers to 
8.5% of the value of the specific crop. China maintains state import rights for some 
agricultural goods, including wheat, corn, rice, sugar, cotton, soybean oil, and tobacco. 
Foreign-invested enterprises in this sector has been able to distribute imported and 
domestically produced agricultural goods since 2003. Foreign majority ownership was 
allowed in 2004 with no geographic or quantitative restrictions, and wholly foreign- 
owned enterprises were permitted in 2005. 
Trend ofGlohalization and High-Technology-Oriented Economy 
Clearly WTO accession generates a new phase of globalisation and technological 
development in China. In consequence, such a trend is having significant effects on 
the state and economy, particularly on the cultural aspect. The development of 
technology has become the main concern of the state, thus rules and policies are 
pushed forward for its encouragement. A more market-oriented, more transparent and 
rules-based economy can facilitate further access to the world market. The integration 
of China into the world market has also required the adoption of leading edge 
technologies as a consequence of this access. Chinese firms are not only faced with 
domestic competition but also the rivalry from foreign firms with highly developed 
management skills and advanced technologies. On the one hand, it is a crucial threat 
to their survival; on the other hand, it is also a driver for improving their management 
skills as well as their competitiveness. 
Employment 's Opportunity or Threat? 
77 http: //fpeeng. peopledaily_con). cn/200003/30/print200003300I03 htnil (accessed 5th November, 2004) 
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A high rate of unemployment is currently a serious problem for the Chinese 
government. Will WTO membership solve this problem? The answer to this question 
varies and induces debates according to different measurements. In the labor market, 
the demand is much less than the supply. In accordance with the official statistics 
report for 89 major cities of China shows the work force seeking jobs is 2.53 million 
while there are 1.98 million vacancies. But the China International Intellectuals 
Development and Exchange Association (CIIDEA), has argued WTO accession can 
increase 12 million job vacancies per annum (Xiao, 2003)78. However, the Chinese 
government faces increasing problem of unemployment as economic reforms deepen 
(See Figure 1.14). The restructuring of state-owned enterprises has generated a large 
number of laid-off labourers. It endeavours to solve it by more actively embracing the 
globalization trend to attract foreign investment. However, this remedy does not 
always work as expected. The reality for the country's labour force is that the 
country's training and education system should be reformed and adapted for the 
changing environment. Only when the local workforce is trained up to international 
standards, can the country gain the benefit brought by globalization and avoid its 
negative side effect on employment. 
Figure 1.14 The Status of Unemployment in China (1985-2005) 
Year 1985 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Unemployment 239 383 520 553 570 571 575 595 681 770 800 827 839 
(10000 persons) 
Unemployment 1.8 2.5 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.6 4.0 4.3 4.2 4.2 
Rate (%) 
Source: China Statistics Yearbook 1998,2003,2006, p125. 
1.6.4 The Relations between WTO and FDI 
WTO membership has indeed promoted an increase in foreign direct investment 
(FDI), which rose from only US$ 3.49bn in 1990 to US$ 40.71bn in 2000, and to an 
all-time high of almost US$ 53.51 bn in 2003 (Table 1.11). The WTO accession has 
therefore helped to reverse the fall in FDI that occurred in 1999. This decline had 
worried the government. FDI has played an important part in driving China's 
economic transformation in the past 20 years, accounting for as much as 17.3% of all 
78 Xiao, Z. (2003), Economic Analysis and Future Perspectives for2003, Economy and Sciences 
Publications, Beijing. 
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investment in China in 1994.79 During the 1980s and 1990s FDI was attracted to 
China by generous tax incentives provided by the government, and by a seemingly 
infinite supply of cheap labor. The attraction of these benefits seemed to be fading by 
the late 1990s as investors realized that chaotic rules and poor infrastructure made it 
hard turn a profit in China. (Ma, 2003)80 Entry into the WTO, has created a more rule- 
based system as well as opening up to FDI previously restricted areas of the economy. 
This seems to have revived foreign investor interest in China. 
1.7 The Challenges Facing Market Socialism 
China's transition is characterized by "gradualism" and `a market growing 
outside of the regime'. Administrative decentralization and the expansion of 
managerial autonomy and incentives for state-owned enterprises, has introduced 
major market-based reforms in the economy since 1979. This gradualist transition has 
led to the extraordinary development of the non-state sectors, replacing the role of the 
state sector in industry at the core of the economy, and to the governance of the 
economy in large part by market forces. 
The extraordinary reforms in China have injected huge rigour to the economy. At 
the same time, it is quite natural that some problems have emerged. Chairman Hu 
Jintao has admitted "China's economic infrastructure is weak, productivity is low and 
development is extremely unbalanced. " This notwithstanding, China is still facing up 
to the painful challenges such as further privatization of state-owned enterprises, 
institutional restructuring in the banking sector, tax reforms, actions on property right 
protection and control of the growing economy. How successful China completes 
these challenges will determine its international status not only in Asia but also on the 
world economic stage. The unfinished reforms on state-owned enterprises and the 
restructuring of the banking sectors are core challenges for the Chinese government at 
present. However, they remain demanding tasks for the Communist Party of China, 
since these require the application of international standards and laws in banking 
systems. 
1.7.1 The Reform of State-Owned Enterprises 
" EIU (2004), The Economy, Country Profile of China, p32, Economic Intelligence Unit. 
80 Ma, Hong (2003), China market development report: latest report compiled by Development and 
Research Centre of State Council, (eds), China Development Press, Beijing. 
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The reasons for reform 
The ultimate goal of China's reforms is to improve the efficiency of the 
utilization of resources. However, state-owned enterprises, as dominant forces in 
economy, have been operating with very low efficiency for a long time. Although the 
reforms of state-owned enterprises, began in 1978, injected greater operating 
autonomy to enterprises, their losses have increased due to institutional constraints 
(See table 1.15). The State Ministry of Finance and state-owned banks have extended 
loans to these loss-making sectors to keep them from bankruptcy. Such ̀ soft budget 
constraints' within the financial sector can have disastrous effects for the entire 
economy (Stiglitz, 1994). 81 Kornai (1992)82 has pointed out that the major reason for 
the poor performance of state-owned enterprises is their `soft budget constraints' as 
the slow reform of state-owned enterprises and the slow reform of state-owned banks 
are closely linked. 
Table 1.15 The Status of Losses in SOEs (1978-1997) 
Unit: % billion RMR 
Year Independent SO Es Branches to Independent SOEs 
Percentage of 
loss SOEs 
Loss in total Percentage of 
loss SOEs 
Loss in total 
1978 n. a. 42 23.9 44 
1979 n. a. 36 23.4 37 
1980 19.2 34 22.4 32 
1981 22.9 46 27.7 42 
1982 20.8 48 25.1 43 
1983 12.8 32 14.6 29 
1984 10.2 27 10.5 23 
1985 9.6 32 9.6 27 
1986 13.1 54 13.4 47 
1987 13.0 61 12.8 51 
1988 10.9 82 10.7 71 
1989 16 180 15.9 128 
1990 27.6 349 30.3 279 
1991 25.8 367 28 300 
1992 23.4 369 22.7 300 
1993 30.3 453 29.8 290 
1994 n. a. 483 n. a. 335 
1995 n. a. 640 44.0 409 
1996 n. a. 791 n. a. 530 
1997 n. a. 741 n. a. n. a. 
Sources: Lnlna rInane Tear BOOK" (1994) P438; 'China Statistics Year Book' (1996), p429; `China 
Statistics Year Book' (1997), p439; Xinhua Daily: `The National Statistics' Report on National 
81 Stiglitz, J. E. (1994), Whither Socialism? The MIT Press, London. 
82 Kornai, J. (1992), The Socialist System, Princeton University Press and Oxford University Press, UK. 
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Economy and Social Development 1997' (1998), 4t' Mar 1998, daily report on China, 98-071. (Sited in 
83 Lardy, 1999, p42). 
As the figures in table 1.15 reveal, the losses of state-owned enterprises declines 
at the period of the beginning of reforms. But then the percentage losses increased and 
reached a summit in the middle of 90s. The transformation of state-owned enterprises 
and their structural readjustments have reached a crucial stage, filled with deeply 
rooted contradictions and emerging problems. The major contradiction between 
planned regime and the demand for independent-operations for a market-oriented 
economy is the routine cause for these problems. A considerable number of state- 
owned enterprises have not yet adapted to the demands of the market economy. They 
are not flexible in terms of structural change; weak in technological innovation; 
heavily in debt; carry social burdens; and have a large number of surplus employees 
and difficulties in production and business operations. 
"It is imperative to take practical and effective measures to solve these problems. 
This has a vital bearing not only on the success or failure of state-owned enterprises 
reform, but also on that of the overall economic restructuring of the country. Thus, a 
number of active measures need to be implemented in order to eliminate the barriers 
of further economic development, facilitate market competition, and promote 
technological progress so as to provide good management systems and a sound legal 
environment", commented Gao, president of the Economic Reform Foundation in 
China (Wang, 2000)84. 
The History of Reform in State-Owned Enterprises 
State-owned enterprises have experienced three stages of reform over the last 20 
years. The first stage started with an experiment in 1980 by focusing on restructuring 
incentive systems for state firms and giving autonomy to managers to produce 
products for the market and outside the planning system (Hay, Morris, Liu and Yao, 
1994)85. The second stage focused on the development of both products and markets, 
and property-rights reform. In contrast, the third stage was to corporatise state-owned 
83 Lardy, N. R. (1999), China's Unfinished Economic Revolution, China Development Press, Beijing, 
p42. 
Wang, Z. M. (2000), ̀ Economic Reform Foundation's President Shangquan Gao on organisational 
reform and sustainable business development', Academy of Management Executive, 14 (1), Feb 2000, 
, 8. "Hay, D., Morris, D., Liu, G. and Yao, S. (1994), Economic Reform and Chinese State-Owned 
Manufacturing Enterprises 1980-87, Clarendon Press, oxford. 
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enterprises (Lin, 200 1)86 and create a diversified ownership structure in the industry 
by implementing a 2-R reform strategy - Retain state ownership structure in strategic 
sectors for large enterprises, and Retreat from state control of small and medium size 
firms that operate in highly competitive markets (Liu and Woo, 2001)87. 
At the third stage of reform, corporate governance and clarity of ownership were 
major issues in the reform of SOEs. Alongside it, some serious problems were in need 
of further solutions. Lack of clarity of property rights and ambiguity of ownership 
were caused by the lack of relevant laws. Secondly, there was often little change in 
state-owned enterprises management structures after corporatization. The State still 
had full control and the capacity for intervention. For instance, there was still one 
owner and no board of directors, which was directly administrated under government 
bureau before 2001. The directors/managers were actually more likely to be 
bureaucrats and not entrepreneurs, which were appointed by the administrative bureau. 
Such management staff was selected based on their rank in the state bureaucratic 
hierarchy. They often lacked management skills and incentives; they were often 
politically motivated. This situation leaded to inefficiency, low productivity and 
sometimes corruption. Although state-owned enterprises had produced an average 
10% growth rate in the value of industrial output during the period 1978 -1998, this 
rate is considerably below the average for other sectors (Zhou, 2003)88. Provinces 
within China where the state controlled a large percentage of production were 
notorious for their shoddy goods, high pollution levels, and ever increasing losses. 
Shanxi, Guangzhou, Yunnan, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjang top the list of the least 
productive provinces with the state controlling 60-80% of the industry. Shanghai, 
directly controlled by Beijing, grew at an average of 6%, the lowest of all areas. 
Regions with less state control and more foreign investment reached 16.9%. While 
SOEs creating these problems were drastically over-staffed, they lacked the ability to 
reform and streamline their business structures. These were the main issues to be 
resolved in the third stage of reform. 
After these three stages of reform, some improvements are evidenced in the 
state-owned enterprise sector. For example, a more diversified ownership structure in 
"Lin, C. (2001), ̀Coporatization and corporate governance in China's economic transition', 
Economics of Planning, 34 (1), pp5-35. 
87 Liu, G. S. and Woo, W. T. (2001), `How will ownership in China's industrial sector evolve with 
WTO accession? ' China Economic Review 12 (1), pp. 137 - 161. 88 Zhou, D. Y. (2003), The SOE Reform in China, Summer Semester 2003, Europe-University Viadrina, 
Germany, p8. 
51 
the industrial sector has emerged in the late 1990s: wholly state-owned firms (44% of 
total industrial sales in 1997), collective-owned firms (26% of sales), and mixed state- 
and private-owned firms (24% of sales, and wholly private-owned firms (6% of sales) 
(Liu and Garino, 2001)89. It is evidenced that state ownership has declined. The focus 
on enterprise autonomy, incentives, management and competition have created a more 
market-oriented economy. Many large size state-owned enterprises have achieved 
significant improvement in their performance on both domestic and international 
markets. For example, Haier, Changhong, Shanghai Haixin, Huali, and Shenzhen 
Mingda, TCL, and China Petrol, between 2001 and 2003. These state-owned 
corporations have made successful mergers and purchases overseas with billions of 
US dollars (Zhang, 2003)90. 
As Table 1.16 illustrates, the number of state-owned and state-holding enterprises 
have significantly declined by 57% (from 64737 in 1998 to 27477 in 2005); and the 
number of employed persons has reduced by 50%. In state-owned enterprises, gross 
industrial output value, total assets and the quality of management have considerably 
improved. These reveal how reforms have improved the efficiency of production and 
effectiveness of management in the state sector. Total profits in the state-owned 
enterprises have dramatically jumped by 12 times from RMB 525.14 million 
(US$63.50 million) in 1998 to RMB 6519.75 million (US$788.36 million) in 2005; 
whereas the total liabilities has also almost doubled in 2005 compared to 1998. This 
reflects the effect of profit-driven policies applied to state-owned enterprises, which 
has significantly pushed the profitability of enterprises in the short term, but has also 
generated side-effects and challenge for their long term competitiveness. 
89 Liu, G. S. & Garino, G. (2001), `Privatization or Competition -a lesson learnt from the Chinese 
enterprise reform', Economics of Planning, 34, pp35-5 1. 
90 Zhang, Li (2003), Make the strong stronger: 21s` Century business overview, Higher Education 
Publications, Beijing, p46. 
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Table 1.16 Main indicators of State-Owned and State-Holding Industrial Enterprises 
Unit: RMB 100 million yuan 





















1998 64737 33621.04 74916.27 35648.27 26759.22 525.14 37.47 
1999 61301 35571.18 80471.69 49877.69 30566.88 997.86 33.94 
2000 53489 40554.37 84014.94 51239.61 32714.81 2408.33 29.95 
2001 46767 42408.49 87901.54 52025.60 35741.27 2388.56 26.75 
2002 41125 45178.96 89094.60 52837.08 36139.17 2632.94 24.23 
2003 34280 53407.90 94519.79 55990.53 38381.02 3836.20 21.62 
2004 35597 70228.99 109708.25 62005.79 47479.25 5453.10 19.73 
2005 27477 83749.92 117629.61 66653.58 50625.00 6519.75 18.74 
Source: China statistics Yearbook 2W6, p526-528. 
Although some state-owned enterprises have been corporatised, they are still not 
separate from political intervention and administrative responsibilities. They still 
undertake social responsibilities and staff welfare, which should be undertaken by the 
Government. Whether the social burden can be stripped out, also depends on a series 
of changes in the external environment and in government policies. If problems such 
as price inflation, poor industrial structure and an undeveloped labor market cannot be 
dispelled through policy reform, the transition of state-owned enterprises can only 
cause inflation, unemployment and other problems. (Otsuka et al, 1998)91 
The reform plan initiated in 1993 has played a limited role in promoting labor 
mobility and market-oriented wages. Accordingly, it usually reflects on the slow 
progress of some state-owned enterprises in off-loading the burden of insurance for 
retirement and medical treatment. 
1.7.2 Economic Disparities in Regions 
The development of the market economy has been unbalanced, with most 
industries clustered in the east coastal regions, where most foreign companies have set 
up business. In 2004, the trend of disparities in regional development is becoming 
even greater by comparison with 2002. This could disadvantage the whole 
91 Otsuka, K., Liu, D. and Murakami, N. (1998), Industrial Reform in China -past performances and future prospects, Clarendon, Oxford. 
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development of the nation, and increase the disparity of income distribution. The 
existence of unbalanced development can be seen in Table 1.17.92 
As table 1.17 illustrates, in 2002, exports in ten provinces account for 87.9% of 
the total export of the country. Cichuan, Xinjiang, Heilongjiang, inner-Mongolia and 
Shanxi have become the fastest growing provinces. The west of China and the inner- 
lands, especially in the extreme North and the mountain areas, have remained 
undeveloped or at a low development level. This is mainly caused by the undeveloped 
transportation system which isolates them from the outside world. Communications in 
these areas are often difficult, besides bureaucracy and language difficulties. Telecom 
services may also be of low reliability. Fax machines are often engaged, telephone 
calls may be routed to the wrong number and Chinese switchboard operators vary in 
their helpfulness, competence and knowledge of English to the extent that 
communication in English is rarely possible in less-developed areas. The poor 
condition of transportation has caused inefficient business support. 
92 China's Economy and Trade Yearbook 2005, Compiled by Committee of Inspection and 
Administration of State Assets, State Council, China Economy Press, Beijing, p65. 
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Table 1.17 Exports and Imports for 31 Provinces, Municipalities and Cities of China 
in 2002 and 2004 
Unit: USD$ Hundred Million 










Beijing 525.09 126.15 398.94 946.62 205.75 740.87 
Tianjing 227.55 115.73 111.82 420.42 208.62 211.80 
Hebei 66.66 45.95 20.71 135.26 93.40 41.86 
Shanxi 23.12 16.62 6.50 53.82 40.35 13.47 
inner-Mongolia 24.41 8.07 16.34 37.23 13.56 23.67 
Liaoning 217.39 123.65 93.74 344.37 189.18 155.19 
Jilin 37.07 17.68 19.39 67.93 17.15 50.78 
Heilongjiang 43.50 19.87 23.63 67.92 36.82 31.10 
Shanghai 726.40 320.46 405.94 1600.19 735.07 865.12 
Jiangsu 702.97 384.71 318.26 1708.57 874.97 833.60 
Zhejiang 419.61 294.16 125.64 852.29 581.59 270.70 
Anhui 41.81 24.53 17.28 72.12 39.37 32.75 
Fujian 284.00 173.73 111.27 475.49 293.96 181.53 
Jiangxi 16.95 10.52 6.43 35.29 19.95 15.34 
Shandong 339.35 211.09 128.26 606.75 358.54 248.21 
Henan 32.03 21.19 10.84 66.21 41.76 24.45 
Hunan 39.53 20.98 18.55 54.34 30.97 23.37 
Hubei 28.76 17.95 10.81 67.72 33.82 33.90 
Guangdong 2211.06 1184.65 1026.41 3571.33 1915.58 1655.75 
Guangxi 24.30 15.07 9.23 42.78 23.86 18.92 
Hainan 18.67 8.19 10.48 34.02 10.93 23.09 
Sichuan 44.69 27.11 17.58 38.57 20.91 17.66 
Chongqing 17.94 10.91 7.03 68.72 39.84 28.88 
Guizhou 6.91 4.42 2.49 15.14 8.67 6.47 
Yunnan 22.26 14.30 7.96 37.51 22.39 15.12 
Tibet 1.30 0.81 0.49 2 1.30 0.70 
Shanxi 22.25 13.77 8.48 36.43 23.97 12.46 
Gansu 8.77 5.49 3.28 17.73 9.96 7.77 
Qinghai 1.97 1.51 0.46 5.76 4.55 1.21 
Ningxia 4.43 3.28 1.15 9.08 6.46 2.62 
Xinjing 26.92 13.08 13.84 56.36 30.47 25.89 
Source: China's Economy and Trade Yearbook 2005, Compiled by Committee of Inspection and 
Administration of State Assets, State Council, China Economy Press, Beijing, p65. 
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Table 1.18 Regional GDP Status 2004 - 2005 (%)93 
REGIONS 2004 2005 
The Proportion of 
Eastern 55.4 55.6 
National GDP by 
Regions (%) 
Central 18.9 18.8 
Western 17.1 16.9 
Northeastern 8.7 8.7 
Notes: The Eastern region covers 10 cities and provinces - Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanghai, Zhejiang, 
Jiangsu, Shandong, Fujian, Guangdong and Hainan. The Central region comprises 6 provinces - 
Shanxi, An'hui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei and Hunan. The Western region includes 12 provinces -Inner- 
Mongolia, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Tibet, Gansu, Shanxi, Guangxi, Sichuan, Chongqing, Guizhou 
and Yunnan. 
The figures in table 1.18 show large regional imbalances. The GDP in the eastern 
area is 55.6% in 2005; in the western regions it is only 16.9% and the gap is widening. 
The GDP percentage of the northestern region is less than one-half compared to the 
central and western regions. 
Due to this unbalanced development, the macro economic controls cannot be 
applied to all areas. Robert Lawrence Kuhn, managing director of Citigroup and 
famous US investment expert, suggested that special consideration and policies 
should be given to enterprises in these areas as it is vital to raise people's income in 
the backward areas and to improve their living conditions and settle the imbalance in 
the nation's economic development. It will benefit China's economy in the long-term 
and stabilize growth. Special attention should be paid to economic development in 
rural areas, as this has a population of more than 900 million. It is favorable to spur 
the domestic demand as a whole since raising farmers' annual income can boost 
farmers' purchasing power. 94 
1.7.3 Paradoxes in Regulation and Deregulation 
It is an imperative trend that China's regulatory environment will be deregulated 
and liberated eventually, when a sound market economy that is totally based on law is 
completed. Notwithstanding this, it still has a long way to go. China, when it decided 
to develop a market economy recognized it would have to confront the paradoxes of 
93 China Statistics Yearbook 2006, Compiled by National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistics 
Press, Beijing, p41. (Note: The statistics in 2004 is amended by the third China Economic Census on 
8`n March 2006. ) 
94 An interview with Kuhn, R. L. by the reporter of People's Daily, `Macro-control policies are 
favourable for the development of China's economy', People's Daily, 6`h May, 2004. 
(http: //enp-lish. people. coin. cl" accessed 18 ̀h December 2004) 
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regulation and deregulation. The process of liberation will be painful, as it will require 
changes in some essential routines embedded in the Chinese regime; particularly, the 
leaders of government. For instance, the reforms on state-owned enterprises will 
remove some potential benefits for bureaucrats and call for less control over the 
economy from government. It will require a more democratic society and political 
party. It won't be easy since state bureaucrats often use public enterprise funds for 
personal expenses and for their own benefits. 
Deregulation is urgent in many aspects of the economy in order to achieve a 
complete market-oriented economy. In China, besides the highly regulated state sector, 
the limited areas for entry of outsiders and foreigners widely exist. Constraints in 
foreign currency exchange create obstacles for foreign firms' operations in China. The 
restricted foreign exchange capital market has hampered domestic enterprises from 
going to international capital markets. Such high regulations lead to the existence of 
the so-called `informal economy', where a great number of firms operate "under 
cover"95. For example, since China has highly restricted the exchange of foreign 
currency, a black market has emerged to meet the market demand. This not only 
generates profiteering for speculators, but also leads to the corruption of banking staff 
who have control over foreign currency cash, because this business requires 
collaboration between them. There are more examples. The smuggling of foreign cars 
was prevalent 10 years ago when the import tax was over 150-200%. Smuggling had 
led to a wide range of corruption in the customs system, when officials were bribed 
for releasing cars and escaping customs duties. This problem is particularly acute in 
developing countries. As McKinsey (Farrell, 2004) 96 suggests "governments must 
correct the root causes of informality - heavy tax burdens and complex regulatory 
schemes - and enforce the law more rigorously. " 
When the market is highly regulated, not only can it create an informal economy, 
but also it can promote the abuse of power of State officials. When government 
officials have too much power over controlling the rules and laws of the market, it 
won't be a fair and spontaneous competitive market. Instead artificial barriers 
discriminate and hamper economic development. For foreigners doing business in 
95 The hidden dangers mean unexposed illegal businesses existing informally in certain market 
segments that are high regulated, but such informal economy contains dangers and harms for the 
formal economy and become the counterpart for the formal laws, although the dangers are hidden 
apparently. 
Farrell, D. (2004), `The Hidden Dangers of the Informal Economy', McKinsey Quarterly, No. 3, 
August 2004. 
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China, "networks" exist in the business world. This is often known as `no relationship, 
no business. '(Zheng, 2006) 97 It cannot be denied that such a highly regulated 
environment has played a crucial role in forming such relationship networks. 
According to the OECD (2002)98, the influence and function of relationships seems to 
get weaker as market deregulation deepens and a more formal market environment 
emerges. 
1.8 Concluding Remarks 
Given this outline of characteristics of market socialism in China, the objective 
of which is to understand the multitude of variables and dynamics (institutions, 
characteristics, society, political and economic systems) that shape this market. Since 
China is formally a socialist country, it has a unique development constituting of a 
hybrid model of capitalism and socialism, a coexistence of both planned and market- 
oriented economy. Furthermore, this hybrid market model is also mixed with its 
historical cultural rich inheritances (such as Confucianism, Taoism and Maoism, 
feudalism, etc. ). This explains why many western theories and models, to a certain 
extent, become inapplicable to the Chinese context, as these were developed from a 
different market context. People and enterprises behave differently when they are in a 
regulated environment. 
This chapter has reviewed key forces in the changing business environment in 
China. It has discussed how government politicians and policies are generating a 
socialist market economy with dynamic growth rates. Through decades of reform, a 
hybrid market structure has emerged, which encompasses both public ownership and 
private ownership, under a combined regime of both planned and market economy. 
By joining the WTO and continuously absorbing FDI, new opportunities and threats 
have been created which impact upon local business strategies and management. The 
inevitable trend of globalization and further market liberation, progress the 
development of the market economy to becoming more mature. Under this changing 
macro environment, the process of state sector restructuring is ongoing and it remains 
a dominant force in market competition. The characteristics of market socialism are 
97 Zheng, P. (2006), ̀ Success and failure in marketing strategies in China: a case study approach' 
Working Paper Series, No. 131, February 2007, Kent Business School, University of Kent. 
98 OECD (2002), `An OECD perspective on regulatory reform in China' published as chapter 11 in 
China in the World Economy: The Domestic Policy Challenges, by Scott Jacobs, managing partner, 
Jacobs and Associates. 
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the influencing factors that shape Chinese management practices. Understanding these 
is essential to understanding the characteristics of Chinese enterprises and 
management structures and processes. The next chapter looks at the development of 
enterprise management practices. Economic transformations have led to the 
emergence of new business ventures that will be examined from both macro and 
micro environmental influences. The case studies introduced in the following chapters 
will illustrate how these are characterized by contrasting strategies and operational 
processes. However, before these are discussed, theories and practices of enterprises' 
management are reviewed by reference to their applicability to the conditions of 
Chinese market socialism. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
Emerging Forms of Business Venture under 
Chinese Market Socialism 
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Figure 2.1 A Framework for Analyzing the Emergence of Management Practices in China 
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Management practices in China can be assessed from two distinctive phases in 
its transition - `socialism' and `market socialism'. Since the foundation of the 
People's Republic of China in 1949, highly central-planned socialism dominated in 
China for three decades. Amidst this phase, some administrative decentralization took 
place, although these didn't change the efficiency and productivity of Chinese 
economy significantly. However, it fostered the conditions for structural reforms in 
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later stages of development. The turning point for the official advocacy of a market- 
oriented economy began in the 80's, headed by Deng Xiao Ping, chairman of the CPC 
(1978-1997). It was a breakthrough that marked the end of 30-years of planned 
economy and it marked a milestone in the transition to market socialism. The 
development and nature of Chinese market socialism has been elaborated in the 
Chapter 1, with an introduction to its distinctive characters. In this Chapter, the focus 
is on management practices under the two periods in contrast. The evolution of 
management in China has to be examined in a historical perspective, since their past 
has shaped many of its present features. 
2.1 Management Practices Under State Socialism (1949 - 1978) 
Under `planned socialism', there were two types of enterprises - state owned and 
collective owned enterprises. In this primary period of socialism, China imitated the 
Soviet model of management for central-planned administration since its foundation 
in 1949; that was a central planned economy where there was no private ownership. 
The entire economy operated as a single corporation directed by the Communist Party. 
Wages, employment and the quantity of goods produced was decided by the Party. 
Lack of operating autonomy was the common feature of all the traditional state- 
owned enterprises in the Chinese economy and other Soviet-type economies. The 
state provided all the inputs to state-owned enterprises and their production was 
according to central plans. In turn, the state-owned enterprises delivered to the State 
all their outputs and revenues. The state set the wage rates of the state-owned 
enterprise's workers and managers. All activities of the state-owned enterprises 
required state approval. The Soviet-style economy focused on the maximization of 
resources for the creation of capital-intensive heavy industries (Lin et al, 1998)99. This 
central planned economy dominated China for 30 years till 1978. 
The central planned economy was regarded as the instrument for the creation of 
socialism. It was embodied in state ownership, administrated by the enforcement of a 
powerful State machine. Marx Karl (1818-1883)100 proposed this theory of socialism 
as an ideal supposition to replace capitalism. The leader and theorist of the early 
9' Lin, Justin, Yi. Fu, Cai, Fang and Li, Zhou (1998), `Competition, policy burdens, and state-own 
enterprise reform' American Economic Review, 88 (2), May1998, pp. 422-428. 
'°° Marx. K. (1938), Capital: a critical analysis of capitalist production, translated from the third 
German edition by Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling and edited by Frederick Engels, George Allen & 
Unwin, London. 
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Russian revolution, Lenin (1870-1924)101 emphasized the importance of the state 
machine organizing economic activities within Marx's theory of socialism. He 
emphasized the power of the state machine as the means for realizing his ideal society, 
when the state would then whither away. Lenin claimed that at the first stage of 
communism - socialism - all the citizens became employees (and armed workers) of 
the state. The whole society would become an administrative unity; it would become a 
giant factory with fair pay and equal work. After the success of the October 
Revolution, Russia was the first country to establish a regime of a central planned 
economy, featured with the enforced authority and administration of the powerful 
State machine. They believed the aggregation and accumulation of capital would 
transform the national economy to an `absolute unified associate trust'. Therefore, the 
proletarian should take ownership of all productive resources and then, in accordance 
with a general state plan, all economic activities should be administrated by a central 
committee of the national economy and its hierarchical subordinates within industrial 
bureaus. At the same time, the commodity market should be abolished. Following 
Lenin, Stalin exerted the power of the state machine to extreme limits. He personally 
characterized the two idiosyncrasies - "State Ownership" and "Central Command and 
planned Administration" as the main features of socialism into the Russian textbook 
of political economy. 
The Soviet-type economy was good at mobilizing resources for building priority 
industry sectors in China. However, the economy was very inefficient due to two 
main reasons: (i) low allocatable efficiency because of the deviation of the industrial 
structure from the pattern dictated by the comparative advantages of the economy; 
and (ii) low technical efficiency because managers had no means to motivate workers 
and to give them incentives for improving their performance (Lin et al, 1996)102. The 
later economic transition from a planned economy to a market-oriented economy has 
been attempting to overcome these two vital defects, by implementing reforms in 
administrative decentralization, autonomy decentralization, privatization, market 
competitive mechanisms and so forth. In consequence, these economic reforms have 
generated a managerial evolution in state and non-state sector firms. 
101 Lenin, V. I. (1870-1942), Selected works in three volumes, International Publisher, New York. 
102 Lin, Justin, Yi, Fu; Cai, Fang and Li, Zhou (1996), The China miracle: development strategy and 
economic reform, Chinese University Press, Hong Kong. 
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2.1.1 Ownership Under State Socialism 
Under the soviet model, state ownership was embodied in two types of firm; 
state-own enterprises (SOEs) and collective-own enterprises (COEs). A large number 
of collective-owned enterprises were established during the 1950s. Taking 
`agricultural cooperatives' as the stereotype, these `Supply and Purchase 
Cooperatives' and `Trust Cooperatives' were reconstructed as collective enterprises 
and integrated into the State's central control system. They were completely 
controlled by the central government in the central planning system, although there 
was some common ownership by employees. This was also the ownership form of the 
majority of small and medium size enterprises (Child, 1994; Liu, 1993; Tian, 1997; 
Opper, 200 1)103State-owned enterprises and collective-owned enterprises were the 
only legal forms of enterprise allowed to exist in this early socialist period. As 
mentioned in chapter 1, the emergence of township and villageship enterprises from 
agricultural cooperatives was a distinctive force for later creating a market economy. 
Many private enterprises grow out of cooperatives and township and villageship 
enterprises in the early stage of market socialism. (Bruton et al, 2000)104 However, in 
the early stage of state socialism, they were an integral part of the state economy and 
under complete administrative control of the State. 
2.1.2 Nationalization and Industrialization in China 
Industrialization and nationalization were initiated in China 1949. At that time, 
industry in China accounted for only 10% of the total economy. After experiencing a 
long period of war turbulence, the GDP in 1949 was less than one-half of before the 
2"d World War broke out in 1939, and heavy industry was only 30% of what it was in 
1937. According to statistics of United Nations in 1947-1949, the development of 
industrialization in China was low, which steel production about 1/87 of that of the 
United States, 1/22 of Germany, 1/19 of Russia, 1/14 of Britain, and 1/6 of Japan. Its 
103 Child, J. (1994), Management in China during the era of reform, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Liu, Guo-gang (1993), `On ownership structure under the market economic structure', Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service, 16 June 1993, p37. 
Tian, Xiao-wen (1997), ̀ The rise of non-state-owned enterprises in China', Communist Economies 
and Economic Transformation, 9 (2), pp219-231. 
Opper, S. (2001), ̀ Dual-track ownership reforms: lessons from structural change in China, 1978- 
1997', post-Communist Economies, 13 (2), Jun2001, pp205-227. 
1°' Bruton, G. D., Lan, Hai-lin and Lu, Yuan (2000), `China's township and village enterprises: Kelon's 
competitive edge', Academy of Management Executive, 14 (1), Feb2000, pp19-30. 
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electric production was only 1/35 of the United States, 1/8 of Russia, 1/6 of Britain 
and Japan. Coal production was equal to 1/9 of the United States, 1/7 of Germany, /2 
of Russia, 1/3 of Britain and Japan. (Peng et al, 2004)105 This was the basis for the 
socialist reconstruction of industries in the newly-established communist state of 
China. In line with the Soviet model, the Communist Party focused on heavy 
industrialization as its main rationale for nationalization. Between 1949 -1956, 
capitalism, market institutions and the private sectors were abolished. The Stalin-style 
centrally planned economy was established. 
2.1.3 The Nature of Enterprises 
Enterprises under a planned economy do not have the same functions as market- 
oriented enterprises. They become adjuncts of the State administrative organs; all the 
properties, employees, finance, purchase and sales, productions and supply are 
decided by state administrative organs or committees. Their economic activities are 
planned and commanded by the Central Committee of the State. They are departments 
of the State and they exist as units of production within state bureaucracies, which are 
led by the Party. 
As the traditional state economy was established in line with Lenin's `State 
Syndicate Model' - in order to manage the whole society as a whole big factory - the 
economy was divided in two parts - rural areas and urban areas. The urban areas were 
organized as a single enterprise with all citizens being employees of the state. State- 
owned enterprises (Guo Ying Qiye) and collective-owned enterprises (Jiti Qiye) were 
simply the grass-root production units for the state administrative bureaucracy. The 
essential tasks for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and collective-owned enterprises 
(COEs) were to officiate and to follow the commands and instructions from the higher 
authorities. They did not need to be creative or innovative. How much and how to 
produce, what to manufacture, where the raw materials were purchased from, and 
where the product was sold, were all decided by the planned command from 
administrative organs of the central government. Neither did the state-owned 
enterprises or collective-owned enterprises have their own incentives, nor were they 
possible to make any decisions on the distribution of resources in line with their own 
benefits and due to changes in the market environment. Nevertheless, they acted as 
'os peng, G. & Huang W. and Guo, Y. (20(4), Studies on the theory and practice of economic 
development in China, The People's University Press, Beijing, pp. 257-258. 
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regulators of the social economy. 
Under a state socialist regime that incorporated party, politics and the economy, 
state-owned enterprises acted not only as units of production, but also as 
organizations of the Party and State's political system. They had imposed on them a 
wide-range of social obligations and functions. During the Culture Revolution, these 
functions of state-owned enterprises were exerted to the extreme as they were 
regarded as `the bulwark of proletarian rule'. The state utilized these enterprises as 
instruments to achieve its political and economic objectives, such as establishing a 
powerful military industry, and investing in the development of nuclear weapons. 
Employees in state-owned enterprises and collective-owned enterprises were treated 
and managed as members of the party and government. Moreover, the state-owned 
enterprises and collective-owned enterprises took all the responsibilities for 
employees, such as social security, welfare, medical care, housing and education, 
providing lifelong service - from the cradle to the grave - for employees (Ding et al, 
2004)106 People management practices were characterized by centrally planned job 
allocations, relatively egalitarian reward systems and seniority-based pay awards 
(Schermerhorn and Nyaw, 1990)107. It was a system referred to as `everyone eating 
out of one big pot'. This model of management system in state-owned enterprises and 
collective-owned enterprises was also known as three irons - `iron rice bowl', `iron 
chair' and `iron wages', which was essentially transplanted from the Soviet-model 
(Ding and Warner, 2001; Child, 1995)108. Within this system, managers had no 
incentive to make decisions, and they tended to avoid responsibilities. Their career 
advancement was based on neither merit nor performance but through political favors. 
With the `iron rice bowl' system, from 1949 to the pre-reform time, there was no 
human resource function in Chinese firms, but only personnel management (renshi 
guanli). This undertook paper-work processing with recruitment based on a job- 
assignment plan organized by the state. Each employee had a dang'an (personal file) 
106 Ding, D. Z.; Ge, G. and Warner, M. (2004), ̀ Evolution of organizational governance and human 
resource management in China's township and village enterprises', International Journal of Human 
Resource Management, 15 (4), June/August 2004, pp. 836-852. 
107 Schermerhorn, Jr. J. R. and Nyaw, M. K. (1990), `Managerial leadership in Chinese industrial 
enterprises', International Studies of Management and Organisation, 20 (1/2), Spring/Summer 1990, 
9-21. 
Ding, D. Z. and Warner, M. (2001), ̀ China's labour management system reforms: breaking the 
"Three Old irons" (1978-1999)', Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 18 (3), pp. 314-334. 
Child, J. (1995), ̀ Change in the structure and prediction of earnings in Chinese state enterprises 
during the economic reforms', International Journal of Human Resource Management, 6 (1), p30. 
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that recorded birth, family, education and career. These data would be kept in his/her 
working unit and managed by the personnel departments of enterprises. There was 
little labor mobility between enterprises, because state-owned enterprises could 
impose stringent controls on the mobility of their staff by locking-up their dang'an 
(Yan and Warner, 2001)1°9. 
In order to understand how the industrial management or administration was 
carried out in state-owned enterprises and collective-owned enterprises, it is necessary 
to understand the structure of the planning system that is the Chinese bureaucratic 
hierarchy. The enterprises, as units of production, were managed through provincial 
and municipal administrative levels. Larger factories in the priority heavy industrial 
sectors normally had executive authority concentrated in the hands of their directors - 
the so-called `one director management system'. (Child, 1998a) 110 This system 
contributed to substantial advances in heavy industrial output during the 1950s and 
the essentials of its planning and administrative structure remain in place today. It was, 
nevertheless, an imposed approach relying heavily upon bureaucratic top-down 
direction which did not fit happily with either the efficiency of management in 
socialist ownership or the demands of autonomy of enterprises. 
2.1.4 Administrative Structure of Central Planning System 
China's State Planning System is outlined in figure 2.2. (Campbell, 1987) 
The management of state-owned enterprises and collective-owned enterprises was 
shared by the Central Government and different levels of local governments (e. g. 
levels of province or city). As Figure 2.2 shows, some state enterprises reported 
directly to central ministries others reporting to municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai and 
109 Yan, D. and Warner, M. (2001), `Sinn-Foreign Joint Ventures' versus `Wholly Foreign Owned 
Enterprises in the People's Republic of China', Working Paper, The Judge Institute of Management 
Studies, Cambridge, No. 11, Oct2001, p31. 
10 Child, J. (1998a), ̀Management and organisations in China: key trends and issues', Chinese 
Management Centre CMC, School of Business, The University of Hong Kong, Working Paper: 
CMC 1998-004-01, September, p25- 
111 Campbell, N. (1987), Enterprise Autonomy in the Beijing Municipality, in the book of 
`Management Reforms in China', edited by Malcolm Warner, Frances Pinter (Publishers), Ltd. London, 
p55. 
This framework from Campbell has been modified by adding more hierarchical structures on the top 
and the bottom, in order to illustrate these relations between hierarchy bureaucracies. On the top of the 
state council is the central committee led by CPC as the superior top, and down to the bottom - the 
enterprise's practices, where there are more management hierarchies within their own structure. The 
structure marked in line of dashes is hypothetical to represent a general imaginary for all SOEs and 
COEs, which shows the top of the enterprise management, known as the board of directors, however, 
commonly the general manager or director is responsible for reporting to the upper authorities. 
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Tianjin) or provincial authorities. The level of central government was made up of 
municipalities, provinces, ministries and state commissions, and directed and led by 
the Communist Party - the Central Party Committee. According to the subordinate 
relationships that state-owned enterprises and collective-owned enterprises were 
subject to, these enterprises were respectively operated by different levels of 
hierarchical bureaux. Then, at each level of hierarchy, the operation of state-owned 
enterprises and collective-owned enterprises was partitioned by a series of 
departments of local government. 
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Figure 2.2 China's State Planning System 
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Note: +It indicates that the majority of these are collective-owned enterprises. 
Source: adopted and modified after Campbell (1987), p55. 
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The lower level of local government comprised of the branches of municipalities 
and the provinces. These bureaux supervised industrial companies, each of which, in 
turn, controlled the activities of a number of factories and research institutes. Most 
enterprises needed to report to two higher authorities, which in turn reported to two 
ultimate bodies -a Technical Ministry and a State Economic Commission. The 
Municipalities controlled district organizations which supervised smaller enterprises, 
which were normally organized as collectives. In the provinces the major cities were 
also divided into districts; some of these districts had ministry bureaux looking after 
state enterprises. Outside the cities the prefectures controlled state enterprises directly 
and collective enterprises through their country sub-divisions (Boisot and Child, 
1988)112 
In general, the decisions relating to investment and production were undertaken 
by the Planning Commission and Economic Commission; those relating to labor 
management such as recruitment and dismissal, assessment and reward, supervision 
and inspection for the key management stuff, were mainly undertaken by the Party's 
Labour department and by personnel departments in central or local government. 
Under the finance system of unifying revenue and expenditure, the State Fiscal 
Bureau was equivalent to the finance department of enterprises, managing cash flow, 
revenue and expenditure, as well as imposing duties, taxes and profits. The Labor 
Bureau substituted the labor market of a market economy through the means of labor 
allocation and deciding the policies of human resource management in aspects of 
recruitment, wages, bonuses and so on. 
Due to the absence of markets, these enterprises did not have to consider prices 
or supply and demand factors. The main task of general managers was to cooperate 
with the bureaucrats of government organs. They needed to coordinate enterprise 
activities with government objectives, instead of satisfying the demands of the market. 
More importantly, they had to constantly negotiate with upper administrative 
authorities in order to gain access to resources, and to be given achievable rather than 
excessive production targets. The problematic relationship between state-owned 
enterprises and central government concerned many economists, who referred to the 
112 Boisot, M. and Child, J. (1988), ̀ The Iron Law of Fiefs: bureaucratic failure and the problem of 
governance in the Chinese economic reforms', Administrative Science Quarterly, 33 (4), Dec 1988, pp. 
507-527. 
70 
`soft budget constraint' (Kornai, 1980)113 In theory, the state should be only 
responsible for state-owned enterprise losses that arise from policy demands. 
However, it was always difficult to distinguish between policy-induced losses and the 
own operational losses of state-owned enterprises or collective-owned enterprises. 
The managers of state-owned enterprises would ascribe their losses to state's policy 
burdens, no matter whether the losses were due to their own managerial discretion. 
Consequently, in most cases, the state in practice was responsible for all the state- 
owned enterprises' losses. As such, the budget constraints of state-owned enterprises 
became soft (Naughton, 1994). 1 to 
Because the prices of inputs and outputs, taxation and capital, were all controlled 
by the government, enterprises could control their production costs through 
negotiations with the government. When enterprises encountered financial hardships, 
the government tended to help them get out of financial difficulty by giving them 
more preferential loans, fiscal appropriate funds, tax reductions, or permission to 
increase their prices. `If such interventions become quite frequent, the norm of the 
enterprises would be built on the expectation of these interventions. ' (Kornai, 1992)115 
2.1.5 Administrative Decentralization in the Central Planning System 
In the middle of 1950s, due to inefficiencies in resources allocation and low 
productivity, the state economy suffered. The Party and economists ascribed these to 
the central administration in which all decisions were controlled by the top 
bureaucratic organs that were removed from enterprise operational activities. It was 
argued if decision-making of enterprises was decentralized to local government; the 
performance of management would be improved. Therefore, economic reforms in 
administrative decentralization were initiated in the state sector by Mao in 1957. This 
was driving the `Great Leap Forward' (1957-1960) and later the `Culture Revolution' 
(1966-1976). These reasons consisted of the following: 
(1) Decentralization of planning to local authorities 
This facilitated the formation of local independent economic systems. Local 
governments decided production plans, the allocation of resource quotas and 
construction projects. 
"' Kornai, J. (1980), Economics of shortage, North-Holland, Holland. 
114 Naughton, B. (1994), `What is distinctive about China's economic transition? State enterprise 
reform and overall system', Journal of Comparative Economics, 18 (3), Jun 1994, pp. 470-491. 115 Kornai, J. (1992), The socialist system, Princeton University Press and Oxford University Press, UK. 
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(2) Decentralization of enterprise governance to local authorities 
Except for a minority of state enterprises, the majority of enterprises (88%) 
were decentralized to local government for administrative control. The GDP 
percentage of direct-administrative controlled enterprises was reduced from 
39.7% in 1957 to 13.8% in 1958. (Zhou, 1984)116 
(3) Decentralization of the distribution of supplies to local authorities 
The supply of goods distributed by central government declined by 75%. 
Distribution was allocated to local authorities to which enterprises had to 
apply for resource allocation. 
(4) Decentralization of the supervision of infrastructural construction projects, 
investments and loans to local authorities. 
Investment and construction projects, with limitations, could be approved by 
local governments. Amounts that exceed certain limitations required plans to 
be submitted to the State Planning Commission for approval. Local state banks 
could determine the amount of loans according to local enterprise requests for 
production and construction. 
(5) Decentralization of taxation to local authorities 
To enhance and expand the fiscal capability of local governments, various 
taxes such as estate duty, stamp tax, culture entertainment tax, etc, were 
allocated to the revenues of local governments. Others were shared with 
central government. 
(6) Decentralization of labor management 
The recruitment of employees in all enterprises could be decided at the 
provincial and municipal levels without the approval of central government. 
This aspect of decentralization was implemented at the enterprise level, giving 
some autonomy of labor management o enterprises themselves. 
2.1.6 Management Autonomy in State-Owned Enterprises and Collective-Owned 
Enterorises under State Socialism 
After the reforms of administrative decentralization, local governments and 
collective communes obtained a higher degree of autonomy in terms of their 
1 16 Zhou, Tai-he (1984), The reform of economic system in contemporary China, China Social Sciences 
Press, Beijing. 
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capabilities to deploy resources. The operational autonomy extended to state-owned 
enterprises and collective-owned enterprises included: 
(1) Production targets conveyed from the State Planning Commission through 
different hierarchical levels were reduced from twelve to four - those of 
production of key products, numbers of employees, wages budgets and 
retained profits. 
(2) The reward system was changed from the old arrangement of "Enterprise 
Bonuses" to a new arrangement of "Full Amount of profit commission 
retained". Moreover, the portion of the bonus distribution could be 
determined by local authorities. 
(3) The autonomy of personnel management was expanded. Except for key 
management staff and technicians, all other employees could be recruited and 
managed by the enterprise itself. The enterprises had the right to arrange the 
allocation of employees between jobs as long as this did not increase the total 
number of employees. 
The state-owned enterprises and collective-owned enterprises could use retained 
profits for paying bonuses to workers, supporting welfare programs, and investing in 
capacity expansion. Enterprise managerial autonomy was gradually extended through 
replacing the profit-retention system by a contract-responsibility system in which 
state-owned enterprises and collective-owned enterprises agreed to deliver 
predetermined amounts of revenue to the state and retain the residuals. The positive 
effect from administrative decentralization reforms was to generate some early period 
of market relations in the gaps of local state protectionism. Such administrative 
decentralization in a central planned economy fostered the conditions for the 
emergence of a non-state sector -a market economy. 
After the Cultural Revolution, the focus of reforms was to transform the 
`autonomy of enterprise management'. But the market economy could not be 
established on the basis of monopoly state ownership. Since the adaptation of the 
market-oriented strategy in 1978, state-ownership monopoly has broken down and a 
non-state sector has emerged. Its growth has enforced the restructuring of state-own 
enterprises. The new pattern of the socialist market economy is gradually comprised 
of diversified ownership enterprises, which has led to a new phase of market-oriented 
socialism. 
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2.1.7 The Functions of Trade Unions Under Centralized Planned State Socialism 
Up to 1927 there were close links between the Party and trade unions. Indeed the 
Party often played a major role in forming both unions and labour federations. By the 
mid-1930s, there was a clear shift to a peasant-based strategy of revolutionary change. 
The Chinese labour unions were not the crucial allies of the Communist Party in the 
lead up to the 1949 liberation. Unlike some East European societies, the Chinese 
unions were weak and shadowy organizations such that there was no coalescence of 
an independent tradition and power base. However, this has not prevented a tale of 
party/union conflict in China. Though trade union leaders have never challenged 
Party control, they have at times tried to carve out a more independent role, resulting 
in fractional disputes. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) built up a 
trade union bureaucracy replacing the remnants of the pre-Revolutionary craft-based 
unions with a system of industrial unions in 1957. During the period of the Great Leap 
Forward, there was a partial collapse of the trade union structure and many union 
cadres were sent to the factory floor. After this, trade unions remained weak 
organizations with ill-defined functions. (Littler and Lockett, 1983)17 
Since the late 1970s, the institution of the Workers' Congress was an adjunct of 
the `factory management committee' and comprised part of the dual structure of 
work-place democracy in the Chinese enterprises (Warner, 1995) 118. After the 
Cultural Revolution, the state appeared anxious to revive work-place democracy 
under a unitary system in order to buttress enterprise autonomy. In place of the dual 
structure preceding the Cultural Revolution, the Workers' Congress was subsequently 
reactivated, but with no the factory management committees. In 1978, Deng Xiao 
Ping declared before a national conference of trade unions that `democratic 
management should be put into effect and the system of workers' congresses should 
be established and perfected in all enterprises. ' (Ng, 1983)119 
Starting from Soviet Model, socialism in China has reflected the significance of 
political conflicts, which affected every aspect of social development and the state 
economy. The functions of enterprises and the socialist economy changed 
institutionally in the next phase of market economy transformation. The processes of 
1" Littler, C. R. and Lockett, M. (1983), ̀ The significance of trade unions in China', Industrial 
Relations Journal, 14 (4), Winter 1983, pp45-78. 
18 Warner, M. (1995), The management of human resources in Chinese industry, St. Martins Press, 
London. 
"9 Ng Sek Hong (1983), ̀ One brand of workplace democracy: the Workers' Congress in Chinese 
enterprise', The Journal of Industrial Relations, 25 (2), p59. 
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evolution in the early phase of socialism reveal the routines for such market 
transformation, which are essential to understand the Chinese characteristics of 
management under market socialism in the next phase. 
2.2 Management Practices under `Market Socialism' (1979 -) 
Since 1979, the Chinese Communist Party headed by Deng Xiaoping, who 
regained power from the `Gang of Four' in 1976, officially launched reforms in the 
direction of a market economy. This was a break-through in the old totally-planned 
economy and endorsed the role of market functions under socialism. 1979 to 1993 
marked the first phase of transition for the initial formation of a market economy in 
which management practices with diversified ownership forms emerged under a 
`dual-track' economic system. This was consolidated after 1993, following the 
adoption of open-door policies, and foreign direct investment absorption. 
Forms of ownership under a market-socialist economy can be discussed in two 
areas - the state owned and the non-state owned sectors. The state sector includes 
state-owned enterprises and collective-owned enterprises, while the non-state sector 
includes privately-owned enterprises (individual-owned enterprises and township and 
villageship enterprises) and foreign joint-ventures. These four types of ownership 
have evolved with economic reforms and are influenced by such forces as 
privatization, market deregulation, technology advancement, World Trade 
Organization accession, globalization and foreign direct investment injection. As 
Sheehan, Morris and Hassard (2000) 120 state: 
"The economic reform process in China, with all its organizational implications, 
is multifaceted. Included is state-sponsored marketisation, state-sponsored ownership 
diversity, the infusion of foreign capital, and reform of state-owned enterprises. " 
Due to limited academic research, management theory is impoverished in China, 
particularly in the period of centrally-planned socialism. We can only trace the 
evolution of practices in the light of developments in China. These are now discussed; 
first, in state sector enterprises followed by an analysis of the features found in the 
non-state sector. 
2.2.1 Managerial Reforms in State-Owned Sector 
120 Sheehan, J.; Morris, J. and Hassard, J. (2000), ̀ Redundancies in Chinese state enterprises: a research 
report', Journal of Industrial Relations, 39 (3), July 2000, pp486-501. 
75 
Following administrative decentralization, the state-owned enterprises and 
collective-owned enterprises were managed by local governments and they were 
given a certain degree of operational autonomy. The contract-responsibility system 
was replaced a modem corporate system in which the state was entitled to a dividend 
on its shares in state-owned enterprises' assets. Having fulfilled their compulsory 
delivery obligations, state-owned enterprises were allowed to sell their above-quota 
outputs to markets at market-determined prices. The state-owned enterprises and 
collective-owned enterprises were also permitted to purchase inputs from markets to 
increase production or to expand production capacity. 
Before 1999 when a considerable number of state-owned enterprises had not yet 
been reformed to the market economy, they were inflexible in structure and 
governance; weak in technological innovation; heavily in debt; had overcommitted 
social burdens; overstaffed; low productivity and lacked managerial skills in business 
operations (Lardy, 1998; Wu, 2003)121. Boisot identified four characteristics of state- 
owned enterprise management in 1987: (1) enterprise performance was hard to define 
and measure; (2) definitions of responsibility were vague; (3) rewards for good 
performance were low; (4) and a cost centre mentality prevailed. The organizational 
culture that prevailed within state-owned enterprises was inward-looking and non- 
performance oriented. These problems within state-owned enterprises reflected the 
challenges the state sector must overcome in the transformation of market economy. 
The traditional state-owned enterprises were the heritage of particularistic `feudal' 
relations rather than universalistic `market' which reforms had to change (Boisot, 
1987; Boisot and Child, 1988)122. 
The managerial evolution in state own enterprises from the transition of a 
command economy to a market-socialist economy had gone through the birth pangs 
of coping with rapid and severe fundamental changes. When the reforms started in 
1979, most state-owned enterprises were profitable. Taxes and revenues from state- 
owned enterprises and collective-owned enterprises were the government's main 
121 Lardy, N. R. (1999), China's unfinished economic revolution, China Development Press, Beijing. 
Wu, Jing-lian (2003) Contemporary China's economic reforms, Shanghai Yuandong Press, 
Shanghai. 
122 Boisot, M. H. (1987), ̀ Industrial feudalism and enterprise reform: could the Chinese use some more 
bureaucracy? ' In Management Reforms in China, (eds), edited by Malcolm Warner, Francis Pinter, 
London. 
Boisot, M. H. and Child, J. (1988), ̀ The Iron Law of Fiefs: Bureaucratic Failure and the Problem of 
Governance in the Chinese Economic Reforms', Administrative Science Quarterly, 33 (4), Dec 1988, 
pp507-527. 
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sources of fiscal income. However, in spite of a significant increase in productivity, 
the profitability of the state-owned enterprises had declined substantially since the 
market-oriented forms started. In the late 90s, more than 40 percent of state-owned 
enterprises were operating at a loss despite large amounts of implicit subsidies from 
low interest loans and other state policy protections. The decline in profitability of 
state-owned enterprises was partly attributable to the dissipation of their monopoly 
rent. However, increases in wages and other worker fringe benefits were other 
important reasons. The average annual growth rate of the state-owned enterprise wage 
fund in the state sector was 16 percent in 1978-1996, while the average annual growth 
rate of output in the same period was 7.6 percent (Lin et al, 1998)123 
Prior to economic reforms, managers of state-owned enterprises in China were 
rewarded primarily on their success in meeting physical output targets set by the 
government. There was basically no autonomy in firms with respect to many 
economic activities. The state specified detailed directives for all the state-owned 
enterprises and collective-owned enterprises to follow, and the exercise of 
performance evaluation was nearly non-existent, or at least, extremely unimportant 
(Boisot, 1987)124. Since the beginning of reforms, enterprises have increasingly been 
given more decision-making power concerning production, supply, marketing, 
financing, pricing, personnel, wages and bonus (Zhou, 1988)125. Such changes were 
reported to be triggered by the demands of managers in state-owned enterprises and 
collective-owned enterprises for increased autonomy. Equally, the government was 
also convinced that more delegation of power to the enterprise level would increase 
operational efficiency (Wu, 2003) 126 
With reforms, rewards were instead based much more heavily on the firms' tax 
payments and accounting profits. While the tax rate on firms remained high by 
Western standards, in practice more than three-quarters of retained profits went to 
firms' managers and workers. The link between accounting profits and employee 
compensation might if anything have been stronger than in Western firms (Gordon & 
123 Lin, Justin; Yi, Fu; Cai, Fang and Li, Zhou (1996), The China miracle: development strategy and 
economic reform, Chinese University Press, Hong Kong. 
124 Boisot, M. H. (1987), ̀ Industrial feudalism and enterprise reform: could the Chinese use some more 
bureaucracy? ' In Management Reforms in China, edited by Malcolm Warner, Francis Pinter, London. 
123 Zhou, Zhong-hui (1988), ̀ Chinese accounting systems and practices', Accounting, Organisations & 
Society, 13 (2), Mar1988, pp207-224. 
126 Wu, Jing-lian (2003), Contemporary China's economic reforms, Shanghai Yuandong Press, 
Shanghai. 
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Lienesch, 1991)127. However, Gordon and Lienesch suggest that due to the large 
difference between accounting prices and market prices, the amount of tax evasion 
increased quickly during the period as market prices grew with inflation while official 
prices remained relatively constant. 
The resulting loss in tax revenue led the government in 1986-1987 to shift to a 
contract responsibility system in which each firm signed a contract with the 
government, typically for three to five years, agreeing to minimum tax payments 
during each year of the contract. It was also designed as a performance evaluation 
system of the enterprise, in order to minimize the loss of control brought about by 
autonomy decentralization (Liu, 1995)128. The functions of the contract responsibility 
system was to achieve three objectives (Xie and Lin, 1992)129 
" Assure a stable growth in government income 
" Change government's control over enterprises from direct to indirect 
intervention; and 
. Create an environment for the emergence of entrepreneurs 
The main objective of the system is to encourage entrepreneurialism and 
stimulate people's inventive to work by specifying certain targets to be achieved and 
linking their achievements to their reward systems. Basically, this is similar to the 
budgetary evaluation system in a modern firm (Liu, 1995). Under this system, the 
Government contracts the enterprise out to be a contractor, which may be an 
individual, a group of individuals or an entire enterprise. Normally the contractor will 
be the chief executive officer of the enterprise (Tang et at, 1994)130. The contractor 
commits to fulfilling various targets or production indexes, of which a profit target is 
normally the major one. A base amount of profit has to be ascertained as a reference 
for setting the profit targets in each year within the contract period. The contractor 
may also be rewarded or penalized by means of pecuniary remuneration. Targets and 
remuneration are negotiated between the government and the contractor for each 
127 Gordon, R. H. and Lienesch, W. (1991), ̀ Chinese enterprise behaviour under the reforms', American 
economic Review, 81 (2), May 1991, pp. 202-207. 
128 Liu, K. C. (1995), ̀ State control and performance evaluation - the case of state own enterprise in 
China', International Journal of Public Sector Management, 8 (6), Sep 1995, pp39-50. 
12' Xie, Q. H. and Lin, Y. F. (1992), The theory and practice of state assets management, Economic 
Science Press, China. 
130 Tang, Y. W.; Chow, L. and Cooper, B. J. (1994), Accounting and finance in China: a review of 
current practice, Longman, Hong Kong. 
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enterprise, so that the terms of contracts are always different from each other (Li et al, 
1993) 131 
The contract responsibility system emerged at a time when there was virtually no 
system of performance evaluation for state-owned enterprises. It has played a role of 
introducing the concept of performance evaluation during the course of managerial 
evolution in China. The system normally works best in profitable enterprises. Those 
enterprises which are suffering losses are incapable of taking out a contract with the 
government, because it is difficult for them to guarantee future profits. Moreover, 
after the government gives the partial right of control and recourse of surplus to the 
contractor, the boundaries of property rights in state-owned enterprises and collective- 
owned enterprises becomes even more ambiguous. In subsequence, it exaggerates the 
conflicts between the contractors of enterprises and the government in the extent to 
which the tort to the state benefits is susceptibly occurred (Wu, 2003)132. Therefore, 
in late 1993 the contract responsibility system was abandoned by the Chinese 
government, but the payroll still remained linked to profitability. Total income of 
employees increased or decreased with the ups and downs of their company's profits. 
Generally speaking, the effects of autonomy decentralization and profit retention 
have been very limited due to the untouched infrastructural administrative institution 
of the state ownership system. These measurements have improved state enterprise 
efficiency, particularly in aspects of motivation and decision making, as well as in 
information transparency. The reduced degree of government direct intervention in 
the daily operations of enterprises has facilitated the efficiency and effectiveness of 
enterprise management. However, it can not solve the in-depth structural problems of 
State-owned Enterprises, such as "soft budgets", multi-objectives, and conflicts of 
interests. Another negative effect of these reforms is "insider control" (Masahiko and 
Hyung-Ki, 1995)133. As a certain degree of autonomy is decentralized to enterprises, 
that is de facto to top management. This inevitably leads to a loss of control by the 
Party over the managers of State-owned Enterprises. The only way to inhibit "insider 
control" is the administrative intervention from the supervisory bureau of the 
131 Li, W. W.; Yang, J. L.; Chen, Y. and Wang, S. Q. (1993), `The relationship between the government 
and state enterprises in China -a study of the contract responsibility system', Institute of national 
Economy, Shanghai Academy of Social Science, Working Paper, No. 12, January 1993. 
132 Wu, Jing-lian (2003), Contemporary China's economic reforms, Shanghai Yuandong Press, 
Shanghai. 
133 Masahiko, Aoki and Hyung-Ki, Kim (1995), Corporate governance in transitional economies: 
insider control and the role of banks, (eds), World Bank, Washington DC. 
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government. However, this would then mark a return to the shortcomings of the 
centralized administration system. Enterprise directors are under the supervision of 
the party committee of the enterprise, but the division of responsibility is vague 
between them, which often results in inefficient governance. Corruption is frequent 
when supervision is weak and irresponsible. Under such conditions, some directors 
with the power of autonomy in management can transfer state capital to personal 
accounts, causing the losses of state-own assets. Such corruption has been described 
as `rent seeking activities' (Wu, 1993)134 Steinfeld (1998)135 has drawn attention to 
two main causes for rent-seeking behavior in China - one is by agencies having to 
seek new roles for themselves in the transition from central planning, and the other is 
by the absence of formal institutions and governance that are essentially required for a 
functioning market economy. 
In November 1993, the Communist Party 14th Delegates Congress determined 
several key answers to the construction of a socialist market economy which stressed 
the necessity for enterprise reforms in institutional innovation. It proposed the new 
system of `modem corporate institution' to replace the old `autonomy decentralization 
and profit retention'. `The Corporation Law' was implemented in Ist July 1994, and in 
consequence, a range of 100 state-owned enterprises was selected for the experiment 
of reforms in institutional corporatization. Until 1997, the party further clarified the 
need of reforms in corporatization by extending this to medium size state-owned 
enterprises. One of the primary aims was to reduce government interference in the 
running of large state-owned enterprises and to encourage them to behave in a more 
entrepreneurial fashion, enabling them to become internationally competitive firms 
structured along the same lines as Western corporations with Boards of Directors 
accountable to shareholders rather than being subject to the political authority of the 
Communist Party (Sheedhan, Morris, and Hassard, 2000)136. In 1999, some emphasis 
on corporate governance and multiple-investor structure were proposed. 
Corporatization of state enterprises includes the following processes: 
134 Wu, Jing-lian (1993), The theory of 'rent seeking activities' and some negative effect of China's 
economy, 2"d ed. China Finance and Economy Press, Beijing. 
131 Steinfeld, E. S. (1998), Forging reform in China: the fate of state-owned industry, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
136 Sheehan, J.; Morris, J. and Hassard, J. (2000), ̀ Redundancies in Chinese State Enterprises: A 
research Report', Journal of Industrial Relations, 39 (3), July 2000, pp. 486-501. 
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" To achieve the divorce of government administration and enterprise 
management. Under the command economy, the Chinese government 
collapsed the role of governance and role of ownership into one body. 
" To restructure state monopoly enterprises into competitive modern 
corporations. 
Under the planned economy, to achieve the economies of scale, there was 
usually one monopoly enterprise in each industry. Under the market economy, 
to create competition in the industrial environment, the state has reorganized 
and restructured state enterprises to create more competitors to break down 
these monopolies. Take the petroleum industry as an example. Prior to the 
reforms, the state set up two bureaux - `Petroleum Industry Bureau' and 
Petroleum Chemistry Bureau' to manage all the petrol businesses nationwide. 
After the reforms, these two bureaux were gradually reorganized into three 
competitive commercial companies - SINOPEC, CNPC and CNOOC. Their 
business operations are under state supervision, but they do not have the 
administrative functions of government organs. 
" Listing on domestic and international security and stock markets through the 
reorganization of assets. 
To improve their performance and management, the core assets are stripped 
from the original state enterprises, and reorganized for initial public offerings 
(IPO) and listings. The non-core assets, bad debt and redundant staff are 
retained in the original enterprises, so that the newly-created enterprises can 
possess the feasibility of IPO and listing with the prerequisite of a good record 
of performance and quality assets. Normally acquisitions and mergers are 
often employed by state-owned enterprises to gain strategic growth, IPO and 
stock market listing. 
" Establish a system of independent directors in state owned enterprises. 
The independence is the key for the function of this system. They should be 
independent business partners, independent of the major shareholders, which 
are not holding a large percent of shares of the company and are not the 
representative of any main shareholders' interests. In accordance with the 
investigation of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) in 1999, the independent directors in public listed 
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companies accounted for 62% in America, 34% in Britain and 29% in France. 
China has initiated this system as a compulsory requirement for all public 
companies in 2001. 
As Sheehan, Morris and Hassard (2000) 137 point out "reforms in this way is 
intended to make those large corporations subject to a greater degree of market 
discipline, while avoiding the still very politically sensitive step of privatizing any of 
the 'commanding heights' of Chinese heavy industry. " But although the Party 
leadership is keen to stress that this is not a programme of privatization for the largest 
state-owned enterprises, the modern enterprise system (MES) and the group company 
system (GCS) reforms are very much concerned with questions of ownership and 
property rights, suggesting that Chinese leaders have at least 'internalized the logic' 
of West European-style privatization strategies (Steinfeld, 1998)139. Furthermore, 
since 1995, the reform and restructuring of small to medium sized state-owned 
enterprises (also called `grasp large and release small'- zhua da fang xiao) was 
launched. This allows individuals and private enterprises to buy out small size state- 
owned enterprises as they are regarded as non-strategic enterprises in the state's 
economic planning. Some actions as selling-off of enterprise housing to workers, and 
the sale of shares to individual investors, bring the programme closer to at least partial 
privatization than the central government seems willing to admit (Zhang, 2000)139. 
Haier is a successful large collective-owned multinational corporation with a 
state-owned background. It is a good example of the outcome of managerial evolution 
in the state sector. Haier began as the Qingdao Refrigerator Factory, originally an 
importer of refrigerator production technologies from Germany. From modest 
beginnings, the company has grown and expanded into a prospering Chinese 
multinational corporation whose brand name has been becoming more recognizable in 
the world community over the last decade. Haier now manufactures a wide range of 
household electrical appliances in 86 categories with 13,000 specifications, and is 
now an exporter of these products to more than 160 countries. Haier's global sales in 
2002 totaled RMB 71.1 billion (US$ 8.6 billion). 10 The development of Haier 
"' Sheehan, J.; Morris, J. and Hassard, J. (2000), `Redundancies in Chinese State Enterprises: A 
research Report', Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 39, No. 3 July 2000, pp. 486-501. 
1'8 Steinfeld, E. S. (1998), Forging Reform in China: The Fate of State-owned Industry, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, p34. 
139 Zhang, Xing-quan (2000), `Housing reform and the new governance of housing in urban China', 
International Journal of Public Sector Management, 13 (6), 2000, pp. 519-525. 
140 Background information for Haier Group available at: www. haier. com (accessed 6 ̀h December 2004) 
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company reflects its success in its managerial evolution. Haier's success can be 
attributed to its prompt response to environmental changes and its implementation of 
managerial reforms. The first opportunity to Haier was from autonomy 
decentralization and the introduction of market mechanisms. As one of the outcomes 
of this transformational opportunity, Zhang Huimin was appointed as the CEO. His 
leadership and managerial talent guaranteed the first step of Haier' success. The 
second opportunity was spurred by Deng Xiao Ping' speech in 1992, which confirmed 
the direction of market development policy. This inspired Zhang Huimin to form a 
growth strategy for market competition. To gain the economies of scale, he planned to 
build Haier to be a giant in household electrical appliances industry with investment 
of 80 million RMB (US$ 9.7 million). But Haier could not get this large amount of 
loan through the State banks. As a solution, supported by the government, Haier 
issued bonds and raised 36.9 million RMB (US$4.5 million) on the stock market, 
which could be regarded as the third opportunity to boost Haier's outgrowth in a 
modern corporatised format. Then, China's rapid economic expansion brought about 
the fourth opportunity to Haier's fast expansion. Haier bought out Qingdao 
Refrigerator Factory, Qingdao Air-condition Corporation, and Guangdong Aide 
Company in 1996. These acquisitions allowed Haier to enlarge its market share in the 
electrical appliance industry and to restructure corporate management and culture. All 
of these steps in its development gradually formed the resources and capabilities for 
Haier to compete in the global market place. As a consequence of growth in size, 
Haier applied the information systems to reenergize its business management system 
so that the company could react to the market promptly. Within 2 years, Haier 
successfully integrated a management information system (MIS) across the 
corporation. The early adoption of this information system was the fifth opportunity 
for Haier's success. Following further opening-up of the market, Haier's CEO 
believed that global expansion was the sixth opportunity for its future development. 
Therefore an international strategy was vigorously promoted. Accompanied with this 
strategy, Haier evolved its management in a global perspective. It built its competence 
in both price and quality and established strategic alliances with many international 
rivals. Haier constructed a learning organization culture to constantly advance its 
management knowledge to cope with the rapid changing environment. Its famous 
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logistics innovation in supply-chain management provided a pattern and an example 
141 for successful Chinese management (Chen et al, 2004) Valuable lessons can be 
learned from Haier' success in how state-owned enterprises can be restructured and 
reformed for their managerial evolution in order to fit into the market economy. 
2.2.2 The Emergence of The Non-State Economy 
Besides state-owned enterprises and collective-owned enterprises included in 
the state sector, the other two types of business - privately-owned enterprises (POEs) 
and foreign joint-ventures (FJVs), are categorized in the non-state sector. In detail 
classification, privately-owned enterprises can be consequently divided into two 
spheres with two specifications respectively. One sphere is domestic enterprises 
which include individual enterprises with fewer than 8 employees and larger private 
enterprises with more than 8 employees. The other area is that of foreign investment 
which includes - wholly-owned foreign firms and joint venture firms. In addition, 
township-villageship enterprises (TVEs) can be regarded as part of the non-state 
sector. The boundaries between TVEs and private enterprises has blurred over time, 
since the prolonged reforms in the TVE sector, especially the nationwide campaign to 
restructure them, has changed the nature and governance structure of TVEs, so that 
some have been transformed into collective-owned enterprises; others partially 
privatized, with township and village governments continuing to hold a minority stake; 
and others even wholly privatized by the sale of the entire stake to managers, 
employees and/or community residents (Ding et al, 2004)142. Although China's Law 
on township-villageship enterprises, effective on 1 January 1997, officially defined 
township-village enterprises as "different types of enterprises that are established in 
townships (including villages under their jurisdiction) with the bulk of capital being 
invested by the rural economic collectives or farmers. " (Che and Qian, 1998)143 
2.2.3 The Development Path of The Non-State Economic Sector 
141 Chen, J. C. H.; Lin, Bin-shan.; Li, Ling-li. and Chen, P. S. (2004), `Logistics management in China: 
a case study of Haier', Human Systems Management, 23 (1), 2004, pp. 15-27. 
142 Ding, D. Z.; Ge, G. and Warner, M. (2004), ̀ Evolution of organizational governance and human 
resource management in China's township and village enterprises', International Journal of Human 
Resource Management, 15 (4), June/August 2004, pp. 836-852. 
143 Che, J. H. and Qian, Y. (1998), ̀ Institutional Environment, Community Government, and Corporate 
Governance: Understanding China's Township-Village Enterprises', Journal of Law, Economics and 
Organization, 14 (1), pp. 1-23. 
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The development of the non-state economic sector initiated in 1978, started to 
break down the ideological obstacles of the soviet model after 1997. This sector's 
prosperity made a remarkable contribution to the growth of the whole economy. In 
general, the gradual evolution of the non-state sector into a market structure 
proceeded through the following paths (Garnaut et al, 2001; Ho, 1994)144: 
(1) The Liberalization of Individual Businesses 
In 1979 after the Cultural Revolution, a good deal of intellectual youth who were 
sent to the rural counties for re-education, returned to the urban cities. This 
generated employment pressures and so the government opened up the economy 
for entrepreneurship. On July 1981, the state council issued laws to clearly define 
the boundaries of enterprises as `businesses employing fewer than 8 as the divide 
between individual enterprises and private enterprises'. As in the early 80s, 
enterprises hiring more than 8 employees were regarded as `exploiters' and not 
part of a socialist economy. 
(2) The Prevalence of `The Contract Farm' On The Basis of the Peasant's Family 
From 1980 to 1982, the contract responsibility system prevailed in rural areas 
after the commune system was dissolved. Peasants with contracted responsibilities 
were permitted to set up their own family farms on the collective owned lands in 
their villages. Officially it was called `collectively-owned corporation economy', 
although de facto it was a private ownership economy. 
(3) The Development of Township-Village Enterprises 
During the 80s, the development of township-villageship enterprises prospered 
and became an important component of the national economy, as well as the key 
supporting force for economic growth in the 1990s. Total industrial production of 
township-villageship enterprises reached RMB 160 million (US$ 19 million) in 
1992, accounting for 35 per cent of total national industrial production. 
Employment in township-village enterprises exceeded 100 million people and 
equaled to total employment in state-owned enterprises in the same year (Chen, 
1994)145. There is consistent evidence that township-villageship enterprises 
outperformed state-owned enterprises in productivity growth (Wu, 1995; Jefferson, 
144 Gamaut, R.; Li, G. S.; Yang, Y. and Wang, X. (2001), Private Enterprise in China, Asia Pacific 
Press, Australia. 
Ho, S. (1994), Rural China in Transition: Non-agricultural Development in Rural Jiangsu, 1978- 
1990. oxford University Press, Oxford. 
145 Chen, N. X. (1994), The study on direction of policy for township-village enterprises in China, 
Economic Management Press, Beijing, p262. 
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1999)146, even though township-village enterprises in general had low-technology 
production methods and obtained technical expertise from state-owned enterprises 
(Peng et al, 1997). 147 Many township-villageship enterprises adapted an export- 
oriented development strategy. The exports of township-villageship enterprises 
had an annual growth rate of 10 percent for five successive years from 1995 to 
2000. In 2000, the total value of exports by township-villageship enterprises 
reached RMB 867 billion (US$ 105 billion), accounting for one third of China's 
total exports. 148 
Township-villageship enterprises in different areas illustrate different 
characteristics, and their ownership structures are various. Based on their sources 
of initial investment, structure of ownership, industrial orientation, income 
distribution and management systems, Chinese economists (Chen, 1998; Zuo, 
2001 )149 have classified township-village enterprises into three models: 
" The southern Jiangsu model (Sunanmoshi), characterized by a 
dominant initial investment by township and village government. 
9 The Wenzhou model (Wenzhoumoshi), featuring private ownership 
under the disguise of the `red hat', i. e. officially `socialist'; 
" The Pearl River Delta model, (Guangdongmoshi), distinguished by 
foreign direct investment and export-oriented manufacturing. 
(4) The Expansion of Foreign Joint Ventures During Liberalization 
In 1979, the enactment of "Corporation Law of Sino Joint Ventures" (Zhongwai 
Hezi Qiye Fa) marked the turning point in the market transition from forbidden 
foreign direct investment (FDI) to encouraging FDI into China. The main focus of 
this strategy was to gain advanced technology and to learn modem management 
experience from foreign companies, in order to enhance the competitiveness of 
indigenous firms. The old strategy of import substitution for China's industrial 
development is then replaced by an export-oriented strategy driven by 
11 Wu, Yan-rui (1995), `Productivity growth, technological progress, and technical efficiency change 
in China: a three sector analysis', Journal of Comparative Economics, 21 (2), Oct1995, pp. 207-230. 
Jefferson, G. H. (1999), `Are China's Rural Enterprises Outperforming State Enterprises? Estimating 
the Pure Ownership Effect'. In Jefferson, G. H. and Singh, I. (eds) Enterprise Reform in China: 
Ownership, Transition, and Performance. Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 153-170. 
'47 Peng, Y.; Zuck, L. G. and Darby, M. R. (1997), `Chinese Rural Industrial Productivity and Urban 
Spillovers', NBER Working Paper, No. 6202. National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge. 
China's Township and Village Enterprises Daily, 9`" July, 2001. 
'49 Chen, J. Y. (1998), Township and Village Enterprises Model Studies, China Social Science, Beijing. 
Zuo, Z. (2001), `Characteristics and Origin of Pearl River Delta Model', Journal of Economics & 
Management Strategy, 10 (3), pp435-461. 
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liberalization and foreign direct investment. From 1979 to 1988, the Chinese 
government established 5 `economic development zones' and initially assigned 
opening 14 coastal cities as experimental frontiers for the implementation of its 
marketisation policy. Since the mid-90s the country has been the second large 
recipient of foreign direct investment worldwide (after USA). This is due to two 
factors at large: investment incentives offered by Chinese government and the 
county's abundance of low-cost labor. The expansion of foreign joint-ventures in 
the market have brought new western management concepts into indigenous firms, 
and improved the competitive market environment (Warner, 2004; Wong and 
Salter, 2002; Jiang, 2006)15°. In the 1980s and 1990s, China's employment pattern 
and economy has been characterized by the downsizing of the state sector and the 
fast-growing share of foreign direct investment companies and joint-ventures in 
the country. Figure 2.3 illustrates this trend. Annual average number of employees 
in foreign-invested enterprise has increased from 7.75 million in 1998 to 18.99 
million persons in 2005 whereas number of employees has declined in state- 
owned enterprise from 37.47 million in 1998 to 18.74 million in 2005. Therefore, 
foreign direct investment firms and foreign joint-ventures are major employers 
that rely heavily on the rural labor force, offering nonstandard (often in the form 
of temporary) employment on a large scale. As a result, the employment policies 
and practices of these firms have a strong bearing on reshaping the pool of human 
resources and the experience of work for a significant proportion of workers in 
China (Cooke, 2004)151 
150 Warner, M. (2004), "Late development' experience and the evolution of transnational firms in the 
People's Republic of China', Asia Pacific Business Review, 10 (3/4), Spring/Summer 2004, pp. 324- 
345. 
Wong, A. L. Y. and Salter, J. R. (2002), `Executive development in China: is there any in a Western 
sense? ', International Journal of Human Resource Management, 13 (2), Mar2002, pp. 338-360. 
Jiang, Fu-ming (2006), ̀ The determinants of the effectiveness of foreign direct investment in China: an 
empirical study of joint and sole ventures', International Journal of Management, 23 (4), Dce2006, 
rrn. 891-908. 
Cooke, F. L. (2004), `Foreign firms in China: modelling HRM in a toy manufacturing corporation', 
Human Resource Management Journal, 14 (3), 2004, pp. 31-53. 
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Figure 2.3 Annual Average Number of Employees in Different Types 
of Enterprise Ownership'52 







1998 3747.78 160.8 775.19 
1999 3394.58 229.06 791.86 
2000 2995.25 346.42 852.96 
2001 2675.11 541.52 938.98 
2002 2423.63 732.90 1054.34 
2003 2162.87 1027.61 1258.67 
2004 1973.20 1515.43 1755.26 
2005 1874.85 1692.06 1899.52 
source: c; nma statistics Year 15oox 2005, p526-549. 
(5) The Legitimatization of Privately-Owned Enterprise 
After this process of reform in the early 80s, China's economy was finally opened 
to foreign investment and for individual businesses. But private businesses (which 
hired more than 8 employees) were still regarded as abandoned capitalism. But 
following the growth of the market, private enterprises expanded greatly in the 
mid-1980s. The Communist Party headed by Deng Xiaoping was determined to 
admit to the existence of a private economy. Until 1988, the development of the 
private sector economy was subsumed in an amendment of the Constitution in the 
7`h People Delegate Congress (Qian, 1993)ßs3 
Private enterprises were initially permitted as a supplement to the state and 
collective sectors. Private enterprises first took hold in the rural sectors, as an 
outgrowth of the virtual privatization of agriculture, and in small-scale individual 
enterprises in the urban sectors. During the mid-1980s, large private enterprises 
grew out of these rural and individual enterprises, and out of collective-owned 
enterprises and state-owned enterprises. Some were sole proprietorships that grew 
and hired more employees. By 1988, when private firms were officially 
recognized, China had 500,000 individual enterprises that could be called private 
152 China Statistics Year Book 2005, compiled by National Bureau of Statistics of China, China 
Statistics Press, Beijing, p526-549. 
153 Qian, Ying-yi (1993), Contemporary economics and China economic reforms, China People's 
University Press, Beijing. 
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firms (Gregory and Tenev, 200 1). 154 The change in political sentiment following 
the voice of protest from some conservative socialists opposed to the emergence 
of private enterprise caused a temporary setback to the growth of private 
enterprise. But Deng Xiaoping famous `south talk' and `south tour' in September 
1992 opened the way for renewed growth. During the 1990s, the government 
encouraged the privatization of smaller, non-strategic state-owned enterprises and 
allowed collective-owned enterprises to transform into private enterprises. In 1997, 
4,180,000 laid-off workers and employees in the state sector found new work in 
the private sector. (Zhang, 2002) 155 The number of registered private firms rose 
from 655 thousand in 1995 to 12 million in 2005, the average growth rate reached 
94.5%; Employment in the private sector increased from 9.56 million in 1995 to 
169.2 million in 2005, almost 18 fold increment. Relevant production and value 
added of private industry all mounted up dramatically (See figure 2.4; 2.5; 2.6; 
2.7). As Gregory and Tenev (2001) says, 
"It is evident that new employment in the private sector has exceeded the 
combined total for state, collective, and township-and-village enterprises. This 
explosive development is in sharp contrast to the decline of the State-owned 
Enterprises and Collective-owned Enterprises. The Private sector has become an 
important source of job creation, absorbing a significant number of workers laid 
off from State-owned Enterprises. " 
154 Gregory, N. and Tenev, S. (2001), ̀ Special Report: China's Private Sector - China's Home-Grown Entrepreneurs', The China Business Review, 28 (1), Jan/Feb2001, pp. 14-18. Iss Zhang, H. W. et al (2002). The development report of private enterprise in China 2001, Social 
Science Literature Press, Beijing. 
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156 Working capitals refer to capitals that an enterprise can cash or use during one year or one 
production cycle that may exceeds one year, including cash and savings deposits of various forms, 
short-term investment, money receivable and prepaid money, inventories, etc. (China Statistical 
Yearbook 2006, p574) 
157 Value added of industry refers to the final results of industrial production of industrial enterprises 
in money terms during the reference period. Value-added of industry in this China Statistical Yearbook 
is calculated by production approach as follows: 
Value-added of industry = gross industrial output - industrial intermediate input + value-added tax 
(China Statistical Yearbook 2006, p574) 
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According to an OECD Economic Survey of China in 2005158, private-owned 
companies that are controlled neither by state nor collective shareholders, are 
responsible for as much as 57% of the value-added production of the non-farm 
business sector in 2003. Overall, between 1998 and 2003, the progressive 
evolution in government policies allowed a fivefold rise in the output of 
domestically-owned private companies. By contrast, the output of the state sector 
rose by just over 70% in this period. (See figure 2.8) 
Figure 2.8 The Private Sector Outpaces the Public Sector in China 
Per cent of Value added by firm ownership 
Change (over 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1998 & 2003) 
Non-farm business sector 
Private Sector 43 45.3 47.7 51.8 54.6 57.1 14.1 
Public Sector 57 54.7 52.3 48.2 45.4 42.9 - 14.1 
State-controlled 40.5 40.1 39.6 37.1 35.2 34.1 - 6.4 
Collectively-owned 16.5 14.7 12.7 11.2 10.1 8.8 -7.7 
Total (79 per cent of 100 
GDP) 100 100 100 100 100 
Economy-wide 
Private Sector 50.4 51.5 52.8 55.5 57.4 59.2 8.8 
Public Sector 49.6 48.5 47.2 44.5 42.6 40.8 - 8.8 
State-controlled 36.9 37.1 37.3 35.7 34.6 33.7 -3.2 
Collectively-owned 12.7 11.3 10 8.8 8 7.1 - 5.6 TOTAL 
(100 per cent of GDP) 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: OECD Economic Survey of China 2005 
Nevertheless, policy discriminations still remain on privately-owned enterprises. 
Although the private-owned enterprises have been permitted to have import and 
export license since 1998, the government has set higher entry barriers on private 
owners for the granting of import and export licenses. For instance, according to the 
"Provisional Stipulation of Self-managing Licenses for Imports and Exports by 
Privately-Owned Enterprises" by the Ministry of Foreign Economy and Trade, the 
conditions for the granting of licenses to privately-owned enterprises, must be: (1) net 
assets above RMB 850 million (USD$103 million); (2) net annual sales revenues 
above RMB 300 million (USD$ 36 million); (3) the possession of teams of 
'58 OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) Economic Survey of China 2005: chapter 2- Improving the productivity of the business sector, 16'" September 2005. 
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professionals and specialists in the import and export business (Sun, 2005). 159 Such 
higher entry barriers have restricted the growth of privately-owned enterprises in 
international markets. As figure 2.9 illustrates, it is obvious privately-owned 
enterprises only contribute a small portion of exports (USD$692.5 billion) and 
imports (USD$419.8 billion) by comparison with state-owned enterprises with 
USD$1535.9 billion of exports and USD$1764.5 billion of imports in 2004. The 
dominate players in foreign trade are foreign-owned enterprises which account for the 
majority share of exports and imports. The growth rates of export (99.3% and 70.8%) 
for the private enterprise are significantly higher than the state sector (11.4% and 
23.9%), which demonstrates the huge potential of competitiveness of private-owned 
enterprises in the future growth. (See Figure 2.9)160 
Figure 2.9 China Foreign Trade Composition by Enterprise Ownerships in 2004 
Unit: Billion USD$ and per cent16' 
Economic Export Import 
Components Amount Growth Rate (%) Amount Growth Rate (%) 
Total 4922 35.4 5010.2 36.0 
State-owned 
Enterprises 
1535.9 11.4 1764.5 23.9 
Foreign-Invested 
Enterprises 
3386.1 40.9 3245.7 40.0 
Collective-owned 
Enterprises 
317.9 26.5 177.2 33.9 
Privately-owned 
Enterprises 
692.5 99.3 419.8 70.8 
Source: China roreign economy ana 1 rase Yearbook (ZOOS), p64. 
2.2.4 Management Practices in the Private Sector under Market Socialism 
China's increasing reliance on private companies as a motor for economic 
growth and new jobs has received official confirmation in a national survey showing 
159 Sun, Yu-chin (2005), The effect of economic reforms on the foreign trade systems, University Press 
of Foreign Economy and Trade, Beijing, p153-154. 
160 China Economy and Trade Yearbook (2005), Compiled by Committee of Inspection and 
Adminstration of State Assets, State Council, China Economy Press, Beijing, p64. 
161 The level approach is applied to calculating percentage of growth rate in this table, which is derived 
by comparing the level of the last year of the interval with that of the beginning year. The statistics in 
this table is adopted from: 
China Foreign Economy and Trade Yearbook (2005), compiled by the Committee of Inspection and 
Administration of State Assets, State Council, China Economy Press, Beijing, p64. 
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them outpacing the economy as a whole (McGregor, 2004)162. Unlike the large size of 
state-owned enterprises, private enterprises are normally small to medium size. On the 
whole, small and medium-sized enterprises are extremely important for providing 
social stability and incomes in the provinces. They are most common in labor- 
intensive industries, constituting an enormous sphere of employment and a significant 
source of local revenues at district and county levels. Small and medium-sized 
enterprises are close to the market and to the customer, and with their flexible 
operating mechanisms and high potential for renewal; they help expand the scale of 
the market economy. They are active in spheres where large enterprises do not yet or 
cannot operate, filling in market niches and engaging in multiple product lines, small- 
series production and service. Production costs are often lower for small and medium- 
sized enterprises than for large enterprises, and their simple operating procedures 
allow these smaller enterprises to accommodate new systems in their businesses fairly 
painlessly (Fan, 2002). 163 Since the beginning of reforms, the modernization of 
management systems has taken place mostly in small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Contracting, leasing, mergers, auctions, bankruptcies, and other reform measures were 
tried first in small and medium-sized enterprises, where they became widespread 
(Peng et al, 2004; Sun and Duan, 2003)'64. 
2 . 2.4.1 
Characteristics of Privately-Owned Enterprises 
Private enterprises are organized in a very informal way because of how the 
domestic private sector emerged from its history; in the shadow of the state economy. 
Many private enterprises possess only the vaguest of property rights, ownership 
structures, corporate governance mechanisms, financial records, and rights to market 
access. The policy environment to date has heavily favored state-owned enterprises, 
whether in providing access to markets or to finance. Since 2005, private enterprises 
have been allowed to establish businesses in many previously restricted areas, such as 
infrastructure, public utilities and financial services (OECD, 2005). 165 However, 
162 McGregor, R. (2004), ̀ Chinese growth bound tightly to private sector', Financial Times, Friday 27"' 
August, 2004. 
163 Fan, Chun-yun (2002), 'Government support for small and medium-sized enterprises in China', 
Problems of Economic Transition, 45 (11), Mar2003, pp. 51-58. 
164 Peng, G.; Huang, W. P. and Guo, Y. S. (2004) Studies on theory and practice of economic 
development in China, China People University Press, Beijing. 
Sun, Li. and Duan, Ya-bing (2003), The development path to the small and medium-sized enterprise: 
the rise of small giant, China Times and Economies Press, Beijing. 
165 OECD, Economic Survey of China 2005, chapter 1: key challenges for the Chinese economy. 
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policy discrimination is still significant for this privately-owned sector (Li, et al, 
2004)166 
This informality gives entrepreneurs great flexibility to respond to an uncertain 
business environment composed of unclear and rapidly changing government policies, 
taxes, and regulations. But it hampers their ability to raise capital, reward managers 
and employees, and operate efficiently. Due to lack of management skills and 
professional managers, private enterprises tend to be stuck in a framework of legal, 
financial, and governance structures that they have outgrown them in terms of the size 
and complexity of their businesses. In private enterprises, entrepreneurs are the spirit 
of organization as they start up their enterprises and take the direct and central 
supervision for management. They make all the decisions and take all the risks for 
business ventures. Their success or failure determines the fate of their enterprises. As 
Schlevogt (200 1)167 has suggested, the private Chinese organizational model tends to 
be very centralized with an informal structure and strong entrepreneurship that 
emphases enterprise networks and traditional cultural values. These distinguish them 
from state-owned enterprises and collective-owned enterprises. 
2.2.4.2 Family-Owned Enterprises' Management Style 
A "family-style management" is a significant feature for a great deal of private 
enterprises, as a large portion of them have been developed from individual and 
family-owned businesses. The start-up owners are usually the president or CEO which 
control the majority or the total shareholding of the company with absolute authority. 
The phenomenon can be termed `dictatorship by the owner-manager' (Montagu- 
Pollock, 1991)168. Other core members of the family are often in charge of important 
positions in the company, which comprise the hierarchical level of core decision- 
making. Their relatives and friends normally form the management group in charge of 
daily operations and routines. Outside the hierarchy of family and relatives are the 
regular employees. This pattern shapes the traditional hierarchy of family-style 
businesses (Sun and Duan, 2003; Yun and Chen, 2000; Schlevogt, 2001). 169 Whyte 
166 Li, Shao-min; Ian, V. and Zhou, Dong-shen (2004), 'The emergence of private ownership in China', 
Journal of Business Research, 57(10), 2004, pp. 1145-1152. 
167 Schlevogt, K. A. (2001), ̀ The Distinctive Structure of Chinese Private Enterprises: State versus 
Private Sector', Asia Pacific Business Review, 7 (3), Spring 2001, pp. 1-33. 168 Montagu-Pollock, M. (1991), ̀ All the Right Connections', Asian Business, 27 (1), 1991, pp. 20-24. 169 Sun, Li and Duan, Ya-bing (2003), The development path to the small and medium-sized enterprise: 
the rise of small giants, China Times and Economies Press, Beijing. 
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(1995) 170 states that in private firms `the dynamics of Chinese families are absolutely 
central'. Within this centralization of family-order hierarchy, the boundary of 
responsibility is not clearly defined and the division of work is vague. The parents of 
the family directly supervise all the business affairs and intervene in all the decisions- 
making (Yun and Chen, 2000). The advantages of this type of centralized hierarchy 
can be viewed as follows: 
" Top management (family members) knows what is going on in daily 
operations and business development, so they can respond quickly to market 
changes. Their prompt decision-making avails the company to grasp 
opportunities in the changing market place. 
" The stability of decision-making reduces the risk of key staff turnover, and 
tends to maintain comparatively steady business operations. 
" The core of the enterprise, comprised by family members and relatives, is 
coherently unified with the same family values. Trust among them 
significantly reduces the management cost at large, and drives the coherence 
in achieving organizational goals. 
Chinese family enterprises emphasize traditional cultural values as the core spirit 
in their organizations. These stress loyalty and filialness, humaneness, diligence and 
obedience to patriarch authority. They insist on the value of harmony and stress the 
need to establish business networks with personal relations, including good 
relationships with governments. More specifically, Lockett (1988)1 
71 also emphasizes 
some basic characteristics of Chinese culture as important influencing factors on 
organizational structure and management practices: respect for age and hierarchy, 
group orientation, "keeping face" and the importance of relationships (guanxi). These 
characteristics are regarded as the main reasons for family-based enterprises' success 
overseas as well as in China. However, problems for this type of management style 
often emerge when they grow in size. Then the shortcomings of this style of 
management structure and concepts appear as consequence. For instance, due to the 
highly centralized decision-making by one entrepreneur - the owner, the survival of 
Yun, G. P. and Chen, Q. Z. (2000), Study of Chinese enterprises' management in East-South Asia, 
Economies & Management Press, Beijing. 
10 Whyte, M. K. (1995), ̀ The Social Roots of China's Economic Development', The China Quarterly, 
144 (3), December 1995, pp. 999-1019. 
171 Lockett, M. (1988), ̀ Culture and the Problem of Chinese Management', Organization Studies, 9 (4), 
1988, pp. 475-496. 
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the enterprise is bounded to one person so that the wrong decision once made, will 
inevitably lead to a big loss or failure for the whole organization. The highest 
authority that ascends from father to son cannot guarantee the son is the most capable 
of being an effective manager to run the organization. The informal accounting 
system often lacks public credibility. Their emphasis on business networks with 
personal relations also narrows their awareness of legitimacy, particularly a heavy 
reliance on government relationships for business opportunities. This can lead to a 
vulnerable position as they get affected by changes in policy and governments, 
although these could be advantages when they are in small scale. Weidenbaum 
(1996) 172 argues that Chinese family businesses are unlikely to become global as 
Chinese entrepreneurs are deeply rooted in philosophical traditions which make it 
difficult for the Chinese to enter into a structured and professional management style 
in a Western sense. The literature on Chinese business includes criticism of 
management practices derived from Chinese traditions: lack of formal structure; 
opaque systems and unclear decision-making processes; collectivism; lack of 
individual initiative and over-reliance on relationships (guanxi) to gain advantage 
(Laaksonen, 1988; Warner, 1992; Boisot and Liang, 1992; Child, 1994; ). 1 73 
In a contingency perspective, `there is no single best way to organize for 
effective performance of an organization. Rather, the key to organizational 
effectiveness rests in matching internal organizational characteristics to the demands 
of the work the organization must perform in achieving its goals' (Lorsch and Morse, 
1974)' 74. Therefore, when the organization expands in scale, it should change its 
internal structure and management in order to match the external environment. For 
example, such internal changes should be made in aspects of the adoption of the 
modern corporation to replace the old centralized patriarchal structure, and the 
divorce of ownership and management for a more professionalized management style. 
172 Weidenbaum, M. (1996), `The Chinese family business enterprise', California Management Review, 
38 (4), 1996, pp. 141-156. 
13 Laaksonen, O. (1988), Management in China during & after Mao, De Gruyter, Berlin. 
Warner, M. (1992), How Chinese Managers Learn: Management and Industrial Training in China, 
Macmillan, London. 
Boisot, M. and Liang, X. G. (1992), ̀ The nature of managerial work in the Chinese enterprise reforms, 
a study of six directors', Organization Studies, 13 (2), 1992, pp. 161-184. 
Child, J. (1994), Management in China during the Age of Reform, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
174 Lorsch, J. W. and Morse, J. J. (1974), Organisations and their members: a contingency approach, 
Harper & Row Publishers, New York. 
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2.2.4.3 Features of Township-Village Enterprise 
As Deng Xiaoping has commented the success of township-village enterprises in 
the non-state economy is their outgrowth from agriculture reforms. Therefore, 
township-village enterprises cannot be neglected from studying management practices 
in this sector. Many researchers have looked for underlying reasons to explain the 
historical remarkable success of township-village enterprises in the Chinese economy. 
Researchers have found their success is due to the shortage of major product markets 
in 1980s in China, cheap rural labor, tax concessions by local government, and 
distortions in state industries (Byrd and Lin, 1990; Ho, 1994; Naughton, 1994). 175 
Others have noted that These enterprises unique institutional structures facilitate co- 
operation through implicit contracts among community members (Weitzman and Xu, 
1994) 176; the inter-organizational relationships between township-village enterprises 
and township-village governments (Jin and Qian, 1998; Zhang, 1999) 177 and 
township-village enterprises capacity to adapt and configure their strategy in response 
to the external competitive environment contributes to their success (Luo et al., 
1998)178. Further, systematic research on human resource management practices in 
twenty cases of township-village enterprises has identified that as firms move toward 
clearer property rights relations and more formal institutional structures, recruitment, 
rewards, performance evaluation, labor relations and so on have been affected in order 
to become sources of competitive advantage and to contribute to firm's performance 
(Ding et al, 2004). A vast majority of these enterprises have undergone structural 
reforms in property rights and ownership through various stages of development. In 
many firms, the initial stakes held by local township-village enterprises have been 
totally or partially privatized. Five common types of township-village enterprises with 
regards to their governance and structures and their respective features of 
"s Byrd, W. A. and Lin, Q. S. (1990), China's rural industry, structure, development, and reform, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Ho, S. (1994), Rural China in transition: non-agricultural development in rural Jiangsu, 19 78-1990, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Naughton, B. (1994), `Chinese institutional innovation and privatization from below', American 
Economic Review, 84 (2), 1994, pp. 266-270. 
16 Weitzman, M. and Xu, C. (1994), ̀ Chinese township -village enterprises as vaguely defined 
cooperatives', Journal of Comparative Economics, 18 (2), 1994, pp. 410-437. "' Jin, H. and Qian, Y. Y. (1998), `Public versus private ownership of fums: evidence from rural 
China', The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113 (4), August 1998, pp. 773-809. 
Zhang, Z. (1999), ̀ Rural industrialization in China: from backyard furnaces to township and village 
enterprises', East Asia, 18 (2), Autumn 1999, pp. 61-87. 
178 Luo, Ya-dong.; Tan, J. J. and Shenkar, O. (1998), 'Strategic responses to competitive pressure: the 
case of township and village enterprises in China', Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 15 (1), 
Apr1998, pp. 33-50. 
98 
management practices are classified by Ding et al (2004) 179 in their research. These 
are: 
(1) Responsibility systems (zeren zhi). Under this system, the general managers 
sign the responsibility contract with the township-village Enterprises. The 
general manager has substantial decision-making autonomy over the firm's 
operations and is highly motivated to achieve the pre-set goals. However, the 
incentive to pursue profit maximization is hindered by the fear of this year's 
success becoming next year's disaster. Line-workers and lower-level 
managers tend to have very small bonuses as incentives, which hamper their 
motivation for better performance. 
(2) Collateral or non-collateral contracting (diya chengbao or wudiya chengbao). 
In the early and mid90s, leasing contracts were popular in small and medium- 
sized township-village enterprises. Under this governance, the local township- 
village enterprises search for an appropriate contract bidder and grants full 
authority to operate the firm for a certain period of time in exchange for the 
rent payment as stipulated in the contract. The ownership of property and 
assets remain with the local township-village enterprise, but the `lease 
contractor' has total authority to run the firm, and is fully motivated by their 
own control over residual profits. However, the decision-making tends to be 
biased toward maximizing the short-term profits for the contracting period, 
which is in many cases at the expenses of the firm's long-term benefits. As 
the scale of firm is normally small, the human resource management functions 
are very preliminary and investment in training and development is scant. 
(3) Joint ventures with foreign investment (hezi qiye). Township-village 
enterprises entering strategic alliances with foreign firms are encouraged and 
preferred by the Chinese authority, because local firms can benefit from the 
capital, technology and advanced management concepts brought in by the 
foreign investors. Indeed, township-village enterprises are exposed to foreign 
management concepts and mentalities. As new management systems are 
introduced, fundamental changes often take place in management practices in 
all major management areas, including recruitment, training and development, 
179 Ding, D. Z., Ge, G. and Warner, M. (2004), `Evolution of organizational governance and human 
resource management in China's township and village enterprises', International Journal of Human 
Resource Management, 15 (4), June/August 2004, pp. 836-852. 
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reward and performance evaluation. The degree of change depends largely on 
the business objectives of joint venture partners. 
(4) Joint stock firms (gufen gongsi), also referred to as the `share-cooperative 
system'. Followed by enterprise reforms, township-village enterprises are 
restructured in terms of the clarification of property rights relations and 
separation of government administration from the enterprise management, so 
as to improve their efficiency. Under this governance, the existing capital of 
the township-village enterprise is divided into shares held by various 
stakeholders. The local township-village enterprise that has bulk investment 
may partially or totally privatize its stake and withdraw its control over 
business operations. The patterns of how the company shares are distributed 
have a great bearing on management practices. The general manager or the 
key managers who have relatively high percentage of shares tend to have a 
high incentive to perform, whereas the line-workers may not significantly 
change their attitude to work. In firms where the majority share is held by a 
single person, human resources are managed as if in a truly private company. 
(5) Publicly-listed companies (shangshi gongsi). In the process of transforming a 
formerly centrally planned economy into a market-oriented one, the Chinese 
government has experimentally established an equity capital market by setting 
up two stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen. Since then, it has been 
maintaining high standards vis-ä-vis the qualifications of the firms to be listed; 
that is, only very successful companies can get approval. These firms, large in 
scale, have a formal management systems and accounting procedures. They 
have the most developed and formal management functions, compared with 
management practices under other governance forms. Especially, Ding et al 
(2004)'s research discovered that for `publicly-quoted firms' with over 2000 
employees, "The importance of management is emphasized from a strategic 
perspective for management planning and managing, as usually a deputy 
general manager or a member of the board of directors is in charge of main 
management functions, the major departments having full authority to make 
all decisions in their own domain. " 
As a general pattern, township-village enterprises recruit line-workers locally, 
but search nationwide for professionals. Local recruitment gives preference to local 
residents in order to release local unemployment issues. In most township-village 
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enterprises, training is limited to improving employees' technical skills for better 
performance. In publicly-quoted companies, there are more formal training programs 
and they invest substantially in staff development. 
One of the significant differences between state-owned enterprises and township- 
village enterprises is their performance-based reward systems. Due to an abundant 
supply of migrants from rural areas, line-workers' wage levels are kept low in the 
form of fixed monthly salaries with little or no bonus. On the other hand, generous 
commissions are applied to marketing staff, because of the perception that they are 
professionals and essential to the firm's profitability and success. Chinese traditions 
of hierarchy mean that officials and academics are regarded as in the higher levels of 
social hierarchy and given preferential treatment. The lowest level of hierarchy 
consists of those with no education and no formal training (Weber, 1983). 180 The 
reward systems for TVE top managers have become diversified a result of property 
rights reform. Under different governance structures, a variety of rewards have 
emerged, including floating income (fudong gongzi), annual income (nianxinzhi), 
basic salary plus annual bonus (jibenggongzi jia nianzhongjiang) and basic salary plus 
dividends (jibenggongzi jia guquan). More and more township-village enterprises 
have realized that a highly motivated top manager is a critical factor for improving 
company's performance. 
However, social security systems are weak in township-village enterprises, 
which are in contrast with state-owned enterprises `guaranteed life-long employment' 
and all round welfares - e. g. from housing to medical care, and from social activities 
to child care. In conformity with the enterprise reform of separating party activities 
from business operations, the presence of the party is very low in township-village 
enterprises compared to state-owned enterprises. Due to their informal structures, 
township-village enterprises provide little protection for their workers. Until the 
implementation of the 1994 Labour Law which requires all employers, regardless of 
ownership type to contribute to five welfare funds (i. e. pension, accident and injury, 
maternity, unemployment and medical funds), township-village enterprises have 
begun to abide by the minimum legal obligations, but the amount of contribution by 
enterprises varies between different firm sizes and governance structures. Furthermore, 
as a result of their informality, trade unions play a weak role in township-village 
180 Weber, M. (1983), Max Weber on capitalism, bureaucracy and religion: a selection of texts, edited 
and in part newly translated by Stanislav Andreski, Allen & Unwin, London. nUBRARYý 
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enterprises, mainly organizing recreational and sports activities. (Ng and Warner, 
1998)181 
It is out of township-village enterprises, that privately-owned ventures have 
emerged. The operational characteristics of these are now described. 
2.2.4.4 Operational Strategies of Privately-Owned Enterprises 
Privately-owned enterprises, evolving out of township-village enterprises, have 
prevalently adopted the strategy of producing low-price commodities to develop their 
market for start-up, by fulfilling the gaps left by the state economy (Naughton, 1995; 
Li et al, 2004; Sun and Duan, 2003)182. Take the Wenzhou Pattern (Wenzhou moshi) 
privately-owned enterprise, as an example. These individual businesses start with 
specialized products targeting market niches which were neglected by the state 
economy. They are small scale with low-costs, formed in joint-structures of `front 
retail-shop with backyard workshop' that can minimize the cost of production. The 
backyard-workshop produces the goods and these are sold in their own front retail- 
shops. These individual small firms usually change their business locations frequently 
in accordance with different profit-oriented businesses. They do not have clear and 
strategic objectives for development and future. They are able to exist in the seller's 
market where the state economy dominated and where there is less competition. 
Taking Michael Porter's competitive theory as an analyzing tool for strategic 
development of private enterprises in Chinese industrial environment, this suggests 
there are `Five Forces in industry competition' as the main driving factors that 
determine how competition is formed. In the regular context of industry competition, 
five influencing forces - buyers, suppliers, substitutes, potential entrants and industry 
competitors - drive the rivalry among existing firms. In coping with the five 
competitive forces, Porter points out three potentially successful generic strategic 
approaches to outperforming other firms in an industry: `Overall cost leadership', 
1 83 `Differentiation' and `Focus' (Porter, 1980) . In the Chinese economy, the pricing 
1" Ng, S. H. and Warner, M. (1998), China's Trade Union Management, Macmillan, London. 
182 Naughton, B. (1995), Growing out of the plan: Chinese economic reform 1978-93, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
Li, Shao-min; Ian, V. and Zhou, Dong-shen (2004), `The emergence of private ownership in China', 
Journal of Business Research, 57(10), 2004, pp. 1145-1152. 
Sun, Li and Duan, Ya-bing (2003), The development path to the small and medium-sized enterprise: 
the rise of small giant, China Times and Economies Press, Beijing. 
183 Porter, M. E. (1980), Competitive strategy: techniques for analyzing industries and competitors, The 
Free Press, London. 
102 
system has transformed from a planned to a market-oriented mechanism. During the 
transformation of a `dual-track economy', many commodities are still under planned 
price controls and there are limited supplies. Therefore, in this sellers market - supply 
falls short of demand for commodities and so the emergence of private enterprises has 
inevitably adopted low-cost strategies for market entry. Their flexibility and profit- 
orientation have given them competitive advantages to succeed under this 
opportunistic market environment. Driven by this strategy, the `price-war' for 
dumping on the market often happens as the main means for privately-owned 
enterprises to compete with other competitors. Low prices are the main strength for 
privately-owned enterprises. As Porter (1980) 184 states, 
"Low cost relative to competitors becomes the theme running though the entire 
strategy, though quality, service, and other areas cannot be ignored. Having a low- 
cost position yields the firm above-average returns in its industry despite the presence 
of strong competitive forces. Its cost position gives the firm a defense against rivalry 
from competitors, because its lower costs mean that it can still earn returns after its 
competitors have competed away their profits through rivalry. A low-cost position 
defends the firm against powerful buyers because buyers can exert power only to 
drive down prices to the level of next most efficient competitor. Low cost provides a 
defense against powerful suppliers by providing more flexibility to cope with input 
cost increases. The factors that lead to a low-cost position usually also provide 
substantial entry barriers in terms of scale economies or cost advantages. Finally, a 
low-cost position usually places the firm in a favorable position vis-ä-vis substitutes 
relative to its competitors in the industry. Thus a low-cost position protects the firm 
against all five competitive forces because bargaining can only continue to erode 
profits until those of the next most efficient competitor are eliminated, and because 
the less efficient competitors will suffer first in the face of competitive pressures. " 
The structure of the market has changed significantly in China since 1990s. For 
example, the state-owned enterprises have begun to play a more market-focused role; 
foreign direct investment has enhanced the intensiveness of competition; the impact 
of globalization and technology innovation and so forth, has transformed an often 
sellers market into a buyers market - supply often exceeds demand. Under these 
changing circumstances, many private enterprises have shifted their strategies from 
ßs4 Porter, M. E. (1980), Competitive strategy - techniques for analyzing industries and competitors, 
The Free Press, London, p35. 
103 
low prices to product differentiation to secure their market share. Many privately- 
owned enterprises have attempted to adopt multiple operations in various industries to 
reduce their risk in one field and diversify their product ranges. Such trend has its 
historical background. as this strategy has been encouraged by the Chinese 
government since the middle-1980s (Li, 2003). 195 However, diversified operations 
require three prerequisites: capital. technology and management, and without any one 
prerequisite will lead to fail. A blinding belief in diverse operations can destructively 
affect the cultivation of the core competencies of enterprises. 
Good examples for illustrating the development of privately-owned enterprises 
practices with two contrast strategies are two famous IT companies in China - 
Lenovo and Giant. Lenovo (formerly Legend) 186 has grown to he a successful 
multinational corporation and has become a world-known company by buying out 
IBM's personal computer division in December 2004. Giant's start-up contemporized 
with Lenovo and even had better fame and a stronger foundation in the 1990s. 
However, within 8 years. Giant collapsed and Levono outgrew to become a world 
famous multinational corporation. Why? The answer is the 'strategy'. The different 
operating strategy leads to different outcomes. 
Giant was established in 1988 with the core business of own-designed software 
products. By the end of 1992, its sales had reached RMB 200 millions (US$ 24 
million) with net profits of RMB 35 millions (US$ 4.2 millions). Giant was growing 
annually by 500%, becoming a prominent star in information technology. Giant's 
leader, Shi Yuzhu set his company's strategy as "diversified investment" and all 
round growth". He believed that if an enterprise can succeed in one industry, it can 
gain the same success in other fields. Under this guiding strategy, in 1993 his 
company stepped into two new and different industries - real estate and health food. 
But too fast expansion resulted in chaos in decision-making structure which still 
maintained a centralized pattern dependent upon one brain - Shi Yuzhu. In 1996, 
Giant went bankruptcy. In contrast, Lenovo's leader, Liu Chuanzhi's concept of it 
company's operation was to focus on its core competency, to optimize the quality of 
its products and service with all its development within the information industry. I le 
believes that an enterprise can only make success in one industry, and this does not 
'RS Li, Xiao-jie. (2003), The essentials of management: structure and integration, China Economy 
Press, Beijing. p154. 
'$`' ̀ Lenovo' is the new name to replace 'Legend' in 2004, as it was originally called 'Legend' when it 
initiated in early 90s. http//wwýti. lenovo(rp. com (accessed 9" December, 2004) 
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mean that it can be successful in other fields. Therefore, Lenovo never became 
involved in popular industries such as health products and real estate. In 1990, Beijing 
Legend (now is known as Lenovo) began the design, manufacture and distribution of 
its own line of PCs, the Legend brand. Lenovo was the first company to introduce the 
home computer concept in China. In 1993, Lenovo invested in Huiyang, Guangdong 
Province for the construction of the Legend Science and Technology Park that serves 
as the group's manufacturing base. In 1997, Legend computers became the best 
selling brand in China and one of the leading computer brands in the Asia Pacific 
region. Obviously, in consequence, Lenovo's focused strategy has insured its 
utilization and optimization of its resources in its own industry and market. 
Following the successful formation of the market economy, many changes have 
taken place in all aspects of management, such as management culture (Warner, 
2002)187, information systems and organizational structures. For instance, under an 
information intensive economy, `guanxi' (relationship networks) in its traditional 
form may be getting less important, although it will be sustained as a virtual link 
facilitating the diffusion of personal transactions. Along with the prevalent venture 
into e-commerce technology to sell goods or source parts, Chinese firms have further 
changed their management practices to meet the challenges of a web-based world 
(Richter, 2000)188. Since China is becoming a legalized and technologized `normal' 
market, the importance of traditions of guanxi networks will gradually become 
weakened and Chinese management practices will more closely match those that are 
experienced in other parts of the world. As Child and Mcgrath (2001)189 suggest, 
"The transition from an economy based on materials to an economy based on 
flows of information has created considerable challenges for organization design by 
unfettering many organizational aspects from physical constraints. Core themes 
reflected are an acceptance of contradiction and paradox, a shift in the goal of 
organizing from buffering against uncertainty to responding to it, a strategic focus on 
structure and process design, a reemphasis on the social and interpersonal, and a 
reemergence of issues of legitimacy. " 
187 Warner, M. (2002), ̀ Conclusion: The Future of Chinese Management', Asia Pacific Business 
Review, 9 (2), Winter 2002, pp. 205-224. 
188 Richter, F. J. (2000), ̀ China's entry into the WTO and the impact on Western firms', China 
Economic Review, 11(2), 2000, pp. 423-426. 
1" Child, J. and Mcgrath, R. G. (2001), `Organizations unfettered: organisational form in an 
information intensive economy', Academy of Management Journal, 44 (6), 2001, pp. 1135-1148. 
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These changes have enhanced and formed the perspective of strategic planning 
and thinking in privately-owned enterprises' future development. A learning 
organizational culture and a trend of strategic management have gradually emerged to 
syncretise privately-owned enterprises' management practices. 
2.2.4.5 Chinese Entrepreneurs in the Market Economy 
Chinese entrepreneurs emerge along with the changing economic structures and 
the development of private enterprises in the market economy. These new 
entrepreneurs have the vision to leave the security of modest factory jobs, hoping to 
make their fortunes. They are adventurers, risk takers, and most run their businesses 
on "rule of thumb" but they possess the trait of sensitive perception of market 
opportunity. They are able to catch opportunities promptly and have great flexibility 
to respond to an uncertain world that is composed of unclear and rapidly changing 
government policies, taxes, and regulations. The market economy, commonly 
regarded as the revival of capitalism, pays off for Chinese entrepreneurs and these 
private enterprises, and it brings big money to them in modern China. The Sunday 
Times magazine (2004)190 commented: 
"As China's economy booms, its tycoons are puffing on cigars and flying in 
private jets. " 
These initial "nouveau riche" are emerging within the special phases of 
economic transition under sponsorship of government policy, when insufficient 
competition is present and high demand markets and opportunities exist. However, 
due to the historical background of privately-owned enterprises, these entrepreneurs 
are often poorly educated and manage their businesses very informally. However, 
they have the desire for formal management patterns and knowledge to handle their 
increasingly complex business environment and growth. A survey of 3539 
entrepreneurs in small to medium-sized enterprises reveals the main needs of Chinese 
entrepreneurs are (Sun and Duan, 2003)191: ̀ The proper mechanism of recruitment 
and selection'; `modern emolument and appraisal system'; `complete supervisory and 
control system'; `specific professional training to the weaknesses of operations. ' 
190 The Sunday Times Magazine, October 17,2004. p. 52. 
191 Sun, Li and Duan, Ya-bing (2003), The Development path to the small and medium-sized enterprise: 
the rise of small giants, China Times and Economics Press, Beijing, p54. 
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Enhancing the quality of entrepreneurs is a condition for the emergence of more 
professionalized management practices in the Chinese market. 
They are facing the challenges as China's accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) provides new impetus for the government to move toward a 
rules-based, nondiscriminatory policy environment for private enterprises. This will 
not only expose the domestic private sector to new competition from abroad, but will 
also introduce new financial institutions to serve the needs of private business. Hence 
the environment will continue to evolve rapidly. The challenge for the government 
and entrepreneurs alike is to put the domestic private sector on a solid footing so that 
it will be ready to seize new opportunities as they arise. China's home-grown 
entrepreneurs have shown impressive flexibility and dynamism in expanding their 
businesses in the absence of secure legal frameworks, and with very limited access to 
external finance (Gregory and Tenev, 2001) 192. Recent policy changes offer 
businesses a sounder footing and access to new sources of capital. Although Chinese 
leaders publicly support the private economy and have ordered that it be treated on the 
same basis as State-owned Enterprises, many banks still struggle to break the habit of 
giving priority in lending to government companies (McGregor, 2004)193. China's 
ability to compete with foreign firms depends on the ability of these entrepreneurs to 
match best practices in the West. `The Chinese government places more reliance on 
entrepreneurs to keep the economy growing and create jobs', as is evidenced in the 
Annual Survey by the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, a government 
body monitoring business. '94 
2.2.4.6 Management Practices of Foreign Joint Ventures in China 
Foreign Joint Ventures in China are formed in two main types: wholly-owned 
foreign enterprises and Chinese-foreign joint ventures. Foreign Joint Venture is an 
important market force in the Chinese market. Not only do they bring new 
management practices and technology to domestic firms, but also facilitate and shape 
192 Gregory, N. and Tenev, S. (2001), ̀ Special Report: China's Private Sector - China's Home-Grown 
Entrepreneurs', The China Business Review, Jan-Feb. 2001, pp. 14-18. 
'" McGregor, R. (2004), ̀ Chinese growth bound tightly to private sector', Financial Times, Friday 27th 
August, 2004. 
194 Financial Times, 26'" August 2004. p20. 
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the formation of a competitive market economy. (Yan and Warner, 2001) 195 
Compared to indigenous firms, their management practices possess some distinctive 
characteristics. 
As mentioned in chapter 1, Foreign Direct Investment has been a significant 
factor in the growth of Chinese economy. Luo and O'Connor (1998)196 describe that a 
number of diverse approaches used by Foreign Joint Ventures to an increasing 
commitment of resources and financial investment - Opportunistic Experimenter, 
Strategic Investor and Dominant Local Player. Opportunistic Experimenter is an 
approach of a group of foreign companies with a low level of corporate commitment, 
who merely aim to learn how to conduct business in China. Strategic Investors 
characterize the majority of foreign companies that have aimed to enjoy the early- 
mover benefits, possibly by building a broader multi-regional or national presence 
through marketing or establishing facilities. Dominant Local Players, describe 
companies with a high level of corporate commitment to investing in China. Foreign 
joint-ventures in this latter group usually have had a highly localized management 
system and aim to secure dominant market positions within their own industry sectors. 
Since mid 1990s, there is an increase in the proportion of foreign direct investment in 
equity joint-ventures. It is argued that foreign joint-ventures seem to increasingly 
favor `go it alone' patterns to pursue success in the market after they have acquired 
practical experience in China (Yan and Warner, 2001). 
During the 1990s, management practices in China gradually moved in a market- 
driven direction, as the labor supply is opened to a free market. Foreign joint-ventures 
have benefited from this change. Particularly, they do not have to accept whichever 
personnel their Chinese counterparts assigned to them, but rather recruit competent 
candidates in the labor market. The graduates of universities are no longer obligatory 
allocated to whichever enterprises or work units by the government plan. Yet, the 
labor market can be described as both high labor-supply and low labor-supply, albeit 
addressed to different categories (Warner, 1992)197. High labor-supply generally 
refers to non-skilled and surplus technical labor, which is simply a nationwide-burden. 
The local managerial and executive staff group constitutes the low-supply category. It 
199 Yan, D. and Warner, M. (2001), ̀ Sino-foreign joint ventures' versus 'wholly foreign owned 
enterprises in the People's Republic of China', The Judge Institute of Management Studies, Cambridge. 
Working Paper, No. 11, Oct2001. 
196 Luo, Y. and O'Connor, N. (1998), ̀ Structural Changes to Foreign Direct Investment in China: an 
evolutionary perspective', Journal of Applied Management Studies, 7 (1), June 1998, pp. 95-109. 
197 Warner, M. (1992), How Chinese Management Learn, Macmillan, London. 
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has been found that the expatriate failure-rate is often quiet high, while the cost to the 
multinational corporation of having an expatriate is almost five times that for a local 
executive (Goodall and Warner, 1997)198. Moreover, the impact of the Asian financial 
crisis coupled with cost pressures on foreign firms in China has served to accelerate 
many firms' localization program. 199 The call to transfer management from 
expatriates to local managers echoes across China (Gamble, 2000)200 . The rapid 
localization has become the mantra of many foreign joint ventures in China (Melvin, 
1997)201. The cost differential and trend of localization then induces a great demand 
on the limited local managerial staff labor-supply. 
"The Executive-Search company predicted a 400 percent increase in demand for 
local executives in this decade. Every qualified Chinese candidate usually has ten 
managerial positions to choose from. " (Goodall and Burgers)202 
As Yan and Warner (200 1)203 comment, Chinese enterprise management is being 
transformed gradually and must move step by step into the nascent labor market, 
while awaiting an increase in supply. Foreign Joint Ventures are chasing a still limited 
but expanding supply of highly skilled human resources. 
As suitably qualified local managers need to be developed over a long time 
perspective, their qualifications to meet the satisfactory level of demand require 
formal business education and professional training, as well as a timely learning 
experience in an advanced industrial context. Particularly, for historical reasons, the 
middle-aged labor force in China is the generation which are victims of the 
educational `fall-out' of the Culture Revolution (1966-1976) (Warner, 1999)204, and 
they need management training. As Gamble (2000)205 suggests, 
I" Goodall, K. and Warner, M. (1997), `Human Resources in Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures', 
International Journal of Human Resource Management, 8 (6), July 1997, pp. 569-594. 
19 Financial Times, 25"' November 1998, p22. 
20° Gamble, J. (2000), `Localizing management in foreign-invested enterprises in China: practical, 
cultural, and strategic perspectives', International Journal of Human Resource Management, 11 (5), 
Oct2000, pp. 883-903. 
201 Melvin, S. (1997), ̀ Passing the Torch', The China Business Review, 23 (3), 1997, p. 32. 
Goodall, K. and Burgers, W. (1998) ̀ Frequent Fliers', The China Business Review, 17 (2), May- 
June 1998, pp. 50-52. 
203 Van, D. and Warner, M. (2001), ̀ Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures' versus ̀Wholly Foreign Owned 
Enterprises in the People's Republic of China', Working Paper, The Judge Institute of Management 
Studies, Cambridge, No. 11, Oct2001. p31. 
204 Warner, M. (1999), China's managerial revolution, Frank Cass, London. 
tos Gamble, J. (2000), `Localizing management in foreign-invested enterprises in China: practical, 
cultural, and strategic perspectives', International Journal of Human Resource Management, 11 (5), 
Oct2000, pp. 883-903. 
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"Localization is likely to proceed at a much slower pace than its main advocates 
may wish or anticipate, and there are practical, cultural and strategic factors which 
may, and perhaps should, inhibit rapid localization. " 
The management practices of foreign joint-ventures in China vary in accordance 
to their growing diversity in terms of size, industry, ownership structure, product 
market, strategy and management style. As Cooke (2004)206 suggests the literature on 
management practices in foreign joint-ventures can be classified into two diverse 
strands. First are the studies on management practices in foreign direct investment 
enterprises, which mainly focus on multinational corporations and joint ventures 
(Child, 1994; Goodall and Warner, 1997; Lu and Bjorkman, 1997)207. Bjorkman and 
Fan (2002)208 have observed, for example, the early-established Western MNCs have 
adapted their management practices to the Chinese environment; a trend seemed to 
have emerged during the 1990s towards introducing more Western style policies. Blue 
chip MNCs (e. g. Motorola, Nokia) are generally considered to have more 
sophisticated management system than Chinese domestic firms. It has been argued 
that these management `best practices' are mainly western practices transferred and 
adapted to suit the Chinese environment. They are often hailed by the Chinese media 
as good models to be followed by domestic firms (Cooke, 2004)209. The other strand 
of literature on foreign firms in China focuses largely on their management of labor 
process and employment practices: these firms are often branded as `sweatshops' 
operating in a mass production mode and characterized by poor working conditions 
and work intensification (Xu, 2000; Chan, 2001)210. These foreign joint ventures are 
staffed by unskilled rural migrant workers who have few formal educational 
'06 Cooke, F. L. (2(04), `Foreign firms in China: modelling HRM in a toy manufacturing corporation', 
Human Resource Management Journal, 14 (3), 2004, pp. 31-53. 
Child, J. (1994), Management in China during the age of reform, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Goodall, K. and Warner, M. (1997), `Human resources in Sino-foreign joint ventures: selected case 
studies in Shanghai and Beijing', International Journal of Human Resource Management, 8 (5), 1997, 
pp. 569-594. 
Lu, Y. and Bjorkman, I. (1997), 'MNCs standardization versus localization: MNC practices in China- 
Western joint ventures', International Journal of Human Resource Management, 8 (4), 1997, pp. 614- 
628. 
208 Bjorkman, I. and Fan, X. C. (2002), ̀ Human resource management and the performance of Western 
firms in China', International Journal of Human Resource Management, 13 (6), 2002, pp. 853-864. 
209 Cooke, F. L. (2004), ̀ Foreign firms in China: modelling HRM in a toy manufacturing corporation', 
Human Resource Management Journal, 14 (3), 2004, pp. 31-53. 
210 Xu, F. (2000), Women Migrant Workers in China's Economic Reform, Macmillan, New York. 
Chan, A. (2001), China's Workers under Assault: the Exploitation of Labour in a Globalising 
Economy, M. E. Sharpe, New York. 
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qualifications and little bargaining power. This segment of the labor market is the 
least protected by legislation, and hence the most vulnerable to exploitation by foreign 
joint-ventures (Cooke and Rubery, 2002)211. The ethical dimension of management 
practices by these firms operating in a `boundaryless' world is therefore vigorously 
questioned (Legge, 2000)212. 
Cooke (2004) argues - based on the evidence from his case studies - that an 
organization's management practices are influenced by a range of institutional and 
cultural factors both at the national and organizational levels and that not all foreign 
direct investment manufacturing firms operate in a sweatshop mode even if they have 
the opportunities to do so. His study has found that, to a large extent, the foreign joint- 
ventures have adopted a mixed package of management practices. For example, in his 
case company there were advanced western management techniques as well as good 
practices from state-owned enterprises (e. g. worker's welfare and culture). It had also 
adopted some bad practices for which the private sector in China in notorious - those 
of non-union recognition and non-compliance with labour regulations. 
As an outcome of localization, a hybrid model of management practices for the 
best suitable fit in the local environment seems to be the favorable characteristic 
among foreign joint-ventures. Taylor's study (200 1)213 reveals that, 
"Chinese managers may be given the power to formulate their management 
practices where localization is seen to have strategic advantage. More so, managers 
seek to use a variety of local and 'universal' strategies and practices to control and 
utilize labor within the constraints of local institutional context. " 
Indeed, Cooke proposes that the managers who are delegated empowerment and 
autonomy play an important role in shaping management practices. Their judgment 
and knowledge determine the factors of management practices. Indigenous models of 
leadership appear to have become more common among multinational corporations 
and joint ventures in China recent years, largely due to the fact that many expatriate- 
211 Cooke, F. L. and Rubery, J. (2002), ̀ Minimum wage policies, gender and the urban/rural divide in 
China', Consultancy Report, International Labour Organization (ILO), Geneva. 
212 Legge, K. (2000), ̀ The ethical context of HRM: the ethical organization in the boundaryless world', 
in Ethical Issues in Contemporary Human Resource Management, (eds) D. Winstanley and J. Woodall, 
Macmillan, London, pp. 23-40. 
Zia Taylor, B. (2001), `The management of labour in Japanese manufacturing plants in China', 
International Journal of Human Resource Management, 12 (4), 2001, pp. 601-620. 
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based management systems have failed to take root and have caused local resentment 
and resistance (Cooke, 2002; Legewie, 2002)214. 
Western corporations through the management practices that they introduced in 
China have more and more influence on the practices adopted by Chinese firms. 
Proponents of the `convergence' hypothesis propose that there is a tendency for 
countries to become more alike in terms of management policies and practices under 
the impact of globalization and the emergence of international `best practices'. As 
Warner (2002) 215 suggests: 
"Linking-up with foreign firms, especially multinational corporations, has been a 
major source of new capital, techniques and innovations. Corporate governance has 
been transformed accordingly. " 
2 . 2.5 The 
Role of Trade Union in Management Practices under Market Economy 
The market reforms in China accompanied fundamental changes in the field of 
labor relations. They were caused by the transformation of the relationship between 
the state and enterprises on the one hand, and between management and labor on the 
other. Previous roles of work units, party organizations and trade unions changed 
accordingly. 
From the mid-1980s, Chinese trade unions have experienced changes at both top 
and bottom levels (Chan, 1993; Jonathan and Chan, 1995)216. At the top level, the 
ACFTU (the All-China Federation of Trade Unions) has made many efforts to 
strengthen the status of trade unions and to protect workers' interests. It began to 
participate in policy decision processes, for example the legislation of the 1994 
Labour Law. It also tries to organize bottom level trade union organizations in non- 
state-owned enterprises. At the grassroots level the role of enterprise trade unions are 
being widened as labour disputes increase. They stand in a middle position between 
management and labour and are developing new fields of influence. Chinese trade 
214 Cooke, F. L. (2002), ̀ Ownership change and reshaping of employment relations in China: a study of 
two manufacturing companies', Journal of Industrial Relations, 44 (1), 2002, pp. 19-39. 
Lewegie, J. (2002), `Control and co-ordination of Japanese subsidiaries in China: problems of an 
expatriate-based management system', International Journal of Human Resource Management, 13 (6), 
2002, pp. 901-919. 
2's Warner, M. (2002), ̀ Introduction: Chinese Management in Perspective', Asia Pacific Business 
Review, Winter 2002,9 (2), pp. 1-21. 
216 Chan, A. (1993), ̀ Revolution or corporatism? Workers and Trade Unions in post-Mao China, ' The 
Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 29, Jan1993, pp31-61. 
Jonathan, U. and Chan, A. (1995), `China, Corporatism, and the East Asian Model, ' The Australian 
Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 33. Jan 1995, pp. 29-53. 
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unions are, within a limited boundary, breaking from their former features of 
administration that were only responsible for labour insurance work. Until now, 
economic reform policies -- which are focusing on the improvement of economic 
efficiency -- assigns only secondary importance to the development of trade unions, 
though the government prepared the official scheme to manage new industrial 
relations such as the formation of the Labour Law and of mediating procedures of 
labour disputes. Also, the support of trade unions by ordinary workers is not so active. 
(Seung, 2000)217 The power of trade unions comes from workers' trust. But when 
workers encounter salary delays. welfare infringements, overwork, security protection 
dangers, and other unlawful infringements, workers become indifferent to trade 
unions. 
In most cases, trade unions in Chinese enterprises are quiet defective in effective 
actions. The loss of trade union's voice on core employment issues is not going to he 
regained through organizing sports meetings and handing out film tickets. In many 
companies, the weak position of trade unions is an irrefutable fact. Some 
multinational corporations' enterprises in China openly resist establishing trade unions, 
such as Wal-Mart, Dell, Sumsung, Kodak, KFC and McDonalds; none of them have 
trade unions. With deepening reforms, the private sector in China has undergone rapid 
development, which gives rise to increasing numbers of employees in foreign- 
invested enterprises and private enterprises. However, the establishment of labor 
unions encounters resistance in most enterprises. (China Economic Net. 2007)`" 
Since trade unions have few significant activities and give little help to workers, 
the evaluation of workers for trade unions is not positive. According to the survey on 
7301 workers and staff by the Zhejiang province General Trade Union in 1994. when 
asked whom they went to first to get help about work-related problems, only 13.1 % 
selected "trade union". Many workers answered "I rely on myself' (43.9%), the next 
was "relatives and friends" (23.2%). When workers were asked "C' an trade unions 
represent workers and protect their interests? " those who answered "basically 
possible" and "possibly" were just 33.1%, whereas "though having intention but 
capacity is limited" was 37.7%, and "difficult to protect" was 29.2%. According to 
"' Seung, W. B. (2000). The changing trade unions in China'. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 30 (1), 
2000, pp. 46-66. 
21R China Economic Net (2007), Trade unions need update, Monday, 19'h Mar 2007. 
h : i/en. ce_cn'Business/Enterprise' 200412 `19't200412 i9 261 ; 9; 4. shtml (accessed I9th Mar 2007) 
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the survey, about 2/3 workers and staff did not believe trade unions were doing their 
job. 219 
To sum up, Chinese trade unions do not bargain collectively like Western unions, 
instead they try to discipline and ensure the production commitment of the labour 
force (Lee, 1986)220. They are organised on both an industrial and a geographical 
basis. The ACFTU is for much of the time a `transmission belt' of government policy 
and will play its part in whatever current campaign the Party delegates to it, such as 
attempting to seek out corrupt officials or being a watch-dog about excessive price 
increases (Warner, 1991)221. 
2 .3 Concluding 
Remarks 
By reviewing the evolution of enterprises in economic transformation from a 
central-command economy to a market economy, the characteristics and historic 
heritages have been explored to explain the emergence of new forms of management 
practices in contemporary China. Four types of enterprises have emerged and these 
reveal significant differences in many aspects of management, such as structure, 
strategy, cultural values and human resource management. The same is true with 
China's economic hybrid model; management practices are a combination of western 
and Chinese characters. These emerging trends in managerial practices can be 
explored in four types of business ownership that have emerged under market 
socialism. These are: state-owned enterprises (SOEs), collective-owned enterprises 
(COEs), privately-owned enterprises (POEs) and foreign joint-ventures (FJVs). 
Through analysis and comparison of these four types of enterprise, emerging forms of 
management practice under market socialism can be explored. These are now 
investigated by reference to an empirical study of each of these types of enterprise 
ownership conducted in China during 2005 and 2006. 
219 Chinese Trade Unions Statistical Yearbook (1994), ZGGTN, Beijing, p399-400. 
220 Lee, L. T. (1986), Trade Unions in China, 1949 to the Present, Singapore University Press, 
Singapore, p26. 
221 Warner, M. (1991), `Labour-management relations in the People's Republic of China: the role of the 
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Introduction 
The first two chapters have discussed the evolution of market socialism in China 
and how this is leading to different forms of business ownership. This review provides 
the background for the empirical research into types of enterprise management as 
these are emerging in China. Because of the rapid growth in number of enterprises - 
particularly in the private sector (Peng, et al, 2004)222 - there is a deficiency of 
management theories for understanding these within the context of the transition of 
the market economy. More theories of how emerging enterprises operate under 
market socialism and how economic reforms affect organizational changes are badly 
needed. 
Evolving from a command socialist economy, Chinese enterprises are changing 
from sole ownership in the state sector to diversified ownership forms in both state 
and private sectors. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in different industries is also 
shaping management practices in China. Through ownership diversification, 
institutional restructuring and FDI involvement, four types of business ownership 
have arisen within the transition of market socialism. The research aim is to explore 
the characteristic features of each type of ownership. This chapter describes how the 
fieldwork research was undertaken. Four business enterprises - characterized by 
different ownership forms - were studied in the textile industry. This is the most 
competitive sector and at the frontier of economic reforms in China. It is a sector that 
reflects nascent managerial trends in the changing Chinese economy. 
Following the approach of Philliber et al (1980)223, in this chapter, we will 
discuss the research design - as a blueprint for research - to elaborate four aspects of 
the research methodology: (1) what questions to study; (2) what data are relevant; (3) 
what data to collect; (4) and how to analyze the results. This research aims to seek 
explanations and to answer the fundamental question of this research: 'What are the 
management characteristics of emerging forms of business venture under market 
socialism in China? ' 
3.1 Contingency Theory 
222 Peng, G. & Huang W. and Guo, Y. (2004), Studies on the Theory and Practice of Economic 
Development in China, The People's University of China Publisher, Beijing, pp. 257-258. 
223 Philliber, S. G., Schwab, M. R., & Samsloss, G. (1980), Social Research: Guides to a decision- 
making process. Peacock, Itasca. 
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The underpinning theory of this research is the `Contingency Approach', as 
applied to explaining organisational forms emerging under market socialism in China. 
This approach provides theoretical principles for understanding how a changing 
business environment and different ownership forms can impact on management 
practices. In contingency theory, there is no one best design of organisation. "The 
most appropriate structure and system of management are therefore dependent upon 
the contingencies of the situation for each particular organisation" (Mullins, 
2005). 224 It suggests that organisation theory should provide insights into the 
situational and contextual factors which influence management decisions. Our 
research design follows this approach. The contingency approach focuses attention on 
the relationships between the effects of uncertainty in a changing external 
environment and the impact upon organisational change and management practices. It 
is concerned with understanding the interdependent relations between the internal 
characteristics of an organization and its external environment. 
The proponents of this perspective differ in the ways in which they have 
conceptualized and /or measured internal organizational characteristics and the work 
of the organization. For example, Woodward (1970)225 focused on a variety of types 
of technology as the key variable. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967)226 conceptualized the 
organization's work as dealing with its external environment and viewed the 
important internal organizational parameters as differentiation, integration, and 
conflict resolution. Thompson (1967)227 has been concerned with both technology and 
environment, as well as with a different set of organizational variables (e. g. structure, 
discretion and control). Lorsch and Morse (1974)228 suggested how the personal 
characteristics of organization members are related to organizational factors and these 
shape organizational effectiveness. 
Organization processes and management practices must fit the requirements of 
the surrounding culture. The cultural context shapes the perception and interpretation 
224 Mullins, L. J. (2005), Management and organizational behavior, 7s' Ed., FT Prentice Hall, England, 
D84. 
25 Woodward, J. (1970), Industrial Organizations: theory and practice, Oxford University Press, 
London. 
226 Lawrence, P. R. and Lorsch, J. W. (1967), Organization and Environment: managing differentiation 
and integration, Harvard University Press, Boston. 
227 Thompson, J. D. (1967), Organisations in action: social science bases of administrative theory, 
McGraw-Hill, New York. 
228 Lorsch, J. W. and Morse, J. J. (1974), Organisations and their members: a contingency approach, 
Harper & Row Publishers, New York. 
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of organizational change and constrains choices concerning how to manage it 
(Faucheux, Amado, and Laurent, 1982; Triandis, 1994)229. Change may be seen as 
linear, rational, and the result of planned actions or as the circular, continuous, and the 
spontaneous interplay between interdependent forces. Conceptions of change 
determine choices concerning an organisation's management. Those who engage in 
cross-cultural, change-related practices often ignore the surrounding cultural context. 
Furthermore, Budhwar and Debrah (2001 )230 propose that an analytical distinction 
should be made between different levels of context, including the national cultural 
context, industrial context and organizational strategy-level context. These 'context- 
specific' and `culture-bound' factors influence the nature of HR practices. 
`Complexity, uncertainty, and diversity emerge as important determinants of 
organizational form. These determinants, in turn, mirror the type of task the 
organization must perform, with entrepreneurial, creative tasks resulting in greater 
uncertainty, complexity and diversityfor the organization. ' (Dessler, 1976) 231 
Contingency theory seems to provide a suitable approach for understanding the 
evolution of management in contemporary China, as it addresses interrelations of 
organizational change within the context of a changing business environment. 
`Contingency' models of organization highlight the interrelationships between 
structure, methods of operations, technology and the nature of environmental 
influences, and provide a further possible means of differentiation between alternative 
forms of organization and management. Managerial practices cannot be independent 
of the environment within which organizations operate. This approach better explains 
the complexity and dynamics within such rapidly changing environments - `socialist' 
to `market socialist'; `closed' to `open' political paradigm; and `planned' to `free' 
economy. The sole focus on an organization's internal environment is not valid in 
view of the fundamental political and economic changes that are occurring in China. 
It is important to address the evolution of ownership in market socialism as it has 
evolved from the past planned economy. Market socialism is the context for the 
229 Faucheux, C.; Amado, G. and Laurent, A. (1982), ̀ Organization development and change', Annual 
Review of Psychology, 33 (3), pp. 343-370. 
Triandis, H. C. (1994), Cross-cultural industrial and organisational psychology, Consulting 
Psychology Press, CA. 
230 Budhwar, P. and Debrah, Y. (2001), `Introduction' in Human Resource Management in Developing 
Countries (ed), Routledge, London. P 1-15. 
231 Dessler, G. (1976), Organisation and Management: A contingency approach, Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
Englewood Cliffs, N. J. p. 54. 
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growth of emerging ventures while economic reforms are the activator of such 
emergence. Unlike western enterprises which were born in a free capitalist market, 
Chinese enterprises grew out of socialist market transformations. Their management 
practices are significantly affected by this ownership paradigm and political economy. 
This research explores these issues on the basis of detailed case studies of four 
different types of business ownership. 
- 3.2 The Utility of Case Studies 
Case studies were conducted in the present research to collect data in order to 
explain the nature of management and organizational behavior in emerging business 
ventures as these are related to different forms of ownership properties under market 
socialism. Through case investigation, we aim to demonstrate some connections 
between theory and practice. The development of management theory is based on 
summarizing and analyzing management practices. As McGregor (1987) 232 puts it: 
"Every managerial act rests on assumptions, generalizations, and hypotheses - 
that is to say, on theory. Our assumptions are frequently implicit, sometimes quite 
unconscious, often conflicting; nevertheless, they determine our predictions that we 
do a, b will occur. Theory and practice are inseparable. " 
Robert Stake (1995)233 argues that "the best use of case studies is for adding to 
existing experience and humanistic understanding. Its intentionality and empathy are 
central to the comprehension of social problems, but so also is information that is 
holistic and episodic. The case studies are likely to continue to be popular because of 
their style and to be useful for exploration for those who search for explanatory laws. 
And, moreover, because of the universality and importance of experiential 
understanding, and because of their compatibility with such understanding, case 
studies can be expected to continue to have an epistemological advantage over other 
inquiry methods as a basis for naturalistic generalization. The method has been tried 
and found to be a direct and satisfying way of adding to experience and improving 
understanding. " 
In each of the four case studies, open-ended interviews were conducted with 
key informants in each organization's management team. As Noaks and Wincup 
232 McGregor, D. (1987), The Human Side of Enterprise, penguin, England, p. 6. 
233 Stake, R. E. (1995), The art of case study research, Sage, London, p24. 
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(2004)234 note, "in order to achieve `rich data', the key note is `active listening' in 
which the interviewer allows the interviewee the freedom to talk and ascribe 
meanings while bearing in mind the broader aims of the project. " These aims have 
been described as "understanding the language and culture of the respondents" 
(Fontana and Frey, 2000)235. In order to achieve such understanding, the open-ended 
interviewer must resolve three main issues: 
" "Deciding how to present yourself, e. g. as a student, as a researcher, etc. 
" Gaining and maintaining trust, especially where one has to ask sensitive 
questions. 
" Establishing rapport with respondents, e. g. attempting to see the world from 
their viewpoint without going native. " (Fontana and Frey, 2000) 
As Byrne (2004)236 suggests; "qualitative interviewing is particularly useful as a 
research method for accessing individuals' attitudes and values - things that cannot 
necessarily be observed or accommodated in a formal questionnaires. Open-ended 
and flexible questions are likely to get a more considered response than closed 
questions and therefore provide better access to interviewees' views, interpretation of 
events, understandings, experiences and opinions. Qualitative interviewing when 
done well is able to achieve a level of depth and complexity that is not available to 
other. " 
The key purpose of our case studies is to explore evidence in relation to the 
following questions: 
(1) What are the distinctive management characteristics of emerging forms of 
enterprise under market socialism? (2) How do rapid environmental and institutional 
changes in economic reforms impact upon them, particularly in re-shaping their 
management models? (3) What are some of general patterns in the development of 
business ventures under the dynamic conditions of the Chinese economy? 
Four cases were selected and so that each represents a particular type of 
ownership of business venture. All the selected case companies operate within the 
textile industry. They are selected for comparison in order to explore the casual links 
234 Noaks, L. and Wincup, E. (2004), Criminological Research: Understanding Qualitative Methods, 
Sage, London, p80. 
235 Fontana, A. and Frey, J. (2004), ̀ The interview: from structured questions to negotiated text' in N. 
Nenzin and Y. Lincoln (eds), Handbook of qualitative Research, 2nd ed. Thousand Oks, Sage, CA. 
oo654-655. 
6 Byrne, B. (2004), `Qualitative interviewing', in C. Seale (eds) Researching Society and Culture, 2"d 
ed. Sage, London, p 182. 
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between ownership and organizational development and performance. The literature 
review suggests that transitional re-deployments in economic configuration have 
changed the nature of business relations and deepened institutional restructuring in the 
state sector. Equally. the rapid growth of the private sector has led to continuous 
ownership diversification and increased market competition. The selected case studies 
cut across the state sector and private sectors in order to highlight the casual links 
between organisational change and emergence of management models within the 
context of the unique features of Chinese market socialism. 
3.3 Operational measures used in the research 
3.3.1 General Logic in Setting Operational Measures 
Emerging forms of business ventures under market socialism in China are 
examined according to the following scheme: 




Changing Business Environment 
Market Competition, Globalization, 
Accession to WTO 
Internal Organizational Processes 
Organizational Development/Growth 
and Management Practices 
Type of Ownership 
121 
Government economic policies and legal reforms are the `push' factors causing a 
changing business environment to be characterised by increasing market competition, 
globalization, technology advancement and institutional restructuring. China's WTO 
accession further opened up the domestic market to world markets and gradually 
changed the regulatory environment in which businesses operate to more international 
standards. These `push' factors change and shape enterprise management and 
development. Data are collected from the four case study enterprises to explore these 
issues. The main features of management practices under different types of ownership 
are conveyed by reference to the emergence of different business ventures as derived 
from economic reforms and institutional transformation. The links between situational 
factors and organizational characteristics are corroborated by empirical data. 
As Yin (1994) 237 suggests, "To explain a phenomenon is to stipulate a set of 
casual links about it. These causal links are similar to the independent variables. In 
most studies, the links may be complex and difficult to measure in any precise manner. 
The better case studies are the ones in which the explanations have reflected some 
theoretical significant propositions. For example, the casual links may reflect critical 
insights into public policy process or into social science theory. The public policy 
propositions, if correct, can lead to recommendations for future policy actions; the 
social science propositions, if correct, can lead to major contributions to theory- 
building. " 
3.3.2 Using the McKinsey 7-S framework 
For the purposes of collecting data and undertaking the case studies the 
McKinsey 7-S framework was adopted. This was used for `organizing' and 
`pinpointing' the main characteristics of each of the case study organisations. This 
framework was originally designed by Peters and Waterman (1982)238 for their study 
of 62 American companies with so-called "excellence traits". From their research 
Peters and Waterman report that: "any intelligent approach to organising had to 
encompass, and treat as interdependent, as least seven variables: structure, strategy, 
people, management style, systems and procedures, guiding concepts and shared 
value (e. g. culture), and the present and hoped for corporate strengths or skills. We 
237 Yin, R. K. (1994), Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 2"d ed., Sage Publications, Inc., 
London, pp110-111. 
238 Peters, T. J. and Waterman, R. H. (1982) In Search of Excellence, Happer & Row, Publishers, New 
York, p. 9. 
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defined this idea more precisely and elaborated what came to he known as the 
McKinsey 7-S framework. With a bit of stretching, cutting and . 
fitting, we made all 
seven variables start with the letter S and invented a logo to go with. " This 7-S-model 
can be used as an analytical tool and as an organising framework for collecting data 
and for obtaining insights in organisations. 
Richard Pascale and Anthony Athos' book, "The art of Japanese Management" 
was an exemplary case study for further developing the 7-S-model in examining 
management practices. It successfully explored Japanese management practices in a 
case study of Matsushita by comparison with an American company. As Pascale and 
Athos (1982) claim, "the 7-S framework has been approved as an effective way of 
perceiving and cutting through the complexity of the organisation. These 7 variables 
selected are of crucial importance. More would be hard to grasp systematically: 
fewer would leave something central out. ' 
Staff Shared value 
_. _. _. _. -. _. _. _. _ 




Figure 3.2 McKinsey 7-S Framework 
(source: Pascale & Athos, 1986, pp80-81)239 
Three elements in the 7-S, structure, strategy and system are seen as `hard' S's, 
and the other four are regarded as `soft' S's. The figure 3.2 visualizes at this point the 
seven elements for describing and understanding an organization as a whole. The 7-S 
framework is not merely an analytical tool; it also serves as a conceptual 
underpinning to indicate what range of information needs to be collected. Each S- 
factor can be operationally stipulated and used for measuring key organisational 
variables. However, these factors interact and explain each other; they cannot exist 
alone. For example, structure shapes strategy and vice versa; the characterization of 
239 Pascale, R. T. and Athos, A. G. (1986), The art of Japanese management, Penguin Books, London, 
pp80-81. 
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structure can be revealed by the ways staff work; the style of managers' behaviour 
reflects the culture and beliefs of the organisation. The interconnectedness of these 
seven variables is the key feature of this framework. By examining variables within 
the 7-S framework, `a profile of organisational characteristics' can be established. 
Accordingly, it is a framework that allows us to compare and contrast organisational 
features by performance to types of ownership. At this point, it is useful to describe in 
more detail each of the components of the McKinsey 7-S framework. 
Structure is the characterization of the organization chart. As Mintzeberg (1983) 
states: "the structure of an organization can be simply defined as the sum total of the 
ways in which its labor is divided into distinct tasks and then its coordination is 
achieved among these tasks. , 
240 Peters and Waterman (1980)241 also suggest that "the 
structure is how the organization divides up tasks, is one of emphasis and 
coordination - how to make the whole thing work" The structure can be classified in 
several types such as, for example, organic-open or closed-mechanic bureaucracy, flat 
or tall hierarchical, functional or divisional, and centralized or decentralized. In 
Contingency theory, how the structure is designed in an organization depends on both 
internal variables and external situational factors. The structure of an organization 
usually incorporates a division of work; hierarchy of authority; formal lines of 
command and authority; and the decree to which authority is centralized or 
decentralized. 
Systems are about those operating procedures and mechanisms designed within 
the skeleton of the structure that determine how work is done and tasks undertaken. 
Peters and Waterman (1980) define it as "by systems, we mean all the procedures, 
formal and informal, that make the organization go, day by day and year by year. " 
Systems also refer to how decisions are made and include such factors as financial 
systems, planning procedures, hiring practices, marketing systems etc. These systems 
are seen as `management's most powerful tool for expressing how it wants an 
organization to work and what they want to accomplish (p273). '242 It provides the key 
understanding of how an organization really does (or doesn't) get things done. 
Therefore they include communication channels/procedures & routine processes 
240 Minzberg, H. (1983), Structure in Fives: designing effective organisations, Prentice-Hall Inc., New 
Jersey. P2. 
24' Waterman, R. H., Peters, T. J. and Phillips, J. R. (1980), `The 7-S Framework - structure is not 
organization', Business Horizons, June 1980, pp273-276. 
242 Pascale, R. T. and Athos, A. G. (1986), The art of Japanese management, Penguin Books, London, 
p36. 
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(paperwork, information flow, meetings, in a formal or informal manner); control 
systems (e. g. financial control); planning systems (how managers plan to achieve for 
objectives); reward and sanction systems (principle criteria for management 
efficiency and performance in each division as well as evaluation for individual); and 
marketing systems (product, sales, marketing communications). 
Strategy is about planning in relation to the allocation of a firm's scare resources, 
over time, to reach identified goals. According to Peters and Waterman (1980): "by 
strategy, we mean those actions that a company plans in response to or anticipation 
of changes in its external environment - its customers, its competitors. Strategy is the 
way a company aims to improve its position vis-a-vis competition -perhaps through 
low-cost production or delivery, perhaps by providing better value to the customer, 
perhaps by achieving sales and service dominance (p273). " It can be viewed as 
consisting of two aspects: the corporate and tactical. Corporate strategy refers to the 
long term planning in relation to organizational development and making decisions in 
relation to the external environment in order to achieve goals. The `tactical' is about 
short-term planning in guiding the operations of those major functions of an 
organization, such as production, marketing, and finance. 
Johnson and Scholes (2002)243 suggest the absence of an explicit strategy may 
result in members of an organization working at cross-purposes. The intentions of top 
management may not be communicated clearly to those at lower levels in the 
hierarchy who are expected to implement these. Change comes about from either 
subjective or intuitive assessment, which becomes increasingly unreliable as the rate 
of change increases. Developing a corporate strategy demands explicit creative effort. 
If strategic planning is to be successful, it requires effective communication flows 
within the total organization. 
Staff refers to the "demographic" description of an organization, that is, its 
human resource capabilities. Peters and Waterman (1980) define `staff in two ways: 
"at the hard end of the spectrum, we talk of appraisal systems, pay scales, formal 
training programs, and the like. At the soft end, we talk about moral, attitude, 
motivation and behavior (p274). " Lynch emphasizes the importance of people as a 
vital resource for sustaining competitive advantage. And for some industries people 
243 Johnson, G. and Scholes, K. (2002), Exploring Corporate Strategy, 6"' ed. Prentice-Hall, London. 
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are not just important but the key factor for successful performance. 244 HR policies 
and practices have an important role to play in facilitating the effective 
implementation of management processes, such as `total quality management'. 
Research by West and Patterson (1998) in an intensive examination of more than 100 
medium-sized manufacturing firms in the UK over seven years confirmed the strong 
link between effective people management and business performance. Their results 
draw attention to appropriate HR practices including: (1) effective recruitment and 
selection; (2) strategic training and appraisals; (3) jobs designed to promote autonomy, 
flexibility and problem-solving; and (4) favorable reward systems, harmonization and 
involvement. 245 
Style is characterization of how key managers behave in achieving the 
organization's goals as well as managing their employees. However, Peters and 
Waterman (1980) stress that "we think it is important to distinguish between the basic 
personality of a top-management team and the way that team comes across to the 
organization. Not words, but patterns of actions are decisive. The power of style, then, 
is essentially manageable. One element of a manager's style is how he or she chooses 
to spend time. Anther aspect of style is symbolic behavior (p275). " According to 
Mullins (2005), the essential part of management is coordinating the activities of 
others and guiding their efforts towards goals and objectives of the organization. 
Leadership is a central feature of any organization which can vary from very 
democratic to directive approaches. 
Shared values: These refer to the significant meanings or guiding concepts that 
an organization imbues in its members. Such as belief in the value and ways of doing 
business, and the social as well as economic purpose of the business. Peters and 
Waterman (1980) define it as "by super-ordinate goals (shared values), we mean 
guiding concepts - as set of values and aspirations, often unwritten, that goes beyond 
the conventional formal statement of corporate objective. They are the fundamental 
ideas around which a business is built. They are its main values. They are the broad 
notions of future direction that the top management team wants to infuse throughout 
the organization. They are the way in which the team wants to express itself, to leave 
its own mark (p275). " 
244 Lynch, R. (2003), Corporate Strategy, 3 ed., Financial Times Prentice Hall, London. 
us West, M. and Patterson, M. (1998), `Profitable Personnel', People Management, 8 (1), Jan 1998, 
pp28-31. 
126 
Handy (1993) 246 has contributed to the discussion of shared values and 
organizational culture by outlining four culture types: power culture, role culture, task 
culture and person culture. Power culture depends on a central power source with rays 
of influence from the central figure throughout the organization. It is frequently found 
in small entrepreneurial organizations and relies on trust, empathy and personal 
communications for its effectiveness. Control is exercised from the centre by the 
selection of key individuals. There are few rules and procedures, and little 
bureaucracy. Role culture is often stereotyped as a bureaucracy and works by logic 
and rationality. It rests on the strength of strong organizational `pillars' - the functions 
of specialists in, for example, finance, purchasing and production. The work of, and 
interaction between, the pillars is controlled by procedures and rules, and coordinated 
by the pediment of a small band of senior managers. Role or job description is often 
more important than the individual and position power is the main source of power. 
Task culture is job-oriented or project-oriented. An example is the matrix organization. 
Task culture seeks to bring together the right resources and people, and utilizes the 
unifying power of the group. Influence is widely spread and based more on expert 
power than on position or personal power. Person culture is where the individual is 
the central focus and any structure exists to serve the individuals within it. When a 
group of people decide that it is in their own interests to band together to do their own 
thing and share office space, equipment or clerical assistance then the resulting 
organization would have a person culture. Management hierarchies and control 
mechanisms are possible only by mutual consent. Individuals have almost complete 
autonomy and any influence over them is likely to be on the basis of personal power. 
Geert Hofstede (1980)247 has extended the work on organizational cultures by 
discussing the impact of national cultures. Arguing that culture is, in a memorable 
phrase, `collective programming' or `software of the mind', Hofstede initially 
identified four dimensions of culture: power distance uncertainty avoidance. 
individualism and masculinity. A fifth dimension of culture, long-term/short term 
orientation, was originally labeled as `Confucian work dynamism'. This dimension 
was developed from the work of Bond in an attempt to assess the impact of Chinese 
246 Handy, C. B. (1993), Understanding Organizations, 4t` ed., Penguin, London. 
247 Hofstede, G. (1980), Culture's Consequences, Saga, London. 
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cultural values on the workplace. 248 These five dimensions can be used to explore 
organizational values and culture from a cross - national comparative analysis. 
" `Power distance' is essentially used to categorize levels of inequality in 
organizations, which Hofstede claims will depend upon management style, 
willingness of subordinates to disagree with supervisors, and the educational 
level and status accruing to particular roles. China is seen to display a high 
level of power distance. In contrast, the USA is characterized as a low power 
distance society. 
" `Uncertainty avoidance' refers to the extent to which members of a society 
feel threatened by unusual situations and risk. China is estimated as medium to 
uncertainty avoidance, and the USA is said to be low-to-medium. 
" `Individualism' refers to the relatively individualistic or collectivist values and 
ethics evident in a particular society. Thus, according to the Hofstede, the 
USA displays high individualism which is in contrast with Hong Kong and 
China which are collectivist societies. 
" `Masculinity' refers to a continuum between ̀ masculine' characteristics, such 
as assertiveness and competitiveness, and `feminine' traits, such as caring, a 
stress upon the quality of life and concern with the environment. High 
masculinity societies included the USA and Hong Kong, whereas China is 
estimated at "medium" on this dimension. 
Every organization will have its own unique culture and core values and most 
large businesses are likely to be a mix of cultures in varying areas of its organization. 
However, the type of culture built within an organization should facilitate 
management effectiveness and unify the organization as a whole. Nowadays, attention 
is given to the importance of culture construction in organizational development and 
performance. It is recognized that a "strong" culture can provide the norms and 
guidance for solving conflicts and releasing tensions. An organization will benefit 
from a shared value belief in its long-term strategic development and growth. 
Skills refer to the distinctive capabilities of key personnel and the firm as a 
whole. Like Peters and Waterman (1980) define - "these dominating attributes or 
capabilities are what we mean by skills (p276). " It also refers to the core competences 
248 Hofstede, G. and Bond, M. H. (2005), ̀ The Confucius Connection: from cultural roots to economic 
growth' Organisational Dynamics, Spring, 1988, pp. 4-21. Cited from Mulins (2005), Management and 
Organisational Behaviour, 7t' ed. Pearson Education Limited, England, pp47-49. 
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the firm possesses. In a rapid changing environment, particularly in the market with 
institutional transition, Chinese organizations are facing challenges in building 
management capacity. Management skills are practically lacking and inhibit 
organizational development. Technological skills are also vital for innovation and 
competitive advantage. 
These are the factors that make up the McKinsey 7-S framework. Each interacts 
with the other to create an organizational profile. As Peters and Waterman state, the 7- 
S framework is an analytical tool for exploring the dynamics of organizational life. 
They stress that it is for the research investigator to construct organizational 
dimensions for each of the `S's that are relevant for the enquiry being undertaken. For 
the purposes of this research, the dimensions created for each `S', as the basis for data 
collection were as follows: 
Strategy 
(1) Business long-term strategies and goals for the next 5 to 10 years; 
(2) Implementation planning processes; 
(3) Short-term strategies at the operational level; 
(4) Strategic development and changes in relation to influencing factors of the 
external business environment; 
(5) Strategy decision-making participants - top teams and key influentials. 
Structure 
(1) Organisational charts and their specification of roles, responsibilities and 
authorities; 
(2) Key decision-making processes; 
(3) Operational management systems 
(4) Performance targets and management objectives; 
(5) Departmental functions, job specialization, relations and coordination between 
departments; 
(6) Departmental goals and performance measuring mechanisms; budgeting and 
planning control processes. 
Systems 
(1) Financial systems and methods of management accounts; 
(2) Communications channels - formal and informal; 
(3) Planning systems for achieving management objectives; 
(4) Reward and sanction systems; 
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(5) Marketing and production processes; 
(6) Mechanisms for innovation, R&D and technological development. 
Style 
(1) Leadership and senior management styles; 
(2) Approaches to problem and conflict solving; 
(3) Work Climate - strategies for employee motivation and morale; 
(4) Communications mechanisms (e. g. paper, face-to-face, formal or informal 
meetings); 
(5) Influence of western management theory (e. g. learning and practice). 
Staff 
(1) Professional and expert competences of key personnel; 
(2) Recruitment policies of HR (e. g. selection criteria, training and mentoring 
process for new recruits); 
(3) Training program and policies; 
(4) Staff development policies; 
(5) Performance evaluation systems; 
(6) Impact of western HR management ideas in working practices. 
Shared values 
(1) Management philosophies (indicators including consideration, respect and 
trust; recognition and credit; involvement and availability; fair and equitable 
treatment; positive action on individual basis; and emphasis on end-results. ); 
(2) Organizational culture (indicators including routines; rituals; stories; symbols; 
power structures and control methods); 
(3) Key values driving employees' beliefs and understanding of business 
development. 
Skills 
(1) Capabilities and expertise of key personnel; 
(2) Technologies employed (including office, manufacturing and R&D); 
(3) Competitive advantages in relation to `core' competences. 
As complementary to the 7-S dimensions, Situational Factors are also examined 
to further explain how the external environment shapes management practices. These 
situational factors include: 
1. Opportunities and threats in the evolving market; 
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2. The impact of legal reforms and government policies; 
3. History and background of the enterprises and the `legacy effect' in business 
development. 
3.3.3 The Selection of Case Studies 
As reviewed in the first two chapters, the state sector was the only form of 
ownership in China under the earlier socialist regime. After two decades of reforms, 
the economy has evolved into a state sector and a private sector, with diversified 
forms of ownership. Four case study companies were chosen to represent these two 
sectors. These are (1) a state-owned enterprise (2) a collective-owned enterprise (3) a 
foreign joint venture and (4) an entrepreneurial enterprise. 
The four cases representing different types of ownership are selected from the 
textile industry. Three of the case companies are located in Dalian, Liaoning Province, 
one of most internationalized cities in south-east China with a population of over 6 
million. The city's annual Fashion Festival is a major international event and the 
clothing industry is a major economic component of its industrial structure. In 1997, 
the central government decided to use the textile industry as the experiment for 
restructuring state sector enterprises. Therefore, as both a traditional and competitive 
industry, the textile sector is a pioneer for the implementation of government reform 
experiments. It offers a perfect case for assessing the impact of legal reforms and 
organizational change for management practices. This is why the four case studies 
were chosen in this sector. 
As a consequence of the prior planned economy, the textile industry was 
overstaffed, over-debt and with heavy social responsibilities. The textile industry had 
always suffered losses; in 1997, this amounted to RMB 1060 billion (US$128 billion), 
and accounted for the highest percentage of state enterprise losses. 54% of state- 
owned enterprises in the textile industry were in debt at a rate far higher than the 
average for state industries (CTIA, 2000/2001). 249 After the reforms in the textile 
industry since 1997, some significant improvements have been achieved. Losses have 
been reduced and new technologies installed as a result of capital investment 
programmes. Enterprises are more market-focused and management skills have been 
249 China Textile Industry Associate (CTIA) `China development report of Textile industry' (2000/2001) 
China Textile Press, Beijing, p139. 
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improved (Wang, 2001 ). 250 The textile industry plays a pioneering role in economic 
reforms and demonstrates significant management restructuring. Following China's 
accession to WTO, the textile industry has access to international markets. This has 
given the sector opportunities for rapid business growth. The textile industry also 
provides a useful context to study economic reforms, the emergence of new forms of 
ownership and re-structured management practices. In this sector, the number of state- 
owned enterprises now makes up only 6% of all enterprises; collectively-owned 
enterprises 4.7% of the sector; foreign joint ventures 43.5% and entrepreneurial 
enterprises 45.8% (CTIA, 2002/2003). 251 All four types of business ownership are 
represented in this sector, offering an appropriate industry for a comparative study of 
case companies characterized by different ownership forms. 
3.3.4 The Four Case Study Companies 
The four case study companies selected for this research are: (1) `Liaoning Times 
Group' (LTG) -a state-owned enterprise (SOE); (2) `Shenyang Liming Anna 
Clothing' (SLAG) -a collectively-owned enterprise (COE); (3) `Dalian Dali 
Cashmere Product Company' -a privately-owned enterprise (POE); and (4) `Dalian 
Sunfed Fashion Clothing' (DSF) -a foreign joint-venture (FJV). 
Liaoning Times Group (LTG) 
LTG as a traditional state-owned enterprise was founded in 1955. It witnessed 
the market transformation from a planned socialist economy to a competition-driven 
market nowadays. Followed by legal reforms of SOEs, LTG became a partly-owned 
public company listed on the `A' stock market of Shanghai in 2000. Today it consists 
of six wholly-owned and partly-controlled factories, and its operational functions 
include fabric dyeing and garments production. Its annual production is more than 2 
million garments and 105 million meters of dyed fabrics. LTG has total assets of one 
billion RMB (US$121 million) with over 6000 employees. As one of the leaders in 
garments export in China, it has amassed more than forty years experience in the 
import and export of all types of woven and knitted garments, as well as related 
materials, ranging from raw material, fabrics, trims and accessories. Products are 
250 Wang, Tiankai (2001), The first breakthrough of enterprise reform in the textile industry, the forum 
of minister and academician, Beijing 2001. 
251 China Textile Industry Associate (CTIA) `China development report of Textile industry ' 
(2002/2003), China Textile Press, Beijing, p128. 
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shipped to more than 60 countries, and the company is internationally known for its 
quality and reliability. Three geographical areas - North America, Europe and 
Japan/Korea - are strategically targeted by specialised overseas divisions of LTG. The 
work of these divisions is further facilitated by its multi-function of transportation, 
warehousing and quality assurance. It has representative offices located in the United 
States, Germany, Japan and Hong Kong, ensuring seamless worldwide business 
relations. 
Shenyang Liming Anna Clothing (SLAC) 
The case of SLAC, as a collectively-owned enterprise has recently undergone 
ownership reforms in 2002. This case combines private ownership and collective 
ownership; a typical collective form of business venture in contemporary China 
resulting from market transformation. Such cases are few nowadays, as the statistics 
indicate that only 4.7% of enterprises in the textile industry consist of this type of 
collective ownership. SLAC was originally founded in 1956 as a collectively-owned 
enterprise in the state sector. It was reformed in 2002 by which private ownership 
became involved as the dominant shareholder while the collective ownership retreated 
as secondary shareholder. A mixed management model is prominent in this case 
company. It currently has 600 employees and fixed asset value of RMB20 million 
(US$2.4 million) in equipment and buildings. This allows for an annual production 
capacity of 1 million garments. As a professional garments company, it integrates 
manufacturing, marketing, retailing, and export & import functions. Its product range 
covers women and men's suits, shirts and trousers to causal wear, fashion clothes, 
Jeans and snowsuits. Its main markets for sales comprise domestic cities and overseas 
countries, such as Japan, South Korea, Europe and USA. SLAC owns two patented 
trademarks: "Anna Lee" for woman's fashion clothes and "Yawenshi" for man's suits 
and shirt. These brands are only for domestic market sales and account for only a 
minor portion of all profits. Its major profits are from manufacturing and processing 
garments for foreign brands. 
Dalian Dali Cashmere Company (Dali) 
The case of Dali Cashmere, as a privately-owned enterprise, is a typical 
entrepreneurial company. The owner as a risk-taking entrepreneur who started his 
business in 1995 and developed the company from nothing to a company equipped 
133 
with RMB50 million (US$6 million) assets and 200 employees. Its annual sales in 
cashmere product reach to RMB30 million (US$4 million), including both overseas 
and domestic markets. The ownership in this case is simple and clear. It represents the 
driving force in the private sector and an outcome of marketisation and privatization. 
Its ten-year's development and success has reflected the rapid growth of the private 
sector in contemporary China under market socialism. 
Dalian Sunfed Fashion (DSF) 
The case of DSF is an American-Chinese joint venture, founded in 1997. Sunfed 
Group U. S. invested 30,000 US dollars capital with its Chinese partner, Mr. Li, an 
overseas Chinese, who brought into this venture 36,000 US dollars capital to set up a 
joint venture company in the clothing business. Affiliated with the Sunfed Group in 
the U. S., Dalian Sunfed Fashion (DSF) has established a branding reputation in 
Dalian for its sophisticated style and fine craftsmanship. The brand has become very 
popular in Dalian and it has consecutively made the top list in recent Dalian 
International Fashion Exhibitions from 2003 to 2005. It was awarded the "BEST OF 
TEN" ladies fashion in the ninth, tenth and eleventh Dalian International Fashion 
Festivals with its excellent styles and high sales. As a distinctive professional 
women's wear company, the DSF collection is outstanding with its fresh and bright 
looking, unique designs and long lasting styles. It breaks through the boundary 
between "professional" and "informal"; professional but stylish. DSF is a brand- 
focused company and produces high value-added products. In eight years, it has 
acquired over RMB40 million assets (US$5 million) with annual sales RMB99 
million (US$12 million) in 2005. Despite this, it remains small with 200 employees. 
3.4 The collection of Data 
Multiple sources of evidence were used; that is, data were collected from the four 
different types of organization, but focusing on the same set of facts/findings through 
one organizational framework, the McKinsey 7-S framework. The case study 
databases, as a formal assembly of evidence are in both paper and computerized forms 
and comprise questionnaires and interviews (in paper format archives); documents 
and companies archives that are categorized in case unit files; financial data; 
recorded tapes of all interviews; and photos of each case company. 
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A chain of evidence is maintained as explicit links between the questions asked, 
the data collected, and the conclusions drawn; it is characterized with clear cross- 
referencing methodological procedures and illustrations of interrelations to the 
resulting evidence. According to Yin's suggestion (2003)252, the incorporation of 
these principles into a case study investigation can increase its quality substantially. In 
order to ensure quality control in the data collection process, the fieldwork 
investigation was well designed and organized in a scientific manner and certain 
formally required procedures were rigorously followed in the process of fieldwork. 
For instance, a protocol of fieldwork research was designed before the investigation 
started, which included the field procedures to be followed; criteria of case selection; 
time table for interviews' arrangement; dimensions of questionnaires and criteria for 
data analysis. 
3.4.1 Fieldwork 
It was very difficult gaining access to the case study companies. The state-owned 
enterprise (LTG) was accessed through personal contacts. This is virtually the only 
way a researcher can gain entry into Chinese companies. The fieldwork in the four 
case companies took one year in total to complete, starting from May 2005 to May 
2006. Arranging access to selected companies and networking with entrepreneurs and 
government officials took place at the initial stage of the research. More than four 
case companies (seven to eight) were initially selected but through verification 
according to case selection criteria (ownership) and the need for full access, the four 
case companies were finally selected. After informal networking and interviews with 
key informants, the formal fieldwork investigation began with the privately-owned 
enterprise in June 2005, the state-owned enterprise in September, collectively-owned 
enterprise in December and the foreign joint-venture enterprise in March 2006. 
During the fieldwork in each case company, two to three interviews were arranged for 
each week, and these were often repeated two or three times due to the detailed 
information required. Re-visits were also caused by the limited time of senior 
managers at single meetings, so that several appointments with interviewees had to be 
arranged. 
152 Yin, R. K. (2003), Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 3'd ed., Sage Publications, London. 
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All the interviews were type recorded and then filed in computerized form. 
Duplicated paper copies of all interviews were also taken and documented. Relevant 
photos to demonstrate the product, office and work climate were taken at each case 
site. The interviews were structured according to the McKinsey 7-S framework, and 
each required three hour interviews with respondents. All four case companies also 
provided relevant documents and financial data for the research. A letter of 
introduction was sent to all case companies involved in the investigation explaining 
the academic purpose of the research and guaranteeing confidentiality of company 
information (See Appendix 3). The questionnaire used in the case studies is 
reproduced in Appendix 4. 
3.4.2 Sources of Data Collection 
There were four sources of data that provide the evidence for each of the case 
study companies. 
(1). Formal and informal Interviews 
These were concluded with the CEO of each case company in an open- ended 
nature and in a conversational manner. The key informants in each of the four cases 
devoted more than three hours for the interviews. Rich information was offered in an 
open-ended manner. (For a list of these key informants see Appendix 5. ) Key 
Departmental managers of each organization were also interviewed as well as 
government officials responsible for policy issues in relation to business and the 
regulatory environment in which organizations operate. The interviews were tape 
recorded and notes of interviews were also taken. These are available for inspection in 
both paper form and computerized databases. They are responded in the Mandarin 
language. 
According to the case study theory of Yin (2003), the use of interviews acts as an 
essential source of evidence in case studies because these allow for the exploration of 
organizational behavior and management processes. Human affairs need to be 
reported and interpreted through the eyes of organizational leaders who are managing 
and directing the whole organization. They are the most valuable informants to 
provide important insights into the core of management practices in an organization. 
Interviewing is undertaken as a precedent approach because it can give shortcuts to 
the history of the organization, helping to identify other relevant sources of evidence. 
(2) The Use of Documents 
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Documents were inspected in relation to management procedures, personnel 
policies, contracts and other issues relevant for exploring the 7-S framework topics. 
These were also used to compare with the data offered by the key informants in the 
interviews. 
(3). The Use of Archival Records 
Organizational records such as organizational charts and budgets/finance were 
analysed. These provided quantitative data about financial performance. 
(4). Non-Participant Observation 
While conducting the interviews, the researcher also observed formal and 
informal patterns of behavior as indicators of culture, style and management practices. 
She observed meetings, supervisory styles and office lay-out. 
3.5 Analyzing the data 
"Data analysis is exciting because you discover themes and concepts embedded 
throughout your interviews. As you continue with the data analysis, you weave these 
themes and concepts into a broader explanation of theoretical or practical import to 
guide your final report. Data analysis is final stage of listening to hear the meaning of 
what is said. " (Rubin and Rubin, 1995)253 
Throughout the 12 months fieldwork, more than 50 interviews were conducted 
with 30 interviewees (incl. revisits) and all relevant data gathered. These form the 
completed archives for each case study. The next goal after the initial data collection 
was to analyze this data to discover key information and cross-check evidence. De 
facto, the data analysis stage started during the interview process and this information 
was added to through later interviews with other respondents. More interviews and 
questions were put to informants, while the questionnaires were also modified to suit 
emergent and contingent situations in the field research. 
At the stage of data analysis, with over 50 digital recordings, along with six 
boxes of documents, I listened to the interviews repeatedly one by one and read 
through all documents from each case organization. I then categorized them in 
relevant subjects in accordance with how I had specified the operational measure in 
relation to the McKinsey 7-S framework. By reading and listening to the data, I 
recorded each time a particular idea or concept was mentioned or explained, and 
253 Rubin, H. J. and Rubin, I. S. (1995), Qualitative Interviewing : the art of hearing data. Sage, 
London, p226. 
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referenced these according to the structured topics of the 7-S framework. Then, I 
grouped these responses together describing the same idea or process and examining 
everything that I put in the same category. In other words, the data are organized to 
describe the structure, strategy, system, staff, style, skills and shared values (7-S), for 
each of the four case study organizations. The following chapters, on the basis of the 
collected data, describe each of the four case study organizations representing as they 
do, different types of enterprise ownership emerging under the evolving market 
socialist economy of China. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
Case Study (1): The State-Owned Enterprise 
Liaoning Times Group Plc. 
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Introduction 
Studies of business organisations in China have yet to focus on the impact of 
different types of ownership upon management styles and organisational behaviour. 
Clearly, different ownership types can lead to different organisational processes 
giving rise to variations in strategy, structure, systems, values, management style and 
decision-making. In addition, the legal context and regulations as these relate to 
different types of business venture create organisational differences in the market 
environment in which business ventures operate. This is a distinctive feature of 
market socialism that cannot be neglected. 
Privately-owned and foreign-owned joint-ventures that have emerged under 
market transformation are continuously changing. State-owned enterprises (SOE) are 
also undergoing management restructuring, corporatization and ownership 
diversification. The reform of state-owned enterprises has long been restricted by the 
Communist Party's socialist ideology but, even so, they have undergone various 
reforms. This chapter, on the basis of case study data, discusses a state-owned 
enterprise in the textile industry. 
4.1 Background of Liaoning Time Group 
`Liaoning Times Group Inc. ' (LTG) is a state owned public corporation which 
was legally "spun-off' from 'Liaoning Garments Import and Export Corp. ' (LGIEC), 
a large State garments trading company in Liaoning Province in 1998. Its past name 
reflects re-structuring since 1955 by administrative reforms from "centralization" to 
"decentralization" and a market-focused organisation. (See Figure 4.1) It was 
originally 'China Sundries Import & Export Company, Liaoning Branch'. It then 
specialised in the textile industry and became 'China Textiles Import & Export 
Corporation, Liaoning Branch (CTIEC) in 1960. It was an adjunct of the State 
administrative system, managed by the Central Party Committee. In 1987, it 
developed as a market-focused trading company with an emphasis on the import and 
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export of garments and related products. Since 1989, it has achieved significant 
financial performance as reflected in figure 4.2. 
Figure 4.1 Historical development of Times Group Inc. 
Year Name 
1955.03 Liaoning Branch of China Sundries Imp. & Exp. Co. 
1960.06 Liaoning Branch of China Textiles Imp. & Exp. Co. 
1987.03 Liaoning Garments Imp. & Exp. Co 
1998.07 Liaoning Times Group Inc. 
Figure 4.2 Achievements of the Times Group Inc. 
Year Achievements 
1989 The Excellent enterprise in Liaoning Province for Foreign 
Outsourcing & Processing 
1990 Grade II State Enterprise 
1990 Advanced National Enterprise for Export exchange earnings, 
committed contractor, credible and reliable enterprise 
1990-1991 Advanced Enterprise in Liaoning Province 
1993 The Outstanding Enterprise on the Achievement Exhibition of 
China Export Commodity Base Construction 
1997 Credit Grade AAA Enterprise in Liaoning Province 
1997 Advanced Collective in Nationwide System of Foreign Trade and 
Economy 
1998 Advanced Enterprise for High Quality & Profitability in Nationwide 
System of Foreign Trade and Economy 
Changes in the global economy and China's accession to the WTO provided the 
company with the opportunity to reform and become the organisation of today: a 
public company listed on the `A' stock market of Shanghai in 2000. In August, 2001, 
it became legally incorporated with an independent board of directors. Today it 
consists of six wholly-owned and partly-owned factories, and its operational functions 
include fabric dyeing and garments production. Its annual production is more than 2 
million garments and 105 million meters of dyed fabrics. On the basis of this core 
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activity, the company is gradually diversifying into different industries, such as real 
estate, property management and retail services. It is also attempting to gain a foot in 
the capital market for investment management. 
Today, LTG has total assets of one billion RMB (US$121 million) with over 
6000 employees. As one of the leaders in China in garments exports, it has amassed 
more than forty years experience in the import and export of all types of woven and 
knitted garments, as well as related materials, ranging from raw material, fabrics, 
trims and accessories (See Appendix 6, photos of product categories). Products are 
shipped to more than 60 countries, and the company is internationally known for its 
quality and reliability. Three geographical areas, North America, Europe and 
Japan/Korea, are strategically targeted by specialised overseas divisions of LTG. The 
work of these divisions is further facilitated by its multi-function of transportation, 
warehousing and quality assurance. It has representative offices located in the United 
States, Germany, Japan and Hong Kong, ensuring seamless worldwide business 
relations. 
In the light of LTG's performance, the statistics demonstrate steady but slow 
growth in profitability and a dramatic improvement in shareholder equity. Its fix 
assets have significantly increased from 291 million RMB (US$ 35 million) in 2000 
to 830 million RMB (US$ 100 million) in 2005. (See Figure 4.3 Operational 
Performance of LTG) The main trading business, Times Garments Export and Import 
(TGIEI), contributes to the majority profit of LTG's total annual gains. Its profit share 
has increased from 75% in 2002 to 90% in 2005. (See figure 4.4 Profit Distribution in 
three industries 2002 - 2005) The major profit from TGIEI is from overseas markets, 
basically from the three areas of Europe, USA and Japan. The profit from China's 
domestic sales is only 19% in 2004. (See Figure 4.5 Profit share in different markets) 
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Figure 4.3 Operational Performance of LTG 























1999 86,570,331 121,705,384 164,776,943 291,836,406 
2000 88,987,478 2.79 346,936,349 185.06 262,959,991 35.48 617,069,314 111.44 
2001 103,736,445 16.57 381,855,352 10.06 229,805,381 11.10 619,483,000 0.39 
2002 104,548,601 0.78 403,548,608 5.68 257,723,204 12.15 669,387,238 8.06 
2003 111,542,633 6.69 429,986,761 6.55 255,785,361 -0.75 688,647,625 2.88 
2004 120,835,412 8.33 450,250,668 4.71 262,655,377 2.61 718,537,418 4.34 
2005 123,445,944 2.16 466,252,970 3.55 318,178,490 17.45 830,315,141 15.56 
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Figure 4.4 The Distribution of Profits within LTG, 2005 
Industries Total % Total °/a Total % Total % 
Profit 2002 Profit 2003 Profit 2004 Profit 2005 
(RMB) RMB RMB (RMB 
Manufact 25.525.867 24.42 26.719,155 23.86 24,602,199 20.29 10,927521 9.81 
uring 
Internatio 79,289330 75.84 85,120,224 76.02 96,555,386 79.63 112,674,440 90.89 
nal 
Trading 
Service 133,777 0.13 125,241 0.11 94,309 0.08 364,875 0.29 
TO7,, 11, 104,548,975 /00 1/1,964.621 100 /21,251,895 /00 /23,966,837 /00 
Domestic 20.899,103 19.99 23,131,875 20.66 22.643,164 18.67 10,554,229 8.51 
Overseas 83.649.871 80.01 88,832,745 79.34 98,608,731 81.33 113,412,608 11.49 
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LTG is a good example of a state-owned enterprise which has successfully 
transformed from a production unit under the planned economy to a market-focused 
enterprise operating in a competitive environment. Through restructuring and 
corporatization, it has become a public company and a leading force in the textile 
industry that plays a dominant role in both domestic and overseas markets. It 
represents an epitome of how State-owned Chinese enterprises have evolved and it 
mirrors the evolution of management in the state sector in general. In the fieldwork, 
senior management's reluctance to answer some questions reflected political 
sensitivity and how government attitudes still affect management behaviour and 
decision-making within the enterprise. This is despite its claims that restructuring has 
divorced the administration of the State Authority from enterprise management. The 
interviews and observations indicate that although LTG is a market-oriented 
conglomerate corporation, it is still directly influenced by the State and political 
forces. As discussed in chapter 3, this company is analysed by reference to each of the 
dimensions of the McKinsey 7-S framework. 





LTG has strategic planning for 5-year short-term objectives and 10-year long 
term goals. The statement of strategy is explicit at both the corporate and operational 
levels. Like the company's formalised management systems, the strategy is officially 
documented and elaborated. It reflects political direction and government policy as 
well as LTG's development from continued market reforms. According to company 
documentation, LTG formulated its strategic plans in 2002, when it became a partly 
publicly-listed company. Its short-term objectives for 2002-2007 as well as its longer- 
term goals, 2002-2012 at the corporate level are as follows: 
Five year objectives for 2002 - 2007 are, (1) an annual increase in profit margins 
for the main garments business of 10% to reach to 72 million RMB in 2007; (2) the 
search for merger and joint-venture opportunities with other compatible enterprises; 
(3) to make a significant break-through in investment and development diversification, 
for new profit opportunities; (4) the subsidiary companies to diversify in investment 
and business opportunities for profit growth; (5) to improve the quality of staff 
selection and management development; (6) to raise the earnings of employees in line 
with productivity increases; (7) to develop a high-performing, profit-focused 
organisational culture; (8) to thoroughly enhance the core competences of the 
company for competitiveness and to ensure the potential strength of future 
development. 
The ten year development goals of LTG (2002 - 2012) are `To enhance the 
company's innovative capacity in business diversification; to grow the total 
profitability by 1.5 times on the basis of 2002, and to achieve one hundred million 
RMB in 2012. To develop LTG as a large-scale conglomerate with strong assets and 
competitiveness; and to diversify into trading and manufacturing industries. 
LTG also has 5 guidelines for the five-year and ten-year strategy: 
(i) to retain profitable growth by operational efficiency and investment in quality 
management systems and advanced technology; (ii) to give priority to export and 
import trading; (iii) to establish joint ventures with foreign companies in relevant 
industries and to establish strategic alliances to expand in international markets; (iv) 
to continually re-structure LTG and to diversify its investment for future growth; (v) 
to develop a corporate culture that stresses spiritual as well as material values. 
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In accordance with these guidelines, LTG has three phrases of development: 
The First Phrase 2003 -2006 Strategic Transformation Period 
The Second Phrase 2006 - 2010 Rapid Growth Period 
The Third Phrase 2010 - 2012 Stable Development Period 
The main tasks relating to the first phrase of strategic transformation are: (a) to 
consolidate the core business and to make export and import trading as the leading 
engine for the development of LTG. LTG has strengths in skills in international 
trading and has a long-term reputation for business credibility; (b) to accelerate the 
upgrading of manufacturing factories and to develop a structure and culture that is 
market-focused for the development of new products. Through joint ventures with 
famous foreign brands, it intends to build its own brand value and core brand products; 
(c) to be actively involved in developing businesses in new industries through 
investment projects; to seek investment opportunities in the areas of real estate and 
information technology; and (d) to eliminate state support and the losses of some of 
its subsidiary companies. 
LTG clarifies its objectives for both the short and the long term, and each stage 
of development is phrased for different tasks. But there is a paradox between its 
strategy of `Focus' and `Diversification'. LTG emphasises that both these strategies 
are at the centre of its business development. But it gives priority to its main business 
with diversification in different industries as complimentary to this. 
The five-guidelines for strategy planning incorporate all the government policies 
for the reform of state-owned enterprises, which differentiate their management from 
other types of enterprises that operate in the same market. The state-owned enterprises 
are much more politically driven than pure market-oriented companies, such as 
privately-owned enterprises and foreign joint-ventures. The strategic planning of LTG 
is not fully decided by its own senior management but is mostly driven by the 
administration agency - The Administration and Inspection Committee of State 
Assets - that reinforces political direction. Conventional Communist Party thinking on 
the planned economy still affects the ideology and behaviour of managers in LTG. 
This is evidenced in the later section on staff. 
4.2.2 Structure 
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It is essential to explain the structure of this State-owned enterprise at both 
administrative and governance levels as it reflects the impact of state ownership over 
the formation of its structure. "The Administration and Inspection Committee of State 
Assets" (AICSA) was set up in 2002 by the 16'' Congress of the Communist Party. 
This was followed by the issue of a "Provisional Decree of The Enterprise and State 
Assets Administration and Inspection". This provides the basic infrastructure for the 
administration of state assets. The Decree defines the role of AICSA to be that: 
"In accordance with its authorization, AICSA fulfils the owner's duty to 
implement discretion in State owned and controlled enterprises in terms of 
independence, merger, purchase, bankruptcy, dismissal, decrease or increase in 
capital, issue of bonds, cessions of shares, etc. and other such grand proceedings. It 
also appoints at all levels of senior posts, such as the president, vice president, the 
general manager, vice general manager, principle accountant, and Board of 
2sa Directors. 
This new administrative agency - AICSA - is responsible for the administration 
and supervision of State assets after the separation of political and enterprise 
governance. It has the role of `Boss' or the `representative of the owner' to fulfill 
owner responsibilities; that is, election of management, claims on profits, major 
decision-making, and the disposal of assets. However, as Fang (2004) 255 from The 
State Finance Ministry says: 
"The degree of this function and how far this administration can go are not 
specified in detail. For example, there is no current law on how to distribute the 
profits of State-Owned Enterprises although there is a proposal for operational 
budget planning. But it does not explain clearly the relations between the operational 
budget of State assets and State finance at the extent to whether the gains of State 
assets should be included into the revenue of State finance. " 
As a result, some conflicts and undefined relations still confuse its 
implementation. The present Party Secretary of LTG, Ms Liang says in an interview: 
"As a state owned enterprise, the current management structure of LTG is still 
inefficient and the reforms have not had much significant effect upon improving our 
254 Li, Xin-xin (2004), Improving administrative mechanism of state assets', The State Assets 
Management, (by The Finance Ministry, The State Council, and The Administration and Inspection 
Committee of State Assets), 160 (7), July 2004, pp. 4-7. 
255 Fang, Zhouwen (2004), (Officer of The State Finance Ministry) `The role of CASISA and target 
models of State assets administrational institution', The State Asset Management, 160 (7), July 2004, 
pp. 8-10. 
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management efficiency. We still have not established the appropriate mechanisms in 
relation to the market. The old management systems in conjunction with the State 
administration still remain the same. If you ask the former Party Secretary, who was 
in the post at the company from 1987 to 2004, you would find that the current 
structure of LTG is quiet similar to what it was before. Personally, I think the quality 
of management in this state-owned enterprise is far behind that of the advanced 
foreign enterprises. Moreover, there is so much uncertainty and confusion in many of 
the guiding policies from the central authority. As an enterprise, we are still waiting 
for how to move to the next step in structural reforms. It tells you that nothing is 
certain at this time. What I say today might change later. Especially my personal 
opinions need to be in concordance with central authority, but we now wait for new 
instructions. The state-owned enterprise is not very flexible like privately-owned 
enterprises, as there are many restrictions on our operations and management. For 
example, in our marketing and sales, the strategy and plans are fixed and settled 
without flexibility, so we are unable to adjust and adopt changes in line with demands 
that arise from customers and the market. We have a different structure in place as a 
state-owned enterprise. " 
Interviews with the former Company Party Secretary, Mr. Qi Zhengming; Vice 
General Manager, Mr. Li Xiao, as well as other divisional managers also 
demonstrated similar attitudes of inflexibility and "constraint" within the Company's 
complex and multi-dimensional structure. The organisational chart, provided by the 
Company's Planning Department is shown in figure 4.6. 
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Figure 4.6 Structure of government administration responsible for LTG 
Central Party Committee 
(CPC) 
The Administration and 
Inspection Committee of 
State Assets 
(AICSA) 
(Organisation, Personnel, Administration & 
Discipline) Inspection Committee of 
Enterprise (I. TG) 
President/GM 
of LTG 
It is a rigid hierarchy, controlling personnel, finance and corporate strategy. The 
AICSA represents the State and the Communist Party and exercises direct 
administration over both wholly-owned and share-holding enterprises. The central 
state authority still has holistic and tight administrative control over state-owned 
enterprises, but its power is aggregated in one body - AICSA. This top-down 
administration restricts the enterprise's ability to responding to changing markets and 
customer demands. Instead, political issues dominate the nature of management in 
State-Owned Enterprises. Although the Party Committee has parallel power to 
AICSA, it has a weaker impact. As the current Company Party Secretary, Ms Liang 
says: 
As the Party Secretary, our role is to smooth the management, and help people 
stay in the same direction as the party. We hold frequent meetings and discussion 
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sessions for the consistent education of the Party's ideas as well as for the assurance 
of political concordance. We solve conceptual conflicts in management, and 
spiritually motivate them for the maintenance of high moral and ethics at work We 
normally don't get involved in business operations, except for board meetings at the 
corporate level for big decision-making. We usually support the general manager's 
decisions. " 
The former Party Secretary, Mr. Qi also says: "I was the Party Secretary from 
1987, and retired from this post in 2004. The role of party secretary becomes weaker 
and less important in State enterprises after the market transformations. Market 
values and competition have gradually taken over from the old concepts of equality 
and life-security. The focus of work has shifted dramatically. In the past, the party 
secretary was superior to the general manager and determined all the decisions in the 
enterprise, but after the market reforms, our function and power of influence have 
faded away. We have become a necessary but insignificant figure. The work involved 
in our routine is with personnel, focusing on moral and ethics, carrying Party ideas to 
employees and conveying new concepts from the central Party authority to senior 
management. However, the principle work in the enterprise today is to focus on the 
market and so that management can generate profits for the higher authorities. " 
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Figure 4.7 Structure of Functions Within 
LTG 
Since 2001, Boards of Directors have been introduced in almost all public 
companies. The formal structure of management is illustrated in figure 4.7. This 
consists of the Board of Directors, Board of Supervision, President and General 
Manager. Final decisions are made by the board of directors, and the board of 
supervision oversees the board of directors. The general manager and vice general 
managers exert direct control through their functional departments - General 
Manager's Office, Finance. Personnel, Planning and Auditing. Authority and 
hierarchy are the key features of the LTG structure. The general manager is basically 
the final decision-maker with relevant consultation to vice general managers. Ile also 
reports to AICSA for authorization on key decisions that relate to corporate strategy, 
financial investment and key personnel appointments. His job is not only about 
management at the corporate level but also in reporting to the higher authority - 
AICSA. Maintaining good relations with this higher authority is essential for senior 
managers, as AICSA has the discretion to appoint or dismiss them. In interviews, they 
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are very cautious in what they say and keep discreet behaviour. This is because 
AICSA stresses they should not give media interviews and should not disclose any 
information in public without authorization. In the case study, we obtained the vice 
general manager, Mr. Li for an interview because of a personal contact. When I ask 
him for the most significant change in LTG reforms, he says: 
"The most significant change in state-owned enterprise is organisational 
restructuring in terms of management autonomy and corporatization. By learning 
from western companies, we have created the modern corporate company to replace 
the old administrative unit. Tripartite governance formalizes the company's efficiency 
for the market economy: the board of directors, the board of supervision and the 
board of senior managers. Big decisions at corporate level, such as investment and 
strategy, need to get authorization from the AICSA. However, daily operational and 
divisional business decisions are delegated to lower-level managers. If we are 
compared to western companies, we are still far from complete corporate 
independence but compared to the state-owned enterprises of the past, it is a 
distinctive change in its regime. " 
At the end of the interview, Mr. Li emphasizes that I should treat him as an 
anonymous interviewee because AICSA doesn't allow him to do this. He mentions 
that AICSA is very powerful and places very tight control and restrictions over senior 
managers in state-owned enterprises. 
LTG as a conglomerate corporation that has six major subsidiary companies in 
different industries. The ownership relations among these companies are illustrated in 
Figure 4.7. Ownership is diversified in forms of state-wholly-owned, state-controlled 
and state-investment subsidiaries. For instance, four subsidiary companies that are 
wholly-owned by LTG are as follows: 
(1) `Liaozhong Phoenix' (a garment factory in Liaozhong city); 
(2) `Anshan Jialian' (a garment factory in Anshan City); 
(3) `Times Mansion' (A 28-floors Modem Office Building in the centre of Dalian) 
(4) Yadu Hotel (a three star hotel in town center of Dalian). 
One subsidiary company - Times Garments I/E Inc. (TGIEI) is State-controlled; 
and is the outcome of restructuring reforms. It is also the main body on the public 
listing. LTG holds the majority share (66%) of TGIEI and has total control over its 
management. TGIEI is the core member and key business in LTG. LTG has also 
diversified its investment in real estate business and owns 20% share of the real estate 
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company - `Times Industry'. As LTG originated from international trading, it has 
acquired a large percent share of overseas markets in USA, Europe, and Japan for the 
past 30 years. Three overseas branches are directly managed by LTG and TGIEI, and 
two supporting branches for logistics and storage, insure smooth management in 
overseas markets. (Figure 4.8) 
Figure 4.8 Organisational Chart of Ownership Relations btw LTG and its Subsidiaries 
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As a complementary to figure 4.8, the organisational chart of limes Garments 
I/E Inc. (TGIEI) is illustrated in figure 4.9. TGIEI is the main business of LTG which 
produces the majority of the profits. It contains twelve branches of which the majority 
shares of these subsidiaries are owned by TGIEI. These subsidiaries are trading 
companies or manufacturing units which serve export businesses and produce 
garments for overseas markets. 
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Figure 4.9 Organisational Chart of TGIEI 
Notes for Figure 4.9: 
Twelve share-holding companies under TGIEI's control: 
XD I- Xiongyue Dyeing Co., Ltd. 
JA2 - Jiahang Cargo Agent Co. 
YR3 - Yisheng Times Real Estate Co. 
CT4 - Chengyue Trading Co., Ltd. 
LT5 - Lianyi Trading Co., Ltd. 
JT6 - Jinfeng Trading Co., Ltd. 
ST7 - Shishang Trading Co., Ltd. 
ZT8 - Zhuojun Trading Co., Ltd. 
SH9 - Shangjia Trading Co., Ltd. 
ZH 10 - Zhengqian Trading Co., Ltd. 
TG II- Times Garments Manufactory 
XG 12 - Xiongyue Garments Manufactory 
The Labour Union (LU) has a role in this state-owned enterprises structure. It 
holds an Employee Congress and has the right to speak for employee's rights and 
welfare in LTG. As the former Party Secretary, Mr. Qi says, "We hold a large 
Employee Congress once a year. Employees can freely express their opinions, 
proposals and suggestions. We put valuable opinions to the management. for adoption. 
It is an organisation to protect employees' rights and benefits in accordance with the 
155 
`Labour Law'. Social events and activities for employees are held on a regular basis 
to improve their social and corporate life, and to make them feel part of the company. 
The Labour Union also provides help to solve problems in employee's personal lives. 
Greeting cards from the General Manager as well as gifts for all their holidays are 
organised for them by the Labour Union. " 
Compared to the collective-owned enterprise (COE), the privately-owned 
enterprise (POE) and the foreign joint-venture (FJV), the Labour Union seems to have 
more functions and much greater impact in this state enterprise. Take welfare as an 
example: a housing fund only exists in state-owned enterprises, sometimes in foreign 
joint-ventures, and non-existent in the other two types of enterprise (POE & COE). 
Life security and employee benefits are well embodied in LTG. Extra hours at work 
are paid at a fair rate in line with the Labour Law. Annual increments in salary as well 
as the offer of long term stock equity to senior management are implemented and 
guaranteed by formal contracts. This is in dramatic contrast with the insecurity of 
employee benefits and welfare in the privately-owned enterprise and collective-owned 
enterprise, where only minimal levels are promised. Employees' rights are ignored in 
these companies. The worst case is the COE in our case studies. The breach of Labour 
Law often happens, and employees work at weekends for long hours without extra 
pay. The state enterprise is still operating in the same way as government agencies in 
that they have almost the same rules for staff and employee contracts. 
In order to strengthen competitiveness in the market and to implement 
government requirements, LTG has invested one and half million RMB for the 
adoption of International Standards Organisation (ISO) 9001 in 2000 and Quality 
Management System (QMS) in 2001. This system further formalizes the routine and 
management procedures for quality control in service and products. To quote what 
interviewees said about the QMS: 
,, We are required to implement QMS in order to improve the of ciency of 
management, as it specialises and clarifies the responsibilities and procedures for 
product and service management in each division and office. It constructs a formal 
procedure in company management, which regularises the flow of supervision in 
terms of series of procedures and processes, makes quality control more predictable 
in planning. But the problem for this quality control system is that it is too complex to 
follow and these compulsive procedures are inflexible sometimes. " (Mr. Liu, Director 
of Planning Department) 
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"We think it is essential for us to have ISO 9001 and Quality Management 
System, as LTG is a very large company and we do need to have formal procedures in 
place to clarify everything to avoid confusion and argument. In my view, this system 
has improved our routine management, so that product and service are controllable 
and manageable. We don't have to worry about the person who is in charge of the 
work if he leaves, because the records and procedures of work are filed in 
documentation. This system implementation has solved such problems. " (Mr. Chen, 
Manager of International Co-Operation Department) 
"The reforms in this SOE are intended to make for more efficient management to 
prevent inefficiency in the State sector. Responding to State administrative 
requirements, most SOEs are encouraged to adopt advanced QMS for managerial 
improvement. We spend RMB one and half million for the implementation of QMS. 
This seems worthy as it noticeably redefines and formalizes our management 
processes and fortifies LTG 's competitiveness to fit in the market systems that are 
demanding better management. " (Mr. Qi, Past Party Secretary of LTG) 
Figure 4.10 demonstrates the structural relations and responsibilities between the 
senior managers and their subordinates for the quality management system in LTG. 
The President and the General Manager is the same person in LTG, and there are four 
Vice General Managers under him. The General Manager is directly in charge of four 
principal departments - The General Manager's Office; Finance & Planning 
Departments; Personnel; and Supply Department, whereby all his commands and 
instructions go through to lower hierarchical levels. These vice general managers, 
under his supervision, are respectively responsible for the overseas markets and 
relevant supporting divisions. Their roles are specialised in detailed responsibilities 
and defined by the level of authority. The communications within this configuration 
flow through several hierarchical orders and layers of management. The core 
company - TGIEI is directly run by the senior management of LTG (President, GM 
and VGM). Other branches operate as independent businesses which function with 
delegated management and under different performance control systems. 
This state-owned enterprise is the only case study company that has passed the 
requirement of QMS and successfully implemented such internationally standardised 
quality-control systems. None of the other three types of companies have 
implemented such formal standardization in their quality control systems. As it 
stressed by the interviewees in state-owned enterprise, such implementation of QMS 
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is a compulsory command of the state administration. QMS fits the demand of 
institutionalisation and the corporatization of state-owned enterprises. Moreover, the 
strong state financial background of LTG gives it the possibility to adopt QMS. The 
style of state administration and its ideas shape the management practice of this 
enterprise. Whereas the other types of enterprises - POE, FJV and COE - respectively 
reflect their owners' interests. Leadership in relation to ownership function is vital in 
shaping management structures, as it is crucial to direct enterprises for either success 
or failure. This is particularly the case in LTG as an example of a state-owned 
enterprise. 
Figure 4.10 Administrative Structure of Quality Management 
of LTG 
4.2.3 Systems 
Management authority is decentralized to subsidiary companies and divisions 
through a Performance Control System which monitor results instead of routines. 
According to the director of the planning department, this control system is designed 
according to three methods - 'Contract', `Rental' and 'Stock-sharing'. The branches 
and divisions in the `Contract' and `Rental' systems are given the autonomy to run 
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their own businesses. They control their operations and determine their own strategies 
for markets. Each branch is responsible for its profit and loss and reports to the 
headquarters of LTG on an annual basis. The `Contract' method is to fix a target for 
profits and production that the branch has to achieve at the end of each year with 
agreed terms and conditions. The `Rental' method is to lease the facilities and assets 
to the subsidiary companies based on an agreement to pay rent each year. 
Headquarters retains control over these relatively independent branches by monitoring 
results in accordance with their accomplishment of profit targets. But if the contracted 
targets are not achieved, headquarters replaces the managers of the divisions/branches. 
As Mintzberg (1993)256 suggests, 
"This is a crucial power in the Divisionalized Form, because the structure 
precludes direct interference by the headquarters managers in the operating affairs of 
the divisions; the closest they can come is to determine who will run the divisions. To 
an important extent, therefore, that success in this Divisionalized Form depends on 
selecting the right people - divisional managers with the ability to run quasi- 
autonomous operations effectively, yet in accordance with the goals of the overall 
organisation. " 
Thus, in the interviews in LTG, it was often stated that the major weakness of the 
company was shortage of management talents to run these companies. The 
headquarters also monitors subsidiary companies on a "Regular Inspection" basis 
(Figure 4.11). The planning department fulfils this role and visits the subsidiaries at 
different locations periodically, to check on the progress of plans and budgets. It also 
provides a consulting service and solutions when there are problems arising in their 
contract implementations. They write reports on each subsidiary's planning progress 
for headquarters. Thus, headquarters knows what is going on in each subsidiary and 
decides whether any intervention is required. Such inspection reports are also part of 
evaluation systems which are used for deciding bonuses and other employee rewards. 
As the Director of Planning Department, Mr. Liu says, 
"We monitor the performance of subordinate subsidiaries by a regular 
inspection scheme, which is part of our planning processes. We study the performance 
statistics of the past year in terms of profitability, turnover and cost of materials in 
January of each year. According to the official "Regulation of State Assets ", we need 
256 Mintzberg, H. (1983) Structure In Fives: Designing Effective Organisations, Prentice-Hall Inc., 
New Jersey, p223. 
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to make sure the state assets appreciate annually by 5%. The appreciation rate cannot 
be lower than the average of total increment, for all state-owned enterprises at the 
provincial level. We set the basic target objectives for the subsidiary companies in 
line with this principle criterion. We also get feedback from subsidiary principals on 
their expected targets, and use these for setting new plans. We visit each subsidiary at 
different locations for the first inspection of planning progress between March and 
April. We check on their implementation of plans and discuss with them possible 
problems and assurance for their accomplishment. For example, sometimes they 
propose an increment in cost of materials, which we will take into consideration. for 
the adjustment of target goals in their profitability and production plans. The report 
on this change will be handed to headquarters and the Board of Directors for 
authorization. By the middle of the year, normally in June, we revisit these 
subsidiaries for a second inspection to check whether the plan in the first half of year 
has gone well and is on schedule. Adjustments and problem solving are involved in 
this stage of the inspection. Reports on the status of their planning implementation 
will he made to headquarters. The last inspection will take place by the end of year, 
around November and December, 
for the final check on the results of'the whole year 
performance. Summary meetings and board meetings at headquarters will be held by 
the end of the year and the beginning of'the next year, and all subsidiary managers 
will attend. " 
Figure 4.1 1 Regular Inspection Scheme 
Department 
January I March II June II Nov 
Preparation of II la Inspection on II 2"° Inspection on II Yd Inspection on II Summary meeting 
subsidiary plans subsidiaries 
Subsidiaries subsidiaries & Board meeting 
The Finance Department is directly responsible to the General Manager in 
association with the Planning Department. The decision-making process is determined 
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by the level of hierarchy and degree of authority. Simple and small decisions that do 
not relate to the whole organisation can be made at the middle management level 
without approval authority from the top. Operational decisions that relate to the 
strategy and finance of the whole organisation require approved authority from 
headquarters - the General Manager. Big decisions in relation to strategy and 
institutional change require authorization from both the Board of Directors and 
AICSA. Mr. Liu, Director of the Planning, gives two examples of such decision- 
making. The first is for an operational decision -a change required in welfare 
regulation in term of the annual heating fee for the employees. The following diagram 
(Figure 4.12) illustrates how this decision is made. The Personnel Department 
proposes this change plan to the General Manager, but he thinks the amount of change 
is unreasonable and passes the proposal to the Personnel Department for revision. The 
Personnel Department then passes this request to the subsidiary companies for the 
collection of opinions. Revisions are made on the basis of these suggestions. The 
second proposal is then handed to the General Manager for approval. Authorization is 
given and the Personnel Department then implements the final plan. Normally such a 
cycle requires one week for final decision making. 
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Figure 4.12 Decision-making processes for the change of welfare regulation in l: FG 
The second example is about selling the Phoenix Garments Factory. From the 
original proposal of selling to the final decision, it takes at least one year and needs to 
pass through five processes: (1) Verification of the selling decision and conditions 
(this verification requires 6 months); (2) broad of Directors' resolution (requires one 
month); (3) authorization of AICSA (requires 1-2 month) (4) evaluation by the 
Professional Group (this group constitutes professional experts that are relevant to the 
project, such as accountants and lawyers. Their evaluation requires 2-3 month. ); (5) 
competitive bidding (1 month). 
Communication procedures and routine processes in LTG are formalized by 
rules and documentations. Take how business activities are conducted, as an example; 
Figure 4.13 reveals detailed procedures and orders involved as requirements for 
completing a business deal. Paperwork is heavily used for information flows. 
However, communication between divisional managers is both formal and informal 
with telephone calls, pop-in visits and face-to-face talks as part of their routine 
processes. Formal operational meetings as well as Party meetings are all held on a 
regular basis for both horizontal and vertical communication across middle line 
management and divisional heads. Senior management is very much engaged in all 
kinds of meetings for both organisational management issues and State administrative 
matters. Tight control from AICSA also requires frequent reports from the senior 
management of LTG. The vice general manager says, they are always busy in 
meetings with AICSA as this is not only part of their duties but also they need to 
maintain good relations with their ultimate 'boss'. 
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The systems of LTG are still changing as it is still in a process of market 
transformation. As a market-oriented SOE, LTG is further diversifying its product 
range across industries and continues to construct better management capacity 
suitable to operate in a dynamic changing environment. The market economy requires 
efficiency and competitiveness, which is a big challenge for SOEs that have operated 
under a planned economy over such a long period of time. Structural change, 
ideological shift and institutional transformation to a free market are very demanding 
for them. As China is still evolving its ownership patterns, it generates chain reactions 
for further changes in the configuration of organisations. Ownership is a practical 
issue at the current stage. As the Director of Planning, Mr. Liu says, 
"The central State authority will continue to reform ownership equity and stock 
equity, as these are two main issues in state-owned enterprises restructuring. We all 
know there will be changes coming soon, but we don't know how it will be. This 
worries us. These changes will require management innovation and new systems, but 
we don't have the professional knowledge for it. We are in the middle situation where 
the old systems are eliminated and new ones are not formed completely yet. At both 
top and middle management, we don't know how to change management to achieve 
what is expected after the ownership is further diversified. It is a significant difference 
in comparison with western public companies, as state-owned enterprises issue three 
types of stock to insure state ownership protection - State shares, Legal Corporate 
shares, and General shares. The total shares of LTG are 106 million, but only 30 
million general shares are in public circulation for purchase. There are 70 million 
State shares and 6 million Legal Corporate shares that make up 66% of the total are 
not released for public purchase by the government, which insures the security of the 
State ownership. Although we have changed in many aspects in structure and 
management, the reality is that we are not a complete market company yet. We are 
still seeking for the best practice for state-owned enterprises. " 
To summarise the management system of LTG; it is officially called a `3+4' 
model, which functions as an institutionalized mechanism for management control 
between headquarters and its subsidiaries. The `3' refers to three rights of 
headquarters, and the `4' refers to the four management functions the headquarters 
exercises to place control over all subsidiaries company. The three powers are: (1) 
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strategic decision-making; (2) the right of personnel appointments; and (3) the right of 
financial returns. 
The four management functions of LTG headquarters are (I) the function of 
setting budgets and planning. The headquarters exercises control over the budget 
approval process, with inspection and auditing of transactions of finance as well as the 
inspection of planning progress in subordinate divisions; (II) the function of approval 
of subordinate companies' strategies. All the subordinate divisions must have their 
strategic planning processes approved; (III) the function of supervision of the 
subordinate divisions; and (IV) the function of managing ownership issues - it 
constitutes the relevant body for the registration of ownership of the subsidiary 
companies as well as for the ownership of equity. 
The headquarters of LTG exerts direct control over its subsidiaries through this 
`3+4' model. Under this model, official institutions are established and operational 
behaviours are formalized at different hierarchical levels, which facilitate concordant 
and harmonious management between the headquarters and the subsidiary companies. 
Compared to other three types of ownership - COE, POE and FJV - in our case 
studies, the structure and systems of SOE are the most sophisticated form of formally 
institutionalized bureaucracy. Strategic decision-making in such systems tends to be 
affected by upper authority rather than by market demands. Despite management 
autonomy and ownership diversity, middle management is still tightly controlled 
through a culture that reflects the continuing dominance of the Party and centralised 
state ownership. 
4.2.4 Staff 
The key staff in LTG are located in the top administrative departments of 
headquarters as well as in the middle line of management of the core division of 
LTIEI. There are about 30 staff at corporate headquarters which include 8 
directors/managers who are each in charge of departments. These departments are - 
Personnel, Planning, Supply, General Manager Office, Finance, Auditing, Party 
Committee, and International Trading. There is the general manager, four vice general 
managers, and eight directors that make up the senior management team. A distinct 
feature about the background of these senior managers is that more than one half of 
them are from the military. Among our 7 interviewees, four have a military 
background - Vice General Manager, Mr. Li; the Party Secretary, Mr. Qi; Director of 
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Planning, Mr. Liu, and Divisional Manager, Mr. Chen, all held a military ranking 
above "Captain" before being transferred to LTG. This is a significant and common 
feature in all state-owned enterprises because a military long-term education ensures 
accordance with the attitudes of the Communist Party. In China, the Communist Party, 
economic power and the military are united in one body. As a rule, those from a 
military background are transferred to either government agencies/administration or 
to state owned enterprises. 
There are about 190 employees in the core subsidiary company - LTIEI, 
including 41 management staff with an average age of 36. Seventy-eight percent of 
management staff have university degrees usually in foreign languages, international 
trading and finance. The management staff of LTIEI are mostly promoted from 
capable people experienced in international trading. The general manager in LTIEI, 
Mr. Fan Xiaoyuan is an example of this kind of person. He is an entrepreneur with a 
background in foreign trading and was working overseas for four years, giving him 
abundant business experience. His appointment is an indication of the growing 
market-orientation of SOEs. 
However, none of these two groups of managers has a qualification in 
management education. New graduates recruited since 1998 do not have this 
qualification. This is a problem as the restructuring of management systems requires 
key staff to understand global management methods if it is to improve efficiency and 
innovation. Human resource management is a new concept in SOEs and conventional 
state bureaucracy personnel policies still dominates the methods of managing labour. 
Despite reforms, old ideas and working practices still prevail with a continuing focus 
on hierarchy, job description and bureaucratic routines and procedures. Take the 
recruitment system, for an instance. To quote what Mr. Liu, Director of Planning says, 
"The recruitment system is backward in LTG although it is explicitly established 
for market-orientation. We have all the policies and criterion for market recruitment 
and the selection of capable talents. But they are only policies in wording and not 
implemented by management. It is an inevitable problem as well as a cultural 
tradition of SOEs. There is an underlying way of doing things in SOEs, especially in 
personnel issues. LTG has not opened-up recruitment after autonomy was delegated 
to the enterprise in 1994. Before this delegation, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economy Committee (MFTEC) was responsible for both appointments and 
recruitment for all SOEs. After enterprise autonomy was introduced, self-recruitment 
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was authorized to be the responsibility of LTG, but we still rarely have open 
recruitment, because the upper authorities continue to make recommendations to 
appointments. Moreover, inside arrangements for filling vacancies also often happen 
in LTG. 
Generally speaking, most of the staff in LTG have personal relations with 
someone in either senior management or in the upper authorities of government. 
Sometimes, there is waiting list for vacancies from employees with personal contacts. 
However, the people who fill these vacancies often don't have the required 
qualifications for the posts, but they are assigned on the basis of personal connections. 
For example, I feel I need an assistant with an MBA degree, but the person who has 
been assigned to my office is a personal contact of the General Manager, has an 
irrelevant qualification, and that does not help me in the way I expect. Furthermore, 
even though we have open recruitment policies on the talent market, selection is not 
done by a scientifically-designed system, but is personally controlled by managers. So 
the candidates who have personal connections will be selected regardless of their 
formal qualifications and capability. 
Because hierarchical authority is an unshakable force and culture in LTG, you 
cannot challenge this practice. This tradition generates problems in our management 
capacity, because the quality of staff is not adequate. This results in failure or poor 
performance in the execution of management plans. That is why the plan is always 
right but the results are often not achieved. " 
Recruitment in LTG seems to be based entirely on personal contacts without fair 
competition and scientific selection. Open recruitment is rarely adopted due to the 
tradition and culture of LTG, although a market-focused business requires selection 
on the basis of meritocratic capabilities. Such a pattern of personal contacts also 
results in a process which means that sanctions on employees are hardly implemented 
due to personal ties that are deeply embedded among government officers, senior 
managers, and lower levels of staff. Those who make mistakes can always be excused 
from punishment through personal relations. It is the culture of SOEs. Mr. Qi, the 
company Party Secretary, comments on this problem: 
"Because of the poor quality and qualification of management staff, the 
execution of rules and regulations cannot be carried out completely. There is always 
a broken sequence between the processes of decision-making and implementation. 
Frequent deviations in execution commonly happen. The staff in the functional 
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departments are often inert and inactive. They have a passive attitude to work and 
only when their leaders push them will they move forward a bit. Some of the new 
graduates being recruited are capable of talking but incapable of acting. They are not 
motivated and stimulated at wort, and they lack a responsive attitude and crisis 
awareness. They have no ambition in pursuing their careers. " 
Mr. Chen, Manager of the International Co-operation Department, says: 
"The implementation of IS09001.2000 systems is not going very smoothly in 
LTG. We all know that this is because of the poor quality of management staff, as they 
don't have a full understanding of what it is and how it should be implemented. Take 
the planning department as example; a lot of planning controls and management are 
carried out by this department, but the director ofplanning doesn't have management 
knowledge - all he has is loyalty to headquarters. I am sure the director doesn't know 
what IS09001: 2000 stands for, but he is the person who is in charge of its 
implementation. Although relevant training is provided to the management staff, they 
don't pay too much attention to it. 
The problem for SOEs is how to deal with competition on the market, and talent 
management is a key part of competition. How to retain capable talent and how to 
motivate talent is a big challenge for an SOE. The new mechanism of talent 
management will challenge the existing culture of SOE. Since 1994, senior 
management has made no new appointments. It is like an organism without fresh 
blood. The people being hired in the enterprise in the past ten years have all been 
through personal connections with ties to provincial authorities and top management. 
Many of them are the children of these officials and political leaders. They are hired 
because of their contacts not for qualification. I worry about this enterprise because it 
will die in the absence of talent in the future. I describe LTG as a `diabetic without 
awareness'. I am a diabetic, but I have awareness of diabetes so I am taking proper 
treatment and improving my condition. But a `diabetic without awareness' is 
dangerous as it is a chronic disease but if you don't realise it and still think of 
yourself as a normal person, the day of the total collapse will happen sooner or 
later. " 
Personnel management in state-owned enterprises seems to be a major problem 
due to their culture. There is no explicit staff development policy and there is a lack of 
a proper motivation mechanism. Training is supposed to be an effective way to 
improve the quality of staff and skills of a profession, but they are not well developed 
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in a systematic mechanism in LTG, but operate on a random basis. Staff awareness of 
the importance of training is not established and so that they don't pay too much 
attention to training courses when these are offered to them. Absence and carelessness 
are common among staff. The control and planning of training is poor, as there is no 
analysis and evaluation of what training is needed. It simply happens whenever there 
is an issue arising from the demand of work or the higher authorities. There is also no 
assessment of the effects of training. Mr. Liu, Director of Planning admitted that this 
is a major weakness in LTG, but he doesn't know how to improve it. Regardless of 
the low qualifications of the administrative staff, the key personnel are located in the 
main business of garments export and import (LTIEI) which consists of specialists in 
international trading. They are the core competence of the company which create the 
profits for the whole enterprise. Over the past twenty years through its monopoly in 
foreign trading, LTG has hired a large number of professionals in international trading 
with profound experience and skills. This is the core competence of LTG and it is still 
the backbone of the enterprise today. However, the main issue for human resource 
management is how to maintain this core staff by rewards and other means of 
motivation. Although rewards have been enhanced by market reforms, these are still 
below the expectations of employees. The Secretary of the Board of Directors, and 
Manager of LTIEI, Mr. Ma Yu comments: 
"The main means for rewarding specialists in LTIEI is the bonus system. This is 
based on profits which is 30% for individuals and 70% for the company. But it is still 
not a fair percentage for individual rewards. We create all the gains but we only get a 
small percentage of bonus. No one owns a percent of this company. That is why a lot 
of capable staff have left to set-up their own companies or work for other private 
companies for better rewards. They become competitors to LTG. I am not very happy 
about the rewards but because I am not an ambitious person I still stay. However, I 
don't know about tomorrow. 
Sanctions are controlled by bonuses as well. People that do no achieve their 
sales don't get bonuses. There is no other punishment method for poor performance. 
Generally speaking, the reward and sanction mechanism is not fair for everyone. 
However, as we are still evolving these in the process of reform, there will be many 
changes in the near future. But we don't know what kind of changes these will be. To 
be honest, I don't know where my future will be as the enterprise is in the middle of 
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transformation. The enterprise tomorrow will be determined by the political 
Provincial Authority and our fu' ture is hanging in the doubt. " 
State enterprises are particularly distinctive in the ways they recruit staff. The 
influence of a personal relations culture is more powerful in state-owned enterprises 
than in other types of ownership, `overriding market demands and rules'. Such a 
difference between the state enterprise case and the other types of enterprise reveal 
that political power and hierarchical political authority are much greater in state- 
owned corporations. 
4.2.5 Style 
Leadership is a central feature of organisational performance. The style of 
managers can be divided into two catalogues - one is that of the senior managers 
including the general manager and vice general managers at corporate headquarters. 
The other is that of key managers in the main business of LTG. 
The General Manager and vice general managers have the most influential impact 
on the style of management. Thanks to their military background, their leadership 
style is mostly based on `Loyalty' and `Orders'. `Caution' and `Correctness' are the 
main ideas guiding the fundamental style of management in LTG. Risk taking is 
avoided in the enterprise as a whole. Mr. Chen, Manager of the International Co- 
operation Department, says: 
,, From the Provincial authorities to the top of management in LTG, they all have 
preference for 'No-Mistakes' rather than 'High-performance'. Because they are more 
bureaucrats than entrepreneurs; 'no-mistakes' secure their positions. Whereas 'high- 
performance' requires both high risk-taking and high capability to handle risks. If 
they fail to achieve, this will lead to their dismissal from their power positions. The 
safe way is to sustain the stability and avoid risking their careers, so they can retain a 
good personal record when they move to the next higher position. What can you 
expect from this kind of boss in an enterprise? To follow this style and approach is 
also safe for us. Otherwise they will think we are trouble makers, and sooner or later 
we will be eliminated from their sight. This is the common reality of state-owned 
enterprises. The leader, like Zhang Riming of Haier is an exceptional case, that is 
why there is only one Haier in China. " 
This common reality deeply affects the style of management in state-owned 
enterprises and it destroys ambitions and entrepreneurial willingness among 
170 
employees. It also restricts the innovation and entrepreneurial development and 
explains why staff motivation is low in LTG. Mr. Ma, Manager of LTIEI, emphasizes: 
"The guiding line for our business development is directed by steady growth, 
and not a hasty rush to the market. We are gradually evolving ftom structural change, 
but not significantly innovative in management and technology. Textile manufacturing 
is a `setting sun' industry in China; its future will be in the inner areas of China. The 
demands of the international market on China's products is low price garments, not 
high-tech branded clothing. Our exports completely rely on outsourced 
manufacturing orders from foreign countries, such as the USA, Europe and Japan. 
We don't have our own branded products, because the creation of brands requires 
heavy and long-term investment. But the top management emphasis is on current 
profits rather than long-term investment, as it is a crucial requirement of AICSA. Top 
managers spend most of their time with the higher authorities. As I know, our general 
manager has to drive four hours to Shenyang three times a week for meetings and 
reports. They are not like us; they are more bureaucratic than enterprise managers. " 
Obviously the government authorities and top managers in LTG are favourable 
to immediate performance in annual profitability rather thinking risks in long term 
investment. They are more driven by political considerations and the rules of 
administrative bureaucracy. Future prospects for the development of LTG are more 
related to political demands than market opportunities. Ms Du Lili, Manager of 
Property Management Department, comments on the style of leadership as: 
"One of the significant styles of the management we feel is 'Authority, which 
represents absolute ownership in a State-owned enterprise. The other style is about 
their dual-roles in management. Top managers are guardians for the state assets and 
they are afraid of losses as this is their responsibility. In decision-making, they are 
cautious in order to avoid risking state assets. The general manager lacks boldness in 
business development. But we understand his dual-role, as he is not only the manager 
of the enterprise, but he also plays the role of being an official bureaucrat. He is at 
the top and difficult to approach. His office is monitored by CCTV, so he can see who 
is coming to visit him and won't open the door if it is a person he doesn't want to talk 
to. We usually report to the relevant vice general manager or Party Secretary, who 
are more approachable. However, work relations are very formal and we don't have 
close relations with subordinates and workmates. " 
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Compared to this `Bureaucratic' and "Authoritarian" style of management, 
leadership in the main business - LTIEI - is quiet different in terms of orientation and 
focus. These operational managers are directly responsible for achieving profitable 
goals, and their style is completely pragmatic and task-oriented. They pay less 
attention to maintaining personal relations with political leaders and put more effort 
into their own business development. Management autonomy is delegated to them and 
the achievement of profit targets is more persuasive. Horizontal co-ordination and 
teamwork are usually adopted for specific task achievement. Informal 
communications are often used for information flows within and between subsidiaries. 
Reports and approvals for authorization pass through the relevant Vice General 
Manager to the General Manager, with only two spans of control involved in the 
hierarchy of authority. 
Work styles differ in the administrative offices and the operational divisions. 
Both are open style, but the administrative offices are more relaxing and less busy, 
and work hours are in a routine schedule. But the operational subsidiaries are 
extremely busy with long working hours, even at weekends. The work tensions are 
much greater in these operating units. As the Manager, Mr. Ma says, 
"We need to learn from western companies in terms of human resource 
management. We need to have a pragmatic training system as well as an annual 
vacation system. We work so many extra hours for the company and with no personal 
vacation, we are stressed. We are very much pressured by targets. " 
These different orientations underlining different levels of management are the 
cause for sharp contrasts in management style. Top management under state 
ownership is the least market-oriented of all the four case studies. This diversity of 
style among management levels within LTG creates tensions and hinders management 
development. It reflects the contrasting approaches of "State-Planning" and "Market- 
Oriented" approaches that will become sources of greater internal conflict as further 
market reforms are introduced within State-Owned Enterprises. 
4.2.6 Shared values 
The most important management ideas guiding LTG's values are ̀ Honesty and 
Faithfulness'; `Professional and Pragmatic'; `Frontier Spirit and Innovation'. These 
are elaborated in documents and constantly emphasized in meetings. ̀ Honesty and 
Faithfulness' are stressed in business operations and are built into the company's 
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reputation. `Professional and Pragmatic' styles of working are embodied in attitudes 
and ways of doing things. It emphasizes the goal of profitability and underlines the 
importance of professional teams in business success. `Frontier Spirit and Innovation' 
result from market reforms. These values are continuously stressed among employees 
to facilitate company restructuring and managerial evolution. 
The key spiritual values deeply imbued in the whole enterprise, particularly at 
the management level, are `Loyalty and Consistency' with the Communist Party, the 
central authority. It is an inviolable principle and a prerequisite above the business 
orientation of LTG. Without this premise, everything is meaningless and irrespective. 
Party meetings are held in routinely and they are as many as business operation 
meetings. Ad hoc activities assigned from the Central Committee of the Communist 
party reinforce the education of `Loyalty and Consistency' on a frequent basis and 
they constitute a core part of LTG's enterprise activities. 
For example, in order to comply with recent Party commands on the 
reinforcement of a new central spiritual theme - the implementation of `Three 
Representatives' from the 16th People's Congress in 2005, new activities on 
`Maintaining Progressive Ideas of the Party' were enforced in state-owned enterprises. 
An Ad Hoc Leading Group on this topic was established in LTG. The whole activity 
is intensified in three phrases, from 22"d July to the end of October 2005. In the first 4 
week phrase, besides sessional meetings, Party members are required to spend at least 
20 hours reading "Party Statutes", "Reports of the 16th People Congress" and "the 
Special Edition for Maintaining Progressive Ideas". In addition there has to be 8 hours 
discussion. Key Party members in leadership groups are required to do 28 hours 
reading in addition to 12 hours discussion. The second phrase of this political 
education is for five weeks in terms of the analysis of the first phrase of study. Sixteen 
meetings are held on topics, analyzing employees' opinions. This means one-and-half 
day each week is taken up with Party meetings. The third phrase is for three weeks to 
rectify and to improve attitudes and behaviour. After this period of intensive political 
education, there is another 12 months for improving behaviour in relation to the 
routine work of enterprise management. This is a distinctive difference in the pattern 
of management in state-owned enterprises by comparison with private or foreign 
owned enterprises. State enterprises spend a great deal of time and effort in such 
political activities and their senior managers are heavily engaged in party education so 
they cannot concentrate on business operations the whole time. 
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Such constantly imposed Party education moulds employees' values and this 
inevitably impacts on management philosophies and behaviours. It further explains 
the style of management in LTG. The core shared values of `Loyalty and Orders', 
`Steadiness and rightness', and `Authority and hierarchy' are derived from the 
legitimate authority of the Communist Party as well as the company's bureaucratic 
culture. Bearing in mind market values that require entrepreneurship and risk, there is 
an inevitable conflict of cultures within the enterprise as a whole. This is why the 
interviews reflected confusion about the future direction of the enterprise. They have 
no clear idea of what kind of culture the enterprise should have. LTG lacks the 
necessary construction of a unified organisational culture because of the conflict 
between Party values and the demands of a market economy. 
State-owned enterprise reforms have long been restricted by socialist ideology. 
Because state ownership is directly conjunct to the state administration and the 
Communist Party's political systems, it means economic reforms need to be 
compatible with existing political systems; i. e. socialist ideals. In order to secure such 
concordance, key managers are mainly selected from the military and constant 
education of socialist ideas is enforced among top managers. This strong political and 
socialist culture significantly distinguishes state-owned enterprises with the other 
three types of ownership enterprises, privately-owned enterprise, foreign joint-venture 
and collective-owned enterprise. However, free market competition requires effective 
management with `market ideals' other than `socialist ideals'. This is the essential 
contradiction within state-owned enterprises. 
4.2.7 Skills . 
Because of its 20 years in a monopoly position in the textile export and import 
business, LTG has established solid foundation in terms of its resources, business 
networks, staff, and capital assets; particularly the backbone of LTG's competence is 
the key staff in the export and import business. They create profit and actualize the 
market value for the company's growth. They are trained and brought up by LTG, 
experienced and skilful in profound business practices. The overseas markets are the 
main strength of LTG in which they have established a reliable network of 
wholesalers and suppliers in the past 20 years. As the Vice General Manager 
comments: 
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"The core competence of our company is having a group of experienced staff 
who work at the frontier of our main business. They are very skilful and 
knowledgeable in export and import business; they develop extensive clients' network 
in international markets, which are the main sources for sales. " 
And the company Party Secretary comments: 
"We have an experienced professional team in international business. They are 
so skilful that they instinctively know what the best price clients can offer when they 
come to negotiation. Not only do they know formal rules in international business, but 
also they possess an understanding of unwritten rules. Such experiences give them 
ability to deal with changes and uncertainties that emerge from both domestic and 
overseas markets. They handle all orders and contracts from overseas' clients and the 
company' survival relies on them. This is our core competitiveness. " 
Due to their high capabilities in price-negotiation, not only can they get the best 
price from foreign clients but also they can transfer the trading risk to outsourced 
manufacturers. To minimise the risk, most time they only pay the outsourcing factory 
when the order is completed. Therefore when any contingent situation occurs in the 
process of manufacturing, LTG always has the upper hand over business partners 
because they withhold the payment. Such key skills of trading staff give the company 
a fast track to enhance LTG's negotiation power and ensure its competitive advantage 
in price. The key staff in this international business are essential and they have a 
different style of management. They pay less attention to relationships with senior 
managers due to the delegation of full autonomy in terms of responsibility for profit 
and loss. They are task-oriented and profit-driven. They only report to the vice 
general manager and there is no hierarchical span of control within their structure of 
operations. This is an institutional innovation in SOE; a highly bureaucratic 
organisation that has diversified its methods of management delegation at the 
subsidiary level to meet the market-driven economy. The vice general manager, Mr. 
Li Xiao, who is in charge of international business, still behaves like a military 
captain, and shows an upright and righteous leadership style in the interview. In fact, 
due to his rigorous and long military training, the majority of senior managers 
demonstrate their loyalty to the enterprise. Despite their lack of entrepreneurial 
attributes, the quality of this trait gives trust and support to those operational 
managers who work at the frontier of the market place. As one interviewee, Mr. Chen, 
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divisional manager of International Co-operation Department, comments on the vice 
general manager; 
"I have a chance to leave this enterprise for better material rewards, but I feel a 
commitment to my leader as he always supports me. I can't let him down since he 
gives me his full trust and takes responsibility for my work I have to work hard to 
prove myself, to show that he doesn't trust the wrong person, and also I need to 
demonstrate to others that I deserve such trust. It is something worth working for. " 
The general manager plays the dual role of being an entrepreneur and a 
bureaucrat. He has to balance these two roles, as the enterprise requires an 
entrepreneur to actualise market value and the government administration requires a 
bureaucrat with whom to communicate. However, as he has been promoted from the 
operational core, he fully understands how the business should be managed and what 
managers need. Therefore, two types of culture co-exist in LTG to satisfy both market 
and state needs. 
As reforms in China are a system change, it is a very complex process. State- 
owned enterprises' reforms play a leading role in this systematic transformation to a 
market economy. Leadership is an especially vital factor for the successful adjustment 
of a state-owned enterprise into the market economy. Independent management 
autonomy in business enterprises is the most significant change compared to the 
former socialist command model. Ownership diversity and involvement in market 
competition have diluted the old ideology of the planned economy, generating 
entrepreneurship and institutional innovation in management. This is a demanding 
task for the leaders of state-owned enterprises. The dual roles they must fill shape a 
special management pattern that is distinct from that in other types of enterprise 
ownership. 
LTG has, particularly as a state-owned enterprise, some special advantages that 
the other types of ownership enterprise do not have. For instance, it has privileged 
access to the essential factors of production - capital, land and labour. The capital 
market in China is still not open to foreign investors and the major banks, dominating 
the capital market are state-owned banks that favour state-owned enterprises over 
other types of enterprise. As interviewees in LTG mention, 
"We have sufficient funds to run the enterprise, and we give increasing profits to 
the Government each year. We can always get loans at any time from the bank when 
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we need more cash flow. The Bank's managers chase us to lend us money. The 
availability of sufficient capital is our strength. " 
LTG has never worried about a shortage of capital for investment and growth; it 
is just a matter of whether managers can do it without high risks and mistakes, so that 
their positions and power can be secured. 
State-owned enterprises also have access to free land to build factories and 
offices. The Liaoning Times Mansion has a fixed asset value of RMB 6 billion (US$ 
73 million) for LTG based on free land and a bank loan. Xiongyue Dyeing Fabric 
Manufactory was a state owned company and went bankrupt in 1996. LTG has 
invested RMB 40 million (US$ 4.8 million) in purchasing 95% of this dyeing factory, 
re-organising it for a diversified manufacturing chain. This subsidiary company, after 
the injection of a large investment in technology and production capability, has 
become profitable dyeing materials for garments. It also provides technological 
support for materials selection for international trading, as it gives more strength and 
advantage to the trading group in bargaining and negotiating power outsourcing 
orders. LTG's Research & Development centre uses up-to-date technology and has a 
group of engineers working on the maintenance of stitching machines, sewing 
machines and needle detection machines. A group of technicians use graphic software 
for designing logo and patterns. They deal with special technical requirements from 
clients and conduct research on market trends and demands. They are the innovation 
centre for technology and manufacturing methods. 
4.3 Concluding Remarks: 
State-owned enterprises in China are tightly controlled by a veiled power - the 
Communist Party. The Communist Party and administrative authorities are powerful 
agencies in China which can provide many concessions and favours for state-owned 
enterprises. Issues associated with government-controlled resources are very 
demanding for other types of enterprise. Founded in the past and with economies of 
scale and cheap access to resources state-owned enterprises have great competitive 
advantages. However, their current competences are not enough for long-term 
sustainability as businesses in the emerging market economy require a strong 
entrepreneurial culture and the injection of new human resources for long term 
development. State-owned enterprises have to solve the cultural conflicts that operate 
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within its management, building a corporate entrepreneurial culture is one of future 
challenges. 
The emergence of a private economy with market reforms is challenging 
communist political control and creating a dilemma for the Party - economy or polity? 
It endeavours to seek a balance in `market socialism' between socialist ideals and 
market forces. State-owned enterprises are foremost in the experiment in this 
ideological transition from a planned to a market-driven economy. This confusion 
affects motivation and morale as well as the ability of this enterprise to develop long 
term strategies and vision. Ownership of the enterprise remains state-controlled but 
without radical change in its political culture and administrative processes, it is unable 
to adapt flexibility to market changing demands. Despite regulatory concessions and 
access to finance, state-owned enterprises are characterized by ineffective 
management and a nepotistic culture. Innovation in operating systems and 
entrepreneurship in managing change are challenges for state-owned enterprises in 
China. How to reform the administrative system of state control and how to further 
diversify ownership remain controversial to the Communist Party. Scarcity of guiding 
theories on creating a socialist market economy obstructs the pace of reforms in state- 
owned enterprises and creates uncertainties in the future vision of market socialism. 
Our case study suggests there are many issues to be resolved in relation to party 
control and intervention if state-owned enterprises are to adapt to the changing 
demands of market forces. 
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CHPATER FIVE: 
Case Study (2): The Collective-Owned Enterprise 
Shenyang Liming Anna Clothing Co., Ltd. 
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Introduction 
The economy in China comprising both state sector and private sectors is 
characteristic of evolutionary reforms. Collective-owned enterprises (COEs), derived 
from the state sector, are undergoing bold reforms in privatization. Due to the 
complex history of collective-owned enterprises, their management models are 
significantly different when compared to those for state-owned enterprises and 
privately-owned enterprises. They are neither purely privately-owned nor wholly 
owned by the state. The collective-owned enterprise is the type of business which is 
owned by its employees and governed by local authorities. They are regarded as a 
component of the state sector but secondary to state-owned enterprises. It is a result of 
the decentralisation of political authority from central government to local 
government levels since 1979. Economic reforms have changed the composition of 
traditional collective-owned enterprises since privatization has become incorporated 
within them. 
Collective ownership creates a hybrid management infrastructure with mixed 
values and culture, both market and socialist. Rarely have there been studies of 
collective-owned enterprises which combine both private owner's management 
control with direct state participation and administration. The collective-owned 
enterprise in this case study, as an emerging form of business venture, and 
demonstrates this type of hybrid management model reflecting the mixture of market 
values and socialist ideals, engendered from these different ownership properties. The 
privatization and marketisation of the collective-owned enterprise in our research 
started in 2003. 
5.1 Background of SLAC 
. Shenyang 
Liming Anna Clothing Co. Ltd. (SLAC) was set up in 2003 through a 
merger between `Shenyang Liming Garments Co., Ltd. ' (SLG), a collective-owned 
enterprise in the state sector and `Anna Fashion Company' (AFC), a privately-owned 
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enterprise in the private sector. `Shenyang Liming Garments Co., Ltd. ' (SLG) was 
listed on the Shanghai stock market in 1999, but claimed bankruptcy in 2001 due to 
poor performance and heavy losses. Following reforms of privatisation, `Anna 
Fashion', a privately-owned trading company in Shenyang, bought 51 percent of the 
shares, becoming the major shareholder in 2002. This new venture was renamed ̀The 
Shenyang Liming Anna Clothing Co., Ltd. ' (SLAG) in 2003. It currently has 600 
employees and a fixed asset value of US$ 2.5 million in equipment and buildings. 
This allows for an annual production capacity of one million garments. As a 
professional garments company, it integrates manufacturing, marketing, retailing, and 
export & import functions. Its product range covers women and men's suits, shirts 
and trousers for causal wear, fashion clothes, jeans and snowsuits. Its main markets 
for sales comprise domestic cities and overseas countries, such as Japan, South Korea, 
Europe and the USA. SLAC owns two patented trademarks: "Anna Lee" for woman's 
fashion clothes, and "Yawenshi" for men's suits and shirts. These brands are only for 
the domestic market and account for only a minor portion of all profits. Its major 
profits are from manufacturing and processing garments for foreign brands. The 
annual value of the exports of SLAC has increased over the years due to increasing 
orders from overseas clients. (Figure 5.1) 
Figure 5.1 Value of exports of SLAC for overseas sales 2002-2005 (Thousand $US) 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Value of Exports 9,000 13,600 20,000 30,000 
Shenyang Liming Garments Co., Ltd. (SLG) -a collectively-owned enterprise in 
the state sector - before the merger, had a period of rapid growth from 1994 to 1999. 
But this declined due to many weaknesses including the local government's 
administration system and the quality of enterprise management. Shenyang Liming 
Garments was initially established in 1956 as a small collective-ownership workshop 
with some basic sewing machines and with eight employees producing uniforms. Its 
collective ownership was directly headed by the Residence Administrative Office257 
and administrated by Shenyang local government. In 1984, the enterprise had 
developed into a medium size corporation with 800 employees and RMB 9 million 
257 The Residence Administrative Office is also called "Jie Dao Administrative Office" which is the 
junior level of local government administration. 
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(US$ 1.1 million) value of fixed assets. But in common with collectively-owned 
enterprises in the state sector, its debt ratio had reached 90%. Following gradual 
reforms in the state sector, market elements were injected into the enterprise, which 
resulted in ownership diversification and institutional restructuring. For example, in 
1990, SLG implemented its first reform experiment by joint-venturing with a 
Japanese company in both marketing and manufacturing. Nevertheless the Shenyang 
Liming Garments still held majority share ownership in this business venture. As an 
outcome of this venture, Japanese technology, management concepts and capital 
became involved in Shenyang Liming Garments and a new brand - `Life' with 
Japanese technology was launched. Since SLG completed its first reform with foreign 
technology and capital, profitable rewards from the market as well as brand cognition 
from customers encouraged Shenyang Liming Garments to seize on further expansion 
and to venture with foreign technology and overseas markets. The new venture with a 
private company in 2002 has transformed this collectively-owned enterprise into a 
different management system. This mixed collective ownership in both bureaucratic 
and entrepreneurial forms gives this collectively-owned enterprise distinct features in 
comparison with state-owned enterprise and privately-owned enterprises. Its 
collective relations and ownership composition are described in the following chart 
(Figure 5.2). The president is the private owner from Shenyang Anna Fashion, which 
owns 51 % of the shares in this new venture; and the General Manager is appointed by 
the local Government Department. This department, the Provincial Bureau of Textile 
Industry, represents the collective ownership - all employees retained from Shenyang 
Liming Garments, that still owns 49% of the shares. 
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Figure 5.2 Ownership Structure of the Collective Owned Enterprise (SLAC) 
PrA, ate sector Stute. St'ctor 
I 
Negotiation 
Jon merger & Shenyang Anna Fashion new venture 
(POE) btw two sides 
Bureau of Textile Industry 
Shenyang Liming Group 
Liming Garments Co., Ltd. 
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Shenyang Liming Anna Clothing Co., Ltd. (SLA( 
" 51 % owned by the private owner 
" 49% owned by the employees as collective ownership 
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5.2 McKinsey 7-S framework analysis: 
5.2.1 Strategy 
Strategic planning is undertaken by top management and the vision of the 
strategy is only shared among Board directors. There is little long term planning, but 
short term goals are normally announced to employees at the annual Employee 
Congress at the end of each year. The present strategic target is to expand facilities 
and the number of employees to meet market demands and increase orders from 
overseas clients. It sets its goals in slogans as "To be the No) in Shenyang in one year; 
to be the No. ) in Liaoning Province in two years; to be the No. ) in China in three 
years. " 
The strategy in SLAC is practical and acclimatized to the environment change, 
which are completely driven by market needs. The merger with Shenyang Liming 
Garments Company in 2003 has satisfied the supply need with Bang Bang Korea. 
However, following rapid market growth, orders from Korea have significantly 
increased from 1 million to 1.8 million garments in two years. Presently, the 
production capacity in Liming Anna Company is only one million and extra orders 
are out-contracted to other factories in different locations. Further growth in Anna 
Trade has expanded its market to Japan, USA and Europe in recent years, where 
orders from these foreign countries require the company's production facility to have 
full control over quality and delivery times. In consequence, business growth 
demands an expansion of production capacity and number of employees. To fulfill 
this growth stage, SLAC has set up its `expansion strategy' and the goals to achieve 
this in 2006. 
In March 2006, SLAC started its construction of a new factory - `Liming Anna 
Clothing Industry Park', in Shenyang Economy and Technology Development Zone. 
Production capacity will approach to over 2 million garments per annum and the 
product range will increase to over thirty varieties. Operation manager, Mr. Tang 
comments on this expansion strategy, 
"The strategy is made by the board of directors, mainly the President and the 
General Manager. They don't listen to middle management. They make 
announcements about strategic plans at the annul Employee Congress. They are 
going to invest about RMB 50 million (US$ 6 million) in a new factory in Sheyang 
Economy and Technology Development Zone. " 
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Ms Gong, Marketing Manager who is in charge of domestic sales and marketing 
development for two brands, says, 
"The marketing in our domestic market aims to develop our own brand image. 
We have patented two brands, "Anna Lee" and "Yawenshi " in 2004. Every year we 
look into popular colour'; `cloth material'; and fashion style'; three key factors in 
clothing design. For marketing communication channels, we annually attend 
`Clothing Exhibition' and `Recent Fashion Release' in Beijing, Shanghai and 
Guangzhou to keep up-to-date with the latest trends and fashion elements for our 
designs. Our General Manager and President often travel to European countries and 
bring back updated fashion information for us. They tell us what we should design 
and what we should do for marketing in the Chinese market. Normally we copy some 
famous foreign brands' designed from their 'Recent Fashion Release' and make some 
minor changes in line with our own craft. Our main cloth materials are imported fr om 
Italy and our design is European style. Our brand design is always at the leading 
edge of fashion in the domestic market. Anna Lee and Yawenshi are distributed to 
Shopping Malls and Department Stores in Shenyang, Beijing and Dalian. We plan to 
build up the image of our brands before we open our own brand shop and make 
franchise sales. 
I have worked in the clothing industry for 20 years, and know that brand value 
can last for a long time. Only manufacturing for other brands will give us no fu' ture. 
Our old brand, "Liming" is a good example, as it has been so many years after 
Liming Group went bankrupt, people still recognise this brand for its quality 
reputation and never forget its history. It is the main reason why Anna Fashion 
bought Liming's ownership share. We still use its name, because our consumers 
recognise this name and still have trust in the credibility of this enterprise. " 
It is obvious that SLAC has set its `expansion strategy' on both overseas and 
domestic markets. Significant investment has been made into corporate expansion in 
terms of economies of scale. Construction of high value branding image requires 
heavy investment and takes a long time to give a visible profit return. However, the 
domestic market is aimed for such long term investment. The main sources of profit 
are presently from overseas orders, but they are used to build up production branding 
in the domestic market. 
In general, of the four types of enterprises in our case studies, both the collective- 
owned enterprise and privately-owned enterprise hold an aggressive strategy in 
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expansion and growth, which benefits from the entrepreneurial vision of their private 
owners. It is the state-owned enterprise that has the most conservative growth strategy 
when it involves heavy investment - despite it has the easiest access to finance 
resources. 
5.2.2 Structure 
SLAC is managed as a group corporation under the President in charge of a 
Board of Directors. Four relatively independent companies constitute the main 
business functions in the organisation (Figure 5.3). Final decisions are taken by the 
Board of Directors and these are administrated by the President, in conjunction with 
the General Manager. `Liming Anna Clothing' is the production base for Anna 
Fashion, providing one million garments per annum. It comprises the core 
competence of Anna Fashion. The management of "Liming Anna Clothing" is 
relevantly independent and its daily operation is under the control of the General 
Manager, Mr. Liang and the Vice General Manager, Mr. Fan, who are both appointed 
by the Local Textile Authority, which are the representatives of the collective 
ownership. The number of employees in this division is approximately four hundred. 
The management staff are about 30 to 40 people. All the production tasks and orders 
come from Anna Fashion, which are mainly for manufacturing Korean "Bang Bang" 
branded clothes. Only a minority is for "Anna Lee". These two companies, `Liming 
Anna Clothing' and `Anna Fashion' have close horizontal working relationships and 
communicate on a daily basis between managers and supervisors at an operational 
level. Bang Bang Clothing has up to 45% of market share in the Korean jeans sector. 
Many famous Korean movie stars are representatives for this brand. Since Anna 
Fashion is the exclusive supplier for the "Bang Bang" brand, it has given Anna 
Fashion rapid growth. 
`Anna Trade' focuses on garments trading. It is completely independent of the 
other three divisions as it has its own accounting system and is only responsible to the 
President. It is not involved with Anna Fashion and Bang Bang Clothing, and has no 
co-operation with Liming Anna Clothing. It has its own overseas clients and places 
orders with its own contracted outsourcing factories. It seldom communicates with 
other divisions at the operational level. The Manager is a member of the board of 
directors merely involved in final decision making and the corporate strategic 
development of the whole company. 
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These four branches separately operate with their own range of responsibilities 
and with autonomy. However, there is frequent communication and co-operation 
between Anna Fashion, Liming Anna Clothing and Bang Bang Clothing. As the 
General Manager of SLAC, Mr. Liang comments; 
"As remained in the form of collective ownership, we retain independent 
management in our factories, although daily operations are totally controlled by me 
and the vice general manager. We report to the President, the private owner, for key 
decisions. All the orders come from Anna Fashion and Bang Bang Clothing, and we 
plan our production based on their command of orders. Particularly we have close 
working relationships with Anna Fashion, as our managers and supervisors keep in 
daily communications with them for delivery and quality issues. Sometimes Bang 
Bang will bring together Quality Control staff with Anna Fashion staff for sample 
verification and quality approval. But we don't have any work relations with `Anna 
Trade'. " 
Government reforms are bringing into gradual privatization of collective 
ownership. The reality of this case study is a business venture with a split ownership; 
private and collective-owned. The merger of a private company with a collective- 
owned company has created shared benefits for both parties. Shenyang Liming 
Garments (SLG) needs orders to keep its factory operating and Anna Fashion 
Company (AFC) requires a manufacturing base to reduce its cost and for quality 
control. Land and capital are two essential production factors that private owners lack 
in China. The collective-owned enterprise in the state sector offers these. However, 
private owners are prone to encroaching upon the collective property ownership and 
this gives birth to increasing tension and disputes in management, as in this case study. 
To sum up structural relationship, a barbell structure illustrates in figure 5.4 -a split 
weight emphasis in two functions of the organisation; one on marketing & trading and 
the other on manufacturing. Flexibility of management is showed at one end (top 
management) but extremely constrained at the other (production base). Such `barbell' 
structure reveals separate entrenchments of dual-type of ownership - private owners 
and collective ownership. 
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Figure 5.4 Barbell Structure of SLAC 
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Within this layout of organisational configuration, management systems and 
processes are schemed to accomplish goals. In this business, the most significant 
systems are finance control; total quality control; and overall everyday evaluation. 
Financial systems are designed and used by the President as the key method to control 
management and costs. Total quality control has been taken from Japanese quality 
management and redesigned in line with the company's own needs and situation. The 
Japanese ̀ Kaizen' cost approach is also used as a complementary part of total quality 
control. Overall everyday evaluation has been taken from the Haier company, a 
collective-owned (public holding) enterprise that is enthusiastically endorsed by the 
government. The approach of overall everyday evaluation refers to detailed daily 
control. An assessment form is required to be completed each day by each production 
unit, so that every day's work is examined to ensure that daily production meets both 
quantity and quality standards. 
There is a centralised accounts office to which the three main divisions must 
report all their expenditures. Expense claims are submitted every Friday with approval 
granted during the following week. Alternatively questions may be asked of the 
division to justify their expenditures. The President supervises all cost claims and 
gives sole authorization for approval. This tight control on finances is also reflected in 
the purchasing of raw materials. The President directly controls all purchases of major 
raw materials that are required by Anna Fashion. Bang Bang Clothing is in charge of 
the imported accessory materials from Korea. They supply the needs of the Liming 
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Anna Clothing. Budget planning is required on both a monthly and an annual basis for 
operational and manufacturing costs, so that the President can predict and control the 
amount of expenditures. Mr. Tang Shaokui, Manager of Operations in Liming Anna 
Clothing, comments on this accounting system as, 
"Liming Anna Clothing has its own autonomy in daily management and 
production operation, but we don't have direct control over finance. We plan 
everything needed in the company and apply for authorization on every cost. Expense 
claims through the General Manager to the President is our routine procedure in 
financial management. The president and the general manager exercise tight control. 
As a result, we are required to minimise all our costs but also to increase production. 
Strict cost control is the main issue in our financial management. " 
Ms Gong, Marketing Manager, mentions the accounting procedures involved in 
daily management; 
"The accountancy procedures in our company are quite complex. Every 
purchase has to go through two authorizations. For instance, we need to firstly send 
the proposal for what we are going to purchase to both the Finance director and the 
vice general manager. They then submit our application to the General Manager. The 
General Manager reviews the application and then sends them to the President for 
her final authorization. When the application is approved from the President, we can 
make our purchases. But an invoice for purchase is required to go through the same 
processes again for final review. Moreover, the product or material being purchased 
needs to go through the warehouse procedures and receipt of stock needs to be 
submitted to the same processes one more time. It is a complicated procedure we must 
follow. The President and the General Manager need to supervise every expense 
regardless of its amount. " (See Figure 5.5) 
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Figure 5.5 Decision-Making Processes in the Financial Control System in SLAC 
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The quality control system is formalised by stipulated processes and procedures 
that are carried out by Liming Anna Clothing. It is a powerful tool to control the 
quality of product and places various tasks 
in place and in good order through 
different levels of management to first line production. Not only does it insure the 
output of production meets expected standards 
in order to satisfy the customers' needs. 
But also cost control is integrated into this system as another valuable aspect of the 
quality control system. This system 
is illustrated at two levels; one is the management 
chart that outlines how this system works 
in the company structure. The other is to 
demonstrate what kind of processes and detailed procedures are involved in this 
system, as well as showing how 
different functional departments follow procedures to 
work together as a whole. The quality control system provides the standards for the 
division of work, and stipulates work relations between departments. It sets the 
processes in order to produce the expected outcome in a predictable manner. Labour 
and capital as inputs are organised and processed in the system and high-quality 
products, as outputs, are produced to meet market needs. Such effective systems are 
important generators for organisational efficiency and profitability. 
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The system of overall everyday evaluation is applied in daily management. 
Based on the results of daily evaluation, control is placed tightly over unit production 
and overall performance. Defects in quality and decline in quantity can be discovered 
promptly, so that remedies can be applied to prevent the spread of faults. Through this 
system, day-based task accomplishment and improvement can be achieved. 
The communication and decision making processes are very bureaucratically 
structured in SLAC. The relationships between different layers of management are 
impersonal and placed in a hierarchical order. Authority is emphasized in the 
company and unquestionable command is often the way of communication by 
management staff. Compliant followers are appreciated and challenges against 
authority are eliminated. Mr. Liang, the General Manager of SLAC, comments on this 
point; 
"We expect our employees to be compliant, as they need to firstly obey 
instructions. It is very important in our management. The authority of managers can 
not be infringed, that is the central guideline of our management. A good employee 
has to be a good listener and follower. I believe effective management is based on the 
premise of authority. " 
However, when the general manager is asked about the weakness of management, 
he continues, 
"The capability of execution is a weak point in our management as our 
objectives are often not achieved completely as to what we plan. The implementation 
of commands always deviates from my expectation. Although I constantly check the 
procedures of work; the capability of employees to carrying out tasks is still very 
low. " 
Job specifications for each position and for each department are regularised in a 
very detailed way. The company also sets many principles to guide what the 
employee should do and what they should not, in order to avoid mistakes in their jobs 
and to insure job efficiency. The total quality control system, Japanese just-in-time 
management method and Kaizen cost control and F. W. Tylor Scientific Management 
methods are all implemented. These insure the smooth operation of the bureaucracy. 
But on the other hand, it often generates low performance with low motivation as well 
as a low rate of innovation and creativity. 
The systems of SLAC show some common characteristics of machine 
bureaucracy. It has very formalized procedures in the operating level and a 
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proliferation of rules, regulations throughout the organisation, which it totally relies 
on employees complying and obeying as the core of the system. The decision-making 
is prone to follow the formal chain of authority in this collective-owned enterprise, so 
that the interests of the private owner and the interests of the collectivity can be 
clarified according to their respectively owned share division. The control of the 
private owner considerably ramps up while the representatives of collective 
ownership intended to entrench their control over collective assets and retain their 
management independence is declining. This is unlike the case study of the privately- 
owned enterprise with its organic entrepreneurial structure and its systems that are 
very flexible without formal rules and regulations but with tasks by informal norms 
and the owner's control. The involvement of collective ownership from the state 
sector is a factor accounting for this distinction as formalized rules are prominent in 
the state sector. 
5.2.4 Staff 
The future growth of SLAC relies on the talents of its key staff, mainly from two 
divisions - Anna Fashion and Liming Anna Clothing which are respectively managed 
by the President and the General Manager. The Board of directors, as the final 
decision-making group, includes five people - the President, the General Manager, the 
Vice General Manager, Finance Director and the manager of Anna Trading Company. 
These form the top management team, which. makes all the final decisions about 
strategy. The general manager and the vice general manager are local government 
appointments - as representatives of collective ownership - and the other three are 
from the private company. Although the constitution of the company stipulates that all 
decisions require the signature of the General Manager, the President is still the final 
decision maker. The General Manager is also the connection with the Textile Industry 
Bureau, which handles reporting and communicating with local government. 
The key personnel in the operational core in SLAC are divided into two 
specialisms - manufacturing and marketing. The manufacturing group is led by the 
Vice General Manager, and covers the majority of employees; approximately 600 in 
total, including 150 managerial staff (supervisors, managers and directors). The 
marketing group is led by the President, and includes three divisions: domestic, 
international and Bang Bang clothing, and has a total of 160 employees. The level of 
education in the manufacturing group is relatively low; 70% of staff have no higher 
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than college qualifications and only 30% have graduate degrees. The marketing group 
is better qualified with graduates forming the majority of staff. 
Formal recruitment is undertaken once a year for management staff, whereas 
recruitment occurs all year for production workers as there is high labour turnover. 
The Company sets ten selection criteria for formal recruitment. These are: 
(1) Professional attitude to work 
Being loyal and having a positive attitude to work. 
(2) Learning potential 
Expertise and experience are no longer necessary prerequisites, but learning 
potential and a capacity for training is important. 
(3) Morality and ethical standards 
Morality and ethical standards are regarded as essential traits for all employees. A 
person without such qualities will harm the enterprise regardless of how high 
capable and talented they are. 
(4) Ability to communicate, and to handle change, and solve problems and be 
capable of making quick decisions. 
A manager in the enterprise has to communicate with bosses, colleagues, 
subordinates, as well as to negotiate with business clients and state officials. 
(5) Willingness to innovate 
Science and technology are developing rapidly nowadays. An enterprise needs to 
continuously progress through constant learning and innovation, otherwise staying 
still means falling behind. Therefore an improving enterprise requires 
management staff with high learning willingness and capacity to develop talent. 
(6) Collective spirit 
One person's power is limited but collective power is mighty. An outstanding 
manager should be able to co-ordinate in teamwork and use collective talents to 
carry out tasks. He should not make arbitrary decisions based on personal 
preferences. 
(7) Health and fitness 
Good health is a basic element for a competent manager. A manager should be 
energetic and dynamic to carry out tasks efficiently. 
(8) Self-understanding 
Understanding personal goals and capabilities is important for a manager. Self- 
understanding encourages intuition for better management work. 
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(10) Adaptability 
A manager should have the ability to accommodate to different environments and 
get along with others. 
These selection criteria are used in the formal recruitment of management staff. 
However, as the Manager of Operation mentions, 
"The President appoints his own trusted fellows, who are relatives and friends, 
to important positions, such as in the Finance Office and the Marketing Department. 
Even the Dining Hall is managed by his uncle and his dog also gets fed there. 
Although we have formal regulations, these do not apply to the President; she is 
privileged. " 
The Personnel Manager, Ms Zhang comments on personnel management as, 
"We have no human resource management and still follow old conventions in 
personnel management. The main content of our work is in relation to contracts and 
recruitment. We do not have reward and motivation mechanisms to manage. But if 
employees make mistakes in production that causes losses they will be fined with a 
penalty. However, if it relates to a finance issue, Finance Department is responsible 
for such things. " 
The Marketing Manager comments about recruitment as, 
"It is always dilcult to find very capable staf. We recruit new graduates every 
year, but they lack work experience and most are practically inept and they make 
blunders at work Take the design work as an example; the new graduates from the 
Clothing University can design nice drawings by computer software, but their skills 
cannot be used in making samples and for manufacturing. Most capable candidates 
think the salaries here are too low, so we invest in new graduates and train them to 
become skilful. However, when they become capable through training and gain 
experience, they often leave for better opportunities and pay. You know that the pay 
for staff in the garments industry is quite low, so we can not retain talents. The 
problem in SLAC is that we lack capable managers and technicians. " 
Training programmes are well designed in SLAC. These cover a wide range of 
management issues and methods taken from successful case companies and western 
management theories. These programmes are to breakdown the old socialist planning 
ideology and create a new market-oriented mentality. They aim to improve innovation 
and enterprise in the company. Training is also aimed to facilitate the implementation 
of institutional change, as SLAC still has traditional management practices based on 
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detailed regulations and rules that sustain a hierarchical, bureaucratic culture. Through 
self-management and training, the motivation of employees can be altered from `make 
me work' to `I want to work'; and from `managed employee' to `self-managed 
employee'; as well as `ask me to perform well' to `I want to perform well'. From 2004 
to 2006, training has been systematically intensified for the implementation of total 
quality control and overall everyday evaluation systems in order to restructure 
business processes and rebuild enterprise management. This is in response to reform 
policies in the state sector. In consequence, the efficiency of production has improved, 
which is evidenced in its production capacity that has increased every year and costs 
of production reduced. 
Bonuses and sanctions are stipulated in employees' contracts. The bonuses are 
very low in amount and limited to only two subjects: `full attendance bonuses - RMB 
60 per month' ($US 7) and `lunch subsidiary RMB 100 per month ($US 12)'. But 
sanctions are applied for such things as days off, absenteeism, mistakes in production 
and unachieved targets. Performance evaluation is directly related to overall everyday 
evaluation assessment. Because of low material rewards, the motivation of staff is low. 
Interviewees at all operational levels (including the vice general manager) complained 
about the poor salary conditions and the "no-reward rewards", as they do not regard 
`full-attendance-bonus' and `lunch subsidy' as rewards. Personnel management has 
no staff development plans. As the Vice General Manager mentions about training; 
"We have many training courses for learning new management theories but 
these are not very applicable to our practical work Theory seems too abstract to us. 
We benefit from some, such as Haier's management concepts and these are adopted 
by us. We are currently working on the objective of `Restructuring Business Processes 
and Rebuilding Enterprise Management'. However, what we can learn from training 
is not much; our work still depends on our own expertise and experience. " 
The Manager of the Operations Department says: 
"I always keep all the training materials, so I can read them later as they are 
hard to understand at the first time. I think they are useful but we are too busy to have 
time to learn the knowledge. Less staff and more work is our situation. The 
production tasks are very demanding each year, particularly as delivery times are 
always very tight. We often have to work over time. Two Sundays off in each month is 
the pattern in SLAC and we get no extra pay for extra hours. Working longer hours 
becomes our obligation. " 
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The staff policy and training of this collectively-owned enterprise emphasise 
management skills and market ideas. The enterprise demands change, innovation and 
creativity and the recruitment of staff and training is designed to develop this culture. 
Nevertheless, such demands conflict with existing systems and structure as staff are 
de-motivated because of low rewards. There is no development planning for staff and 
training is not designed to meet individual needs. 
5.2.5 Style 
The management style in SLAC is a mixture of that of the private entrepreneur 
and the state bureaucrat. The private entrepreneur operates informally and flexibly 
while the state bureaucrat prefers hierarchy and control. Such characteristics are 
mixed together in this company and form a unique leadership pattern, characteristic of 
COEs. The President, Ms Li Ying, who determines final decision-making, is an 
entrepreneur driven by profit maximization. Her style of management stresses 
dictatorship and absolute authority. The employee must listen and obey her 
commands whether it is wrong or right. Her way of control focuses on financial 
management; whether it is minor or major issue, it must be approved by her. The 
General Manager, Mr. Liang -a local government appointment - is a typical state 
bureaucrat with a political focus and a very cautious approach in what he says in the 
interview. He is more concerned with the security of his own position than about the 
situation of his employees. He emphasizes the importance of authority in management 
and shows a very strong preference for hierarchical orders in organisational processes. 
He expects employees to be good listeners rather than independent individuals with 
their own opinions. Mr. Liang describes his own style of management as; 
"Authority is the centre of our management. I can't see how management can be 
implemented if employees do not listen to you. They must listen first and do what we 
ask We set rules and procedures that employees must obey. It is how our systems 
work I need to solve conflicts that emerge and work with both the President and our 
Local Government Textile Bureau to ensure smooth management and to develop 
strategy for the future of this company. I believe every process of employees' work 
needs to be checked to insure that they do it correctly. If the processes are right, then 
the results will be right. As a leader in the company, I must stress that compliance 
with the leader is the most important criteria in examining our employees' loyalty and 
commitment. " 
196 
Operations Manager, Mr. Tang comments on Mr. Liang's style as; 
"He is not an expert in the garments business and he has no idea about how 
manufacturing works. He is appointed by the local government authorities for this 
venture. He is a bureaucrat rather than a manager. He completely relies on the vice 
general manager for the management of manufacturing. But he is the only connection 
with the President in reporting what is going on here and he is involved in final 
decision-making. He attends all board meetings at headquarters and frequently 
communicates with the State Textile Bureau for meetings and reports. He is normally 
in his office two days a week to listen to reports from the vice general manager. This 
is the major content of his work. The joint venture with Anna Fashion has saved us 
from bankruptcy, so we appreciate our jobs more than ever. Even though work 
conditions have got worse, we still have a deep commitment to this enterprise since 
we have been working here for over 20 years. The new style of management in this 
type of ownership treats employees as capitalists, exploiting cheap labour. But we 
have to survive, so we try to accommodate to this new style. " 
Marketing Manager, Ms Gong comments on the President's style as; 
"Our leader is very arbitrary and dictatorial. We must fully listen and do what 
she asks. Well, actually we can't express our own opinions as that would offend her 
authority. She won't accept your ideas anyway. So we already get used to following 
concordantly instead of thinking independently. We have no right of speaking, no 
source of information, and no independent thinking. When we have better 
performance, we won't receive any material reward and only verbal praise. But when 
there is any mistake, a penalty will be given. To perform better is what we are 
expected to do and it is regarded as our obligation. This is our management style. (A 
helpless smile appeared on her face when she stated this) But I like this enterprise. 1 
like my work very much. I have worked here for over 20 years and I don't want to 
leave, so I have to be adaptive to the management style here. " 
Nevertheless, at Vice General Manager level, the style of management is 
significantly different from that of the top decision makers. The Vice General 
Manager, Mr. Fan is a pragmatic and approachable person, promoted from the core 
operation level. He is in charge of manufacturing and routine management. He 
focuses on daily operations and keeps close communication with staff. Face-to-face 
and telephone conversations are his most common methods of communication, 
though paperwork and reports are also used for following-up formal procedures and 
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documentary processes. The Technology and Finance Departments are the two most 
important functions for Mr. Fan. He thinks technology is the backbone of innovation 
and the key for the productive factory, and that finance is the centre of the enterprise. 
He works with technicians to improve production methods in order to reduce costs. 
The implementation of quality control systems is directly managed under his 
supervision. He does not believe in rule-of-thumb management and says; 
"We have learned a lot about advanced management practices, such as Haier's 
unique management system and Japanese just-in-time management. The methods are 
good but they only work when they fit into our own situation. The theory is too 
abstract for the practice and most are non-applicable for the real life scenario. The 
theorists are masters in talk but they do not know how to do it by hand. We do not 
know how to talk but we know how to do it in good hands. " 
Mr. Peng, Manager of Production, comments on the style of leadership as; 
"We have seldom communication with the General Manager and rarely see the 
President. But they give management autonomy to the Vice General Manager. He is 
the person who is in charge of daily management here. He is not only a practical 
leader, but also an expert in production and technology. He always gives appraisal to 
our performance and solves problems immediately. He talks to employees in person 
when they make mistakes and we know he is trying to help us. His office is open and 
welcome for any pop-ins and questions. Unlike the general manager and the president 
who are hard to reach, he is close to us. We like his style, as he is very supportive of 
our work Among top management, he is the only leader who really cares for us. He 
has both quality and capability. " 
The Manager of the Technology Department, Mr. Gao also comments on the 
leadership style; 
"The key in our management mechanism is to do with what the leader tells us. 
Compliance to the leader, no-mistake, good quality and low rejection rate are 
emphasised in daily management. We don't have contact with the General Manager 
and the President; they are far away from us. We work under direct supervision of the 
Vice General Manager. He is a democratic leader and is willing to accept different 
opinions. He encourages us to discuss problems and find solutions in teams. We have 
very harmonious working relations. He creates a friendly work climate for us. " 
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The personal impression in SLAC is one word - "Busy"! In the offices, everyone 
is busy, running around the building with phone lines ringing all the time. The 
Operations Manager, Mr. Tang says; 
"We only have one day off in two weeks due to work pressures. We often work 
over weekends, and when there are urgent orders we have to stay late at night. But 
these extra hours are not paid for. As management staff, we have better working 
conditions compared to first line workers. A large number of our workers are lowly 
educated labourers from the countryside - they are farmers with temporary contracts. 
They are paid very low pieces rate. In order to gain enough for monthly living costs, 
these temporary workers have to work at nights and weekends. We have a very high 
turnover rate of them. The company relies on exploiting employees to earn maximum 
profits. The state ownership just gives us space for survival but it does not allow us a 
better life than survival. " 
The management style in COE is "mixed" and combines the dictatorship 
exploitation of the private owner, and the bureaucracy and dogmas of state 
management. It makes the worst case in terms of employment working conditions and 
treatment in comparison with the other three types of ownership in our case studies - 
state-owned enterprise, privately-owned enterprise and foreign joint-venture. As such 
it has none of the positive features of state management (e. g. employee welfare and 
equality) nor the ethics and flexibility of entrepreneurial management. Instead, it 
emphasises dictatorship, authority and bureaucracy. Capital accumulation through 
ruthless cost minimisation is most strongly demonstrated in this form of business 
venture. It is evidenced in this case study of a collective-owned enterprise that private 
ownership and collective ownership in a joint form gives rise to capitalist exploitation 
and the absence of business ethics. The venture purposes of the two owner parties and 
their entrenched control over resources seem to be the reasons for this outcome. 
Seeking opportunities for growth is the aim of the private owner, while survival in the 
market is how the collectively-owned enterprise existed because of its lack of market 
networking and incentives. Its state-owned background gives this collectively-owned 
enterprise advantages in land and production resources, which is what the private 
owner needed. The private owner regards the collective assets as resources to be 
exploitable and usurped. Therefore, direct control and bureaucracy are often resisted 
by the private owner while intervention of state governance is frequently involved to 
protect the collective interests. Implicit or explicit hostility has emerged between the 
199 
private owner and the representatives of collective ownership. The private owner is 
reluctant to hand in profit to the local authorities but attempts to use it for further 
expansion. Privatisation as an inevitable trend of reforms is an echo surrounding 
China. Implicitly, the opportunity to buy out the collective ownership at a good price 
could be possible in the near future, which leaves the temptation to the private owner 
to plan for such a possibility. This joint venture generates unsolvable conflicts such as 
- `speculation over collective production resources'; `ambiguity in ownership 
property'; and `hostility between diversified owners'. The only solution seems to be 
either sole private-ownership or full state-controlled ownership. 
5.2.6 Shared values 
SLAC is a collective employee venture in ownership with a hybrid model in 
management style. Although a collective owned venture, the company management is 
a mixture of four types - private, collective, state and joint venture. The President 
represents the values of private ownership; the General Manager those of the state 
ownership style; the vice general manager, collective-ownership values, and the Bang 
Bang Korea those of a joint venture partnership. As a consequence, values, beliefs and 
organisational culture are complex among both owners and employees. 
The president is purely market driven and emphasizes profit maximization and 
cost control. She believes in capitalism and practises the atrocious exploitation of 
employees. Her financial control strategy is against employees' legal welfare and 
work conditions. She is an authoritarian and believes in tight management controls. 
However, she is highly sensitive to capturing market opportunities. As an ambitious 
entrepreneur, she is a big gambler, willing to take high risks that give expectations of 
high profit returns. She and her followers have an aggressive approach to market 
development. They move fast to respond to market trends as in any market-driven 
enterprise. Since 2002, they have grown from a small trading company with about 
100 hundred staff to a company with 600 employees and a manufacturing capacity of 
one million garments in three years. Further expansion plans will grow the company 
to an enterprise with 1800 employee in a new industrial park with production capacity 
of two million garments. It will become the biggest garments manufacturing base in 
Liaoning Province within 2 years. 
As a result of market reforms, SLAC is a new venture with combined collective 
ownership connecting the private and state sectors. To a certain extent pure market- 
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driven forces in the private sector exert direct influence over state enterprises and 
pushes them into pure market competition. The emerging market economy is not only 
demanding organisational restructuring, more crucially, it is challenging management 
attitudes in changing from a socialist to a capitalist regime. People have to discard 
their belief in a planned economy and accept the ideas of a market economy. Such 
changes in ideology generate confusion and question employees' beliefs, particularly 
for those who are deeply involved in planning mechanisms, such as enterprises in the 
state sector. This is why the people in state-owned enterprises often have been slow to 
react to market changes because their confusion blocks their ability to identify market 
opportunities. Private enterprises, on the other hand, are the outcome of the market 
economy. They grow from the market gaps of a socialist planned economy, which 
were regarded as a revival of capitalism that had to be suppressed in the old regimes 
of the 1950s andl960s. Hence private enterprises have a capitalist nature and market 
characteristics. The market environment to them is like water to fish, they can freely 
swim in it. Any business consisting of private and state ownership produces shared 
values in recognising the nature of market orientation, but it gives rise to conflicts in 
organisational culture and management philosophy. 
The General Manager has the role of representative of collective ownership as 
well as the role of guardian of collective assets for the local government. He reports to 
local government authorities, the Textile Industry Bureau, on SLAC management and 
financial matters. He is neither an entrepreneur nor a manager, but a bureaucrat. He 
represents government policy in relation to the strategy and management of the 
company. But he gives full autonomy and responsibility of management to the Vice 
General Manager and takes a detached supervisory role for the management of SLAC. 
He works at the top of the strategic level of the business with the private owner and 
acts as an important connection to the State agency that exercises inspection over the 
collective property. 
The Vice General Manager works directly and closely with the operational core 
and first line workers. He is an amiable leader, truly representing the collective values 
- employees' interests. He 
is an expert in technology and production and always gives 
support to his employees. In this collective venture, he shares equalitarian values with 
his employees and his democratic style of management is different from that of top 
management. Although he has no right to change the rules of the company, he tries to 
create an easy work climate for his employees. Loyalty and diligence are shared 
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values in his environment. Despite his different beliefs and opinions with the top 
management, he often tells his staff to work hard to improve themselves and they 
need to survive in the market. As the company slogan announces, "If you do not work 
hard today, you will have to look hard for work tomorrow. " 
Bang Bang's partnership in both supply and franchise sales gives SLAC the 
opportunity to expand their scale and to closely learn from its successful Korean 
partner. As Bang Bang Korea emphasizes quality of products and sets high standards 
for inspection of samples and delivery times. Quality control becomes a main theme 
and focus on SLAC's management. Every interviewee in the company brings forward 
this emphasis on quality control. They all believe that quality is the life blood of the 
product. The implementation of total quality control and overall control evaluation 
systems is well practised by management and first line workers, although they have to 
follow petty procedures and processes. 
In order to understand market forces and to be fit for financial control on costs 
and efficiencies, an education programme about "Market-Related-Wages" and 
"Market Chain Management" has been implemented to change the old ideology of 
"fixed wages" in the state sector. This re-education is built into learning and training 
processes and is designed as part of management development. The old standard was 
to pay workers on a daily basis and employees normally believed that the full amount 
of wages should be given when their work was done. However, employees seldom 
asked ̀why do I get my wages? ' 
Market-related wages that have been implemented in SLAC has re-evaluated the 
amount of pay to employees in line with market objectives and the reality of market 
conditions. The company slogan is "Work effectively and Get paid clearly! " It 
stresses that employee's salaries come from the orders they produce, which is 
determined by whether they can turn orders into quality products that the customers 
are satisfied with. The new standards on salaries changes the responsibility of 
employees from `the accomplishment of tasks for the boss' as in old approach, to `for 
the market benefit and client satisfaction' in a market economy. It is the clients who 
really pay the employees' wages. It is a market chain relationship which includes 
relations with clients and market relations with profit. The employee should be part of 
this chain and be responsible for customer relations and producing quality products. 
Everyone's wages are determined by these market mechanisms. The new standards 
for pay break down the old functional management and turns the functions of 
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organisation into processes, with all business activities regarded as customer delivery 
processes. It transforms outside market pressures into internal market pressures to 
stimulate the employee's self-awareness of their market value. 
In order to cope with new systems and processes, new concept and continuous 
improvement, SLAC is prone to gradually foster a learning culture in the enterprise by 
introducing regular training and assessment processes. It uses the Party advocacy of 
the 16th People Congress: "To form a people-learning and life-learning society in 
order to facilitate all-round development of the people" as a company slogan to 
encourage the growth of the learning culture. It proposes six learning objectives for all 
staff as follows: 
(1) Systematic thinking, so that people can see the whole picture instead of pieces. 
With systematic thinking, we will know how the piece of work in our hands 
can contribute to the organisation, which gives us understanding on what we 
can do better to make the whole system better. 
(2) Self-improvement, leading to better work performance for the good of self, 
company and society. 
(3) Improving employee psychologies to cope with the new business environment. 
(4) Encouraging collective consciousness for team work and cooperation. 
(5) Encouraging emotional and social intelligence alongside technical skills. 
"Learning how to learn" is the education theme. "Concepts decide behaviour; 
ideas decide solutions; innovation decides development"' are promoted as values for 
employees. Management education in 2006 advocates three objectives: (1) to improve 
the quality of middle management by staff selection and performance appraisal; (2) to 
develop a central core of management with a spiritual belief in the enterprise; (3) to 
establish market-focused values among managers. 
These continuous learning programmes are in concordance with Central 
Government policies and political decisions. This pattern of intense training and 
education demonstrates a typical approach of collective-owned enterprises which 
distinguishes them from purely entrepreneurial firms that lack systematic training 
schemes. 
Although all training and education tend to equalise values and cultural beliefs in 
COE's, conflicts are still inevitable. The major conflicts in SLAC amongst owners as 
well as employees are represented in the following paradoxes: 
(1) Individual Values vs. Collective Values 
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The private owner tends to maximise profit values by all means. Although the 
enterprise is based on collective ownership, the private owner regards the enterprise 
as her own as she is the majority share holder. This individual value is against 
collective values as she tries to keep all the profits and to retain these in the enterprise 
for further growth instead of sharing them with the employees and the local 
government. Such disputes in profit-sharing emerge in this enterprise as it grows 
compared to the stable status of the past. In addition to this profit-sharing problem, 
she controls the financial system to avoid tax payments and to evade fees that should 
be paid to the government. It is a big conflict in this venture as the local government 
is a victim in both ways, either profit loss or tax loss. Two key elements in SLAC - 
Finance and Marketing - are still directly controlled by the Private Owner. This 
conflict may evolve into a fatal problem if the local government continuous to receive 
no profits. The expansion of the new factory temporarily leaves this dispute to later 
discussion as future higher profits may solve this problem. The General Manager 
mentions that the local government provides land for the new factory building but still 
counts for only 49% of collective ownership. The government expects a profitable 
future from this further expansion in the venture. 
(2) Legal vs. Non-Legal 
A further conflict between individual and collective values refers to appropriate 
ways for getting things done. The market legal infrastructure is still not completed so 
there are still ways of avoiding rules and illegal behaviour is not punished by legal 
processes. The emergence of private enterprises was initially the outcome of a non- 
legitimate environment consisting of market gaps. These generate non-legitimate 
ways in business operations. Because of a prevalent social culture in favour of trust 
and personal relationships, private entrepreneurs tend to ignore legitimacy in business 
and instead, try to find `cheap' and `short-cut' ways to success. They strongly believe 
that the informal power of relationships is greater than legal and contractual processes. 
Such values direct their behaviour to manage their businesses in non-legitimate ways, 
which may contravene the legal frameworks. 
Take the construction work for the new factory as an example. The President is 
trying to evade the legal procedures for this project as these involve paying various 
fees. The bid for hiring a professional construction company seems to be too 
expensive for her as she would prefer to use another cheaper construction company 
from the countryside that she personally knows. When the project was stopped by the 
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local authority because of its illegal operation, she attempts to use personal 
connections in the government agency to help her to avoid legal regulations. Although 
employees and the local government disagree with her approach, she controls the 
finances of the company and owns the majority shares. Conflicts and complaints are 
inevitable but she still dominates the enterprise for the final decision making. 
(3) Capitalist vs. Socialist 
The private owner is capitalist, driven by market forces and capitalism, 
compared to the collective ownership governed by the local government still with its 
socialist ideology. Lack of concern with human relations is an obvious feature of 
capitalist enterprises at their early stage. The staff are treated as ̀ economic men' in 
Shenyang Liming Anna Clothing in the market economy, instead of `master of the 
factory' as in the collective enterprise in the socialist economy. In order to maximize 
profits, the conditions for employees are seriously reduced to a minimum level. 
The collective enterprise in the past provided such welfare services as nursery 
houses for female employees who had children; subsidies for free meals in the 
dinning hall; holidays and sick-off-days with pay. Extra hours at work were paid at 
the legal rate. Moreover, employees also enjoyed annual bonuses, and the assignment 
of welfare house and medical insurance. The employees in the former company were 
treated as if they were part of a big collective family with equality and democracy as 
the key values of belief under socialism. However, welfare and a non-profit 
orientation as socialist values in the past also caused inefficiencies and non- 
competitiveness. 
Today, Shenyang Liming Anna Clothing is now dominated by private ownership 
under the market economy, and these welfares and benefits for employees are mostly 
eliminated. Moreover, they have to work longer hours and only get two days off every 
month. Employees are unpaid for extra days and hours. Salary for staff is fixed at a 
minimum rate, for example, RMB1,000 (US$ 121) for supervisors, RMB1,500 (US$ 
181) for managers, RMB3,000 (US$ 363) for vice general manager and RMB 5,000 
(US$ 605) for general manager; and no bonuses are given. No pay is given for days- 
off for illness and no compensation is given for medical treatment. The countryside 
labourers are temporary and no contracts are issued to them, which means they have 
no security and no insurance cover. They can be fired at any point and receive no pay. 
As Mr. Tang, manager of Operations mentions, some fired employees have 
reported SLAC to the State Labour Inspection Department on several occasions for 
205 
breach of labour rights, but nothing happened in the end. Such poor conditions for 
shop-floor workers in the garments production factories are common, not only in 
SLAC. The company is more powerful than individuals and it has strong relations 
with officials in local governments. Such actions by SLAC means that it will not be 
punished legally. There is no trade union or any employee association to represent 
labour rights and protect their interests. Employees who want to stay employed keep 
silent and do not complain about such treatment as they need their jobs to survive. In 
the North-eastern heavy industrial cities, there are a large number of laid-off 
employees from bankrupted state-owned enterprises and collective-owned enterprises, 
and they are normally low-skilled and older labourers. Marketisation is a shock wave 
to them and they are struggling to find a job again. 
Although the culture in SLAC is mixed with both socialist and capitalist values, 
as market reforms deepen, the capitalism values are becoming dominant in driving the 
enterprise. It demonstrates some characteristics of primary capitalist accumulation. As 
Karl Marx (1974)258 said about ̀ Capital', 
"The bourgeoisie, as its rises, wants and uses the power of the state to `regulate' 
wages, i. e., to force them within the limits suitable for surplus-value making, to 
lengthen the working-day and to keep the labourer himself in the normal degree of 
dependence. This is an essential element of the so-called primitive accumulation. " 
"But if the labourers could live on air they could not be bought at any price. The 
zero of their cost is therefore a limit in a mathematical sense, always beyond reach, 
although we can always approximate more and more nearly to it. The constant 
tendency of capital is to force the cost of labour backwards this zero. " 
"The capitalists become bold when there is proper profit. They can take risk for 
50% profit; they can override all laws for 100% profit; they can commit crime for 
300% profit and even regardless of the danger of hanging. " 
In the case of SLAC, conflicts in shared values and changes in culture are 
inevitably taking place in the transition to market socialism. It reflects the outcome of 
ownership diversification and illustrates one scenario of mixed ownership 
experiments in the socialist market. Nevertheless, it forms the most complex case 
comprising of mixed values and styles, and particularly reflects the diversified 
interests of shareholders and hostile attitudes in management control, when compared 
258 Marx, K. (1974) Capital- a critical analysis of capitalist production, volume 1, Progress Publisher, 
Moscow, p689 and p562. 
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to the other three types of enterprise ownership; the state-owned enterprise, privately- 
owned enterprise and foreign joint-venture in our case studies. 
5.2.7 Skills 
SLAC is a large-scale collectively-owned enterprise crossing both state and 
private sectors formed on a solid middle management team with professional training 
and qualification in garments manufacturing and domestic marketing. The middle 
management staff are very experienced and skilful in practice since they have worked 
in the garments industry for over 15 to 20 years and they have been brought up 
alongside the growth of the Chinese textile industry. They have practical knowledge 
and expertise about the technology and traditional crafts required in textile 
manufacturing. Loyalty and diligence are their strengths; commitment to the work and 
the collective make them a valuable human asset for the Company. New systems and 
processes are being implemented and executed by this key staff that form the core for 
insuring quality and on time delivery. Without guarantees of quality control, products 
cannot be sold, customers will not order, and in consequence businesses will fail. 
They are the backbone of the business and of marketing. 
The Manager of the Technology Department comments, "The Technology 
Department is the dragon head of the whole factory, as every department of 
manufacturing requires our technological guidance. Every order from clients need to 
come to us first to verify whether we can meet the standard and define the 
requirements of quality control. Innovation in technology is for better techniques and 
methods of production and to carry out cost control and efficiency improvements. " 
The Marketing Manager, Ms Gong, "Our Marketing Department focuses on 
domestic market development for our own brand, Anna Lee. This department 
combines many functions, such as Design, Sales, Retail, Distribution, Promotion and 
Advertisement. The marketing work is done by experienced staff as new graduates we 
hire are not experienced and have no skills in this area. The staff in our department 
require multi-talents who know all the functions of marketing and understand the 
traditional craft techniques in clothing and who have management capability. New 
graduates from the school are required to have extensive training before they can be 
adequate for their jobs. However, because of low pay in the textile industry, they often 
"hop their jobs" after they gain qualification. Our company has no effective 
management to retain young people. " 
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Due to the absence of human resource management, the company lacks a 
motivation mechanism to attract capable talents through recruitment. The absence of a 
proper reward system generates low motivation among staff. The objective of 
management is to improve employees' motivation but the reality is far from this goal. 
As the complexity of technology progresses and the number of employees increases, 
the human resource management will be a major issue for SLAC in the future. An 
increase in wages and improvements in work conditions will be the demands of 
labourers. 
The President, Ms Li Ying is a strong female entrepreneur. She started her own 
business by selling clothes in 1990's. Marketisation has provided her with huge 
opportunities and an environment for rapid growth. She has developed her own 
clothing business in the domestic market and taken opportunities with Korean 
companies for outsourcing and supply in the late 1990s. By 2001, she became an 
exclusive supplier for Bang Bang Korea Company. She is the person who gets the 
business and contracts for the enterprise. Her capability in business development is 
vital for the future development of the enterprise. As a private entrepreneur, she has 
pure market incentives and her strong sense of capitalism is exerted as a belief value 
in the management of SLAC through her direct control. Profit maximization and cost 
minimization is her main objective of management. 
The General Manager has the responsibility for setting up formal management 
systems and to institutionalizing the whole enterprise management. As a leader from a 
SOE, he has implemented formal bureaucratic management systems. These consist of 
formal procedures and processes in different systems, detailed job specifications and 
hierarchical orders from top to down. This is the management pattern of SLAC, which 
demonstrates the significant features of scientific management in the early 1920's 
during the age of Lenin's Industrial Revolution in Russia. Such a formal structure is 
not common in private enterprises such as the privately-owned enterprise in our case 
study, as most of them are informal, entrepreneurial with a family style. 
5.3 Concluding Remarks: 
SLAC, as a collective-owned enterprise, has the combined characteristics of both 
private and state organizations in terms of structure and systems. Machine 
bureaucracy and hierarchy is the foundation of SLAC while closed and formal rules 
are highly stressed. Unlike the state-owned enterprise case study, this collective- 
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owned enterprise is headed and navigated by a private entrepreneur, not a state 
bureaucrat, to the extent to which state participation is limited at protecting its 
interests rather than managing them. It leaves a `vacant space' so in this type of 
ownership, labour law, social responsibility and business ethics are neglected. Despite 
the involvement of the private entrepreneur, this collective-owned enterprise focuses 
entirely on low-cost, standardised high volume production at the low-end of the value 
chain. Basically, it offers cheap sub-contracting services to foreign companies. As a 
direct impact of market socialism, two forms of ownership - private and collective - 
create a buddy system that offers benefits to two separate interest groups. Conflicts 
and tensions between these two owner groups are intense, reflecting how their merger 
has enmeshed two types of ownership in a dialectic and antipathic relationship. 
Property ownership is a main focus of change in the transformation to a market 
economy, and this inevitably affects managerial behaviour and organisational 
processes. This collectively-owned enterprise illustrates many of these tensions. 




Case Study (3): The Entrepreneurial Venture 
Dalian Dali Cashmere Product Co., Ltd. 
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Introduction 
One of the striking features of China's economic reforms, transforming from a 
command to a socialist-market economy, is the rise of the private sector. Rapid 
growth of privately-owned enterprise has become a driving force for the Chinese 
economy as well as a dominant ownership mode in the country. Private enterprises are 
organized in a very informal way because of how the domestic private sector emerged 
from its history; in the shadow of the state economy. This informality has given 
entrepreneurs great flexibility to respond to an uncertain business environment 
composed of unclear and rapidly changing government policies, taxes, and regulations. 
But it also hampers their ability to raise capital, reward managers and employees. Due 
to lack of management skills and professional managers, private enterprises tend to be 
stuck in a framework of legal, financial, and governance structures that they have 
outgrown in terms of the size and complexity of their businesses. 
In private enterprises, entrepreneurs are the spirit of the organization as they start 
up their enterprises and take the direct and central supervision for management. They 
make all the decisions and take all the risks for their business ventures. Their success 
or failure determines the fate of their whole enterprises. As Schlevogt (2001)25`' has 
suggested, the private Chinese organizational model tends to be very centralized with 
an informal structure and strong entrepreneurship that emphases enterprise networks 
and traditional cultural values. These distinguish them from state-owned enterprises 
and collective-owned enterprises. The privately-owned enterprise in this case study 
demonstrates such distinctive characteristics as it is a typical entrepreneurial 
organisation outgrowing from economic reforms in the recent decade. 
6.1 Background of Dali 
Dalian Dali Cashmere Product Co., Ltd. is a typical entrepreneurial company. it 
was founded in 1995 by Mr. Zhu Li with start-up capital of only RMB 20,000 
259 Schlevogt, K. A. (2001) The Distinctive Structure of Chinese Private Enterprises: State versus 
Private Sector', Asia Pacific Business Review, 7 (3), Spring 2001, pp. 1-33. 
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($2,500). Within ten years (1995-2005), it has grown to be a company with 200 
employees, and total assets of RMB 50 million (USD$ 6million). It manufactures 
cashmere knitwear and combines all its functions - raw material purchasing, 
manufacturing, marketing, retailing on a single site. The company is equipped with 
advanced computer technology and has 220 production machines. These include auto 
computing transverse knitwear machines and 7G-18G manual transverse knitwear 
machines, manufactured in Japan and Korea. The factory has an annual production 
capacity to produce 150 thousand pieces of knitwear and over 20 tons of cashmere 
yarns. 
Its famous brand of cashmere sweater - `LiaoNanWang' ('the King of Liaonan') 
is particularly well-known in Dalian city, as well as nationwide. It was one of China's 
pioneering companies in building its brand value in the early 1990s, along with its 
competitors, `Erdos' and `Kingdeer'. Besides its cashmere products, Dali has also 
diversified its product range into silk knitwear and various natural blend fibres to 
meet the demands of the Japanese market. These products are now also exported to 
the USA, Japan, Korea and Europe. Overseas sales have been rapidly increasing since 
2000 and since 2005, account for more than 50% of the company's total sales. 
Mr. Zhu, the owner and general manager, is a typical entrepreneur with a self- 
confident, open minded and risk-taking approach to the market. In interviews, he tells 
the story of how he started his business260. At the time he had a secure job working in 
a large-scale, state-owned cashmere factory, Guoxing Cashmere Company, in the 
Dalian Economic Development Zone, working as a deputy manager. In the early 
1990s, a job in a state-owned enterprise would be something to be proud of, as it 
offered guaranteed life-long-security. However, the person who can survive in a state- 
owned enterprise, has to be a good listener, follower and respect seniority, regardless 
of personal competence. The cultures of state-owned enterprises' do not reward 
performance based on personal ability. Instead, there is an old saying in China that, 
"The gun will shoot the bird that shows off'; that is, the person who demonstrates 
personal competence would be regarded as a threat to senior management and be 
rejected. Mr. Zhu was a victim of this. He had faced up to a decision; either to tolerate 
this work situation, or leave the security of a state-owned enterprise for a position that 
would be high risk. He decided to become an entrepreneur; to take high risks and to 
260 The interviews with Mr Zhu Li were recorded for the archives of primary data. 
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make more money. He believed that life should be one of personal success and 
achievement rather than oppressed by the procedures of a state-owned enterprise. 
He started his business in 1995 using all his savings - RMB20,000 ($2,500USD). 
He used credit to rent a store to sell his cashmere sweaters and to purchase raw 
materials. His personal relationships and the business network that he had built in his 
previous job played a crucial role at this start-up stage. Without personal trust he 
enjoyed, he couldn't have obtained credit. His friends gave him loans for his initial 
capital. Since then, he has always been committed to building up long-term credibility 
and personal reputation as the basis for his business development. The second stage in 
the growth of his business was the establishment of manufacturing workshop in 1997. 
As a technical expert in production, he was knowledgeable about raw materials and 
knitting technology and this gave him an advantage in setting up his own factory. 
Through personal contacts in banks and friends, he obtained loans to extend his retail 
business to manufacturing. Before 2000, the domestic market was his focus and the 
exclusive source of his profit. 1997 to 2000 was particularly important for Dali's 
domestic market growth, which established his competence in aspects of technology, 
equipment, skills and staff. Following the wider openness of the economic 
environment and WTO membership, Mr. Zhu began to focus on overseas markets as 
new growth areas for his entrepreneurial company. During the period 2000 to 2005, 
Dali rapidly expanded its sales by between 80% and 100% per annum. (Figure 6.1) 
Figure 6.1 Annual sales and respective portion of domestic and overseas 
markets of Dali Cashmere 
Year Annual Sales 
(Million Yuan RMB) 
Portion of domestic market 
(Percentage) 
Portion of overseas 
market 
(Percentage) 
2000 6-7 100% - 
2001 7-8 10-20% 80-90% 
2002 10 10-20% 80-90% 
2003 20 20% 80% 
2004 28 35% 65% 
2005 32 50% 50% 
Total 105 
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One of the features for Dali's growth, is that Mr. Zhu always heavily reinvests the 
company's earnings into the expansion of his company's manufacturing facilities. 
(Figure 6.2) Increasing production capability is his strategic focus in business 
development. When asked for the reason of his success, he says there are two reasons: 
"I should say that the open environment - the free market, provides me with 
great opportunities to develop my own business. In early 90s, I saw increasing 
demand for high-class cashmere products but the supply was low. During this period, 
having a cashmere sweater was a wish for almost everyone. As the market was 
booming, there were too many opportunities, but it depended on whether you could 
step out of old ideas. The planned economy and regime had locked people's mind for 
too long, the economic reform was subversive to most people who were born and 
brought up under the planned socialist economy. In the late 80s and early 90s, those 
who started their own private individual businesses were most likely forced into it 
because of their situation. For example, those with criminal records and the 
unemployed couldn't find jobs in state-owned enterprises or even in collectively- 
owned enterprises, and so they have to do some individual business or trade to 
survive. In people's minds, jobs in SOEs were the preferred choice with respectable 
social status. Private businesses were discriminated by the society. That is why the 
quality of the first entrepreneurs was poor with low education. There is an old saying 
in China `The hero grows in the times of disorder'. I think the creation of the open 
market and the high demand for cashmere products were major reasons for my 
success today. I just did the right things at the right time. 
As for me personally, I believe that if you can cope with the hardest of hardships, 
you can rise in society. Hard work and the ability to endure hardships are important 
to my success. I reinvest my profits in technology and business expansion, not in 
pleasure-seeking. As the motto of my company says, `excellence is created from bit by 
bit', `Ideas determine the path of development and the calibre of people determines 
the quality of the products'. " 
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Figure 6.2 Major investment and fixed assets in 10 years of Dali Cashmere 
(Exclude the stocks of cashmere products and raw materials) 
Year Investment (RMB Yuan) Purposes of investment 
1996 20 thousand (US$ 2.4 thousand) Starting capital (registration of an 
individual company) 
1998 1 million (US$ 120 thousand) Basic computer-controlled knitting 
machines 
1999 10 million (US$ 1.2 million) Constructing factory building 
2001 3 million (US$ 363 thousand) Increase 30 manual knitting machines 
2002-2004 15 million (US$ 1.8 million) Equipping factory building and office 
(IT systems/ERP, computers, elevators, 
conditioners, etc. ) 
2005 5 million (US$ 605 thousand) Increase equipments/machines to 220 
(Auto-computing knitting machines and 
manual machines) 
Total 34.2 million (US$ 4.1 million) 
Within ten years, Mr. Zhu has gradually and constantly reinvested profits in 
increasing his company's technological competence. Despite the fact he knows little 
of management theory and has no idea about such terms as `strategy' and `structure', 
his actions demonstrate unconscious strategic thinking and planning. This case study 
attempts to unwrap the management processes and examine these by using the 
McKinsey 7s framework. 
6.2 McKinsey 7-S framework analysis: 
6.2.1 Strategy 
When Mr. Zhu is asked about the business strategy, he is confused. He asks for 
further explanation of this term. After a few minutes, he says; 
"I don't have any strategy or ambitious goals in my business development. I just 
do what I think is right, following my instinct and rule of thumb, doing work with a 
down-to-earth style. Firstly I never thought I would have achieved what I have today 
when I started 10 years ago. Secondly, I have never been satisfied with what I have 
achieved in each year. I don't have long term objectives like market share, or to build 
a mansion, or how much profit to make, or to compare myself with others. Maybe it 
explains my weakness, no planning or explicit goals. I am working step by step. When 
215 
I saw the opportunity for cashmere products, with my expertise in raw material and 
cloth making technology, I decided to become an entrepreneur. But I didn't think 
anything more than being a retailer. But as my business went well, I thought if I could 
open a manufacturing facility, it would be more profitable and 1 would have more 
control on market supply. Then I borrowed loans and with my profits, I set up a 
workshop with only 20 hand machines. The market has continually grown and so I 
have been naturally expanding the scale of production to meet this increasing demand. 
Actually I have no strategy or plan for my business, but I do look back for what I have 
done in each year and compare that to the market demand. However, the outcome has 
never satisfied me, as I always think I can do better. So, I have been trying to improve 
myself by expanding the level of production and quality control. Our objectives are 
focused on each customer order, each batch of production, every season of sales, and 
each step of work `Excellence is created from bit by bit' is at the core of my guiding 
principle. " 
He is not pretentious and arrogant in his speaking. He talks as a dedicated and 
focused entrepreneur. He takes risks and he is always looking for new market 
opportunities. He is committed to steady business growth, constantly investing in 
technology to improve his volume and quality of production. His strategy is no 
strategy! 
As the motto hanging on his wall states, `The idea creates fortune, and the wise 
person sails the boat with the help of the current. ' He understands how important it is 
to use other peoples' resources to achieve his objectives. That is why he could set up 
his business almost from nothing. He gives the impression of honesty and integrity 
and through this he gains other people's trust. Relationships are an important resource 
for doing business in China, and even more important for entrepreneurship. Not only 
did he rely on personal credit at the start-up stage of his business, but also he drew 
upon bank loans to expand it. All this required the use of personal relationships and 
networks, as the bank system in socialist China didn't support private businesses in a 
formal sense. Without maximising the use of his personal relationships, he wouldn't 
acquire the necessary capital for business growth. But the business was structured on 
a very informal basis and through his personal integrity he was able to fund his 
strategies for growth. 
In the second stage of business growth he built up the core competences of his 
company. Technology and quality were the focus of his mind, and the need to identify 
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market needs. Due to the rapid speed of market transition, and political uncertainties 
in China it was difficult for him to have an explicit strategy and business plan. He had 
to respond swiftly to market changes and trends in the business environment. 
In the third stage of his growth, he developed a strategic alliance with a Japanese 
company in 2003 that gives him market opportunities to expand his business. This 
business relationship with a foreign company gives him tax advantages. According to 
`The Rules for implementation of Income Tax Law for Foreign Enterprises and 
Foreign Invested Enterprises' (The State Council Decree, 1991, No. 85)261, clause 
Seventy-Five, foreign joint-ventures in manufacturing can enjoy `two-year total 
exemption and three-year half reduction in corporation tax'. The two-year exemption 
starts from the date of making profits. Moreover, in line with clause 80, when the 
gains from a foreign partner are reinvested in China or in the expansion of production 
and technology, the reinvested capital can enjoy the full refund of corporation tax. 
Further, on the grounds of `The Notice of Income Tax Policy on Purchasing Home- 
made Equipment . 
for Foreign Enterprises and Foreign Invested Enterprises' by the 
Ministry of Finance and National Bureau of Taxation (Finance 2005, No. 74)26'`, the 
foreign joint venture can enjoy the tax refunds and offsets on the tax paid on the 
amount of capital used for purchasing home-made equipment. Based on the annual 
sales Dali made in 2005 (Figure 6.1), it has saved RMB 1.28 million (US$ 155 
thousand) in terms of taxation because of this joint venture strategy in just one year. 
As Dali is constantly expanding its scale of production, these refunds and offsets on 
home-made equipment facilitate business growth. 
The Japanese partner is responsible for the Japanese market and is signed as an 
exclusive agent. Japan is a large consumer market for cashmere products, and is vital 
for Dali's future growth. Following the setting-up of this strategic alliance in 2003, 
Dali has developed a second line product -women's silk wear to meet Japanese 
customers' demand. Mr. Zhu also regards this strategic alliance as a route to 
international markets since, in response to WTO, he knows there will be the 
cancellation of tariffs and quotas on cashmere products. Dali's business strategy is 
implicit and emergent. responding to market opportunities as they arise. 
261 http7//www. chinatax. gov. cn/view. isp? code-200309241006262333 (Accessed 2nd May 2006) 
262 http"//www. chinatax. Rov. cn/view. isp? code-2005 10121519356588 (Accessed 2oi1 May 2006) 
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Strategy is decided by only one person - Mr. Zhu. All other employees in middle 
management have little idea about the company's goals and future development. Five 
managers, respectively from sales, marketing, production, finance, and office, are 
interviewed and asked about the company's strategy, but no one has any idea about it. 
They think it is the owner's responsibility and they simply focus on their own, 
present-day objectives. Among the five interviewees, with questions that do not relate 
to their own responsibilities, they reply, `don't know' or `it is the owner's 
responsibility'. They don't contribute to their company's business decision-making. 
This is entirety focuses upon the ideas and inclinations of Mr. Zhu. 
6.2.2 Structure 
Structure in Dali is almost non-existent. When I ask for a chart of the company's 
structure, Mr. Zhu tells me to wait for his office director to show me. But in a later 
interview with this office director, Mr. Ding, he says that they don't have such a 
document. Not even documents for HR policies, management procedures, or company 
regulations. As he says: 
"I have been told to write these papers since last year, but I have been too busy 
to get it done. This work requires me to sit down but I have been so busy so 
unfortunately we still don't have it today. I know that formal management structures 
are important for us and that is what we lack but it is not easy to set this up because 
of the nature of this company. You know, it is the way small privately owned 
companies operate. I would prefer to have a normal structure and procedure in 
management, which would make things more predictable. However, it is not what we 
can decide really. Maybe in the future we will formalize our management as the 
company becomes bigger. " 
During the second interview with Mr. Zhu, I ask him to describe the number of 
departments they have, the relationships they have with each other, and major 
responsibilities in each of them. According to his description, I draw an organisational 
chart. However, he says that some departments are only a wish for the future. In 
figure 6.3, these future plans are indicated in a broken-line. An exploration of the 
relationship between the owner and the functional departments, reveals the owner 
retains total control over all functions of his organisation. He is the centre and the 
totality of management. The Vice general manager and office director are like "two 
hands" of the owner, which help him to manage the company, but report to him for all 
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decisions. and they are under his direct control. In the interviews, the vice general 
manager. Ms Xu and office director, Mr. Ding both say that they need to report to the 
owner for every decision. The owner expresses his management style by stating his 
belief that if each process is navigated well, then the result will not go wrong. For him, 
giving autonomy to employees generates risk in the company's management. So in 
reality. Dali's organisational structure is as identified in figure 6.4. Basically it is 
NOT a structure but a pattern of dependency upon Mr. Zhu. 
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Job' specialisation in this structure remains very unclear and individual 
responsibilities are unclear and not defined. Except for the accountant from the 
finance department, the other three interviewees, respectively from office 
administration, marketing and sales departments, take on multifunctional duties and 
play flexible roles in meeting diverse needs as they might arise in the organisation. 
The vice general manager who is in charge of the sales department is also a manager 
in manufacturing, but she was transferred to sales when there was a shortage of staff. 
Take the designer as an example. During field research in Dali's company, I call 
the owner and ask for an interview with the designer in his company. Mr. Zhu tells me 
that, 
"I don't have a professional designer, my technician in tailoring and craftsman 
in production are doing this job. The professionals are too costly and new graduates 
are too young and I do not want to spend time training graduates. But I know it is a 
problem in my company, maybe I will find one in the future. " 
I am surprised they do not have a designer, as his product ranges are fashionable 
women's wear. 
The Office Director has a more active role in the company structure and deals 
with whatever arises from the owner and other emergent needs. His responsibilities 
are very broad - such as government requirements for annual reports and renewals, 
public relations, personnel issues, and trading affairs and particularly with overseas 
business. His role is like a lubricator or a fireman that smoothes and enhances the 
flexibility of Dali's entrepreneurial structure, so that responses can be swift to 
changes or new situations whenever they arise. This role is a strength in such an 
entrepreneurial structure in that it releases the proprietor from total management 
control; at least, to a certain degree. But as this role acts as the extension of the 
proprietor, it has limited autonomy for decision-making. The proprietor is very much 
at the centre of the management web. 
Work relations in the structure are carried out in a very informal way. Little 
paper work is produced - except that required by external agents - and more face-to- 
face communications are the bases for information flows. There are no written rules to 
guide employees but only informal norms generated from the proprietor's principles 
that are conveyed to the employees to obey. Through frequent face-to-face meetings, 
verbal communications, and mottos, the proprietor passes his unwritten rules to the 
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employees. By regularly checking on each working process, he "corrects the wrong" 
and "encourages the right" in line with his criteria to make sure his ideas are being 
fully implemented. Despite the owner's total control, informality and high flexibility 
are still the major characteristics of the Dali entrepreneurial company. In the interview, 
the proprietor explains why he cannot delegate autonomy to managers. As he says, 
"I would be glad to delegate responsibilities to other managers. But the thing is 
that no one in the business is capable of having these. Their ways of thinking and 
ways of doing things are not beneficial to this company. They don't treat this 
company as their own in the way I do. More importantly, no one is competent enough 
to make important decisions. For example, I had a vice general manager, Mr. Qu. I 
gave him full delegation in charge of sales. What I experienced from him was 
cheating and mistakes. Because the cashmere sweaters are for seasonal sales, stocks 
are divided into two classes in accordance with their quality and fashion design. The 
first category are high quality and fashionable. The second class is for those that have 
quality defects and that are out of fashion and which need to be sold at a discount. Mr. 
Qu sold the first category of stock at a big discount for his own benefit. Another 
example is the current marketing manager. She says we need new brochures for 
marketing promotion. So I ask her to show me the design. Her design is not creative 
at all, but just adding bits from the old brochures. I also find out there is still a large 
storage of old brochures still remaining. 
I keep direct control on every procedure to make sure each step is done properly 
so that the final result meets my expectations. I always believe that if the procedures 
are right, the outcome will be right. Sometimes I really feel very tired and exhausted, 
because everything depends upon me. Money is important for an enterprise, but 
capable staff is the most important asset. I would like to invest an extra RMB 300 
thousand (US$ 36 thousand) every year for recruiting better talent for my company, 
but the reality is that I cannot find good people. The problem for my company is not a 
shortage of capital but a shortage of capable talent. When I look back; I realise that I 
predicted some trends in business development, but unfortunately my good ideas can't 
be implemented by only my two hands. I don't have enough people to achieve all my 
plans. 
I know reliable statistics are very important for making the right decisions. I 
cannot always judge everything subjectively. My enterprise needs effective systems 
and mechanisms to manage these data scientifically. I need to have formal 
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management processes. These are important for the enterprise and we need to 
gradually build these up in the near future. I am aware of this, but the changes need 
to take place gradually. " 
6.2.3 Systems 
Within a minimal skeleton of the structure, the systems of direct control are 
informal and highly flexibility. Communications are carried in a very informal way 
with little paperwork involved. The telephone and face-to-face contacts are the means 
of daily communication. Regular meetings take place on a weekly or fortnight basis to 
review the week and to plan for the following week. These meetings between the 
proprietor and management staff are when verbal reports are presented and problems 
arising are discussed for solutions and approval. The proprietor is the centre of 
decision-making and has direct and total control over every procedure. He emphasizes 
the importance of supervising the procedures when I ask him whether his 
management focus is on results or on process control. To quote what he says, 
"This is my frequent emphasis in my meetings with my management staff: the 
correct procedures must lead to the right results; the wrong procedures that lead to 
the right results are a contingency; the wrong procedures that lead to the wrong 
results are an inevitability. " 
Hierarchy is low in this system and the proprietor is the sole authority for all 
working procedures. He gives a very interesting and visual description of how his 
organisation operates. As he says, 
"This organisation is like the human body and functions like a transmutative 
kingkom. This organism has only one brain which is me, and other employees are the 
different organs of this body. These organs work together to create the metabolism to 
be alive. In this sense, every part is important and need to play its own function. They 
must stay in their own roles and listen to the commands coming from the brain. They 
cannot be disturbed. For example, the assistants work as my two hands and they have 
to do what the brain tells them to do. They fulfill the function of being hands and not 
of being the brains. If they begin to think, they might slap the face when the brain 
commands them to achieve things. All the organs must be in order and listen to the 
brain's instructions otherwise the whole organism will breakdown. An enterprise 
should also act as a transmutative kingkom. When the different parts are assembled, 
the transmutable kingkom-toy can change into different things; for example, an auto 
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car or a gun, or a tank The people in an enterprise should act like the assembly parts 
of a kingkom, in which they can become cars when they are at work and become tanks 
when they are at home. I can be a car at times and also change to a brain when the 
situation requires. The enterprise should be able to change into different shapes 
through combining and reforming these parts, in order to meet the changing demands 
of the market. Sometimes I feel like a `hemiplegia'; my brain has many ideas but the 
body cannot move or run as fast as what the brain wants. " 
Day-to-day work is managed through informal communication, face-to-face 
decision-making and flexible systems. We can also understand how the informal 
system operates within Dali's company through interviewees with managers in the 
four major divisions: central office; sales & manufacturing; marketing; and finance. 
The central office combines many functions (personnel, international trading, public 
relations, e. g. ) and consists of four employees under one director's control. There is 
no job specialization in this department and it has access to all the other functional 
departments for mutual coordination and flexible teamwork. The office is just aside of 
the main entrance and it is open plan. Telephone and verbal conversations are the sole 
means of communication among staff and between them and proprietor. The Office 
Director often goes to the proprietor for reporting and gaining approval on a daily 
basis. To quote Mr. Ding, the Office Director; 
"I worked in a large state-owned enterprise for many years before I came here, 
so I know the distinct difference in the two types of organisations. In the state-owned 
enterprise, an approval required many layers of hierarchical processes to pass 
through, such as from supervisor to manager, and vice general manager to general 
manager. There was hardly any face-to-face communication, but many boundaries 
between departments, lack of flexibility and much paperwork But in this private 
company, flexibility is supreme, the systems are very flexible. Only one person makes 
the decisions and there is only one procedure to follow - that stated by the owner. I 
report everything to him and he decides everything. No written rules or formal 
processes exist in this company; the systems are open and flexible. Work relationships 
between employees are very friendly. Harmony is emphasized by the owner in this 
enterprise. " 
The Labour Union is also the responsibility of the Office Director, but it only 
exists in order to meet a government requirement. It has no powers to represent 
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employees. Its only duty is to arrange infrequently some social activities for 
employees. The company accountant comments on the Labour Union as: 
"It is too far from us. I didn't perceive any benefit from it when I worked in the 
state own enterprise. It is even more so in this private enterprise. " 
"I was appointed by the owner to take charge of the labour union, but it is just a 
title, no responsibility. The only thing it does is to arrange some social activities, like 
a dinner or a party for the employees, maybe once a year, which requires the 
approval and a budget from the proprietor. There are no scheduled activities in the 
union, and it does not speak for employees rights. " Mr. Ding comments, the Office 
Director. 
When I ask Ms Jia, the Marketing Manager, about labour union, she says: "I 
have no idea about it. " 
The finance department is controlled directly by the proprietor. Weekly and 
monthly reports are produced for the proprietor and annual financial plans are 
prepared. Financial controls are operated by the computing systems and reports are 
produced for the State Tax Bureau. The accountant, Ms Liang, says, 
"There are four employees in the finance department, three accountants and one 
trainee. There is not much lateral coordination with other departments and our 
planning is made mostly based on the previous year's statistics. Plans for sales and 
manufacturing are prepared and reported to Mr. Zhu. We mediate some financial 
issues, such as sales targets, production budgets, etc. between sales and 
manufacturing, or other departments. All final decisions are made by Mr. Zhu. The 
work and management in this department is not very complicated as the principle 
areas of the business are specialised in two main fields - manufacturing and sales. " 
The marketing and sales departments are responsible for developing and 
managing production and distribution. There are two major distribution channels for 
cashmere sweaters. One is the sales agents and wholesalers in different cities, and the 
other is the local retail stores. Two systems with different terms and conditions apply 
to these two channels. Only a small team is required for completing these tasks. 
Morning and evening reporting meetings are the communication mechanisms in this 
department. Some paper work is produced in terms of marketing plans, but verbal 
communications are the main means of getting things done. 
The Sales department is managed by Ms Xu, a vice general manager, who also 
supervises marketing. Because she has worked in manufacturing as a supervisor for 
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many years, she knows production procedures and this gives her an advantage in 
managing the sales department in conjunction with the manufacturing planning. She 
has introduced quality control checks and cost controls. This is important in cashmere 
production because of the expensive price of raw material. Mr. Zhu personally 
supervises both manufacturing and raw material purchasing. In the interview, Ms Xu 
mentions both advantages and problems in both the sales and manufacturing systems; 
"We combine purchasing, manufacturing and sales & marketing together, which 
gives us competitive advantage in controlling all the procedures in this business to 
minimise our production and marketing costs. This integrated control process also 
gives us great flexibility in deciding the profit margin and discount ranges offered to 
our dealers. We have invested millions in technology and advanced manufacturing 
equipment, which allows us to produce a broader range of styles and varieties as well 
as to reduce labour costs. But we still have problems in our sales system that is the 
conflict between stock management and the delivery to both retailers and dealers. 
This causes a problem in stock and delivery in that some products in high demand can 
be out of stock; and some in low demand are largely overstocked. This balance is 
hard to manage as it is not totally controlled by us. We have to depend on retailers 
and dealers to keep us updated on what is sold every week Most of the time, they 
don't keep daily updates, or they order goods on the assumption they can be returned 
when they do not sell. There are also regional differences in the demand for varieties 
of stock For example, in Dalian, the sales for cashmere trousers are very popular, 
but we are out of stock Whereas the dealer in Qingdao, has very low demand in such 
trousers, has stockpiling. But we won't know until he reports to us. We are not 
efficient in solving this issue, but we are in the process of improving as we increase 
the number of delivery staff and improve our communication with these distributors. 
In the manufacturing system, there is a conflict in scheduling production for 
overseas and domestic markets. These demands are difficult to balance, as both the 
domestic and overseas markets are important to us. But when there is an order from 
an overseas buyer, it is always according to a tight delivery schedule. A solution is to 
manage the switch of focus between domestic sales and overseas sales in different 
seasons. For example, we plan to get orders from the international market by the 
summer when there is little demand in the domestic market, while the main production 
focus in the winter is for national sales. Moreover, we have built up an outsourcing 
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system for international orders, by which some reliable subcontracting factories are 
selected for production. " 
6.2.4 Staff 
The Owner, Mr. Zhu says: "In ten years development of this business, the people 
in my company have come and gone, but the total quality of my employees has 
improved. I believe the quality of people is very important for getting work done. " 
The total number of employees in Dali's company is about 150-200 with the 
majority first-line workers with low education (middle school to high school) and 
sales and delivery staff. There are also 50 part-time seasonal sales, production and 
delivery workers. The key personnel are about 20 managerial staff, who are college 
graduates with expertise in foreign trading, English language, marketing and finance. 
Besides, there are about 6 experienced technicians in cashmere production 
technological processes. 
The company training programme is informal and random, and depends on the 
needs of the work process. New workers in production are trained by their supervisors 
on the factory floor. The training programmes are only offered to management staff 
when the proprietor thinks there is a need, or when a special task requires it, such as 
when foreign trading requires an understanding of contract conditions and procedures. 
However, the proprietor often takes relevant managers to visit other efficient factories 
or more advanced companies, so they can gain experience from their competitors. The 
accountant, Ms Liang said: 
"I benefited a lot from a visit to an advanced factory in Hong Kong. We saw how 
the modernised procedures are operating and learnt the techniques of advanced 
production management. We appreciate and feel excited about such learning 
experience, which open our eyes to something new and what we have never seen in 
our lives. " 
Ms Xu, vice general manager, also made the same point: 
"Mr. Zhu often arranges for our key staff to visit other efficient companies on a 
regular basis. We have learnt about their advanced management philosophy, efficient 
methods, various new styles in design, production techniques and even how they 
decorate the outside of retail stores. These field visits have impressed us very much. 
Particularly, I remember once we visited a big textile spinning factory in Beijing. I 
have never seen such a large scale of spinning production. I was shaken up. By 
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learning from these different advanced enterprises, we know where we are and how 
much difference there is between us and those modern corporations. We are 
motivated to work harder in the practice. " 
There is no clear or written policy for staff development. Firing policy is simply 
on the basis of whether or not the owner thinks the employee is doing a good job. 
Promotion criteria do not exist in either a verbal or written form. Mr. Ding, the office 
director tells that: 
"We don't know promotion criteria and I don't think there is any chance to get 
promoted. In this private company, the matter is of how much responsibility you can 
take and how much pay you can get. But the salary depends on the boss's preference, 
and so does the year-end bonus. " 
Ms Liang, the accountant says the same point: "we all listen to our boss, and the 
boss decides everything. " 
It is the same situation with the reward system. The subjective and discretionary 
judgment exercised by the proprietor is the only criteria for material rewards; there 
are no written rules or guidelines. The only guaranteed rewards are in the signed 
contract and are the monthly salary and the social & labour insurance that are legally 
required by the government. The year-end bonus is used by the proprietor to keep 
control over his employees and gain their commitment to the company. However, it 
generates insecurities for employees as well. 
In addition to the reward system there is the spiritual and moral methods the 
owner uses to motivate his employees, such as `weekly exemplar' or `monthly 
paragon' and `progressive individual'. Mr. Zhu tends to stress the importance of 
ethics and morals for his employees to create devotion, loyalty and honesty. This is so 
that less material rewards need to be used but more commitment and output can be 
gained. 
Mr. Zhu emphasises he is urgently in need of highly skilled management talent 
for his company. To do this he will need to change his present entrepreneurial 
approach that does not retain able people because of the absence of an effective 
human resource management system. A formal system is required and he needs to 
delegate more responsibilities if he is to retain highly skilled talent. His insistence on 
total control over management procedures is against human resource retention. On the 
one hand, he describes himself as the only brain of the organism and that his 
managers are his hands that just to do what he tells them. On the other hand, he feels 
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that he needs highly skilled and independent talents to share his responsibilities and 
work, so that he can delegate autonomy to them. This thinking reveals a paradox in 
his mind. As the company is growing to the limits of his ability to exercise total 
control, this is making him recognise the need to recruit skilled staff to share his 
responsibilities. His company is reaching a bottle neck in its growth, which is 
blocking its further potential to expand. He may come to realise that although an 
entrepreneur requires one brain; a larger business requires a think tank. 
6.2.5 Style 
Mr. Zhu is a typical entrepreneur with charisma. His explicit leadership style is 
to manage people by heart and affection, not by rules. This informal leadership is built 
on top of his unassailable authority. He demonstrates a hybrid leadership style in his 
management. He is democratic, amiable and gracious, he always consults employee's 
opinions and he is a good listener. He always explains when he rejects the opinions of 
a manager. He is caring to his employees and works as hard as his staff. Nevertheless, 
he is also an authoritarian with more-or-less arbitrary decision-making. He does not 
allow others to challenge his authority. For instance, he has rejected the idea of a 
board of directors and controls the whole company on his own. In the interview, when 
asked about the ownership status of his company which is set up as a limited company, 
and which should have a board of directors involved in decision-making, he says, 
"This company is completely mine, and I have sorted them (the board of 
directors) out by giving them enough money to go away. I am the person who makes 
all the decisions. I do not like others to be involved in the decisions, and tell me how 
to do things. " 
He has total control over all strategic decisions; his authority is uncontestable. 
His professional expertise in cashmere-spinning technology and his knowledge of 
cashmere raw material makes him venerated among his employees. The Vice General 
Manager, Office Director and Accountant all refer to this background of expertise 
with respect in their interviews. This also contributes to his successful establishment 
of his business and its rapid expansion. The raw cashmere material is a very rare 
resource that not every business can have easy access to it. However, his networks in 
access to raw material resources and his knowledge in this field guarantee his success. 
It is the reason he still directly controls the two areas of raw material purchasing and 
manufacturing in person, and which are not allocated to others. 
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All his employees share the same perceptions about his style. Besides his 
authoritarian nature, his leadership is a mixture of supportive, participative and 
achievement-oriented approaches. As the Office Director comments, 
"He is a democratic leader with affinity, he is amiable and always discussing 
and consulting with us. He explains the reasons for his decisions and asks you for 
mutual consent. He has a wise strategic view on things and he is a resolute man when 
he comes to a decision. " 
His Marketing Manager, Ms Jia says, 
"His personality is very prompt and decisive. He cares for us and participate 
with us in our work He can democratically discuss with us and you can feel his 
affinity. " 
The Finance Accountant, Ms Liang comments, 
"He is a leader who does things with religious care. His style is decent with 
justice, generosity and patience. He cares for his employees. I still remember that he 
treated us to a nice dinner as a welcome when we came back from the New Year 
holiday. He gives us a warm feeling. " 
The Vice General manager, Ms Xu comments, 
"Mr. Zhu knows how to put people to good use; he knows how to develop 
people's talent. He is an expert in spinning technology. He is good for getting things 
on hand quickly and he employs the right people for doing things he can't do. " 
The owner manages people by his heart and not by rules. Once they had an 
urgent order from an overseas client. As the delivery time approached, they were still 
much behind the schedule. He asked his employees to work at nights and at weekends. 
He also works as late as his employees and leaves the company as the last person. He 
constantly says `thank you' to his employees for their hard work, which normally is 
very rare for a Chinese boss to do. Although the work makes them exhausted their 
hearts are happy and content, because what they do is highly appreciated by their boss 
and their boss works as hard as they do. Furthermore, he demonstrates his care for his 
employees respecting to Chinese traditions, such as attention to traditional holidays, 
and he always gives small gifts to his employees to keep them happy. 
A family atmosphere is successfully cultivated by his leadership style. His 
emphasis on this type of business culture incarnates the importance of his authority as 
the father of this family. He can be an affable father because his authority is secured. 
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Moreover, this family culture also enforces the informality of the business and 
reinforces his employees' dependency on him. 
6.2.6 Shared values 
The significant meaning and guiding concepts that Dali enterprise imbues in its 
employees can be revealed from various mottos and creeds that are hanging on the 
walls in the buildings. Some of these are as follows: (Appendix 6 Photos of case 
studies 3)264 
`Excellence is created bit by bit' 
`The idea determines the path of development and the calibre of people 
determines the quality of product' 
`The idea creates fortune, the Wiseman sails the boat with the help of the current. ' 
`Please watch your thinking, it will influence your behaviour, 
Please watch your behaviour, it will influence your habit, 
Please watch your habit, it will influence your character, 
Please watch your character, it will influence your fate. ' 
'FAMILY' -A big Chinese character hanging on the wall in Mr. Zhu's office, 
which demonstrates he runs the company as a big family. 
These statements illustrate the management philosophies that Mr. Zhu 
emphasises as important and valuable for all members of the company. To cultivate 
the family culture, he shows his democracy, consideration and respect to employees. 
The work climate is friendly and harmonious with little hierarchy, making employees 
feel psychologically comfortable. He tries to share the attitudes of his employees by 
educating them to have the right values so they cooperate and comply with his 
direction and decisions. He is the centre of a power culture and imposes total control 
throughout the whole organisation. This is similar to how Handy (1993) 265 describes 
a power culture. 
"It depends on a central power source with rays of influence form the central 
figure throughout the organisation. Control is exercised from centre by the selection 
of key individuals. There are few rules and procedures, and little bureaucracy. " 
Z" These guiding mottos are photographed from the site of Dali Cashmere in August 2005, attached as 
appendix 6 Photos of case studies (3). 
265 Handy, C. B. (1993), Understanding Organisation, 4th Ed., Penguim, London, p23. 
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But also the business prides itself on having a learning culture. This is strongly 
promoted in the company by Mr. Zhu. He frequently arranges field-visits to advanced 
companies nationwide and actively joins industry associations, in order to find ideas 
for continuous improvement. He constantly educates his employees and stresses the 
importance of learning and improving their working practices. As Mr. Ding, one of 
the interviewees says, 
,, We are in a period of improvement. There are many things in the company that 
need to be improved, and we are working on that, such as quality, formalization, and 
advancement in management techniques. We will get it gradually, it takes time, but 
we are processing. " 
Such a learning culture has led to innovations in the quality control system and 
marketing, but the management structure has not yet been altered. 
6.2.7 Skills 
Alongside China's rapidly growing economy, Dali Cashmere Company has 
successfully exploited opportunities in the cashmere market place. Within ten years, it 
has developed its own featured capabilities and skills in the market. These core 
competences in Dali enterprise are analyzed in terms of. leadership, business 
reputation and networked resources, and technology and machanisation. 
The leadership is the most important competence in this entrepreneurial business, 
as everything depends on the proprietor's preference and capability. As a successful 
entrepreneur, Mr. Zhu demonstrates his high capability, charisma and wisdom. He is 
the determining factor for the fate of this organisation and his strong leadership is an 
incontrollable competitiveness. His entrepreneurial qualities definitely account for the 
strength of the business. The strategic focus and intuitive vision and sensitivity allow 
him to find opportunities in the market. His flexible and informal structure with quick 
decision-making processes allows him to swiftly respond to market trends. As he 
describes himself, he can change to any form and be adaptive to any situation when he 
needs to. He possesses such strengths that are lacking in large, formal enterprises. His 
talent in thinking, decision-making and charisma of personality, these qualities enable 
him to be a successful leader. Equally, this strength could turn to become a weakness 
when his business grows to a certain big size, whereby these capabilities cannot be 
used for total control. His entrepreneurial style will start to limit his potential for 
further business growth and development. 
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Business reputation and personal network for access to raw resources are a 
special strength in Dali company. In ten years, Mr. Zhu has intentionally built up his 
business reputation by always honouring contracts, and guaranteeing refunds and 
product returns. As he states, 
"Sometime the contract is not for profit purposes but for future strategic 
alliances. Other businessmen may not do business that creates losses but 1 will do this 
for getting market share. It is my long term vision. I am not only a profit-driven 
person....... I consider the social responsibility of my company, such as donations to 
the poor and public road maintenance, as I have such capability now. We are part of 
society and I feel I should do something for others. " 
He says his reputation and personal credibility for the long term is more 
important to him than short term profit gain. Cashmere raw materials are a scarce and 
expensive resource and there is hardly sufficient supply. Thanks to his previous work 
in the State-owned company, he has established his own resource network, and this 
has benefited him when he set up his own business. The other competence that helps 
his company's growth is the technology and mechinasation that Mr. Zhu has heavily 
invested in. This strength enables his company to produce 150,000 cashmere sweaters 
a year. This facilitates his growth not only in the domestic market but also allows him 
to rapidly expand in overseas markets at the time of China's accession to WTO. His 
intention is to develop the company from one based on labour intensive low 
technology to one operating with high technology. 
In the view of the core competences Dali possesses, Mr. Zhu's entrepreneurial 
traits play a critical role in its primary success. However, these will limit further 
business growth unless he delegates and develop management competences among 
his staff. He needs to shift the company's dependence from a brain to a think tank. 
6.3 Concluding Remarks: 
The emergence of private ownership is of major significance in market socialism. 
It forms a stimulating force not only to contribute to China's economy growth but also 
to restructuring the economy. This privately-owned enterprise is characterized by its 
flexibility, organic systems and entrepreneurial culture. In a turbulent and changing 
marketplace, it is not surprising that such entrepreneurs often emerge as a new class 
of plutocrats and business magnates. Their entrepreneurial traits and ingenuity lead to 
their exploring and securing business opportunities. Privately-owned enterprises are a 
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sharp contrast to state-owned enterprises in every organisational dimension. But this 
often raises future challenges for the further growth of privately-owned enterprises as 
an owner dependency management structure needs to shift to a delegacy system with 
appropriate control mechanisms. Through seeking a balance between delegation and 
control, successful start-ups can grow into large businesses. 
Supportive government policies for privately-owned enterprises to access capital 
and finance sources will further promote the growth of the non-state, privately-owned 
sector. Non-discriminative treatment should be guaranteed to the non-state-sector in 
terms of prices structures and the availability of goods and services provided by 
industries including traffic and transportation costs, energy, basic telecommunications 
and other factors for production. This privately-owned will continue to grow and enter 
the fields once monopolized by the state-owned sector. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: 
Case Study (4): The Foreign Joint-Venture 
Sunfed Group U. S. A. Dalian Sunfed Fashion Co., Ltd. 
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Introduction 
State-owned enterprises (SOE), collective-owned enterprises (COE), privately- 
owned enterprises (POE) and foreign joint-ventures (FJV) are four types of ownership 
evolving from economic reforms and management change in China. These enterprises 
demonstrate distinctive characteristics in terms of their leadership style, strategy, 
structure and management systems. Studying each of these different types of 
ownership provides a better understanding of the dynamics of emerging enterprise 
practices in the context of Chinese market socialism. 
Foreign joint-ventures are the outcome of foreign direct investment in China and 
have been a significant factor in the growth of China's market economy. At an early 
stage of market reforms, because of government encouragement, sino-foreign joint- 
ventures were the dominant option for companies' entry into the Chinese economy. 
However, since 1997, wholly foreign-owned enterprises have become the preferential 
choice mainly because of foreign frustration with joint ventures with Chinese partners; 
particularly, after WTO accession, and as China has become a more market-driven 
country. (Yan and Warner, 200 1)266 As government controls in some of industrial 
sectors are relaxed, the formation of wholly foreign-owned enterprises seems to be a 
favourite mode by foreign companies. Davidson (1987)267 pinpoints the factors that 
determine foreign joint-ventures' performance as individual personalities, 
organisational cultures, administrative style and management philosophy. These 
factors are often combined as the `One Bed, Different Dreams' symptom 
(Vanhonacker, 1997)268. Moreover, the `veto-power' of Chinese partners in joint 
ventures is often a hindrance for foreign partners in their strategic decision-making 
2" Yan, D. and Warner, M. (2001), "Sino-foreign joint ventures versus wholly foreign owned 
enterprises in the People's Republic of China', The Judge Institute of Management Studies, Cambridge. 
Working Paper, No. 11, Oct2001, p31. 
267 Davison, W. H. (1987), ̀ Creating and Managing Joint Ventures in China: Motivation and 
Management of Political Risk'. California Management Review, XXVII (4), Summer1987, pp44-58. 
268 Vanhonacker, Wilfried (1997), ̀ Entering China: An Unconventional Approach'. Harvard Business 
Review, XII (2), Mar/Apr1997, ppl9-32. 
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(China Joint Venturer, 1996b)269. All these lead Foreign Joint Ventures to take `go-it- 
alone' strategies for running businesses in China. 
Nonetheless, Sutter (2000)270 argues that, 
"Wholly foreign-owned enterprise has its disadvantages in several areas. First, 
in sectors like consumer goods and high-technology hardware, Chinese firms are 
relatively stronger. In the absence of suitable Chinese partners, a wholly foreign- 
owned enterprise can be handicapped in the competition by a lack of effective 
connections to handle governmental work Having a competent Chinese partner may 
be useful in developing applications for the local market for the high-tech 
companies. " 
Knowledge of local governmental issues, culture and market, is critical to both 
Chinese and foreign investors in China, albeit with different emphasises in different 
areas. Sino-foreign joint-ventures overcome economic and political hurdles, and 
achieve sales volume more rapidly. (Davidson, 1987)271 Child (1998b)272 points out 
that wholly foreign-owned enterprises have relatively lower profitability when 
compared to sino-foreign joint-ventures. However, after China's accession to World 
Trade Organisation, both types of venture have benefited from market reforms as the 
business environment has become more market-driven. Many foreign firms' 
localization programmes have been accelerated due to these reforms. The call to 
transfer management from expatriates to local managers echoes across China (Gamble, 
2000)273. More and more studies reveal that the management practices of these joint 
ventures have adopted a hybrid model in combining characteristics of western 
management and Chinese cultural and human resource features. "The rapid 
localisation has become the mantra of many foreign invested enterprises in China" 
(Melvin, 1997)274 
269 China Joint Venturer (1995b), ̀ Do You Need a Partner in China? ' China Joint Venturer, 2 (2), 
Oct1995, pp3-5. 
270 Sutter, K. M. (2000), 'Investors' growing pains', The China Business Review, 27 (6), Nov/Dec2000, 
n 14-21. 
Davidson, William H (1987), ̀ Creating & Managing Joint Ventures in China'. California 
Management Review, XXIX (4), Summer 1987, pp78. 
272 Child, J. (1998b), 'PRC investment control: exploring the myths', China Direct Investor, Aug1998, 
ppl0-15. 
Gamble, J. (2000), ̀ Localizing management in foreign-invested enterprises in China: practical, 
cultural, and strategic perspectives', International Journal of Human Resource Management, 11 (5), 
Oct2000, pp. 883-903. 
21 Melvin, S. (1997), ̀ Passing the Torch', The China Business Review, 23 (3), 1997, p. 32. 
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In this case study of a sino-foreign joint-venture, the form of ownership is a joint 
venture in capital investment rather than management participation. This case is 
examined as an example of full localisation in the management of foreign joint- 
venture enterprises. As Davidson (1987) mentions, the performance of sino-foreign 
joint-ventures depend greatly on qualitative factors such as individual personalities, 
organisational cultures, administrative style and management philosophy. As 
disappointments are not unusual with foreign management participation, this case of 
full localisation without foreigners' direct participation may provide a different 
approach. In this mode of foreign investment venture, an entire `Fit-in Strategy' is 
maximised through trust-based operational and strategic autonomy. The expatriate 
managers in this venture, the president and general manager, are overseas Chinese 
who were born and brought up in China but emigrated to the United States. They have 
adopted advanced western management approaches through overseas higher 
education and a deep understanding of foreign culture by living in the West. However, 
they also have a full understanding of Chinese culture and market as they have lived 
and worked in China during their working careers. They have both an understanding 
of the western style and Chinese business practices. The characteristics of such joint 
ventures emerging under market socialism reflect how economic reforms and 
environmental changes shape management practices and how they find the best way 
to fit in with local market requirements. A review of the literature shows there are few 
studies of this type of emerging venture and in particular, with this type of expatriate- 
owned management. 
7.1 Background of Dalian Sunfed Fashion Company 
Dalian Sunfed Fashion Co., Ltd. (DSF) is an American-Chinese joint venture. In 
1997, Sunfed Group U. S. invested US$ 30,000 capital with its Chinese partner, Mr. Li, 
an overseas Chinese, who brought into this venture US$ 36,000 capital to set up a 
joint venture company in the clothing business. The America investment accounted 
for 45% of total start-up capital and the Chinese party 55% with an agreement that 
full management autonomy is assigned to the President, Mr. Li and that the profit is 
divided 45: 55 on an annual basis. The company's Annual Report is required to be 
submitted to the Sunfed Group US as a formal method of communicating business 
performance. The American investment in this company is based on trust as it had 
been in auto parts trading business with Mr. Li for many years. Mr. Li and his wife, 
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the General Manager of DSF, have both Chinese and Canadian nationality. Prior to 
this venture, they lived in Canada and America for years and they engaged in auto 
parts trading business and traveled between China and America. 
This joint venture has specialist expertise in the clothing business as Mr. Li's 
sister-in-law is a fashion designer who is a graduate from a French fashion college 
with several awards for designing women's clothes. Mr. Li and his wife are 
professional business people with high qualifications (Mr. Li has a MBA and his wife 
a PhD) in business management. They identified an opportunity in the clothing 
industry -a gap for value-added products - branded clothes. The America partner had 
little know-how about the Chinese clothing industry but he saw the unprecedented 
potential of the Chinese market. Thus, Mr. Li and his American partner decided to 
invest together through a `capital venture mode' with full management autonomy 
assigned to the Chinese partner and the interests of the American investment protected 
by a legal contract. This venture company, Dalian Sunfed Fashion (DSF) is positioned 
in the clothing business with a target market of professional women and with a 
strategic focus on brand building. 
In this research, six management staff were interviewed including the President, 
the General Manager, the Designer and three departmental managers in marketing 
technology, and HR. The president Mr. Li stated in his interview: 
"The American investor injected capital into this ventured business and his 
interests are guaranteed by a legal treaty in addition to personal trust and confidence 
in me. We all know that the Chinese market is filled with opportunities; it is just a 
matter of how you can catch and secure them. You can earn a fortune from the growth 
of the market economy if you know on which side your bread is buttered. Foreigners 
see the opportunities but they don't know how to secure them and they don't have 
know-how in local practices. China has the most complex business environment with 
a discrete market infrastructure. The legal framework in this market is not the same 
as in the West and the absence of market laws is a matter of fact. Personal 
relationships and business networks and nepotism are key values of the business 
culture. The Americans understand these dynamics and complexity and regard them 
as the highest risks that can cause failure for their investment in China. I can 
minimise this risk by offering capital venture with them and taking full responsibility 
for management practices in China as I know them like the back of my hand. But to do 
this I need to have full autonomy in management for effective flexibility and control. 
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The opportunity cost is high for exploring the Chinese market. The investment . 
from 
America is not only important in sharing the high economic cost but also the 
American venture adds brand value. In addition, a foreign joint venture company ccm 
enjoy tax holidays and benefits and gain supportive policies, from the government. " 
Affiliated with the Sunfed Group in the U. S., Dalian Sunfed Fashion (DSF) has 
established a brand reputation in Dalian for its sophisticated style and fine 
craftsmanship. In 1999, DSF has been conferred the "Famous Trademark" by the 
Provincial Government. By combining the latest European fashion trends with elegant 
classics, the Sunfed line appeals to professional working women. The brand has 
become very popular in Dalian and it has consecutively made the top list in recent 
Dalian International Fashion Exhibitions from 2003 to 2005. It was awarded the 
"BEST OF TEN" ladies fashion in the ninth, tenth and eleventh Dalian International 
Fashion Festivals with its excellent styles and high sales. '" 
As a distinctive professional women's wear company. the l)SF collection is 
outstanding with its fresh and bright looking, unique design and long lasting style. It 
breaks through the boundary between "professional" and "informal"; professional but 
stylish. Its design is based on the "oriental female", in particular, temperament, 
complexion and figure. Having merged with European's simple and clear fashion 
concepts, a perfect combination of eastern and western fashion culture enables it to 
demonstrate the natural elegance of the cultivated modern metropolitan Asian female. 
The culture underpinning this brand is well defined in company stories and tales. The 
meaning of brand is delivered to all salesmen through constant training programmes. 
This well-established branding culture is a distinctive feature which differcntiatcs it 
from other types of enterprises studied in this research. The state-owned enterprise. 
the collectively-owned enterprise and the privately-owned enterprise lack clear 
cultural content and brand definition in the marketing of their products. 
7.2 McKinsey 7-S framework analysis: 
7.2.1 Strategy 
The original purpose for the establishment of this foreign joint-vean(tire was to 
explore the potential and opportunities in the Chinese market that emerged from 
275 http7//w\Nw. suni'ed. com, laboLitsuiifede. htm (accessed on 20th April, 2006) 
239 
economic reforms. The American investor had little know-how about China and the 
clothing business, and so a `capital venture' approach was adopted as the entry 
strategy into the Chinese market. A clothing business with a strong focus on branded 
products requires sophisticated marketing distribution and retailing, with a large scale 
customer-based networks. Designs for meeting local customers' fashion preferences 
are critical factors in product brand and demands designers possess both an 
understanding of Chinese culture and western fashion values. In fact, an integration of 
both cultural elements is essential in clothing design. The American investor did not 
have this expertise and resources to carry out a go-it-alone investment in China. 
Therefore, a full localisation approach was adopted as a `fit-in strategy' giving full 
operational and strategic autonomy to the local Chinese partner. 
The development strategy in DSF is explicitly stated in documents that focus on 
marketing and branding. The western pattern of branding enterprise is adopted in DSF 
as `Marketing - Design - Manufacturing - Outsourcing'. The president, Mr. Li is 
very knowledgeable about Chinese market and clothing industry. In the interview, he 
discussed the macro and micro economic environment for the textile and clothing 
industries, knowing opportunities and threats in this industrial sector, and 
understanding the strengths and weaknesses of his own business. As he says: 
"The configuration of the clothing industry is constructed as three different types 
of components. First, there is the type of enterprises that outsource with a chain of 
subcontractors, used for manufacturing. Second, there is the export-type of enterprise 
which gets orders from foreign purchasers and arranges manufacturing and 
outsourcing for these exports. These are the types of enterprises with their own 
manufacturing equipment. Third, there is the type of enterprise with its own brand 
manufacture and which heavily invest in marketing and branding. We position 
ourselves so as to produce value-added products by constructing our own brand and 
marketing. We target the luxury consumer market as China's economic growth 
creates this demand. But this market is dominated by foreign brands, such as Zara, 
Channel, Armani, Luis Vuitton, Giorgio, which have entered the China market 
through franchising, retail distribution and their own flagship shops. They set up 
branches in China and managing brand marketing. 
We aimed to establish a woman's brand to take a leading role in women's wear 
when we started this company. We have made this task in the past eight years, but the 
next goal is to create a chain of by-products such as adorning jewellery, bags, hats 
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and shoes in the same brand The range of women clothes need to be diversified into 
different collections in our next stage of development; for instance, sports 
collections. " 
He positions this foreign joint-venture enterprise in competition with other 
foreign entrants rather than domestic players, as in the branded clothing market, only 
a few players are indigenous firms. As the Development Report of Clothing Industry 
(2005)276 indicates, 
"Indigenous brands dominate these popular consumer goods markets, like 
cashmere sweater, men's shirt, knit underwear, suit trousers, snowsuit; but the luxury 
branding goods markets in women clothes and T-shirt are dominated by foreign and 
joint venture brands and this is a growing trend compared to last year. The demand 
for luxury brand goods is steadily increasing; as the luxury goods consumers in 
China have reached 13% of the total population and that is still growing. The total 
value of luxury brand goods market in China is estimated to be worth US$ 2 billion, 
which accounts for 3% of the world total and ranks as No. 3 countryfor luxury goods. 
It is predicted that the luxury goods market in China will continuously grow to be No. 
2 in the world in the next 10 years. " 
The report also points out the major weaknesses of indigenous clothing 
enterprises are lack of advanced management knowledge and management innovation 
to break through conventional low-technology manufacturing and move up to high 
technology and value-added production. 
DSF operates a western approach to branding with a deep understanding of 
strategic approaches to brand marketing. This is difficult to imitate by other domestic 
players who are much behind in their management practices. In the field of branded 
clothing, foreign companies have many advantages because of their expertise, 
advanced knowledge and long history. Comparatively, indigenous firms are weak in 
brand building; brand is an invisible asset which is a general term; it describes an 
emotional experience that businesses create for their customers. 
"I fa company's product is perceived to be the same as those of competitors, then 
consumers will be indifferent and will choose the cheapest or most accessible. 
Companies that are forced to compete on price rarely make satisfactory profits. If the 
customers perceive one brand as superior, then they will prefer it and pay more for it. 
276 The Development Report of China Clothing Industry 2005, by China Clothing Association, China 
Business Union, and China Textile Export & Import Committee, April 2006, pp. 26-51. 
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Brand equity is the value of these additional cash flows generated for a product 
because of its brand identity. "(Baker, 2000: 159)277 
In its corporate strategy for 2006, DSF sets out three objectives for this year's 
brand updates: 
(1) Developing Sunfed Brand's Culture and Characteristics 
" Constant promotion and marketing of brands in a rich cultural context. 
(2) Building a team of talents 
" Recognizing that external business relationships and networks and interpersonal 
skills are the core of marketing. 
(3) Improving sales performance 
" Developing new markets and strengthen the international position of Sunfed 
brands 
Two objectives on operations and management 
(1) To establish divisions and branches nationwide. 
(2) Bring three functional branches into operation: 
a. Beijing Branch - enhance the operational capability of brand building 
b. Shanghai Branch - focus on the R&D on product material innovation 
c. Dalian Branch - reinforce top management function & improve service standard 
Brands are at the heart of marketing and business strategy. Given the advanced 
knowledge about brand management, DSF has placed the objective of developing 
brand equity as the core of the company's strategic management and regarded it as a 
key determinant of corporate values. 
`The average British and American company is valued by the stock market at 
around twice net balance sheet assets. However, companies with portfolios of strong 
brands are valued by the stock market at four times net assets. '(Financial Times)278 
Strong brands can obtain good prices and high market share and offer a company 
avenue for further growth through line extensions and the penetration of new markets. 
However, investments in brand building activities do not have an immediate pay-off. 
Without an understanding its future potential value and with no long term vision of 
strategic development, many of today's Chinese companies are unwilling to invest in 
building brand. They cannot see such invisible value in the long run but tempted and 
277 Baker, M. J. (2000), Marketing management and strategy, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p159. 278 `Price to book ratio of brand name stocks', Financial Times, 23 November 1991, p. 111. 
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pressured by short-term profit return. DSF's brands strategy shows a long-term focus 
that increases its market competitiveness. As the President says, 
"We don't earn any profit from brand building but we have heavily invested in 
marketing and promotions of our brands. We spent about 5 million RMB in marketing 
and advertising activities for the first five years. The American capital inflow is a very 
important source for this investment. I also continue doing the auto parts trade with 
them, and this income source covers our overheads. We have strong belief in the 
future reward of this brand investment and we know we are doing the right thing. 
Profit is an important measure for an enterprise performance, but building a long 
term strategy is more important for future growth and competitiveness. " 
The brand has paid off for increasing market share and profit margins after five 
years of investing (1997 - 2001). The profit return from this brand's sales is up by 
206% since 2002. (See figure 7.1) It is growing every year following the company's 
successful brand strategy. 
Figure 7.1 Sunfed Annual Sales: (US$ Million)279 
year Main Sales Operational income Total Increase % 
2001 0.11 0.05 0.16 - 
2002 3.48 1.48 4.96 206% 
2003 4.21 1.94 6.15 24% 
2004 5.32 2.66 7.98 30% 
05 
1 
8.94 3.14 12.08 51% 
In relation to ownership, foreign joint-ventures have the distinctive advantage in 
advanced management approaches due to direct investment and learning from the 
West. The foreign joint venture is a form of indigenization that overcomes the 
shortcomings of foreigners or expatriates directly involved in management but utilises 
the value of foreign capital in resources. This type of localised foreign venture is 
dependent upon a high degree of trust and tight legal contracts. Compared to state- 
owned enterprises, collective-owned enterprises and privately-owned enterprises, they 
are the only ones positioning themselves at the top of value-added production in the 
clothing industry. Foreign capital is the wherewithal for the adoption of such a 
strategy as brand building requires constant and extensive investment for a long 
279 The main sales are obtained from National Tax Bureau, Zhongshan District Department. The 
operational income is from Local Tax Bureau, Zhongshan District Department. 
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period without immediate payoff. Financial pressure is often the ruthless reason for 
killing such a strategy as such investments do not have visible returns in short-term 
sales and profits. Faced with such elusive, long-term and intangible benefits, it is not 
surprising that companies and managers always drop this strategy in planning. This is 
the prevalent situation in China, with a deficiency of capital to fund growth in 
privately-owned enterprises. Even state-owned enterprises, with privileged access to 
financial sources, are usually driven by short-term profit returns due to performance 
assessment mechanisms used for managers that emphasise immediate profits. Foreign 
joint ventures have competitive advantage in creating high value added products 
through their strengths in capital, technology and advanced western management 
techniques. 
7.2.2 Structure 
The structure in DSF is especially designed to serve its strategy. It functions in 
two modes: through its organisational chart and its operational structure. (See Figure 
7.2 & 7.3) The organisational chart reflects the joint venture and management 
relationships within the company. The operational structure demonstrates the 
customer-centred operations. One distinctive feature of DSF's organisational chart is 
the business relations between its U. S. and Chinese partners. The auto-parts trading is 
the foundation of this venture that formed the basis of trust through many years in a 
joint partnership. When the two parties joined in the new area of clothing business, 
the auto-parts trading remained the close tie between the two partners. This is handled 
as an exclusive business separate from the clothing investment by the President. 
However, auto-parts trading profit contributes to the profitability of the company. 
This trade was an important source of finance to support the overheads for the first 
five years when the clothing company received no profits from its brand building 
investment. 
The President in Sunfed plays an overall supervisory role at a strategy-decision 
making level and he exerts direct operational control over the Finance Department. 
The General Manager acts as CEO with the General Director and Vice General 
Manager. These four together form the top management team. Middle management 
consists of managers from six functional departments; finance, personnel, marketing, 
design, manufactory and technology. The marketing function is the core focus of the 
company, with a network that covers the three major international cities in China - 
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Beijing, Shanghai and Dalian. The Dalian office is the company's Headquarters that 
controls the other two branches. The Shanghai branch is the centre for Research and 
Development working on new products, materials and technology innovation. The 
Beijing branch is responsible for brand marketing and includes advertising planning, 
sales distribution and promotion support. The Dalian office is the base for brand 
management and manufacturing supply. The main management functional 
departments, such as Finance, Personnel, Design and Marketing and Logistics are 
centralised at Headquarters in Dalian. 
All the operations and management of DSF are focused on customers' needs and 
support services. The division of work is grouped to meet this objective and tasks are 
allocated to serve customers' needs. Work relationships in the marketing function are 
more informal and based on team work but with sales personnel given autonomy to 
achieve their sales targets. In other departments, such as Finance, Personnel, 
Technology and Manufactory, hierarchy and authority are stressed by top 
management. Formal rules and policies are enforced and descended from top to the 
lower levels. Total management control is exercised by the top managers with an 
emphasis on the formalisation of management and systems. Authority is stressed by 
the General Manager in order to ensure the implementation of commands and 
strategic plans. However, the marketing division has a flat hierarchy with 
considerable management autonomy compared to other departments so it can react 
quickly to external changes and customers' needs. Larry Chen, the Marketing 
Manager comments; 
"Marketing is the main activity of the company. The product has priority in 
coordination, an absolute priority, and other departments must collaborate with 
product marketing. We have the most complex structures in other departments; the 
responsibilities for each job and each unit are clearly defined with given duties to 
carry out the objectives. " 
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Figure 7.2 Organisational Chart of DSF 
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Figure 7.3 Operational Structure of'[)S1 
7.2.3 Systems 
Communications in DSF are set in hierarchical orders. Employees in each 
division report to their supervisors and managers. Ignoring orders is regarded as 
offensive behaviour. 
Middle managers can have direct face-to-face communication 
with top management. 
Information flows in a bureaucratic system. Paperwork and 
formal meetings are the dominant means of communication with top managers. 
Informal communication processes are pronounced between sales staff. 
Manufacturing is the department with strictest bureaucratic rules that standardise 
routine processes of production. 
The design department has independent operational 
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autonomy. Creative ideas and design styles are the main output of this department. It 
has the least number of employees (only five) and focuses on fashion culture rather 
than management issues. Communication and cooperation with manufacturing and 
technology is close to make sure that designs are put into products. The marketing 
department often gives feedback from customers to the designers, so that designing 
can meet customers' needs. Communication between design and R&D comprise an 
essential component in this management system to meet the objective of brand 
building. 
The Sunfed Club provides membership and after-sales service for retail 
customers. Since customers are the key element in brand building, their satisfactory 
experiences are the main measure for a successful brand. DSF uses its `direct- 
relationship marketing' to forge a close, direct relationship with its customers and 
offers them free membership of the Sunfed Club to enjoy experiences and 
satisfactions from membership services. The Sunfed brand that represents people's 
life style, dignity and quality is delivered and penetrated into customers' perception 
through membership service. Free events are held for members, such as coffee 
afternoons and weekend buffets. Such social events give members further experience 
of the Sunfed culture and recognition of brand personality. Moreover, as members, 
they also get access to personal networks, which are regarded as an important social 
resource in Chinese society. The Sunfed brand is positioned as a premium price (e. g. 
piece price is in the range of US$100 - 600. ) for middle class professional female and 
rich people. They form a valuable resource of social networks when they are 
organised by the company's club membership. This is important for word-of-mouth 
marketing. As the General Manager says, 
"The Sunfed Club is an important communications tool for direct relationships 
with customers and getting direct feedback from them about their feelings, 
perceptions and preferences. I always try to attend every event, so that I can listen to 
what our customers' feel about our brand image and know what they want. Our 
product targets the segment of luxury goods which mean our customer groups are not 
in the mass market. They are differentiated from the mass with their own 
characteristics. They are not easy to satisfy because of their profession, social class, 
wealth and knowledge. We need to have direct communication with them in order to 
diffuse our brand values and so that they not only commit their brand loyalty to us but 
also they can tell others about us through word-of-mouth. More customers are 
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attracted by our Club because they can enjoy a high-class social life and get to know 
more people who may form a useful social network for their business. In addition, 
only members of Sunfed can enjoy privilege discount based on their purchases. In 
order to guarantee this privilege right of membership, we never have promotion and 
discount sales in retail stores. " 
The president exerts direct management control over the finance system, and all 
budgets and expenditures require his approval. The Finance Department is directly 
responsible to the President. Through financial control, the President can then direct 
and adjust marketing activities at a strategic level. The planning system is an essential 
mechanism in the company as it has high employee involvement. Every employee in 
each department is involved in planning and they discuss their work with their 
departmental managers on a weekly and monthly basis. The Company sets targets (e. g. 
sales volume and stock rate) for `macro control' and soft targets (e. g. customer 
satisfaction, work attitude and creativity) for `micro control' in its planning systems. 
Employee creativity and participation are high through this planning process. Cost 
and quality control is exercised through this system. Responsibilities and division of 
labour are clearly defined. Personal autonomy is based on level of responsibility and 
management position. The annual assessment of planning targets is the most 
important stage in the management process. It is the key element of performance 
management. Middle management have a high degree of autonomy on deciding how 
to plan marketing activities with customers and for promoting the brand. However, 
conflicts between the company strategy and marketing plans are frequent. The 
Marketing Manager comments that the brand strategy often prohibits discount 
promotion in order to preserve the value of the brand whereas the hard targets on sales 
volume often need to be achieved through discount sales promotions. Coordination 
and communication between top and middle management are often set in formal and 
informal meetings for seeking solutions when such conflicts emerge. As brand 
management is a relevantly new concept in the Chinese market, education and 
training are often required for employees to understand brand strategy and the 
processes of brand building. Particularly in foreign joint-ventures, western 
management approaches (e. g. strategic management approach, human resource 
management, branding management, marketing communications approaches, etc. ) are 
highly adopted and integrated into the organisational systems. Local employees need 
to have good understanding of these approaches in order to carry out their objectives. 
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The execution of tasks is often unsatisfactory when staff understanding of these 
concepts is low. It is the so called 'capability of execution'. It is a problem in all types 
of enterprise regardless of their ownership characteristics. 
7.2.4 Staff 
The total employment in DSF is about 200 people including 60 managers, 
supervisors and technicians which form the key personnel. The education level of key 
personnel in this foreign joint-venture is higher than in the other three case study 
companies. The President holds a MBA qualification and the General Manager has a 
PhD in Management. All the other management staff have either postgraduate degrees 
or undergraduate degrees in relevant marketing, HRM and technology subjects. 
Higher education qualifications are an essential requirement for key staff in DSF as 
their knowledge is regarded essential for brand building and the company's long term 
development. The US partner emphasises the importance of this. The quality of 
employees is related to their education and professional background, as the President 
emphasised in the interview: 
"The quality of employees is very important in demonstrating our brand's image, 
as they represent the company. We by to build up a high quality team with proper 
courtesy and capability through training and education. The level of knowledge that 
employees hold determine their degree of creativity and capability. This is crucial for 
successful marketing communication to our customers. " 
Recruitment policies are based on this strategic vision of brand building. 
Selection criteria for staff recruitment focus on five elements, `education', 
, qualification', `ability potential for creativity', `open-mindedness', and `acceptance' 
to the Sunfed culture. The selection process includes four procedures: written-format 
questionnaires; informal interviews; culture workshops and final stage of formal 
interviews. During these procedures, employees' intelligence quotient (IQ) and 
emotional quotient (EQ) are evaluated. The culture workshop is an important feature 
in the selection processes as it is designed as a special observation programme. 
Candidates are invited to this 3-day workshop to experience the Sunfed culture before 
the final stage of interviews take place. During these workshops, observations on 
candidates are recorded to examine their acceptability to the Sunfed culture. As the 
General Manager says, 
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"During workshop activities, some people get excited about the Sunfed culture 
and cannot wait to ask questions about it in order to know more. Some are not 
interested and some are confused. We observe their interests and understanding of the 
Sunfed brand philosophies, so that we know whether they can adopt our culture and 
style, and integrate into this system as a whole. " 
Training programmes are an essential part of staff development planning. 
Written formal assessment of recruits aims to identify the specific areas that require 
training. Tailored training courses are thus designed to meet this need. For example, 
new sales staff are required to attend one month full-time, off -job training courses 
before they start. The courses include sales techniques, colour collections, the art of 
displaying clothes, retail distribution, etc., in addition to brand management training 
that is compulsory for all levels of employees. Managerial staff have training courses 
that focus on strategy and advanced management approaches. Professors from 
academic institutions are invited to give such theory lectures. Managers are not only 
sent to Beijing and Shanghai for learning, but also to France and Italy to learn about 
brand management, as the Sunfed brand represents a European style. The design of 
training in DSF shows that the constant education of employees is focused on their 
understanding of management knowledge, underpinning the company's brand. Due to 
the owners' U. S. background and their direct adoption of western management 
practices, the strategic vision of the company is based on high value-added product 
development with rich culture connation, which requires a knowledge-based staff 
team. Therefore, constant training including off and on-the-job, aims to close the gap 
between advance management practices and low skilled local managers. 
Reward and sanction systems, as part of human resource management, generate 
motivation to drive consistent performance. In a market-focused system, rewards 
based on sales performance is the common approach. The criteria for reward and 
sanction are set in relation to hard and soft targets in the planning system. It is 
formularised as - "basic wages + performance wages (assessed by hard and soft 
targets) + annual rewards = total employees' pay". Rewards are also increased twice 
a year respectively in February and August. The amount of increment is dependent on 
an individual's performance. The frequency of their faults at work is also recorded. 
When these are too great employees may be transferred to other positions or 
dismissed. 
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Personnel policies for employees' treatment and welfare are fairly good in this 
foreign-invested enterprise. Legal contracts provide employees with cover for five 
types of insurance, which include housing and pensions. Extra hours at work are paid 
at the legitimate rate, holidays and sick-days are also covered by the standard salary. 
Business travel is compensated by extra subsidiaries. Employees are well treated at 
DSF in comparison with those in the COE and POE case studies; particularly by 
contrast to the COE that is ruthless to its employees. This is another example of the 
influence of US ownership participation. 
The "soft" means of rewards reflect human relations concerns in DSF; for 
example, promotion opportunities for every member of staff and opportunities for 
studying abroad (e. g. France, Italy) are part of the whole reward system. Good 
working conditions are provided with personal laptops, company cars, and 
compensation for travel. These "soft" methods fulfill an important function in 
motivating staff and developing personal potential. The interviews in DSF suggested 
that motivation among interviewees is much higher than in the other three case 
companies. 
As the Personnel Manager, Mr. Liu Ming comments; 
"I feel the company not only meets employees' living needs, but more 
importantly it gives opportunities for personal development. We have convergent 
objectives with the company's development. We interact within this organisation as a 
whole, as the organisation's development depends on us, and our personal 
actualisation depends on the organisation. " 
The Marketing Manager, Mr. Larry Chen comments: 
"This company has very advanced management concepts and philosophies which 
encourage us to learn management theories that we never looked into before. This is 
a company with huge potential in development and it can definitely do better as time 
goes on. However, much has yet to be done and more capable talents need to join us 
as we grow. A complete motivation system to retain highly skilled talents is in demand, 
although this company has been very successful in building brand image and culture 
with precise market position. Further development will put challenges on our human 
resource management. The motivation incentives are still not enough and rewards 
systems need to be more improved in order to fully develop personal capabilities. For 
instance, responsibilities that managers carry out need to relate to specified rewards, 
and we need to know what we can achieve and what we can do. " 
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As the General Manger says: 
"We still need to find better solutions to motivate the middle management. 
Groups of employees at sales level are well motivated by specified sales-related 
reward mechanisms; whereas other departments, like design, technology and 
outsourcing that don't have direct links to retail stores and sales, require better 
incentives. We need a multi-designed motivation mechanism to retain capable talents. 
Currently this is the most challenging task for our company, as we are struggling with 
a shortage of capable managers. Our concepts and ideas need to be executed by 
capable staff, but we don't have enough of them. It is not easy to find skilled 
managers on the Chinese labour market. Actually we have been trying to train 
potential employees from internal promotion. However, re-education and training are 
a tough task for us. " 
7.2.5 Style 
Leadership style in DSF is dichotomous. The president represents a democratic 
and consultative style, whereas the General Manager demonstrates an authoritative 
and directive role. In the Chinese sense, the president is a Confucian style leader 
which emphasises intellectual wisdom and courtesy, advocating knowledge education 
rather than an emphasis on material values. Referring to his overseas education 
background and expatriate experience, he is open-minded to adopt both western and 
Chinese philosophies, showing appreciation of advanced knowledge practices and 
technology regardless of country boundaries. He is a gracious and approachable 
person, which gives employees amiable feelings. Communication with him is much 
easier than with the General Manager. 
The General Manager is an authority-based leader, believing in command-and- 
obey management. Impersonal rules and procedures are her preference as she 
emphasises that disciplines to regularise the employees' behaviour are necessary for 
effective management. She underlines this in company training programmes and that 
authority plays a key role in reinforcing management and the achievement of 
company objectives. Brand management is a new concept in the Chinese market, so 
its enforcement is required to push employees' acceptance of it. Because of her strong 
preference for authority management, conflicts often occur between the General 
Manager and the President. She complained in my interview that the president is too 
easy with employees. However, although dissensions exist, when it comes to strategic 
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vision, they always reach consensus; if not, she accepts the final decision of the 
President. 
The leadership style in DSF seems to be a good combination of authority and 
democracy as they compensate each other to form a mixed style to serve different 
needs of management. The General Manager regards herself as the teacher of the 
organisation who gives lessons to employees for their training. She has influence over 
employees. She is not only their manager but also their preacher of the company's 
culture and brand management concepts. The Personnel Manager comments on her 
style as: 
"The General Manager exerts great influence on the staff in terms of culture, 
values, management concepts and ways of doing things. She is a perfectionist in 
everything, so she expects high standards from us and on enterprise development. She 
is an entrepreneur with strong personal capabilities, which influence everyone 
around her. She is very authoritative in insisting on her ways of doing things. She is 
very directive to teach us to do new things. We respect her as she has profound 
knowledge and experience. She speaks fluent English and always engages in 
diplomatic affairs with foreigners and different countries. She has a very 
internationalised style and open mind. " 
The Manager of Technology comments: 
"Leadership in DSF is strong. Our president is a democratic leader, but with 
very cutting-edge concepts and vision. He represents the American style of 
management - open and creative. The Chinese general manager is an authoritative 
leader with a determined mind. She makes sure things get done and she is very good 
at creating cultural values for the enterprise. Both of them are very intellectual and 
knowledgeable. Their leadership is a mixed style in the company. " 
`American companies are often regarded as high profile, and are deemed as the 
most desirable to work for. Because the Americans are more generous and open, they 
tell you what to do and let you get on with it. ' (Gamble, 2000)280 Leadership in this 
American-Chinese joint venture seems to demonstrate a similar style - high profile, 
open culture, high management autonomy. DSF emphasises end-results from the 
middle managers while excellent achievements are expected by the top management 
280 Gamble, J. (2000) ̀ Localizing management in foreign-invested enterprises in China: practical, 
cultural, and strategic perspectives', International Journal of Human Resource Management, 11 (5), 
Oct2000, pp. 883-903. 
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as the company aims to develop high profile performance. There are great 
opportunities to develop personal potential, but the company also challenges the 
capabilities of managers who take these responsibilities. As the Marketing manager. 
Larry Chen comments: 
The company just tell you the objectives, the processes and decisions are ic/I to 
us to determine. Although the company has taught us so much about new management 
concept and theories, we have to digest them by time and through practice. We feel 
the company should provide us with more support in process management, but 
actually they leave the work completely to us to make decisions, developing the tasks 
and responsibilities to first-line employees. 
The president only looks to the results, 
and the general manager takes a more participative role in daily operations, but she 
is more likely to he in a supervisory role rather than supportive. " 
The following figure 7.4 reflects the style of performance management in DSF 
which also illustrates what the local managers are expected to do. 
Figure 7.4 Performance Management in DSF 
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The work environment is designed to high professional standards. I)SI's office 
is located in a prestigious area, comprising wealthy people and foreigners, as this 
matches its brand image and market position. Its location also offers convenience to 
members of the Sunfed Club for its social life. The company's physical internal 
environment is creative and unique in terms of colour schemes and space arrangement. 
The Sunfed Group USA sign is the biggest logo at the front door denoting its foreign 
joint venture status. Coffee facilities remind the visitor of this distinction as a coftce 
culture is seen as symptomatic of the western life style. The clothes showroom is 
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arranged in the lobby next to the reception, which customers can walk into. 
Contrasting colours and designs impress visitors and catch their attention immediately. 
The workplace plays Mozart and Beethoven music, which reinforces western values 
and enhances the work atmosphere as friendly and relaxing. F mployees demonstrate 
proper courtesy and modest manners as a well-trained high quality team. 
7.2.6 Shared values 
The General Manager is the advocator and preacher for creating and enriching 
the Sunfed culture. She did primary research to define the Sunfed brand with both 
western and Chinese identification. For instance: 
"Sunfed 's western identity means "Bathe in the sunshine ", expressing beauty, 
warmth and love. Sunfed Chinese translation (Si Fan) means "Repine for a secular 
world, a tale from 'Sinful Sen Biography' which was published by Mei Lan fang, who 
was the maestro of Beijing Opera. This story tells how a young Nun is attracted by an 
elegant boy and decides to return to the secular world. It represents women's nature 
and beauty and love. This cultural connotation. forms the orientation of the Sun/ed 
brand. It is the symbol that incarnates the feminine style of life, a kind of philosophy, 
a kind ofpoetry, a kind of graceful and romantic life style . -281 
The goal of the company is shared by all employees, which is described as "In 
pursuit of the high and the beyond". "The High" is defined to be the highest profile 
brand in the world; "the beyond" is denoted to develop Sunfed to be a hundred year 
enterprise with a solid foundation. This organisational goal reflects its ambition and 
long term development vision, while the spirit of "being the best" inspires employees. 
Rich cultural connotations and legend under the brand, express a prolific brand 
personality and value, which gives customers an emotional experience that builds the 
company's competitiveness in a way hard to intimate by competitors. 
The general manager plays a valuable role in teaching and educating employees 
to the extent that her values and philosophies have changed employees' behaviour and 
mentality. She promotes a high profile style of quality of life, encouraging employees 
to pursue excellence. Knowledge is highly respected in this company and creativity 
and innovation in marketing and technology are a key focus in employees' education. 
The motto being advocated in DSF among employees is "Excel yourself to he 
281 ̀Origin of Sunfeä, from Sunfed website, www. sunfed. com (accessed by April, 2005) 
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creative! " As the General Manager always tells employees; if you want to change 
your life, you come to Sunfed; this is the company that can give you the opportunity 
to be better and can provide you with different cultural experiences. ' This is the key 
value in the company's culture that creates an environment to develop employees' 
capabilities, encouraging their creativity and innovation. An emphasis on autonomy to 
staff is regarded as an essential philosophy underpinning DSF's management to 
activate employees' potential, which is a precondition to achieve high performance in 
the market. The philosophy of performance management is to stress self-oriented 
result-driven performance. Sunfed retail stores are the main channels for sales, and 
this distribution network covers over 38 cities in China. Increasing sales volumes in 
flagship stores is the main focus of the company while developing more channels of 
distribution is a supplementary objective. The realisation of these objectives demands 
capable managers with self-motivating skills. The Sunfed culture and management 
philosophies are well-matched with organisational objectives and strategy. 
The organizational culture in DSF is learning and knowledge-based. Learning is 
reinforced through constant training programmes. The willingness and exigencies to 
learn new things have become both formal and informal norms for staff. Every 
departmental manager in their interviews expressed the demand to learn new 
knowledge as part of their routines. It goes without saying that it is the main task of 
top managers to promote and enhance this learning culture. 
Power in DSF is only structured in the senior management group, and its 
authority is stressed by the general manager. They prohibit other individuals or groups 
in the organisation which may challenge their power. Take the ex-manager in the 
Human Resource Department as an example. She was a very capable talent and did a 
great job in DSF, but she had been intending to form her own clan among middle 
managers to challenge the general manager's authority. This situation contravened the 
power structure in the organisation and she was inevitably fired. This sometimes 
generates a paradox in management, as highly skilled talents with autonomy usually 
make their own decisions and assign tasks to members in their groups under their own 
leadership. Such performance management unavoidably causes the formation of 
powerful individuals or group within work processes, which might become a threat to 
the top authority when there is dissidence. Is the shortage of capable talents in the 
company caused by their challenge to the power structure so they cannot be retained, 
or can the company really not get the right people due to the general shortage of 
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highly skilled labour market in China? The sole authority within the power structure 
engenders tensions between top and middle management, which acts against the 
retention of capable and independent managers. This scenario is particularly common 
in small and medium size enterprises, where power is centralised at the top, under the 
control of a small group of individuals, and more importantly, while the company is 
structured without corporation institutions. This is evidenced in all the three other 
types of ownership in the case studies. It is less likely the case in the state-owned 
enterprise undergoing corporate institutionalisation, with subsidiaries relevantly 
independent of top management and their administrative relations in the form of 
contractual responsibilities. Governance in such large-size corporations is 
institutionalized and the power structure is controlled by a board of directors and 
supervisory board rather than by specific individuals. The underpinning problems for 
SOEs are retaining highly-skilled talents because of poor rewards rather than power 
structures. 
7.2.7 Skills 
The President of DSF with an MBA background and work experience in the 
United States has applied his management knowledge to business practice. In the 
interview, he demonstrated a full understanding of key management concepts and 
approaches. An advanced Western style of management is adopted in his company; 
for instance, `brand building' marketing communications as well as management 
pattern, structured as `marketing + design + manufacturing + outsourcing'. This 
pattern is used by Western brand-focused companies, as it prioritises the marketing 
and design functions as the main focus and regards manufacturing as the supply 
function to serve marketing and design needs. The outsourcing strategy is used in this 
pattern as supplementary to manufacturing in order to reduce production costs and 
maintain a focus on high value-added product management. `Chinese garment 
factories usually concentrate on labour intensified manufacturing work and low value 
added products. They lack marketing and branding knowledge to design a strategic 
management to build up high value added product, thereof they are unable to move up 
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to R&D based industry but cluster in the low technology and labour intensity 
industries. ' (CTIA, 2005/2006)282 
The General Manager with PhD qualification, together with a high capability in 
management, has enhanced the knowledge-based learning and teaching culture in 
DSF. As she explains, her role is more like a preacher and teacher to direct employees. 
They convert management concepts and theories into practice and test them in the 
Chinese market. This is the strength of this company. However, it is also the cause of 
problems in the management. As they inoculate ideas and theories in their employees, 
they expect them to implement these. Nevertheless they don't know precisely, 
themselves, what the processes should be between concept and results. Management 
concepts need to be converted into techniques before they can be applied to practices. 
It is the reason why the managers express their confusion in process management, and 
emphasise that they need more support from top management if they are to refine the 
procedures and processes in terms of how to meet their objectives. They are already 
aware of the problems in refining process management and one solution offered by 
the President and his managers is the implementation of an ERP (Enterprise Resource 
Planning) system. The IT software technology of ERP aims to maximise the use of all 
the resources in an organisation. These resources include: employees and their skills; 
the business processes, procedures and organisational structure; and IT systems which 
support the various business areas. ERP promises one database and one user interface 
across an entire multi-site enterprise. Taking information from every business area, 
ERP helps managers and employees plan, monitor and control the entire business. 
Improved control of resources means greater efficiency and effectiveness. ERP is a 
large investment for DSF, and at the time of the interviews, they were working on the 
selection, implementation and optimisation of software packages (e. g. BaaN, JBA, 
JDEdwards, Oracle, PeopleSoft, SAP, SSA), as these must be closely managed to 
deliver maximum benefits. The investment in ERP also places demands on skills 
training for staff; it is a challenging learning process for DSF in pursuit of technology 
innovation and management advancement. 
In this case, Sunfed is going through a learning process that utilises Western 
management approaches in its own conditions. The adoptive process is illustrated in 
figure 7.5. It is similar to Deming's PDCA circle (plan, do, check, act), but figure 7.5 
282 China Textile Industry Associate (CTIA) `China development report of Textile industry' 
(2005/2006), China Textile Press, Beijing, p52. 
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demonstrates in a more precise level how foreign joint-ventures train local managers 
to carry out advanced management concepts. 
Figure 7.5 Adoptive Processes for Management Theories in Enterprise Practices 
The expertise of key personnel are strengthened through constant learning and 
training. The brand design director, Helene Zhou, is the sole person responsible for 
brand personality in DSF. She is a graduate from a France fashion college in 1999 and 
had one year study of fashion design in Japan in 1992. Her style integrates Asian and 
European fashion and culture, appearing as elegant but also simple. She breaks 
through the cultural boundaries between countries to assimilate different elite 
elements into a fresh European style which meets Chinese consumers' preference in 
pursuit of quality life style. She has gained many awards in design, for instance, a 
silver medal in Taegu Fashion Festival 2000 in Korea and a gold medal of Most 
Fashionable Dress Brand' in China International Fashion Week 2002. In the interview. 
she emphasised the importance of training for staff and that style values need to be 
delivered to consumers through all the marketing staff. Brand management requires a 
high quality team which understands both high cultural connotations underpinning the 
brand as well as communications techniques in marketing. 
As she comments: "Brand building is customer-centred management. We need 
to follow up their changes in tastes and needs, so that our foreseen ability and 
creativity are important in brand building, as the creation of brand value is combined 
by rationality and art. Design with research & development is a total activity. The 
colour motif, material technology and craft of clothing are all dependent on market 
data and scientific research. We intend to create a high value-added brand through 
knowledge and science. Therefore we aim to build a high quality team to achieve this 
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goal through well-designed training programmes, as it is diflcult to get highly-skilled 
staff on the labour market in China. " 
The key staff in Marketing, Technology and the R&D centre in Shanghai form 
the core competence in DSF. Their expertise and abilities are enhanced by well- 
designed training and education while their creativity is encouraged by an open 
culture and leadership. Compared the other three case studies that put their focus on 
manufacturing and outsourcing with low-value added products, Sunfed has a much 
higher focus in strategic management and high value-added products. It is interesting 
that this foreign joint-venture has such a high profile while the other types of case 
study engage in different strategies with different management models. It reflects how 
this foreign joint venture operates on the basis of very different principles (derived 
from its US co-ownership) than the other three types of indigenous-owned case 
studies. 
7.3 Concluding Remarks: 
Foreign investment, as a salient constitution of the Chinese economy, plays an 
increasing role in market transformation. Foreign joint-ventures, as one form of 
business venture emerging from market socialism, demands the localization and 
adaption of foreign investment in China's changing marketplace. DSF, a typical 
indigenised foreign joint-venture, with expatriate-owned management, is 
characterised by competitive virtues and a visionary orientation positioned in the high 
value-added chain of the clothing industry with brand-focused marketing. This case 
study suggests that a knowledge-based product portfolio and a people-focused 
management system are the key factors of competitiveness that distinguish foreign 
joint-ventures from domestic enterprises. Building `home brands' is appealing for 
domestic enterprises, particularly in the clothing industry. But in the four case studies, 
the foreign joint-venture as the only case successfully developing brands for the 
Chinese market. By applying its `learning from the West' it has implemented such 
practices in the Chinese marketplace through intensive staff training. Its adhocratic 
and professional structure in combination with formal and informal management 
systems provide openness and flexibility to promote personal development. The 
constant dissemination of knowledge through integrated training programmes 
generate a learning orientation to stimulate self-renewal and encourage innovation and 
creativity. Retaining highly-skilled managers requires an organisation to establish an 
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environment encompassing relevant supportive systems and processes as a whole. 
Through this means, this foreign joint-venture is able to develop its core competences 
for its long-term investment strategies. 
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Some Conclusions: Emerging Forms of Business Venture 
in China 
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Chapter 8 Some conclusions: emerging forms of business venture in 
China 
Introduction 
The pace of economic change in China has been extremely rapid since the start 
of market reforms in the 1980s. Government policies have moved markedly towards 
allowing market forces to influence economic activity. These policy changes have 
permitted a much increased role for the private sector and foreign investment (OECD, 
2005)283. Overall, reforms have generated the emergence of four types of business 
venture under market socialism in China as `state-owned enterprises', 'collective- 
owned enterprises', `privately-owned enterprises' and `foreign joint-ventures'. This 
thesis has explored these emerging forms of business venture and analysed the 
distinctive characteristics of each of them under market socialism. The organisational 
factors, interacting with environmental and institutional changes of economic reforms, 
have been studied for their impact on re-shaping management models of business 
venture. Case studies on these four types of enterprise draw organisational profiles for 
each form of ownership, to not only examine how the property of ownership is likely 
to impact on shaping their distinctive characteristics, creating challenges and tensions 
in each type of venture, but also to draw some conclusions for future trends and policy 
recommendations. 
8.1 The four case studies: some contrasting differences 
Using the McKinsey 7-S framework, as used throughout this thesis, it is possible 
to identify the major differences between the case studies. 
8.1.1 StrateEv 
Even though the four cases operate in the same industry (textile and garment 
industry), their strategies significantly vary according to different type of ownership. 
The motivations that drive companies to develop, the means by which they expand 
and grow, and the mind-sets of those who built their operations are dissimilar due to 
293 OECD (2005), 'Economic Survey of China 2005: Policy Briefs', Economic Outlook No. 77, June 
2005. 
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diverse ownership. The development strategy of the state-owned enterprise is 
prominently influenced by state policies and political factors. Thus, its strategy 
expressly reflects Party policy and political direction to the extent it may not best suit 
the market needs and the business itself as long as it is responsive to political 
demands. The state-owned enterprise has the least market-oriented strategy, resulting 
in the highest tension created by political demands that are of the inconsistency with 
market demands. 
The state-owned enterprise - LTG - presented its corporate strategy in a very 
formal fashion, which officially documented its strategic objectives for both the short 
and the long term. Each stage of development is formulated for specific tasks. This 
forms a distinct contrast to the privately-owned enterprise, where an entrepreneur 
operates his small and flexible company with `no strategy' and `no paper rules'. No 
formal and explicit strategic planning is stated in this entrepreneurial company; the 
private owner determines the company's planning and strategy on an ad hoc basis 
according to how the market changes and what the customers require. Such informal 
strategy is never described in documents but only verbally explained by the owner in 
the direction of tasks for employees. Strategy can randomly change whenever the 
owner decides. The strategy in the privately-owned enterprise is fluid rather than 
fixed as in the state-owned enterprise, which demonstrates superior flexibility and 
freedom in planning and operation. The state-owned enterprise has utmost 
inflexibility and constraints in strategic change. 
Due to the tension between political needs and market demands in the state- 
owned enterprise - LTG - conflicts existed in both the operational and corporate 
levels. The corporate level strategy is a reflection of the state reform objectives, which 
are politically driven in line with the Party's expectation and ideas of economic 
development. For instance, the five-guidelines for strategy planning of LTG 
incorporate all the government policies for the reform of state-owned enterprises. 
These guidelines sometimes are in contradiction with the actual situation of the 
market in which the enterprise operates. For example, the guideline stipulating a 
priority to export and import trading, whereas there is the market demand for own 
branding. The guideline desiring the establishment of a joint-venture with a foreign 
company form strategic alliance is unlikely due to both ownership constraints and 
political sensitivity. Because the strategic planning of LTG is not fully decided by its 
own senior management but mostly driven by the administration agency, AICSA, 
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political direction is thus reinforced. Specially, strategic planning cannot be constantly 
adjusted in good time when the market situation changes. Such strategic change in 
state-owned enterprise requires a long bureaucratic process of approval from AICSA. 
Lack of flexibility and the absence of entrepreneurship is an evident disadvantage in 
state-owned enterprise compared to the other types of enterprises that can adapt 
quickly to changing market demands. Administration and bureaucratic processes 
significantly affect the management pattern of this state-owned enterprise, as the main 
influencing factor, distinguishing the state-owned enterprise from the other types of 
enterprises that operate in the same market. 
Compared with the state-owned enterprise, the collective-owned enterprise - 
SLAC - has a more market-driven strategy and the flexibility to adopt to market 
changes due to less government intervention and non-centralised administration. 
Especially, the reforms bring into being private ownership and involvement in the 
collective-owned enterprise, shaping the management pattern in the form of the 
coexistence of both private owners and collective-owned assets. Collective ownership 
has gradually shifted from the state sector to the private sector alongside with the 
progress of economic reforms in China. (Li et al, 2004; Chao, 1998; Shirley, 1999; 
Chiu, 2006; Wen, 2004)284 By 2005, collective-owned enterprises only accounted for 
4% of investment in fixed assets in urban areas, compared to 65% for state-owned 
enterprises, 17% for privately-owned enterprises and 14% for foreign-investment 
enterprises. 
285 The case study of SLAC is a typical example to demonstrate such 
transition in process. Due to the involvement of private ownership, the strategy in 
SLAC is practical and acclimatized to environment changes, and driven solely by 
market needs and owners' interests. The main success of SLAC has resulted from 
overseas orders, manufacturing foreign-branded goods for processing fees. This 
demands the expansion of manufacturing facilities and the augmentation of 
284 Li, Shao-min; Ilan, V. and Zhou, Dong-sheng (2004), `The emergence of private ownership in 
China', Journal of Business Research, 57 (10), Oct2004, pp. 1145-1152. 
Chao, J. (1998), ̀ Factors affecting the competitiveness of China-based companies', Competitive 
Intelligence Review, 9 (3), Jul-Sep 1998, p39. 
Shirley, M. (1999), 'Bureaucrats in Business: the role of privatization versus corporatization in state- 
owned enterprise', World Development, 27 (1), Jan 1999, p 115. 
Chiu, C. (2006), ̀ Changing experience of work in reformed state-owned enterprises in China', 
Organisation Studies, 27 (5), 2006, pp. 677-697. 
Wen, Wei (2004), ̀ Bankruptcy, sale and mergers as a route to the reform of Chinese SOEs', China 
Economic Review, 15 (3), Sep2004, p249-267. 
285 China Statistic Year Book 2006, compiled by National Bureau of Statistics of China, China 
Statistics Press, Beijing, p207. (The percentage for different ownership is calculated by the author 
according to the data in statistic year book. ) 
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productive capacity in order to gain lucrative returns from quantity and quality. The 
limitation of mixed private and collective ownership is the contradiction in 
stakeholders' interests leading to myopia of strategy with a focus on short-term profit 
return, rigid cost control and low value added mass production. It is in 
contradistinction to the foreign joint venture - DSF, which operates a western 
approach to high value-added branded goods with a deep understanding of strategic 
approaches to brand marketing. The foreign joint venture demonstrates high vision of 
strategy for long term planning with management flexibility and knowledge 
advancement, responding not only to domestic market needs but also to international 
market standards. 
In the field of branded clothing, foreign companies have many advantages 
because of their expertise, advanced knowledge and long history. Comparatively, 
indigenous firms are weak in brand building; foreign-invested firms are pone to place 
brands at the heart of marketing and business strategy. Given the advanced knowledge 
about brand management, DSF has placed the objective of developing brand equity as 
the core of the company's strategic management and regarded it as a key determinant 
of corporate values. However, investments in brand building activities do not have an 
immediate pay-off. Without an understanding its future potential value and with no 
long term vision of strategic development, many of today's Chinese companies are 
unwilling to invest in building product brands. Their reluctance is mainly due to little 
knowledge of know-how to brand building as well as lack of long term vision. They 
tend to be tempted and pressured by short-term profit return. DSF's brand strategy 
shows a long-term focus that increases its market competitiveness. In relation to 
ownership, the foreign joint-venture has the distinctive advantage in advanced 
management approaches due to direct investment and learning from the West. The 
foreign joint-venture is a form of indigenization that overcomes the shortcomings of 
foreigners or expatriates directly involved in management but utilises the value of 
foreign capital resources. This type of localised foreign venture is dependent upon a 
high degree of trust and tight legal contracts. It is a result of market reforms and 
adaptation to the regulatory environment. Compared to state-owned enterprises, 
collective-owned enterprises and privately-owned enterprises, foreign joint-ventures 
are the only ones positioning themselves at the top of value-added production in the 
clothing industry. Foreign capital is the wherewithal for the adoption of such a 
strategy as brand building requires constant and extensive investment for a long 
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period without immediate payoff. Financial pressure is often the ruthless reason for 
killing such a strategy as such investments do not have visible returns in short-term 
sales and profits. Faced with such elusive, long-term and intangible benefits, it is not 
surprising that companies and managers always drop this strategy in planning. This is 
the prevalent situation in China, with a deficiency of capital to fund growth in 
privately-owned enterprises. Even state-owned enterprises, with privileged access to 
financial sources, are usually driven by short-term profit returns due to performance 
assessment mechanisms used for managers that emphasise immediate profits. The 
foreign joint-venture shows its competitive advantage in creating high value added 
products through its strengths in capital, technology and advanced western 
management techniques. 
In general, of the four types of enterprises in our case studies, both the collective- 
owned enterprise and the privately-owned enterprise hold an aggressive strategy in 
expansion and growth, which benefits from the entrepreneurial vision of their private 
owners as well as the market survival needs. By comparison with the foreign joint- 
venture, they are limited by scarcity of knowledge, technology and professional teams 
to carry out their entrepreneurial vision. Collective-owned and privately-owned 
enterprises still have much to learn in order to further develop their competitiveness 
and capability. Being restricted by the property of ownership, the state-owned 
enterprise is inevitably intervened by the state administration and governance, 
resulting in the most conservative strategy for growth and brand building as it 
involves long term investment without instant profit return. This goes against its 
performance evaluation mechanism stipulated by the government, in spite of having 
the easiest access to finance resources. 
8.1.2 Structure 
Structure varies according to the size of enterprise, nature of work and the 
philosophy of management; it provides the framework of an organisation and its 
pattern of management and it makes possible the application of management 
processes that creates a framework of order and command through which the 
activities of the organisation can be planned, organised, directed and controlled. 
(Child, 1984; Birkinshaw, 2001; Mullins 2005)286 Our case study reveals that the 
286 Child, J. (1984), A guide to problem and practice, Harper & Row, London. 
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pattern of structure is also determined by the type of ownership and is consistent with 
its strategy, system and culture. It reflects the way of owner's control. The state- 
owned LTG is a typical divisionalised structure with centralised government 
administration, authority and bureaucracy. The entrepreneurial firm - Dali - has the 
most flexible and fluid structure designed as owner-centred management. The foreign 
joint-venture - DSF - is characterised by a market-focused structure to meet its brand 
strategy, characterised by operational flexibility. Such a relatively "open" structure 
facilitates personal development embedded with a high level of concern to promote 
intraprenuership. It presents a striking contrast with the foreign joint-venture (DSF) 
and collective-owned enterprise (SLAG) in terms of their employee development and 
management philosophy. 
SLAC has a `barbell' structure, a split weight emphasis in two functions of the 
organisation; one on marketing & trading and the other on manufacturing. Such 
`barbell' structure reflects separate entrenchments of dual-type of ownership - private 
owners and collective ownership. This collective-owned enterprise is the offspring of 
the primary socialism that has evolved into such a hybrid pattern with diversified 
ownership structure under later market socialism. Flexibility of management is 
showed at one end (top management) but extremely constrained at the other 
(production base). Centralised authority and linear relationships are structured from 
the top to the bottom to meet standardisation and cost control purposes. SLAC has 
adapted a management model similar to the Scientific Management approach in its 
manufacturing function, which emphasises a tight system of control over workers and 
optimising the level of workers' productivity on `piece-rate work' (Taylor, 1947). 87 
For example, the system of "overall control everyday evaluation" is applied in daily 
management in SLAC. Based on the results of daily evaluation, control is placed 
tightly over unit production and overall performance. Defects in quality and decline in 
quantity can be discovered promptly, so that remedies can be applied to prevent the 
spread of faults. Through this system, day-based production maximisation and 
improvement can be achieved. According to Braverman (1974) 288 , scientific 
management starts from the capitalist point of view and method of production, and the 
Birkinshaw, J. (2001), ̀ The structure behind global companies' in Pickford, J. (ed. ), Financial Times 
Mastering Management, Financial Times Prentice Hall (2001), p75. 
Mullins, J. L. (2005), Management and organizational behaviour, 7d' ed. FT Prentice Hall, England. 
287 Taylor, F. W. (1947), Scientific management, Harper and Row, USA. 
288 Baverman, H. (1974), Labour and Monoply Capital, Monthly Review Press, UK. 
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adaptation of labour to the needs of capital. A distinctive feature of Taylor's thought 
was the concept of management control. In the case of SLAC, personal centralised 
control, bureaucratic control and output control are combined in the management 
process. Workers in SLAC are controlled not only by orders and maintenance of 
discipline, but also by removing them from any decisions about the manner in which 
their work is to be carried out. Gospel and Littler (1983)289 suggest that by division of 
labour, and by dictating precise stages and methods for every aspect of work 
performance, management can gain control of the actual process of work. The 
rationalisation of production processes and division of labour tends to result in the de- 
skilling of work and this may be a main strategy of the employer. 
Compared to three types of ownership - COE, POE and FJV - in our case studies, 
the structure and systems of the state-owned enterprise are the most sophisticated 
form of formally institutionalized bureaucracy. Strategic decision-making in such 
systems tends to be affected by upper authority rather than by market demands. 
Despite management autonomy, middle management is tightly controlled through a 
culture that reflects the continuing dominance of the party and centralised state 
ownership. Consequently, conventional Communist Party thinking on the planned 
economy retains a strong impact upon the ideology and behaviour of employees in 
LTG. 
Structure in Dali is almost non-existent, providing an extreme contrast to the 
state-owned enterprise. There are not even documents for HR policies, management 
procedures, or company regulations. Basically it is NOT a structure but a pattern of 
dependency upon the private owner. The proprietor is very much at the centre of the 
management web. Informality and high flexibility are the major characteristics of the 
Dali entrepreneurial company. 
8.1.3 Systems 
To be compatible with their different structures, applied systems vary in each 
form of business venture. The privately-owned enterprise presents the most fluid and 
informal systems in communication and management. The foreign joint-venture 
places an open and knowledge-based mechanism with an emphasis on personal 
development and intraprenuership. State ownership requires formal and 
299 Gospel, H. F. and Littler, C. R. (1983), Managerial Strategies and Industrial Relations, (eds). 
Heinemann Educational Books, London. 
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institutionalised systems for its divisionalised large-scale organisation. Collective 
ownership, in merger with private ownership, shapes standardised systems with 
centralised communication processes and authority to meet its objectives of cost 
control and a scrutiny of direct supervision on mass production. However, the 
collective-owned SLAC demonstrates the highest conflicts in diversified owners' 
interests which lead to great tension in their systems and de-motivates employees. 
Entrenchment and defence of dual-forms of ownership in such a coexistence situation 
can cause conflicts to evolve and for there to be silent resistance to each interest group 
of employees. This gives birth to an outcome of a `barbell' communication system, 
with two ends operating relatively independently with limited interactive 
communication in between and merely through finance and planning control. 
Hierarchy and impersonal rules are built into this `barbell' structure to maintain the 
routine management and legal connection between stakeholders. 
In SLAC, authority is emphasized in the company and unquestionable command 
is often the way of communication by management staff. Compliant followers are 
appreciated and challenges against authority are eliminated. The systems of SLAC 
show some common characteristics of machine bureaucracy. It has very formalized 
procedures in the operating level and a proliferation of rules, regulations throughout 
the organisation. It totally relies on employees complying and obeying as the core of 
the system. Decision-making is prone to follow the formal chain of authority in this 
collective-owned enterprise so that the interests of the private owner and the interests 
of collective individuals can be clarified according to their respectively owned share 
division. The control of the private owner considerably ramps up while the 
representatives of collective ownership intended to entrench their control over 
collective assets and retain their management independence is declining. 
Institutionalisation and formalization of systems is the main feature for the large- 
scale state-owned enterprise. For instance, LTG is the only case study company that 
has passed the requirement of QMS and successfully implemented such 
internationally standardised quality-control systems. None of the other three types of 
companies have implemented such formal standardization of their quality control 
systems due to the cost of this system and scale of production. Such implementation 
of QMS is a compulsory command of the State Administration. QMS fits the demand 
of institutionalisation and the corporatization of state-owned enterprises. Moreover, 
the strong state financial background of LTG gives it the possibility to adopt QMS. 
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In distinct contrast, in the privately-owned enterprise, with a minimal skeleton of 
structure, the systems of direct control are informal and highly flexible. The proprietor 
is the centre of decision-making and has direct and total control over every procedure. 
Hierarchy is low in this system and the proprietor is the sole authority for all working 
procedures. Although it gives flexibility to management, it also suffers from chaos 
and muddle when the task becomes more complicated and when the company 
expands quickly. Particularly the owner in the centre is likely to be saturated with too 
much information and this results in exhaustion and incapability of exercising total 
control. It is evident in the case study of Dali that formalised structure and systems are 
required for systematically planning and organising business activities when size of 
company grows to be over 200 employees. 
Nonetheless, by comparison, the foreign joint-venture (DSF), has combined 
systems in both formal and informal format. It has an open and knowledge-based 
mechanism in management structure which promotes personal development and 
employees' creativity and innovation. DSF emphasises formal rules for control of 
implementation processes and procedures while it gives autonomy to the staff for 
creativity. A knowledge-based learning system is highly promoted and implemented 
in the organisation acting as the incubator for innovation and intraprenuership. 
Constant knowledge education and leaning becomes incumbent upon the employee 
in DSF rather than only necessary. Tension in DSF is created between the demand of 
creativity and the capabilities of employees. Although more intense education and 
training is designed to enhance skills of employees, however, their capacity to digest 
such knowledge is still in question. Constant renewal to retain its competitiveness is 
the major challenge for DSF as it positions itself at the cutting edge of knowledge and 
in the high value-added chain of the clothing industry. 
8.1.4 Staff 
By contrast to the collective-owned enterprise, the privately-owned enterprise 
and the foreign joint venture, life security and employee benefits are well embodied in 
the state-owned enterprise. Extra hours at work are paid at a fair rate, annual 
increments in salary and all round welfare is legitimated and guaranteed for the staff 
in line with the Labour Law. The state-owned enterprise also offers more benefits, 
such as stock options, housing and bonuses, to his key personnel. This is in dramatic 
contrast with the insecurity of employee benefits and welfare in the privately-owned 
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enterprise and the collective-owned enterprise, where only minimal levels are 
promised. Employees' rights are ignored in these companies. In the privately-owned 
company, the owner utilises financial rewarding as the control tool in an informal and 
verbal approach to gain employee's commitment and motivation and to create 
employee's dependency upon his power. It is used at a minimum level whenever the 
owner feels necessary to do so. There is no formal guarantee and legitimate security 
for long term employee's benefits and welfare. The worst of our case studies in this 
aspect is the collective-owned enterprise; breach of Labour Law is frequent, and 
employees work during weekends for long hours without extra pay. The staff policy 
and training in this collectively-owned enterprise merely emphasises production skills 
and market ideas with an ignorance of individual needs. Although the enterprise 
demands change, innovation and creativity, some training courses are therefore 
designed to develop this culture. Nevertheless, such demands often conflict with 
existing systems and structure as staff are de-motivated to participate in such training 
because of low rewards. 
Comparatively, the foreign joint-venture provides all legally required welfare 
and benefits to the staff with formal but short-term contracts. Furthermore, benefits 
are presented in DSF to attract employees. There is also personal development 
scheme, offering opportunity and training for ambitious individuals. These distinctive 
elements - open minded and high vision, cutting-edge knowledge, opportunities for 
personal actualization - are well merged in the staff development system in DSF. The 
"soft" means of rewards reflect human relations concerns in DSF, such as good 
working conditions with personal laptops, company cars, and compensation for travel, 
opportunity to study abroad and promotion, etc., which fulfil an important function in 
motivating staff and developing personal potential. The education level of key 
personnel in this foreign joint-venture is higher than in the other three case study 
companies. Higher education qualifications are an essential requirement for key staff 
in DSF as their knowledge is regarded essential for brand building and the company's 
long term development. The US partner emphasises the importance of this. Training 
programmes are essential parts of staff development planning. Written formal 
assessments of recruits aim to identify the specific areas that require training. Tailored 
training courses are thus designed to meet this need. The design of training in DSF 
shows that the constant education of employees is focused on their understanding of 
management knowledge, underpinning the company's brand. Due to the owners' U. S. 
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background and their direct adoption of western management practices, the strategic 
vision of the company is based on high value-added product development with rich 
culture connation, which requires a knowledge-based staff team. Therefore, constant 
training including off and on-the-job, aims to close the gap between advance 
management practices and low skilled local managers. Employees are well treated at 
DSF in comparison with those in the COE and POE case studies; particularly by 
contrast to the COE that is ruthless to its employees. This is another example of the 
influence of US ownership participation. The interviews in DSF suggested that 
motivation among interviewees is much higher than in the other three case companies. 
In contrast with the foreign joint-venture, the state-owned enterprise is 
disadvantaged and challenged in its personnel management, particularly in the ways it 
recruits staff. The influence of personal relations culture is more powerful in the state- 
owned enterprise than in the other types of ownership, `overriding market demands 
and rules'. Such differences between the state-owned enterprise case and the other 
types of enterprise reveal that political power and hierarchical political authority are 
much greater in state-owned corporations. It forms underpinning cultural norms that 
direct and guide management behaviours. This common reality shapes the style of 
management in the state-owned enterprise and destroys ambitions and entrepreneurial 
willingness among employees. It also restricts innovation and entrepreneurial 
development and explains why staff motivation is low in state-owned enterprise. 
Moreover, the reward system is mainly dependent on the bonus system; the 
government authorities and managers are driven by profit objectives. These might 
improve immediate performance in profitability but does not take into account risks in 
long term investment. Future prospects for the development of state-owned enterprise 
are more related to political demands than market opportunities. 
8.1.5 
How key managers behave in achieving the organization's goals as well as 
managing their employees form different patterns of actions. The management 
philosophy underpinning and directing key managers' behaviour is decisive and 
interactive with other organisational factors, such as structure, systems, culture and 
environment etc. The style of managerial behaviour in the four types of business 
venture reflects different patterns according to diverse ownership. The decisive 
patterns of actions will reflect the major stakeholders. This varies depending to how 
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much influence the leaders or senior managers can impact upon management. For 
instance, top and middle management all play an influencing role in the state-owned 
enterprise due to its divisionalised structure and decentralised management autonomy 
in subsidiary business units. On the contrary, the owner entrepreneur in the privately- 
owned enterprise accounts for management style as it is an owner-centred 
management. Likewise, the foreign joint-venture presents its style through top 
management with foreign culture involvement. Western education, life experience in 
living in America and US partnership, has formed influencing factors to shape 
management style of managers in DSF. However, the leadership situation in the 
collective-owned enterprise is in dual forms presenting by both collective-owned 
managers and private entrepreneurs. Their management styles embody dialectic 
ramifications of two conflicting interest groups, such as `autocratic style vs. 
democratic style'; `individualistic values vs. collectivistic values' and `capitalist 
mentality vs. socialist mentality'. 
The style of state administration and its ideas shape the management practice of 
the state-owned enterprise, whereas the other types of enterprises respectively reflect 
their owners' interests. Leadership in relation to ownership function is vital in shaping 
management structures, as it is crucial to direct enterprises for either success or failure. 
The major difference between the leadership in the state-owned enterprise and other 
types is that the leaders in the state-owned enterprise do not represent independent 
individuals but the embodiment of the party and government as a whole. In practice if 
not in profession, they cannot make decisions on their own volition, but must keep 
consistency with political direction and principles. This is in contrast with the leaders 
of the privately-owned enterprise and foreign joint-venture in which individuals freely 
represent their ideas, identity and style. Leadership styles vary to a large extent 
according to ownership. For example, in line with Maslows's need hierarchy 
(1987)290, the foreign joint-venture demonstrates a delegating leadership style, 
providing both high supportive behaviour and guidance so that their employees are 
expected to carry out tasks by themselves. The managers work for their own interests, 
achievement and advancement. An open culture and delegation of management give 
the highest motivators to the employees in DSF. Likewise the owner of the privately. 
owned enterprise has a participating and consultative style, providing a high degree of 
290 Maslow, A. H. (1987), Motivation and Personality, 3'd ed. Harper and Row, London. 
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supportive behaviour and developing a close interdependent relationship with his 
employees, but giving relatively low guidance for how to do so in detail as they are 
expected to take certain level of independence for their own work despite final 
decision needing to pass to the owner. The owner entrepreneur works for himself as a 
self-motivated leader, but his followers do not have the same high motivators due to 
unstable and lower rewards in the small entrepreneurial firm. The lowest motivation is 
for those managers who work for the collective-owned business venture for a 
minimum level of physiological needs. The employees are told what to do and high 
degree of guiding rules is applied to standardize their work. Rigid cost control is the 
locus of the management which results in depressed working conditions and 
impersonal rules. Little personal development and individual needs are considered in 
this collective-owned enterprise. 
Comparatively, the state-owned enterprise presents a "selling" style of leadership, 
providing both high level of supportive behaviour and specialised guidance for 
administrative control and governance (Hersey et al, 2001). 291 Good working 
conditions, life security, high standard welfare and bonus rewards meets the 
satisfaction of employees' needs at levels like physiological, safety, and social; but it 
lacks employees' satisfaction for self-actualisation. This is mainly caused by absence 
of opportunities for personal creativity and inflexibility for entrepreneurship or 
intraprenuership, engendering tensions and hindering management development. The 
style of the state-owned LTG reflects the contrasting approaches of "state-planning" 
and "market-orientation" that will become sources of greater internal inconsistency as 
further market reforms are introduced within state-owned enterprises. State-owned 
enterprise reforms have long been restricted by socialist ideology. Because state 
ownership is directly linked to the state administration and the Communist Party's 
political systems, economic reforms need to be compatible with existing political 
systems; i. e. socialist ideals. In order to secure such concordance, key managers are 
mainly selected from the military and constant education of socialist ideas is enforced 
among top managers. This strong political and socialist culture significantly 
distinguishes state-owned enterprises from the other three types of ownership 
enterprises. However, free market competition requires effective management with 
291 Hersey, P., Blanchard, K. H. and Johnson, D. E. (2001) Management of organizational behaviour: 
leading human resources, 8t' ed. Prentice Hall, New Jersey. 
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`market ideals' other than `socialist ideals'. This is the essential contradiction within 
state-owned enterprises. 
The management style in the collective-owned enterprise is coercive. It 
combines the dictatorship exploitation of the private owner, and the bureaucracy and 
dogmas of state management. It makes the worst case in terms of employee working 
conditions and treatment in comparison with the other three types of case study 
ownership. As such it has none of the positive features of state management (e. g. 
employee welfare and equality) nor the ethics and flexibility of entrepreneurial 
management. Instead, it emphasises dictatorship, authority and bureaucracy to meet 
its rigid purposes of cost control and standardized efficiency. Capital accumulation 
through ruthless cost minimisation is most strongly demonstrated in this form of 
business venture. It is evidenced in this case study of collective-owned enterprise that 
private ownership and collective ownership in a joint form gives rise to capitalist 
exploitation and ignorance of business ethics. The success of this merger is based on 
communal benefits and compensation of the needs for both parties; collective 
ownership desires getting orders to keep employees' survival and the private owner 
requires a manufacturing base to reduce cost and quality control. The land and capital 
are two essential production factors that private owners lack in China; on the contrary, 
it is the granting advantage that collective-owned enterprises in the state sector 
possess. However, the case study of this business venture shows that the private 
owners are prone to encroach upon collective property and to gain power for control. 
This gives birth to increasing tensions and disputes in management. Seeking 
opportunities for growth is the aim of the private owner, while survival in the market 
is how the collectively-owned enterprise exists because of its lack of market 
networking and incentives. The private owner regards the collective assets as 
resources to be exploited and usurped. Therefore, direct control and bureaucracy are 
often resisted by the private owner while intervention of state governance is 
frequently involved to protect the collective interests. Implicit or explicit hostility has 
emerged between the private owner and the representatives of collective ownership. 
The private owner is reluctant to hand in profits to the local authorities but attempts to 
use it for further expansion. Privatisation as an inevitable trend of reforms is an echo 
surrounding China. Implicitly, the opportunity to buy out collective ownerships at a 
good price could be possible in the near future, which leaves the temptation to the 
private owner to plan for such a possibility. This joint venture generates unsolvable 
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conflicts such as - `speculation over collective production resources'; ̀ ambiguity in 
ownership property'; and `hostility between diversified owners'. The only solution 
seems to be either sole private-ownership or full state-controlled ownership. 
The owner entrepreneur is the determining factor for the success of Dali 
company. His explicit leadership style with charisma is to influence people by heart 
and affection, not by rules. This informal leadership is built on top of his unassailable 
authority. He demonstrates a hybrid leadership style in his management. Besides his 
authoritarian nature for control of his own business, his leadership is a mixture of 
supportive, participative and achievement-oriented approaches. This owner actively 
participates in all activities and decision-makings in this business. He prefers to share 
ideas and consult with his managers before final decisions are made. He expects his 
employees to take independence for task implementation. However, his employees' 
readiness sometimes seems to be lower than what he expects. Insecurity and low 
rewards may also affect commitment and motivation of his employees. 
Leadership in the foreign joint-venture - DSF - is dichotomous. The president 
and general manager respectively represents a different preference to management 
style; one is democratic and consultative style and the other plays an authoritative and 
directive role. They form a strategic combination as both styles are needed in such an 
open system. DSF provides opportunities for personal development and promotes a 
learning culture throughout the whole system. Delegation is often authorised to the 
middle management and managers are expected to make their own decisions and 
determine implementing procedures to achieve their final objectives. Leadership in 
this American-Chinese joint venture seems to demonstrate a similar style - high 
profile, open culture, high management autonomy. DSF emphasises end-results from 
the middle managers while excellent achievements are expected by the top 
management as the company aims to develop high profile performance. There are 
great opportunities to develop personal potential, but the company also challenges the 
capabilities of managers who take these responsibilities. 
8.1.6 Shared values 
The guiding concepts, values and beliefs underpinning each type of business 
venture are in significant contrast. Such dissimilarity seems to be a corollary of 
different types of ownership as the orientation and interests of ownership property 
vary. The foreign joint-venture adopts more western cultural values with its 
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absorption of western management philosophy and knowledge. It explains why the 
foreign joint-venture leads the cutting edge of brand development. The privately- 
owned enterprise is a pure entrepreneurial driven business with intrinsic motivation, a 
total market-orientation as the guiding belief, thus it has a fluid, flexible, loose and 
owner-dependent management structure. The owner's philosophy and behaviour 
determines the organisational processes and cultural norms. To the extreme extent the 
state-owned enterprise is significantly influenced by the state administrative norms 
and political bureaucracy culture, which creates a dramatic difference with the other 
three types of business venture. The collective-owned enterprise as a drawback from 
the state sector is mixed with both values of belief - collective and individual - as 
well as capitalist and socialist. Its hybrid values and culture generate conflicts and 
tensions in management which result in the lowest motivation and least commitment 
from its staff. The management of SLAC emphasises cost minimization and quality 
control, giving little attention to individual needs and business ethics. The private 
owners do not take the collective employees as their responsibility to treat well. The 
conflicts in diversified ownership form engenders a pitiless and ruthless management 
style in collective-owned enterprise. It represents `moral failure' and `personal 
failure'. Bums (2005) 292 distinguishes between three types of failure in the 
entrepreneurial organisation: ̀ moral failure' which occurs when there is a breach of 
ethics or moral standards; `personal failure' which relates to inadequate skills, 
knowledge or understanding; and `uncontrollable failure' which happens because of 
events or conditions out of the control of the individual. Whilst `moral failure' should 
not be tolerated, personal failure can be addressed through training, development and 
counselling. Uncontrollable failure is bound to happen in an entrepreneurial 
organisation and valuable learning can take place as a result of it. SLAC is not 
regarded as an entrepreneurial organisation but a hybrid model mixing with 
administrative and entrepreneurial features. Its moral failure can be seen not only as a 
result of ownership conflicts but also as the negative impact of market change. 
Shenyang, as a large industrial city, has been suffering from high unemployment and 
the bankruptcy of state-owned enterprises since reforms in the state sector since the 
late 1990s. Large number of redundancies from state-owned enterprises has 
292 Burns, P. (2005), Corporate Entrepreneurship: building an entrepreneurial organisation, Palgrave 
Macmillan, New York, p117-118. 
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oversupplied the labour market which has given no bargaining power to low skilled 
labour. 
In SLAC, values, beliefs and organisational culture are complex among both 
owners and employees. The training programmes are designed to meet the purpose of 
cost minimization and quality control with little concern about personal development 
of staff. As a collective-owned enterprises, the local government agency intervenes at 
a moderate level. For instance, regular reports from the general manager are required 
for the inspection of collective-owned assets but it leaves independence to 
management for strategic planning of SLAC. The local government only involves in 
decision making when it is concerned with collective assets and key personnel. 
However, collective employees have to take party education on a regular basis when 
there are new policies. This is similar to the state-owned enterprise, but not as 
intensive. This also distinguishes the collective-owned enterprise from the purely 
entrepreneurial firm such as the privately-owned enterprise and foreign joint-venture 
which have no Party policy training in their management schemes. In the case of 
SLAC, conflicts in values and changes in culture are inevitably taking place in the 
transition to market socialism. It reflects the outcome of ownership diversification and 
illustrates one scenario of mixed ownership experiments in the socialist market. 
Nevertheless, it forms the most complex case comprising of mixed values and styles, 
and particularly reflects the diversified interests of shareholders and hostile attitudes 
in management control, when compared to the other three types of enterprise 
ownership. Although the culture in SLAC is mixed with both socialist and capitalist 
values, as market reforms deepen, the capitalism values are becoming dominant in 
driving the enterprise. Two total different types of ideology are in irremediable 
contradiction in this business venture. The clarification of ownership property would 
possibly change the orientation of management. However, uncertainty in legislation 
on private ownership gives rise to myopia in marketing and planning. Short-term 
profit return thus becomes the locus for many Chinese domestic enterprises. 
Collective-owned enterprises take advantage of low cost labour intensity following 
the status quo of market reforms but they can become vulnerable in the low value 
added industry chain as many external factors will have impact upon their profitability. 
The further openness of international markets is a double-edge sword to this type of 
enterprise. On the one hand, it means more overseas orders in quantity for better profit 
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return; on the other hand, it also means more competition and higher international 
standards which will challenge their low cost advantage. As Porter (1980)293 suggests: 
"Cost leadership can impose severe burdens on the firm to keep up its position, 
which means to reinvesting in modern equipment, ruthlessly scrapping obsolete assets, 
avoiding product line proliferation and being alert for technological improvements. It 
is relying on scale or experience as entry barriers. However, technological change 
can nullify past investments or learning; low-cost learning by industry new comers or 
followers, through imitation or through their ability to invest in state-of-the-art 
facilities; inflation in costs that narrow the firm's ability to maintain enough of a 
price differential. " 
SLAC has achieved cost advantage through large volume orders and cost 
minimisation on labour, manufacturing facilities and land. This strategy gives SLAC a 
short term sustainable competitiveness in price. In the long run, it is very susceptible 
to lose its competitive advantage and engage in a price war, which it will struggle 
either on the margin of survival or shakeout of competition (Johnson and Scholes, 
2002)294. 
The key spiritual values that drive the state-owned enterprise, at the management 
level in particular, are `Loyalty and Consistency' with the Communist Party, the 
central authority. It is an inviolable principle and a prerequisite above the business 
orientation of LTG. Without this premise, everything is meaningless and irrespective. 
party meetings are held routinely and are as many as business operation meetings. Ad 
hoc activities assigned from the Central Committee of the Communist Party reinforce 
the education of `Loyalty and Consistency' on a frequent basis and they constitute a 
core part of LTG's enterprise activities. This special character predominantly 
distinguishes the state-owned enterprise from the other three types of business venture. 
Such driving belief is decisive to how managers prioritise their time and work; it also 
unravels an important reason why the state-owned enterprise is slow to react to 
market changes. Such constantly imposed Party education moulds employees' values 
and this inevitably has an impact on management philosophies and behaviours. The 
top managers seek for infallible performance and short term returns other than long 
term investment. Such management philosophy is deeply embedded in both state 
293 Porter, M. E. (1980), Competitive Strategy: techniques for analyzing industries and competitors, 
The Free Press, New York, p45. 
29" Johnson, G. and Scholes, K. (2002), Exploring Corporate Strategy, 6s' ed. FT Prentice Hall, 
England, p320-322. 
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administration mechanism and performance assessment systems. It is not surprising 
that prudent and myopic behaviour are in favour of managers in state-owned 
enterprise. Too many constraints and intervention from the state administration gives 
little versatility to the operation and practice of state-owned enterprises. It further 
explains the style of management in LTG. Bearing in mind market values that require 
entrepreneurship and risk, there is an inevitable conflict of cultures within the 
enterprise as a whole. Take the recruitment system as an example; the state-owned 
enterprise has no choice but to opt for a closed-internal allocation of recruitment 
because of its deeply embedded political hierarchy culture. Anyone who would like to 
survive in the state-owned enterprise must make a compromise in matters of political 
needs. Such an inexorable underpinning culture and values will inevitably confine 
further reforms on market-driven management. Although reshuffle reforms instantly 
ameliorate the status quo of state-owned enterprise, it is likely to encounter a plateau 
afterwards. 
The management philosophies of the owner entrepreneur in Dali, the privately- 
owned enterprise, focus on the importance of family culture and showing democracy, 
consideration and respect to all employees. The work climate is friendly and 
harmonious with little hierarchy, making employees feel psychologically comfortable. 
The owner entrepreneur tries to share the attitudes of his employees by educating 
them to have the right values so they cooperate and comply with his direction and 
decisions. The proprietor is the centre of a power culture and imposes total control 
throughout the whole organisation. This is similar to how Handy (1993) 295 describes 
a power culture. 
"It depends on a central power source with rays of influence form the central 
figure throughout the organisation. Control is exercised from centre by the selection 
of key individuals. There are few rules and procedures, and little bureaucracy. " 
But also the business prides itself on having a strong learning culture. This is 
strongly promoted in the company by the owner entrepreneur. Peter Senge (1999)2% 
even observes that learning organisations can only be built by leaders with fire and 
passion. Timmons (1999) 
297 says successful entrepreneurs are `patient leaders, 
2" Handy, C. B. (1993), Understanding Organisation, 4s' Ed., Penguim, London. P23. 
2" Senge, P. (1999), ̀ It's the learning: the real lesson of the quality movement', Journal for Quality & 
participation, 22 (6), Nov/Dec 1999, pp. 34-40. 
297 Timmons, J. A. (1999), New Venture Creation: Entrepreneurship for the 21P' century, 
Irwin/McGraw-Hill, Singapore. 
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capable of instilling tangible visions and managing for the long haul. The 
entrepreneur is at once a learner and a teacher, a doer and a visionary. ' Being a learner 
and a teacher are two of the prime tasks for a leader in a learning organisation (Burns, 
2005). 298 The owner of the Dali entrepreneurial firm frequently arranges field-visits to 
advanced companies nationwide and actively joins industry associations, in order to 
find ideas for continuous improvement. His approach is more pragmatic and direct 
perception can be reached compared to the traditional training courses. He constantly 
educates his employees and stresses the importance of learning and improving their 
working practices. Such a learning culture has led to innovations in the quality control 
system and marketing. Burgoyne (1995)299 says that a learning organisation facilitates 
the learning of all its members and continuously transforms itself. Garratt (1994)300 
views learning organisations as essentially liberating and energising and as crucial for 
organisational survival and growth. 
In like manner, the organizational culture in the foreign joint-venture (DSF) is 
constructed as distinctive learning and knowledge-based; it is keen on renewal of 
itself constantly. Learning is reinforced through constant training programmes. The 
willingness and exigencies to learn new things have become both formal and informal 
norms for staff. The manager entrepreneurs of DSF are also the advocators and 
preachers for the dissemination of brand connation and promotion of a learning 
culture. The goal of the company is shared by all employees, which is described as 
"In pursuit of the high and the beyond". "The High" is defined to be the highest 
profile brand in the world; "the beyond" is denoted to develop Sunfed to be a hundred 
year enterprise with a solid foundation. This organisational goal reflects its ambition 
and long term development vision, while the spirit of "being the best" inspires 
employees. Rich cultural connotations and legend under the brand, express a prolific 
brand personality and value, which gives customers an emotional experience that 
builds the company's competitiveness in a way hard to intimate by its competitors. 
The top managers play a valuable role in teaching and educating employees to the 
extent that their values and philosophies have changed employees' behaviour and 
mentality. They promote a high profile style of quality of life, encouraging employees 
2" Burns, P. (2005), Corporate Entrepreneurship: building an entrepreneurial organisation, Palgrave 
Macmillan, New York. 
299 Burgoyne, J. (1995), ̀ Feeding minds to grow business', People Management, 1 (22), Nov 1995, pp. 
7-15. 
300 Garratt, B. (1994), The Learning Organisation, Harper Collins, London. 
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to pursue excellence. Knowledge is highly respected in this company and creativity 
and innovation in marketing and technology are a key focus in employees' education. 
This is the key value in the company's culture that creates an environment to develop 
employees' capabilities, encouraging their creativity and innovation. An emphasis on 
autonomy to staff is regarded as an essential philosophy underpinning DSF's 
management to activate employees' potential, which is a precondition to achieve high 
performance in the market. The philosophy of performance management is to stress 
self-oriented result-driven performance. 
To sum up, the privately-owned and foreign joint-venture enterprises are the 
organisations in possession of strong learning cultures, which are in sharp contrast 
with the administrative culture in both the state-owned and collective-owned 
enterprises. As Hofstede et al (1990) 301 suggest the different dimensions of 
organisational culture discriminate between entrepreneurial and administrative 
organisations. Such contrasts are summarised in figure 8.1. 
Figure 8.1 Entrepreneurial vs. Administrative cultures 
Entrepreneurial 
(Privately-Owned Enterprise & 
Foreign Joint-Venture) 
Administrative 
(State-Owned Enterprise & 
Collective-Owned Enterprise) 
" Results-driven " Process orientation 
" Job-orientation " Employee orientation 
" Small and fluid . Inflexible and institutional 
" Open system " Closed system 
" Loose control " Tight control 
" Pragmatic " Normative orientation 
" Market driven " Political driven 
" Capitalist with market ideal " Socialist ideal 
" Low power distance " High power distance 
" Low uncertainty avoidance " High uncertainty avoidance 
" High risk taking " Low risk taking 
avid %, V. awl's xx., iL, «uc ct ai ki YYU), wItn amendment according to 
the author's findings in case studies. 
301 Hofstede, G., Neuijen, B., Ohayv, D. D. and Sanders, G. (1990), `Measuring organisational cultures: 




Skills refer to the distinctive capabilities of key personnel and the firm as a 
whole, which form the core of competitive advantage that firms are keen to sustain. In 
line with resource-based theory (Grant, 2005)302, a firm's strategic capability is 
underpinned by the resources available to an organisation. From a strategic 
perspective an organisation's resources include both those that are owned by the 
organisation and those that can be accessed to support its strategies. These can be 
classified as physical resources (e. g. machines, buildings or production capacity), 
human resources (e. g. knowledge, skills of people and adaptability), financial 
resources (e. g. capital, cash, shareholders and bankers) and intellectual capital (e. g. 
patents, brand, customer database and partner relationship). Amongst these, human, 
intellectual and reputational assets are more often difficult to imitate, and so can be 
the source of competitive advantage (Haberberg and Rieple, 2001)303 
Independent management autonomy is now demanded in state-owned enterprises 
and is the most significant change compared to the former socialist command model. 
Ownership diversity and involvement in market competition have diluted the old 
ideology of the planned economy, requiring entrepreneurship and institutional 
innovation in management. This is a demanding task for the managers of state-owned 
enterprises. LTG as a state-owned enterprise has some special advantages that the 
other types of ownership enterprise do not have. Benefiting from its long history of 
development, state-owned enterprises have trained a large number of professional 
teams and experienced specialists in core businesses which form the elite of the 
organisation with expertise and loyalty. Moreover, state-owned enterprises also have 
privileged access to other types of resources, such as capital, land and labour. 
Especially, access to the capital market in China is still limited; the major banks 
dominating the capital market are state-owned banks that favour more state-owned 
enterprises over other types of enterprise. Furthermore, the Communist Party and 
administrative authorities are powerful agencies which can provide many concessions 
and favours for state-owned enterprises. Such issues associated with government- 
controlled resources are very demanding for other types of enterprise. For instance, 
302 Grant, R. M. (2005), Contemporary Strategy Analysis, 5d' ed. Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, p152- 
159. 
303 Haberberg, A. and Rieple, A. (2001), The Strategic Management of Organisations, FT Prentice Hall, 
London, p248-252. 
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free access to capital and loans is a common problem for all privately-owned 
enterprises, and policy discrimination creates higher entry barriers for private 
ownership; for example, the granting of export and import licenses. 
Following the rapid pace of economic growth, state-owned enterprises have 
attempted to become more market focused. In order to build up its competitiveness, 
LTG has adopted a diversification strategy in the attempt to utilise its resources as a 
defence response to external changes. LTG had purchased and merged other dying 
companies and further invested in state-of-the-art dye technology and equipment. This 
buy-out had its dual purposes, as not only did it help out another state-owned 
enterprise to avoid bankruptcy but also it gained greater control of wider industry 
chains. Guided by its diversification strategy, LTG has also invested on other areas 
such as real estate and logistics transport to increase its competitiveness. According to 
Theodore Levitt's (1968)304, as a solution to external changes, companies should 
define their served market broadly rather than narrowly, which explains why LTG has 
set upon its diversification investment strategy. 
`But such broadening of the target markets is of little value if the company 
cannot easily develop the capabilities required for serving customer requirements 
across a wide front. Evidence suggests that serving broadly defined customer needs is 
a difficult task and created serious management problems. '(Grant, 2002)305 
As its businesses scope has widened, the top management of LTG has experienced 
a shortage of capable talents to run their divisional businesses suffering lack of skills 
in human resource management. Due to constraints in rewards and performance 
assessment system, LTG is unable to retain its core competences - those highly 
skilled talents. Some have left the state-owned enterprise and become competitors in 
the same industry. The current imperative task for the state-owned enterprise is to 
build an entrepreneurial culture throughout the corporation which can facilitate the 
growth of `intrapreneurs'. As Burns (2005)306 defines "the term 'intrapreneur' is used 
to describe the individual charged with pushing through innovations within a larger 
organisation, in an entrepreneurial fashion. They are entrepreneurs in larger 
organisations. " The emerging market economy requires a strong entrepreneurial 
304 Levitt, T. (1968), Innovation in marketing: new perspectives for profit and growth, Pan Books, 
London. 
305 Grant, R. M. (2002), The resource-based theory of competitive advantage: implications for strategy 
formulation. In Segal-Horn, S. (eds) The strategy reader, chapter 9, Blackwell, UK, p 181. 306 Burns, P. (2005), Corporate Entrepreneurship: building an entrepreneurial organisation, Palgrave 
Macmillan, Hampshire, p134. 
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culture and the injection of new human resources is necessary for long term 
development of state-owned enterprise. Transformation from conventional personnel 
management to a market-driven human resource management is a tough challenge for 
state-owned enterprises under the ideology of socialism. Their intrinsic recruitment 
systems are certainly in need of change to free market mechanisms. However, for 
reasons regarding tradition, authority and relationship culture, the transition to an 
open recruitment mechanism will inevitably engender great tensions in the power 
structures of state-owned enterprises. The current status quo of state-owned 
enterprises does not encourage entrepreneurship neither intraprenership. Some top 
managers and bureaucrats inevitably resist change - even if it is ultimately in their 
own interest. They will even resist it to the point of trying to sabotage it. As Kirby 
(2003)307 suggests that this could because: 
" They think it will have a negative impact on them; 
" It affects their social relationships within the organisation; 
" It means long-standing habits have to be changed; 
" The needs for and benefits of change have not been properly communicated; 
" Structures, systems, rewards are not aligned with the changes and inhibit them; 
" They feel coerced, not in control. 
These reasons for resistance to change seem to be the case in the state-owned 
enterprise case study, which are also the source of management tensions. To 
overcome this, the state-owned enterprise will need to develop a shared vision for the 
future and communicate with different levels of employees more effectively. Rewards 
and performance assessment need to be altered to fit the need of intrapreneurs. A 
learning culture needs to be put in place to facilitate innovation and corporate 
entrepreneurship. (Lambing and Kuehl, 2007)308 Although the state-owned enterprise 
may experience a `control-crisis', it would be a necessary growth process that cannot 
be avoided (Haberberg and Rieple, 2001)3°9. 
In the case of the collective-owned enterprise, its skills rely on two groups of 
experts. One is the private owners who have the marketing capability to get 
orders/contracts for the manufacturing base. The other is the production group in 
307 Kirby, D. (2003), Entrepreneurship, McGraw-Hill Education, Berkshire, p148. 
308 Lambing, P. and Kuehl, C. (2007), Entrepreneurship, 4th ed. Pearson Prentice Hall, New Jersey. 
309 Haberberg, A. and Rieple, A. (2001), The Strategic Management of Organisations, FT Prentice Hall, 
London. 
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possession of expertises in technology and production skills. They guarantee the 
quality and delivery of product and form an important core competence of the 
organisation. Nonetheless, due to lack of marketing skills, they have to depend on the 
private entrepreneurs to provide orders and customers. The absence of a proper 
reward system generates low motivation among staff in this collective-owned 
enterprise. The objective of management is to improve employees' motivation but the 
reality is far from this goal. As the complexity of technology progresses and the 
number of employee increases in the near future, human resource management will be 
a major issue for SLAC. An increase in wages and improvements in work conditions 
will be the demand of labourers. The battles between the different interest groups will 
expand to the first line labour defending their legal rights. This type of business 
venture reveals many of these tensions and conflicts. Property ownership is a main 
focus of change in the transformation to a market economy, and this inevitably affects 
managerial behaviour and organisational processes. It is evidenced that ownership 
clarification needs to be manifested in this business venture to release increasing 
tensions. 
The privately-owned enterprise, as an entrepreneurial firm, has successfully 
exploited opportunities in the cashmere market place. Within ten years, it has 
developed its own featured capabilities and skills in the market. These core 
competences in Dali enterprise are analyzed in terms of. leadership, business 
reputation and networked resources, and technology in machanisation. The leadership 
is the most important competence in this entrepreneurial business, as everything 
depends on the proprietor's preferences and capabilities. As a successful entrepreneur, 
the owner demonstrates his high capability, charisma and wisdom. He is the 
determining factor for the fate of this organisation and his strong leadership is an 
incontrollable competitiveness. His entrepreneurial qualities definitely account for the 
strength of the business. The strategic focus and intuitive vision and sensitivity allow 
him to find opportunities in the market. His flexible and informal structure with quick 
decision-making processes allows him to swiftly respond to market trends. He leads 
an adaptive and organic firm and cultivates a strong learning culture to facilitate 
innovation and constant breakthrough. However, as their businesses grow 
entrepreneurs face challenges and problems as the nature of their organisations 
change. The more rapid the growth, the more difficult this is. Entrepreneurs have to 
change the way they operate - recruit reliable managers, delegate to them and control 
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and monitor their performance. The organisation must become more formal and to a 
certain extent some formal rules and processes need to be applied and built into the 
structure and systems so that the implementation of complex tasks can be predicted 
and monitored. The privately-owned entrepreneur is likely to face up to the next 
growth phase of his company - `autonomy crisis' and `control-crisis' as Greiner 
(1972)310 suggests in his growth model for the entrepreneurial firm. Particularly, 
entrepreneurs generally have a strong internal locus of control, which means that there 
is a danger they will be unable or unwilling to delegate responsibility to their 
management team. The entrepreneur needs to shift the company's dependence from a 
brain to a think tank. The leader then faces a crisis of autonomy that will only be 
addressed by putting a management team in place and delegating work to it. Growth 
in this phase comes because the team is in place and effective delegation is taking 
place. The business is no longer a one-man-brain. However, there is always the 
danger that delegation becomes abdication of responsibility and, as the firm continues 
to grow, there is a loss of proper control. Entrepreneurs will then encounter the next 
control crisis. 
In the foreign joint-venture its core competences are gained by developing 
people and providing opportunity for self-actualisation. Such as the key staff in 
marketing, brand design, technology and the R&D centre mould inimitable skills in 
DSF. The open and learning culture facilitate its formation of distinctive capabilities 
as constant training and knowledge education help to overcome `personal failure'. 
The Western culture and advanced knowledge in marketing and branding open the 
staffs view and raise their desire for learning. The use of foreign capital and its joint 
ownership gives it a competitive strength. Lack of skills and advance management 
and technical knowledge are common problems for most domestic firms. As The 
China Development Report on the Textile Industry (2004)31 1 reveals: 
"Chinese garment factories usually concentrate on labour intensive 
manufacturing work and low value added products. They lack marketing and 
branding knowledge to build high value added products, therefore, they are unable to 
become a R&D based industry but cluster in the low technology and labour intensity 
industries. " 
"o Greiner, L. E. (1972), ̀ Evolution and revolution as organisations grow', Harvard Business Review, 
50 (4), Jul/Aug1972, pp. 37-46. 
311 `China development report of textile industry' (2002/2(03), compiled by China Textile Industry 
Associate, China Textile Publisher, Beijing, p52. 
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Foreign joint-ventures are effective ways of strategic learning for Chinese firms 
to shift their locus of low value adding to high value with knowledge advancement. 
Compared to the other three case studies - the privately-owned enterprise and the 
collective-owned enterprise, and even the state-owned enterprise that place their focus 
on manufacturing and outsourcing with low-value added products, the foreign joint- 
venture has a high profile in producing value-added branded goods. It reflects how 
this foreign joint venture operates on the basis of very different principles (derived 
from its US co-ownership) than the other three types of indigenous-owned case 
studies. 
In view of the case study findings, the comparisons between the four types of 
ownership, as analysed by the McKinsey 7-S framework may be summarized as in 
figure 8.2. 
290 
Figure 8.2 Organisational Profiles of Each of the Four Case Studies 
According to The McKinsey 7-S Framework 
State-Owned Collective- Privately- Foreign Joint- 
Enterprise Owned Owned Venture 
Enterprise Enterprise 
Strategy Cautious, Expansion Growth in Brand Focus 
diversification through low- capability (market 
cost volume penetration) 
Structure Multi-divisionalised Machine Organic and Adhocratic and 
business units bureaucracy entrepreneurial Professional 
Systems Closed Formal; Closed Informal and Combination of 
institutional; formal; open formal and 
personal connections hierarchy informal; 
open 
Staff Professional and Low-skilled; Multi-roles; Highly-skilled; 
specialist; and no individual opportunities for high vision of 
political development individual personal 
development development 
Style Administrative and Hierarchical, Adaptive and Open and 
bureaucratic impersonal; fluid entrepreneurial; 
and knowledge-centred 
exploitative 
Shared Political culture, Mixed Market-driven; Learning 
socialist ideals socialist and family-type orientation; 
values capitalist management belief of 
values; knowledge power; 
cost self-actualisation 
minimization 
Skills Expertise Production Production Highly-skilled 
competence; capacity; capacity; managers; 
technology and low cost expertise of team; knowledge 
production capacity; leadership capabilities of advancement; 
access to finance owner brand; 
foreign capital 
Evidence from the four case studies suggest different types of ownership, shape 
distinct dissimilarities in their organisational characteristics and management patterns. 
Environmental influencing forces, such as economic reforms, WTO accession, 
globalisation and competitors, are likely to impact upon organisational change and 
ownership evolution of each type of business venture (see chapter one). These form 
the social and economic conditions for a changing market socialism in which these 
four types of business venture have emerged. 
The textile industry that the four types of enterprise operate within is a traditional 
industry with a long history that is a major contributor to China's export revenue. 
Since 1995, China has become the largest supplier of textile goods, taking 
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approximately one sixth of the global share, and competing with other three major 
players: USA. the European Union and Japan. After W"l'O accession, world markets 
have opened up for China as quotas on textile goods are nullified. As a result, export 
quantities to WTO member countries have significantly increased. On the other hand, 
non-tariff and non-quotas barriers have been raised against C'hina's textile goods. 
These have often taken the form of technical barriers, anti-dumping action, labour 
standards issues, specific permission requirements and administrative delays. As 
global competition becomes more severe, trade friction in textile goods with other 
countries is increasing. During the first half year of 2005, there was a total of 16 cases 
of this nature, when WTO member countries imposed specific requirements and 
administrative delays against China's textile trade. In responding to this, the Chinese 
government nullified export tariffs on 81 types of textile goods on l, ` June 2005.; 12 
Nevertheless, as the effect of trade friction, exports to the IInited States and the 
European Union in 2006 have fallen by 60 percent and 35 percent respectively. 31 
According to the agreements signed in 2005 between China and the [: l I, and ('hina 
and the US, annual growth rates for the export of certain textile products is restricted 
to between 8 to 12.5 percent and 10 to 17 percent respectively until 2008. U4 .. Trade 
difficulties are going to he diversified und cont1)licaled 1471h some 
. 
fri'Iions snore 
difficult to cope with such as anti-dumping. social rc'. V)onsihiliti und lc'c'h, rirul 
barriers" Zhang Li (2006).; 15 Comments made by official responsible for the textile 
industry from the Bureau of Economic Operations under the National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRU). 
These influencing factors from international markets will inevitably have an 
impact on the strategy and organisational process of those enterprises involved in 
312 Lu. Qi (2006), WTO Outline, Shanghai Fudan University Press. Shanghai. p217. 
313 'EU China Trade Brief, Oxford Analvticcr, November 2006. 
" in June 1 1,2005. China and the EU reached an agreement on the annual growth of exports to the 
European market for the ten lines of Chinese textile products from June 11,2005 to the end of 2007. 
With an agreed base quantity. annual growth limits are set between 8 and 12.5 percent during this 
period. 
In November 8,2005. the US and China sign a three-year agreement. A total of 2I types of clothing 
and textiles are placed under 
import restrictions, and the agreement provides for progressive annual 
increases in imports of major textile and apparel products trom China by 10 to 15 percent in 2006,12.5 
to 16 percent in 2007. and 15 to 17tpercent in 2008. 
''` w ww china. org,. cn (accessed 26 February 2007) by Yuan Fang, May 26''' 2006, China Internet 
Information Centre. 
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foreign trade. Furthermore. according to `China Xinhua News' (2006)"". the recent 
depreciation of the RMB has become a major issue for garment manufacturing 
companies in exports. as the trade requires a turnaround time of two to three months, 
a one to two percent fluctuation in profit margins is already factored in from the 
beginning. The revaluation of RMB and the likelihood that it will continue to 
appreciate in time to come has raised concerns for the continued competitiveness of 
China's textile industry, which has until now, been riding on its one market advantage: 
its low price. The appreciation of the RMB will have a long-term effect on those 
companies with a focus of international trade business. The state-owned enterprise 
(LTG) being an example; it will see its lucrative profit margin decline if the RMB 
appreciation continues by 5 percent. The average gross profits of the textile sector is 
approximately 5 to 10 percent. Since the majority of Chinese products are low-end 
and easily replaced, it would be difficult to expect foreign customers to absorb any 
extra costs. Evidence suggests that 'diversified investment' and 'specific high- 
technology development' have been the emerging shill-strategics I'M Chinese textile 
enterprises responding to these external threats. `Home brand building'. however, as a 
long-run strategy with a more advantageous competitiveness, is not prevalently 
adopted by domestic 
firms despite the Chinese government appeals to domestic firms 
to do so. The recognition of brands is scanty among the majority of domestic firms 
and mainly it is a result of poverty 
in knowledge and management theory. The 
literature on Chinese management still remains meagre which raises the demand tier 
rich theory development to guide and 
direct practices. Moreover, the financing of the 
private sector and knowledge 
dissemination system is not well developed and industry 
infrastructure and government advocacy to promote 'home brands' still has a long 
way to go. lt will 
be a challenge for the Chinese government to change its 
administrative role 
from that of 'support' to effective policies that will re-adjust the 
infrastructure of China's industries and its regulatory environment. 
8.2 The Development of Market Socialism in China: Some F; merging l renth 
8.2.1 Future Perspective of Chinese Economy 
316 http"//ne w s_xinhuanet. com/en ish 2007-02'08/content 5715808. htm (accessed 26'x' February 2007) 
`China's textile factories earn 
less than national industrial average', by Yuan Liang, China I'iew, 
Xinahua News, February 8 2007. 
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Over the last two decades, China has been remarkably transformed from a 
socialist planned economy to a market-oriented economy. Market socialism is 
constantly changing towards the trends of globalisation and further marketisation. 
Confronted with ever intensifying international competition, enterprises in China 
(whether state-owned or not) have to make constant adjustments in order to keep 
abreast with these ever changing market conditions. The Chinese government has 
deepened economic reforms in the state sector and made further melioration of the 
regulatory conditions for foreign investment in 2006. For instance, barriers in the 
financial service and banking sectors are being lifted for foreign capital entry and an 
amendment on the Foreign Enterprise Law allows wholely-owned foreign enterprises 
to set up in China. The new Foreign Trade Laws that were implemented in 1st July 
2004 allows for the full entry of collective-owned enterprises and privately-owned 
enterprises to engage in foreign trade. During 2001 to 2005 domestic firms with 
licenses for foreign trading have dramatically increased from 45,000 to over 
200,000.317 After the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party convened in 
November 2002, some laws and regulations which are consistent with international 
practice and beneficial to the development of the national economy were put forward 
to ensure compliance with international arrangements. Policies and regulations which 
discriminate against the development of the private sector will gradually be abolished, 
to be replaced by those amended and improved to support and encourage the 
development of private enterprise. China's accession to WTO and the promulgation of 
policies for attracting foreign investment. will inevitably trigger off an influx of 
transnational companies into China, intensifying the impact on China's domestic 
enterprises. After 24 years of reform and opening-up, many world-known 
transnational companies (e. g. Motorola, Siemens, Alcatel, Nokia, Philips and General 
Motor) have established joint-ventures and wholely-owned enterprises in China. They 
have achieved fabulous success in the Chinese market, as the market-oriented reforms 
in China is a powerful statutory support to their efforts in developing world markets. 
These companies are witness to the development of Chinese market socialism, 
significantly influencing China's economic development and facilitating `learning 
from the best practices' for domestic firms. Continuous promotion and attraction for 
foreign direct investment will be pursued by the Chinese government which will lead 
317 China Foreign Economy, Trade, Co-operation and Enterprise Yearbook (2005), Compiled by China 
International Trade Promotion Committee, China Commercial Press, Beijing, p269. 
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to ever-more fierce competition between China's enterprises and large foreign-owned 
enterprises on the domestic market. It is expected that the role of the non-state-owned 
sector in China's economic development will continuously be reinforced, and will 
make further contribution to the growth of the national economy. It is likely that 
market socialism is changing to market capitalism; the "Socialist ideal" will be diluted 
and eventually replaced by "market ideals". 
8.2.2 Future Trends of The Four Tunes of Business Venture: 
The current status of the Chinese economy is clearly divided into two major 
dominant sectors - state-owned and private. The state-owned sector includes those 
state-owned and controlled enterprises while the non-state-owned sector comprises 
collective-owned, privately-owned and foreign-invested enterprises. Comparing these 
three emerging forms of private business venture, the foreign joint-venture and the 
privately-owned enterprise appear to have greatest growth potential. Both two types 
have strong entrepreneurial learning cultures and high market orientation. Foreign 
joint-ventures benefit from access to advanced knowledge, capital and technology to 
facilitate their growth and competitiveness. These influences also shape the 
, behaviour model' of managers in these organisations, which increasingly mould the 
formulation of organisational processes in terms of their strategies, systems, structures, 
cultures, human resources, and product portfolios. As a consequence, innovation and 
entrepreneurship are becoming the foundation of their competitive advantage. The 
two types of enterprises all reflect innovation in the following areas which 
Schumpeter (1996)318 describes as: 
" Constant introduction of new or improved goods or service(s); 
" Constant introduction of new processes in service delivery systems; new 
production, marketing, sales, distribution and supply chain management 
systems; 
" Opening up new markets in either overseas or domestic segments 
" Identification of new sources of supply of raw materials 
" Continuing adoption of new technologies 
While foreign joint-ventures are built on knowledge-based processes which 
allows them to develop higher value-added products, privately-owned enterprises are 
311 Schumpeter, J. A. (1996) The Theory of Economic Development, Transaction Publishers, New 
Jersey. 
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comparatively disadvantaged in this respect. However, they can overcome this flaw 
by attracting highly-skilled talents to develop more knowledge-centred product 
profiles. This trend increases the demand for a supply of graduates and skilled capable 
managers. The problem is, that at this present juncture in its development, there is a 
scarcity of such talent in the Chinese labour market. 
The trend of marketisation of state-owned enterprises is towards corporatisation 
and diversification. A new management system for state property was established in 
2003 together with the issuance of relevant laws. In the days to come, except in some 
special fields (national security and vital economic significance), large and medium 
size state-owned enterprises will mostly be transformed into non-state-owned but 
state-controlled enterprises. State-owned enterprises are now more market-orientated 
in respect of price setting. However, there are still some significant non-market 
elements in corporate governance and internal management. For instance, "closed" 
recruitment mechanisms, leading not only to senior management being subject to 
government appointment or removal, but also staff who are often selected by "who- 
they-know" internally through a political hierarchy. Moreover, inconsistent 
performance assessment systems with government stipulated reward standards 
demonstrate the non-separation of government from enterprises management. As 
state-owned enterprises will face severe competition from both domestic 
entrepreneurial firms and foreign firms, their inflexibility and constraints from the 
administrative culture will ultimately hinder their growth and competitiveness. They 
will decline if future reforms in innovation and entrepreneurship cannot provide 
significant remedies. Undeniably further reforms on corporate entrepreneurship will 
be a huge challenge to change the behaviour model of the `socialist ideals' of state- 
owned enterprises. 
Collective-owned business ventures are likely to fail in the future. They will 
evolve into private ownership. The contradiction between the interests of different 
owners in this type of business venture is irreconcilable. The collective-owned 
enterprise is a special historical legacy that will gradually decline under market 
socialism to be replaced by private ownership. As competitive conditions continue to 
change both the international and domestic markets, the impact will be addressed by 
this type of enterprise, relying on overseas orders and only producing low-value 
added goods on a low-cost advantage. 
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Evidence provided by the case studies show that labour unions play a dependent 
and weak role in the power structure in the state-owned sector while their function in 
the non-state-owned sector is non-existent. The rapid growth of the Chinese market 
economy has given a rapid rise to a private sector which has yet to develop a code of 
business ethics and corporate social responsibility (McEwan, 2001; Ying, 2002)319. 
8.2.3-The Role of The Communist Party in China 
The relationship between governments and markets is a concern in all countries. 
The role of government is to create a favourable environment for fair competition for 
businesses by means of macroeconomic control. Compared to the governments of 
Western countries, the Communist Party in China plays a different role in developing 
the market economy. China's market socialism is the result of government policy 
shifts from the traditional socialist planned regime. It is also a process leading the 
Communist party to gradually change its functions; to decentralise its administrative 
control; to reduce the size of government; to reform the economic administrative 
system and to create a dynamic market economy. In the coming decades, China's 
political agenda will be focused on developing strategic international relations with 
United States, Russia, the EU, Latin America and Africa; controlling interest conflicts 
and territory tensions with Japan, Taiwan and North Korea. Energy scarcities will also 
place an imperative task on the Communist Party as the country searches for new 
sources of energy in the near future. As Richard Scase (2007)320 points out: "China's 
huge thirst for oil could persuade it to engage in economic imperialism, especially in 
Africa where it is already buying companies and supporting many governments with 
its aid programmes. " 
Market socialism is characterised as socialist ideology with market forces. The 
state-owned sector is still a major share of the economy and this reflects the political 
will. Tensions between ̀state' and ̀ market' socialism become prominent when market 
reforms go so deep they touch the political and cultural underpinnings of the political 
regime. Market socialism comprise both opportunities and problems which generate 
complexity and diversity in its unique market structures. Understanding these 
dynamics of market socialism is important for understanding business practices. 
319 McEwan, T. (2001), Managing values and beliefs in organisations, FT Prentice Hall, London. 
ying, Hong (2002), ̀ Business ethics: is it useful? - an empirical study of Chinese enterprise' 
Business Ethics: A European Review, 11 (4), Oct2002, pp. 335-342. 
32° Scase, R. (2007), Global remix: the fight for competitive advantage, Kogan Page, London, p 150. 
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8.2.4 Final Remark: 
Some Comments on The Present Research 
Our research has focused on four types of emerging business venture under 
market socialism in China. They are the offspring of market reforms that have 
evolved from the legacy of state socialism and the command economy. Such 
ownership forms shape the character of businesses as they participate in the market 
economy. As Haberberg and Rieple note: "As most organisations are subject to a 
range of stakeholder influences, stakeholders shape an organisation's objectives and 
also the yardsticks that are used to access its success and failure. Also different 
stakeholder groups can be a powerful influence on the extent to which an 
organisation can change its strategy. " (Haberberg and Rieple, 2001) 321 Our case 
studies have shown how different ownership forms shape a diversity of management 
practices. 
However, there are some issues about the present research that need to be 
emphasised. These may be considered as follows: 
(a) The textile industry was selected as the context for the case studies because of 
its critically significant role in market reforms in China. Compared to other industries, 
the textile industry was the pioneer in market transition, and it also experienced the 
greatest impact of China's WTO accession. Businesses operating in this industry 
reflect state-of-the-art trends in terms of the implementation of market economy 
reforms. Therefore, the industry was appropriate for studying emergent forms of 
business ownership and their impact on management practices. 
(b) There are shortcomings in this research associated with the role of case 
studies in producing valid theories. The use of case studies is still controversial in 
management research, ̀the case study has long been stereotyped as a weak method; 
but it can only be a rigorous method of research if the researchers follow the 
principles and structured procedures' (Yin, 2003 )322. The measurement problem, `a 
small number of cases and big conclusions', often raises questions of generalisability 
321 Haberberg, A. and Rieple, A. (2001), The strategic management of organisations, FT Prentice Hall, 
London, p6. 
322 Yin, R. K. (2003), Case study research: design and methods, 3'' ed. Sage Publications, London. 
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of findings (Lieberson, 1985)323. This is the case with the present research and is, 
indeed, a factor that has to be taken into account when interpreting the findings. But 
case studies allow for the analysis of complex issues. The complexity of these in the 
case studies was managed by using the McKinsey 7-S framework, providing an 
analytical framework for understanding qualitative data. Since the vague nature of 
qualitative information is a major problem of case studies, this can be overcome by 
structured data collection. This is what we have tried to do in this research. 
According to emerging forms of business ventures we identified in our literature 
review, four case enterprises were selected to represent four types of ownership under 
market socialism. The aim of this study was to explore the main characteristics of 
each of these types of business venture and discover the impact of ownership on 
management processes. Not only were structured questionnaires used to collect in- 
depth and wide ranging data, but also multiple sources of evidence were utilised to 
minimize the risk of researcher bias. By comparative analysis across four cases, 
differences and similarities were analyzed in order to examine the impact of 
ownership. Four cases were described in detail in order to depict their rich 
organizational profiles so that differences in their management processes could be 
identified. The four cases were selected as typical representatives of four emerging 
forms of ownership; `typicality' of cases is a fundamental criterion for the selection of 
a small number of cases. It may not cover all the variety of ownership forms, but as 
typical representatives, the likelihood of generality can be obtained to a certain extent. 
For instance, the common characteristics of state-owned enterprises distinguish them 
from privately-owned enterprises. Collective-owned and foreign joint ventures also 
demonstrate critical contrasts. Each type of business venture represents distinctive 
behavioural patterns and organizational profiles due to their different ownership forms. 
These are generalisable and applicable to other enterprises with similar ownership 
forms. Nonetheless, the limitations of a small number of cases are inevitable as they 
cannot cover the whole variety of management practices under market socialism. We 
are aware of the complexity and diversity of ownership restructuring accompanying 
rapid enterprise development in these changing market conditions. Case study 
research only provides a glimpse of such dynamics. Further research on ownership 
323 Lieberson, S. (2000), 'Small N's and big conclusions: an examination of the reasoning in 
comparative studies based on a small number of cases', in Gomm, R., Hammersley, M. and Foster, P. 
(2000), Case study method, (eds). Sage Publications, London. 
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impact will compensate for this limitation by using mixed methods of data collection; 
both qualitative and quantitative. 
(c) The use of the McKinsey 7-S framework played a key role in the study of our 
cases. It comprises seven elements for describing and understanding an organization 
as a whole. The 7-S framework is not merely an analytical tool; it also serves as a 
conceptual underpinning to indicate what range of information needs to be collected. 
Each S-factor can be operationally stipulated and- used for measuring key 
organisational variables. However, these factors interact and explain each other; they 
cannot exist alone. This feature facilitates the analysis of management processes for 
an `interaction effect' of all the variables that make up a comprehensive explanation. 
Other successful applications of this framework are evidenced in Peters and 
Waterman's in Search of Excellence' (1982) and Pascale and Athos' `The Art of 
Japanese Management' (1986). It can be very useful when applied to understanding 
an organization as a whole. It almost covers every aspect of management providing a 
systematic analysis to cutting through the complexity of an organization. However, it 
demands full access to organizations and high `time-energy cost' in fieldwork. The 
enterprise must be open to this research which often raises issues of confidentiality. 
Moreover, it requires access to a wide range of information from informants, and 
sufficient time and energy to devote to interviews and observation. We have 
experienced in our fieldwork the patience and time needed to conduct case studies. 
We revisited our key informants more than three times to complete our questionnaires 
and each time spending more than one hour for each of these interviews. This places a 
high demand on the co-operation of case study companies. It would not be realistic to 
conduct such research without the commitment of CEOs and managers. Our research 
benefited from this advantage. 
(d) This present research is entirely focused on qualitative analysis. Our research 
needed to explore how organizational processes work and how owners and managers 
behave in each type of business venture. It needed to analyze the `interaction effect' 
among seven elements (strategy, structure, systems, staff, style, shared value and 
skills) of our case study organizations. People's perceptions and points of view 
needed to be examined; strategies and systems needed to be described; decision 
making processes and leadership style had to be portrayed. All of these required a 
quality approach. How these management processes operate demands a qualitative 
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case study approach. Quantitative research is unable to explore these organisational 
processes in depth. 
(e) In the selection of case studies for this research, ownership is the main 
dimension of examination as the distinctive characteristic of each pattern of business 
venture. Size and scale of organization that may possibly affect management 
processes and strategies have been neglected. Due to historical reasons, state and 
collective-owned organizations are larger and enjoy economies of scale. Private firms, 
particularly entrepreneurial firms, tend to be small because of the late emergence of 
market reforms. Thus, the ownership is the main focus throughout the entire analysis; 
the `size effect' is reflected in organisational processes - structure, strategy and 
systems - and as a variable to examine, but it is not treated as a criterion of case 
selection. In the author's point of view, `size' is also determined by owners' interests 
and their different strategic visions. 
(f) The data was collected in the Chinese language. Some meanings may get lost 
in the process of translation from Chinese to English. The author's cultural 
background may unconsciously influence data interpretation. It is impossible to 
control for this and represents one limitation of the present research. 
Future Research 
The agenda for further research should focus on the relationship between 
innovation and entrepreneurship to ownership forms. Our present work has studied 
some emerging trends of ownership formation and the impact of these for 
organisational profiles. Further research should explore the competitive effect of 
ownership diversification, addressing the importance of innovation and 
entrepreneurship in both state and private sectors. Ownership diversification, as the 
main strategy of market reforms, has dramatically changed the structure of market 
forces and successfully created a market orientation in enterprise management. 
Through ownership diversification practices, enterprises are expected to develop their 
competitiveness and create market-oriented management to fit in with changing 
market conditions. Rather than examining the general patterns of emerging forms of 
enterprise, the focus of research should be on the causal effect of ownership 
diversification for the competitiveness of enterprises. In China, deregulation, 
privatization, internationalization and technology advancement demand that all types 
of enterprise should build their competitiveness in order to survive in the new market 
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situation. The generation of new ideas and development of new products and services 
is crucial for the constant renewal of organizations. Linking the effects of ownership 
diversification, this future research needs to explore how innovative and 
entrepreneurial activities in different types of organization result in entrepreneurial 
spin-offs, new products and services. Such research needs to develop concepts and 
methods for creating organizational cultures that facilitate the development of 
innovation and entrepreneurship. The barriers and facilitators to the generation of 
innovation and entrepreneurship need to be identified. In addition, correlations 
between internal entrepreneurial characteristics, attitudes and opinions, with external 
environmental influence need to be tested across the private and state sectors. This 
further research needs to consider how changes in property law can be supportive of 
entrepreneurial development. 
One crucial issue in case study research is how to gain access to companies to 
conduct empirical investigations. Cooperation is vital if there are to be interviews 
with key staff and owners (ideally), access to financial information, company 
documents and the ability for direct observation. Gaining access to desired case 
companies has been a major constraint in most case studies research. Companies may 
be willing to answer survey questionnaires but case study investigations require direct 
access to internal organizational processes, meeting key staff and participating in their 
work activities. Documentary information that reflects their policies, regulations, and 
systems also need to be available to the researcher. Such data is almost impossible to 
access in most companies as it touches upon commercial confidentiality and political 
sensitivity. It is particularly the case in China and especially in state-owned 
enterprises because of the state administration and political confidentiality. The 
Administration and Inspection Committee of State Assets" (AICSA) is a powerful 
government agency which centralizes the administration of all state-owned enterprise 
in China. It explicitly stipulates that state-owned enterprises are forbidden to expose 
any internal information to external bodies. Managers in state-owned enterprise will 
rarely risk their careers by breaking such political rules. Gaining full access to a state- 
owned enterprise has been a major achievement in the present research. Full access to 
case study companies is a key factor in determining the success of qualitative 
management research, besides factors such as limited budgets and time-energy costs. 
In fact, access to companies is one of the major challenges facing those who wish to 
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do management research in China. In this, we succeeded when many others have 
failed. 
More research is required to explore the changing dynamics of management 
practices as government reforms continue to change the conditions of market 
socialism in China. The literature on Chinese management, generated by empirical 
case study research is meagre. Our intention in this research was to explore, if only by 
reference to a small number of case study enterprises, some emerging trends. If this 
stimulates more detailed studies of evolving ownership forms and the effects of these 
for management practices under Chinese market socialism, this research will have 
served its purpose. 
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Appendix -1 Major Reforms Between 1994 - 20041 
1994 The system of tax distribution 
The system of tax distribution financial system initiated in 1994 contains mainly the 
division of the post-tax-reform 18 tax categories into central and local taxes and the 
sharing of tax revenues between central and local authorities. At the same time, two 
taxation authorities were set up wherein the central and local governments levy and 
manage taxes separately. The direct result of this reform was that the proportion of 
the central financial income to total financial revenue rose from 22 percent in 1993 to 
52.2 percent in 1995. to 54.93 percent in 2002 and further to 57.47 percent in 2003. 
The merger of exchange rates 
At the end of 1993 China decided to carry out retbrms of the exchange rate 
mechanism. The merger of exchange rates was introduced to the Renminbi (People's 
Currency). On January 1,1994, the dual exchange rate was changed into a single 
managed floating exchange rate system. The post-merger exchange price quotation 
was fixed at one US dollar against 8.7 yuan. From that time until December 2003, the 
conversion rate of Renminbi to US dollar appreciated by about 5 percent in 10 years. 
1995 1 Modern enterprise system 
At the forums held respectively in Sli iwh, ii on May 22.1995 and in Changchun on 
June 26 the same year.. liang Zemin delivered speeches. calling lor reinforcing 
confidence, clearly setting tasks and actively promoting state-owned enterprise 
reform. He said the basic characteristics of the modern enterprise system are summed 
up in four sentences "distinct property rights, clearly defined rights and duties, the 
separation of government administration from enterprise management and scientific 
management". they are an interrelated integral whole and must be fully and 
accurately understood and implemented. 
1998 Proactive financial policy 
In 1998. in order to cope with the Asian financial crisis and prevent economic 
recession, the Chinese government adopted a proactive financial policy. The 
government got involved in market economic operation through a purposeful 
investment policy, designed to absorb precipitation funds, maintain economic 
aggregate and promote the restoration of "savings--automatic investment 
mechanism" by the "savings--government investment" method. but the actual result 
was manifested as a direct impetus to "savings--government investment--economic 
growth". 
Source: 'Review: 13 keywords of economic reform'. October 30,2004, People's Daily Online. 
htt . ', 
'english. ecple. com. cn"? 0Oý110'i0/eng2004103O 1.62190. html 
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Prudent monetary policy 
In 1998, in order to cope with the impact of the Asian financial crisis and overcome 
the tendency of domestic deflation, and to coordinate the "proactive financial policy", 
the Chinese government introduced a "prudent monetary policy", which helped the 
Chinese economy to tide over difficulties and maintain a relatively rapid growth. 
1999 1 Debt-to-equity swaps 
In August 1999. the State Economic and "tirade Commission put forward a concrete 
plan. condition and scope for debt-to-equity transfer and declared that the debt-to- 
equity work would soon start in China. At the same time the State Council approved 
the scheme of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of('hina, the 
Agricultural Bank of China and the Bank of China to establish the I luarong Assets 
Management Company. the Great Wall Assets Management Company and the 
Dongfang (Eastern) Assets Management Company respectively. 
2000 1 Rural tax-for-fee reform 
In March 2000, the then Premier Zhu Rongji, in his "Government Work Report", 
pointed out that active efforts should he made to push rural tax-for-fee reform, so as 
to fundamentally reduce burdens on farmers, and decided that experiment on this he 
carried out in Anhui Province that year, and that experiences summed up there should 
spread to other places. In the year 2000, the total tax fee of farmers in Anhui 
Province was reduced by 1.69 billion yuan, with the rate of decrease reaching 31 
percent, the charge of fees in rural areas tended to become standardized, and the 
phenomena of "arbitrary collection of charge, unchecked apportionment of expenses 
and abuse of fund-raising" was basically kept under control. 
Urbanization 
On June 13.2000, the CPC Central Committee and the State Council issued "Some 
Opinions on Promoting the Sound Development of Small Towns". The Proposal on the 
"10th Five-Year Plan" passed by the Fifth Plenum of the 15th CPC Central Committee 
in October pointed out: Raising the level of urbanization and transferring rural 
population can provide a vast market and sustained motivation for economic 
development. It is an important measure for optimizing urban and rural economic 
structures and promoting a virtuous cycle of the national economy and the coordinated 
development of society. The whole Party and people of the whole country should he 
told "to implement the strategy of urbanization without delay" 
-319- 
Implementing development of the western region 
On October 26.2000. the State Council issued Document 13), and the Circular oil 
implementing the policy measure for the development of the western region. The scope 
for application of the policy on western development encompasses Chongctiig 
Municipality. Sichuan. Guizhou. Yunnan. Shaanxi, Gansu, and Qinghai provinces, 
Tihet. Ningxia Hui. Xingjiang Uygur. Inner Mongolia and Guano Zhuang 
autonomous regions. 
2001 ' Reform of the administrative examination and approval 
system 
On October 24.2001, the State Council held in Beijing a video conference on the work 
of reforming the administrative examination and approval system, making 
arrangements for accelerating the work of reforming the administrative examination 
and approval system. The main objective is to establish an administrative examination 
and approval system compatible with the social market economic system and realize 
institutional innovation through reform. 
2002 QF11 
On November 7.2002. the China Securities Regulatory Commission and the central 
bank jointly promulgated the "Interim Measures for the Management of I)omestic 
Securities Investment by Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors IQI" II I", which 
came into effect on December 1,2002. 
2003 Rejuvenating northeast China's old industrial bases 
On September 10,2003. Premier Veen . 
liahao chaired an executive conference ofthe 
State Council to discuss questions on implementing the strategy for rejuvenating 
northeast China's old industrial bases, putting forward guidelines, principles. main 
tasks as well policy measures for the rejuvenation. The conference pointed out: 
supporting the accelerated adjustment and transformation of northeast China's old 
industrial bases is an important strategic decision put forward by the 16th CPC 
National Congress. 
2004 1 Green GDP 
Gl)P has its limitation, it reflects only economic development, but does not reflect the 
influence of economic development on the resources environment, thus making it easy 
to overestimate the economic scale and economic growth and giving people a distorted 
economic picture. Green GDP is a supplement to and perfection of GDP. Within 2004, 
the state has chosen six provinces and cities including Beijing, ilin, Shaanxi, Guangdong 
and Shanghai as the pilot units to carry out green GI)P accounting 
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Appendix 2. Economic Development in China: A Brief Chronology 
FOUR STAGES OF YEAR IMPORTANT EVENTS 
DEVELOPMENT 
" Stage 1949 The Establishment of China 
planning economy 1949- The Chinese planning system evolved in the direction of copying the 
1957 Soviet model, and progress was assisted by a sizable volume of Soviet 
aid. ' 
1958 The `Great Leap Forward' and the split with the Soviet Union. 
1959 - The `Culture Revolution' started and the whole society was led into 
1969 political crazy by Mao Zedong. 
1975 A statement of objectives: 'four modernization' agriculture, industry, 
science and technology, defence, first put forth by Zhou Enlai. 2 
1976 China's economic reforms were launched after the arrest of the Gang of 
Four in 1976. A weak foundation gained in agriculture. 
Z" Stage 1978 CPC 11' Central Committee made the 
decision to shill the policy stress 
' Reform on De-collectivization to socialist modernization, and implement the strategic re t rin and 
& Privatization opening to the outside world. ' 
1984 CPC 12' Central Committee adopted the decision on restructuring the 
economic system, which signalled the elevation of the reform of China's 
economic system to an urban-centered stage. 
3r Stage 1992 The 14' National Congress of the CPC established Deng Xiaoping's 
Economic transformation to a theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics as the guiding 
market socialism policy 
in China and put forward the goal of China's economic reform as 
establishing a socialist market economy system. 
1997 Hong Kong was returned. The 15" National Congress of the CPC 
stressed the non-public-ownership sector in part of socialist economy and 
essential production factors - such as capital and technology was 
participated in reform for bigger steps. The second generation of leader. 
Jiang Zemin has carried forward and deepened Deng's open theory since 
then. 
1998 The reform had gone smoothly in every aspect, and important progress 
and achievements had made in grain circulation system, SOEs, banking 
system, etc. 
1999 China's willingness and arrangement to WTO accession. 
2000- Progress was made in restructuring SOE: s. And China officially joined 
2001 WTO. 
2002 A socialist economy is being set up, the basic functions of the market in 
resource allocation have been obviously strengthened, and the initial 
framework of the macro-adjustment and control system has taken shape. 
The form of economic growth is changing front the extensive to the 
intensive type. A great promotion is made to private sector. 
4' Stage 
2003- New leader government represented by Wen Jiabao has taken over and 
Market Socialism steps into 2004 the Beijing/China's development model 
is recognized by the world and 
political reform and economic replace 
the Washington consensus. A political economy is in process of 
lobalization. taking place. An attention to speeding up of banking sector and to the g 
rural economy, and to revitalising the north-east. 
Nove, A. (1991) The Economics of Feasible Socialism Revisited, Happer Collins Academic, London. 
P 157. 
2 Thorelli. H. B. (1985) Market Socialism in the People's Republic q%China, International Marketing 
Review, Summer85. Vol.? Issue 2, p7,8p. 
CPC is a breviary for The Third Plenary Session of the Communist Party Congress (CPC) 
ýN, wN". asianinfö'chinrseeconomv'economicrestructurino' (accessed 12'h January 2005) Lt p 
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As a doctorate student and researcher, I am working on a research topic `Emerging forms of' 
business ventures in China'. Through case studies of management practices in China, the 
characteristics of different types of business ventures under economic reform and market 
transformation are to be explored, and their interactive relations between organizational change 
and environmental impact to be explained. The contributions of this research are reflected in three 
aspects: 
First, through studying and analyzing the complex phenomena of managerial behavior, their 
characteristics and regularity are to be identified and explored. Second, based on case studies, 
emerging trends in management development are to be identified. Third, rapid but uneven 
development of market economy has led to a diversity of management practices, while a gap has 
emerged between managerial practice and theoretical conceptualization. There are few cases on 
the complexity of management practice under market socialism. 
I would be grateful for your enterprise's cooperation and support in this field research. We 
promise to keep anonymity and confidentiality of the enterprise in the selection of case studies. All 
the information and data collected from the cases will only be applied for academic purposes and 
theoretical study. 
Again, thank you very much for your anticipated cooperation and support. If you are willing 
to cooperate, please write to me/call me so that we can meet and I can give further details of the 
purposes of the research. 
Yours sincerely, 
Ping Zheng 
Doctorate student in Management 
Kent Business School 
University of Kent 
Canterbury 
Kent CT2 7PE 
Tel: 01227 823375 
Fax: 01227 761187 




Uni\ersity of Kent 
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Appendix 4 Questionnaires 
Part I. Questions to CEO/Presidentl 
(Referring to top management) 
Externally, what kinds of opportunities and challenges does your enterprise 
encounter? 
Internally, what kinds of problems and challenge does your enterprise face? 
(Weaknesses) 
What is the strength of your company in the market? 
As the economic reforms deepened, what is the most influential change the reforms 
have brought into your organisational development? 
What is the history of the establishment and development of your enterprise? 
Strateey (k` I) 
1. What is the long term strategy for organisational development? What is the goal 
for the next 5-year or 10 year? Do you have policy or plan to implement and 
realize these goals? 
2. What is the short term strategy for your operation? What is your priority in 
organisational development? Which embody in divisional operating strategy? For 
example, marketing strategy in market and sales department? Manufacturing 
strategy in production department? 
3. How does your company tackle with the change from external environment? Such 
as institutional change or political change? 
' The questions designed for top management are required to gather answers to all questions listed. 
Whereas the questions designed for middle management are shorted for relevant information in relation 
to the departments in which they operate. 
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4. How is the strategy developed in you company, who is involved and how are 
decisions taken? 
Structure ( .$ 
M4tJ ) 
1. What is the most important department in your company? 
2. How many and what processes are involved for one decision - from original idea to 
implementation? Respectively stated at two levels - top management (e. g. board 
directors) and middle management (e. g. departmental managers) 
3. What is the degree of autonomy at divisional or departmental levels, and how does 
CEO control these subordinates? 
4. How are tasks carried out? Through teamwork or hierarchical commands, or 
otherwise? 
5. Could you describe your organisational structurelchart - functions in each 
department, job specialization and employee organisation; relations and 
coordination between departments. (literal documents are required, such as 
archive and profiling information) 
6. How are budgets appropriated to each department? How do these departments 
meet their targets? Who decides the budget? How is the performance in each 
department measured? 
System (J) 
1. What do you think is the most important system in your organisation? 
2. How does the CEO control the whole company and each department? Particularly 
how is the finance department controlled? 
3. What is the communications processes between departments and subordinates? 
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4. How is the planning system operated in the company? How do managers plan to 
achieve for objectives? 
5. What are the main criteria and principles for employee reward and sanction 
systems? 
6. What are main characteristics of the marketing and production systems? 
7. Is there any innovation in your company? How do you process innovation? And 
how are product portfolios and markets developed? 
8. How is R&D developed, and how much is invested in R&D? How far has it 
contributed to organisational growth? 
Shared value (*TI/14t ) 
1. What are the main management philosophies - for example, employee recognition; 
rewards; and customer relations? 
2. How would you describe your organisational culture - for example, the way you 
and your staff do things in this organisation? 
3. What kind of culture do you desire for your management - for example, 
entrepreneurial, bureaucratic, or innovative, etc.? What makes you feel frustrated? 
4. What kind of cultural conflicts are you experiencing? 
Style (JISAA) 
1, What kind of leadership style you think you engage yourself? 
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2. What kind of approaches do you use to solving conflicts? 
3. What is the work climate like in the organisation? 
4. How far is there a reliance on formal process, such as meetings or paperwork or 
informal face-to-face? 
5. What kind of perception do you have of western management? Do western 
management ideas influence your management style? 
staff (Aji l) 
1. What is the knowledge structure of your key personnel? 
2. What are your recruitment policies in human resource management? (Incl. 
selection criteria, training and mentoring process for new recruits) 
3. Do you have any training policy/program for first-line staff and 
managers/supervisors? If do, what is the training content and frequency? 
4. Do you have a staff development policy - such as job rotation, tenure, promotion 
procedures? 
5. How do you evaluate individual performance and what criteria do you use for 
reward and sanctions? 
6. As it is known, the term of HRM is adopted from western management practices, 
what kind of impact does such adoption place on your HR practices? 
Skill (r8t/A '1W 
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1. What range of expertise do the key personnel possess? 
2. What kind of technology is involved in your management? Including application 
of technology in production and application of information technologies in the 
office. 
3. Which following aspects reflect the competitive advantage of your organisation? 
a) Product (quality & design) 
b) Product branding 
c) Marketing and sales 
d) Financing 
e) R&D (if any) 
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Part II. Questions to Managers 
(Referring to middle management) 
1. As economic reforms deepened, what do you think of their impact? What has been 
the most influential change on your organisation's development? 
2. Externally what kind of opportunities and challenges does your enterprise 
encounter? 
3. Internally what kind of problems and challenge does your enterprise management 
face? (Weaknesses) 
4. What are the strength and weaknesses of your company? And your department? 
5. Does your company have long term strategy/goals for organisational development 
or short term strategy/goals for operations in your departmental planning? If it does, 
what they are? 
6. How is strategy developed in your company? Who is involved and how are 
decisions taken? 
7. How many and what process are involved for one decision - from original idea to 
implementation? Respectively stated at two levels - top management (e. g. board 
directors) and middle management (e. g. departmental managers). 
8. What is the degree of autonomy at divisional and departmental levels, and how 
does the CEO control these? 
9. How are the tasks carried out? Through teamwork or hierarchical command, or 
otherwise? 
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10. How are budgets appropriated to each department? How do departments meet 
their targets? Who decides the budgets? How is the performance in each department 
measured? 
11. What is the organisational structure/chart; functions in each department, job 
specialization and employee organisation; relations and coordination between 
departments. (literal documents are required, such as archive and profiling 
information) 
12. What do you think is the most important operational system in your organisation? 
13. How does the CEO control the whole company and each department? Particularly 
how does he/she control the finance department? 
14. How does communication flow between departments and subordinates? 
15. How is the planning system operated in the company? How do managers plan to 
achieve their objectives? 
16. What are the main criteria and principles for employee reward and sanction 
systems? 
17. What are the main characteristics of the marketing and production systems? 
18. Is there any innovation in your company? How is innovation managed? And how 
are product portfolios and markets developed? 
19. How is R&D developed, and how much is invested in R&D? How far has it 
contributed to organisational growth? 
20. What are the main management philosophies in your company? 
21. What is the organisational culture? What are the values and beliefs? 
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22. What kind of culture do you desire for your management? (E. g. entrepreneurial, 
bureaucratic, or innovative, etc. ) 
23. What makes you feel frustrated? What kind of cultural conflicts are there in this 
business? 
24. What kind of leadership style you perceived in your company? 
25. What kind of approaches do you use to solving conflicts? 
26. What is the work climate like in the organisation? 
27. How far is there a reliance on formal processes, such as meetings or paperwork or 
informal face-to-face? 
28. What kind of perception do you have of western management? Do western 
management ideas influence your management style? 
29. What are the recruitment policies in human resource management? (Incl. selection 
criteria, training and mentoring process for new recruits) 
30. Is there any training policy/program for first-line staff and managers/supervisors? 
If do, what is the training content and frequency? 
31. Is there any staff development policy - such as job rotation, tenure, promotion 
procedures? 
32. How is individual performance evaluated? And what criteria are applied to reward 
and sanctions? 
33. What range of expertise do the key personnel possess? 
331 
34. What kind of technology is involved in your management? Including application 
of technology in production and application of information technologies in the office. 
35. Which following aspects reflect the competitive advantage of your organisation? 
(1) Product (quality & design) 
(2) Product branding 
(3) Marketing and sales 
(4) Financing 
(5) R&D (if any) 
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Appendix 5 List of Interviewees 
Government officials and professionals' 
1, Mr Gao Fujun - Director of Dalian Foreign Trade & Economic Cooperation 
Bureau (DFTECB) 
2. Mr Fan Chenghua - District Director of DFTECB 
3. Mr Ding Lianyu - Section Chief of DFTECB (Foreign Trade Section) 
4. Mr Fu Qingzhong - Secretary Director of Liaoning Province Foreign Trade & 
Economic Cooperation Depart. 
5. Mr Bai Guangwei - Section Chief of Dalian Customs (Goods Administration) 
6. Mr Qin Xiaotang - Director of Administration Council of Economic 
Development Zone of Dalian (ACEDZD) 
7. Mr Yao Qiang - Section Chief of (ACEDZD) (Enterprises Administrative 
Section) 
8. Mr Wang Xingjia - District Director of National Tax Bureau Dalian 
9. Mr Guo Dezhi - District Director of Local Tax Bureau Dalian 
10. Mr Tang - Section Chief of Civil Council of Sheng Yang City (Industry 
Administrative Committee) 
11. Mr Wang Benhai - Lawyer & partner of Chengyu Law Firm 
12. Ms Zhang - Accountant of Jiaxing Accounting Firm 
Can 1. Times Groan (SOE18 interviewees 
13. Mr Li Xiao - GM of Times Group 
14. Mr Qi Zhengming - Secretary of the Communist Party of Times Group (1992- 
2005) 
15. Ms Liang - Secretary of the Communist Party of Times Group (2005-) 
I Government officials were interviewed in an informal, open-ended manner except for Mt Gao Fujun 
who was interviewed in a formal manner. Interviews with government officials was 
for gathering 
information to analyse the business environment by reference to regulations and policies. The 
professionals, such as lawyers and accountants were interviewed for information analysis and 
interpretation. These informants played an important role in accessing and selecting case companies, as 
well as facilitating comprehension and analysis of data collected. 
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16. Mr Jia Zhi - Office Director of Times Group 
17. Mr Liu Qinghai - Director of Strategic Planning Department of Times Group 
18. Mr Ma Yu - Secretary of Board of Directors of Times Group & Manager of 
Exp. & Imp. Department of Times Group 
19. Mr Chen Xuejun - Manager of Service Imp. & Exp. Branch of Times Group 
20. Ms Du Lili - Manager of Facility Management of Times Group Mansion 
Case 2. She®vans Umimt Anno Clothing Co.. Ltd. (COE) 9 interviewees 
21. Mr Liang - GM of Liming Anna Co., Ltd. 
22. Mr Fan - VGM of Liming Anna Co., Ltd. 
23. Mr Tang Shaokui - Manager of Operation Depart. of Liming Anna 
24. Mr Peng Zhenning - Manager of Manufacturing Depart. of Liming Anna 
25. Ms Zhang Lixin - Manager of Personnel Depart. of Liming Anna 
26. Ms Gong - Manager of Marketing Depart. of Liming Anna 
27. Mr Gao - Manager of Technology Depart. of Liming Anna 
Case 3. Dalian Dali Caabmere Product Co.. Ltd. (POE) 7 interviewees 
28. Mr Zhu Li - President & GM of Dali Cashmere Co., Ltd. 
29. Mr Ding Yang - Office Director of Dali Cashmere Co., Ltd. 
30. Mr He - Partner of Dali Cashmere Co., Ltd. 
31. Ms Liang - Director of Finance Depart. of Dali Cashmere Co., Ltd. 
32. Ms Jia - Manager of Marketing & Sales Depart. of Dali Cashmere Co., Ltd. 
33. Ms Xu - VGM of Dali Cashmere Co., Ltd. (Marketing, Sales and 
Manufacturing) 
34. Ms Wang Bin - Accountant of FTZ Enterprise 
Can 4. Dalian Sunfed Fashion Co.. Ltd. of Sanfed Groan USA (FIE)6 
interviewees 
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35. Mr Charles Lee - President & CEO of Dalian Sunfed Fashion Co., Ltd. 
(Sunfed Group USA) 
36. Ms Zhou Yan - GM of Sunfed Fashion Co., Ltd. 
37. Ms Zhou Hong - VGM & Chief Designer of Sunfed Fashion Co., Ltd. 
38. Mr Liu Ming - Manager of HR Depart. of Sunfed 
39. Mr Larry Chen - 
Manager of Marketing & Sales Depart. of Sunfed 
40. Mr Hong Fei - Manager of Technology Depart. of Sunfed 
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Appendix 6 Photographs of Case Studies 
Case (1) Liaoning Times Group Plc. 
1. Head-Office in Dalian 
2. Staffs working at the office of Dalian 
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4. Times Shihe Garments Manufactory 
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5. Times Ya Du Hotel - diversified investment 
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6. Large-scale production line, top-of-the-line equipment 
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Staff at Garment factory 
Inspecting raw materials before production 
Checking for any stitching irregularities and loose threads 
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7. R&D: Computer-assisted design room 
Staff designing samples for customers 
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I -. T , Night wear and beddings 
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Shoes, Caps & Sports Wear 
Fabrics and accessories 
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Appendix 6 Photographs of Case Studies 
Case (2) Liming Anna Fashion Co., Ltd. 
71 /I 
3. Liming Anna Factory 
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4. Retail Store 
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Appendix 6 Photographs of Case Studies 
Case (3) Dali Cashmere Co., Ltd. 
2. Dali's factory building 
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3. Mottos on walls 
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1. Mr Zhu Li in his office 
-I \CLIICncC is created from bit by bit' 
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The concept dcterminr., the \\a ý -lopment and the calibre of people 
determines the quality of product' 
ti 
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`The concept creates fortune, the wise sails the boat with the help of the current. ' 
, ý. - _'ý _. _ .. __ 
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äl1 A41ff5" zl aA1"ra *iI 
Please NNatch your thinking, it vvill influence your behaviour. 
Please watch your behaviour, it will influence your habit, 
Please watch your habit, it will influence your character, 
Please watch your character, it will influence your fate. ' 
' `ra=se 
lamily' a big Chinese character hanging on the wall in Mr Zhu's office, which 
demonstrates he runs the company as a big family. 
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4. Rewards and honour of [)ali Cashmere: 
Honour I 'Faithful Enterprise on contract -abiding and credibility' issued by 
Dalian City Commercial and Industrial Administration Bureau. 
Honour 2 `LiaoNanWang Cashmere - 2002 the Favourite Brand in Dalian', issued 
by Dalian People's Government. 
Honour 3 `LiaoNanWang Cashmere - 2003 the Favourite Brand in Dalian', issued 
by Dalian People's Government. 
1ionuur 4 i_i: m,, anWang- the Famous Brand in Liaoning Province' issued by 
Dalian City Commercial and Industrial Administration Bureau. 
Honour 5 `The satisfactory enterprise of the customer' 2004, issued by Dalian, 
Shahekou District Consumer Association. 




6. Show room of LiaoNanWang cashmere inside Dali's building 
LiaoNanW cashmere product 
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Appendix 6 Photographs of Case Studies 
Case (4) Sunfed USA, Dalian Sunfed Fashion Co., Ltd. 
1. General Manager of Sunfed 
3. Designer of Sunfed 
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3. Retail store 
4. Products 
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